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This dissertation analyses how the hegemony of Hindu nationalism has structured the narratives of 
Hindu Partition survivors and recruited them in service of a putative Hindu nation. Using an 
interpretive approach, this dissertation analyses politics as culture. It is based on fourteen months of 
ethnographic fieldwork with Partition survivors from west Punjab and the North-West Frontier 
Province, in Delhi and its surroundings.  
As a memory of the demarcation of political boundaries and religious topographies, the memory of 
the Partition is intrinsically spatial. This spatial quality is best embodied in the individual memory 
practices of some informants who spontaneously drew maps of their childhood homes and cities while 
remembering the Partition. Using Michel de Certeau’s (1984) phenomenological theorisation of space, 
this dissertation treats these memory maps as ‘speech acts’ that represent a memorialisation of space 
and a spatialization of memory.   
This chiasmic formulation foregrounds a number of symbolic patterns that occupy this dissertation 
such as violence, victimhood and theodicy. Partition survivors remember the Partition through a 
discourse of sacrifice and martyrdom. This discourse constitutes a form of theodicy that aims to 
rationalise the ‘uselessness’ out of their suffering by remembering their displacement and the death 
of their kith and kin as a ‘sacrifice’ to the (Hindu) nation.  
At the heart of this discourse lies a sense of historical victimhood that is motivated by the Hindu Right’s 
perspective of Indian history. This victimhood is then used to justify the contemporary violence of 
Hindu nationalism as self-defence; as the ‘reaction’ to an ‘action’. This perceived victimhood is 
motivated by a ressentiment – hatred with a moral content – that re-brands its violence as ‘justice’. 
Victimhood (and the ressentiment it produces) plays an instrumental role in global majoritarian 
mobilisations.  
In this way, by establishing the centrality of the memory of the Partition to the discourses of Hindutva, 
the dissertation questions the efficacy of oral history in such a context where memory is actively 
weaponised against the ‘other’. Ultimately, this dissertation asks what it means to remember the 





Adivasi: A term used to refer to the indigenous or ‘tribal’ people of South Asia. 
Article 35A: A former Article of the Indian constitution that conferred on the state legislature of 
Jammu and Kashmir the power to define its ‘permanent residents’ and, to grant them special rights 
and privileges. This Article was abrogated through the passage of The Jammu and Kashmir 
Reorganisation Act, 2019.  
Article 370: A former Article of the Indian constitution which gave special status to the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir. This Article was abrogated through the passage of The Jammu and Kashmir 
Reorganisation Act, 2019. 
Arya Samaj: A Hindu nationalist cultural organisation that began as a monotheistic reformist 
movement within Hinduism. It was founded in 1875 by Dayananda Saraswati. The Arya Samaj strictly 
prohibits idol worship and believes in the idea of one creator God called ‘Om’. Arya Samaj also believes 
the Vedas (a collection of ancient Sanskrit texts said to be the product of an ancient oral tradition) to 
be the ultimate source of knowledge. The Arya Samaj was also the first to introduce conversion into 
Hinduism as it aimed to consolidate the Hindu-fold by converting Hindus ‘back’ from other religions 
(van der Veer, 1994). Historically the Arya Samaj has also supported cow protectionism and has close 
ideological links to the RSS and BJP (ibid.; Gundimeda and Ashwin, 2018). In this way the organisation 
has played a critical cultural role in the creation of a Hindu nationalist consciousness (ibid.).  
Batwara: The word translates to ‘division’ and is one of the many colloquial terms used to refer to the 
Partition. Also see Gadar, Kabadla and Vibhajan.  
Bhagwat Gita: A 700 verse Hindu scripture that emerges from the epic Mahabharata. The Bhagwat 
Gita constitutes an important treatise on ethics. In mythology, the Bhagwat Gita is said to have been 
dictated by the Lord Krishna to the Pandava Prince Arjun prior to the start of the Mahabharata war. 
The title of the book is sometimes also transliterated as Bhagavad Gita. Also see Ramayana and 
Mahabharata.  
BJP: An acronym for the Bhartiya Janata Party or ‘National People’s Party’. The party was founded on 
April 6, 1980 by LK Advani and Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The BJP is India’s foremost Hindu nationalist 
political party and has been in power since 2014. The BJP along with the RSS and VHP comprises an 
important part of what is commonly referred to as the ‘Sangh Parivar’.  
Boli: Language or dialect 
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CAA: An acronym commonly used to refer to the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019. Passed in 
December 2019, this controversial amendment to India’s citizenship laws provides Hindu, Buddhist, 
Sikh, Parsi, Jain and Christian minorities residing in the neighbouring states of Afghanistan, Bangladesh 
and Pakistan, Indian citizenship through naturalization provided they entered the country before 
December 31, 2014.  
Chacha: Father’s brother 
Chachi: Wife of father’s brother 
Chaupar: A traditional Indian board game where the playing board is laid out in the shape of a square 
cross.  
Chowk: A traffic circle or roundabout. 
Dada: Paternal grandfather 
Dadi: Paternal grandmother 
Dalit: The word Dalit means ‘broken’ or ‘oppressed’. It is a word that has been appropriated by lower-
caste Hindus – castes that are considered as ‘untouchable’ – as a powerful label of self-identification. 
Dalits are also alternatively referred to as Scheduled Castes, ‘untouchables’ or Harijan (men of god). 
Also see Scheduled Caste. 
Dera: Settlement or colony. 
Gadar: Chaos or anarchy. It is one of many colloquial words used to refer to the Partition. Also see 
Batwara, Kabadla and Vibhajan.  
Hakim: In South Asia, this term denotes a doctor or traditional herbal healer who follows the Unani 
or Yunani school of medicine. Unani medicine is a pseudoscientific practice in the Perso-Arabic 
tradition. It was the predominant school of medicine in South and Central Asia during the time of the 
Mughal Empire. 
Hindutva: Coined by Hindu nationalist ideologue V.D. Savarkar, the term ‘Hindutva’ means Hindu-
ness. Predictably, the politics of Hindutva comprises a Hindu supremacist nationalist ideology. In Hindi, 
Hindu nationalism is called Hindutva. This dissertation often uses these terms interchangeably.   
Jauhar: A South Asian, Hindu practice of collective self-immolation of women – often assisted or 
coerced by male relatives – to avoid ‘defilement’ when facing certain defeat and capture in war. 
‘Martyrdom’ by ‘suicide’ was seen as an ‘honourable’ death; one that also precluded the possibility of 
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enslavement, sexual assault, forced marriage or any other form of humiliation at the hands of the 
enemy. Also see sati. 
Kabadla: The word means ‘exchange’ and is used by Partition survivors to refer to the transfer of 
population.  
Kara: A simple metal bracelet worn by most Sikhs. It is a sacred symbol and a sign of one’s religiosity. 
Mahabharata: Along with the Ramayana, the Mahabharata constitutes the core of popular Hindu 
mythology. An epic poem, the Mahabharata tells the story of a cataclysmic war between the 
mythological Pandava and Kaurava dynasties. Like the Ramayana, the Mahabharata constitutes an 
important treatise on culture, politics, statecraft and ethics. The Bhagawat Gita is a part of the 
Mahabharata.   
Massi: Mother’s sister 
Mleccha: The word means ‘foreign’ or ‘impure’ and is specifically used by Hindus as a racial slur against 
Muslims. 
Muhajir: The term used in Pakistan to describe Muslims who migrated from India during the Partition. 
The word has religious connotations as the Muhajirun are said to have been the first converts to Islam 
and emigrated with Prophet Mohammed from Mecca to Medina during the Hijra.  
Nana: Maternal grandfather 
Nani: Maternal grandmother 
Nazm: A genre of Urdu poetry that is often written in a rhyming verse. Comparable to a sonnet. 
NPR: An acronym that stands for ‘National Population Register’. It is a census-like list of all individuals 
residing within the Indian state. This is the first step for the compilation of the proposed all-India NRC. 
NRC: An acronym that stands for ‘National Register of Citizens’. The National Register of Citizens uses 
the data of the NPR to compile a definitive list of Indian citizens. The process requires ‘genuine’ citizens 
to submit legal proof of their Indian citizenship through either ‘proper’ descent or naturalisation. 
While an acrimonious NRC drive is currently unfolding in the Indian state of Assam, a pan-India NRC 
has also been proposed by the BJP in order to identify and detain ‘illegal immigrants’.   
OBC: An acronym that stands for ‘Other Backward Castes’. This is the legal term used by the 
Government of India to identify a number of socially and economically disadvantaged castes. This 
should not to be confused with Scheduled Caste.  
8 
 
Punjabiyat: A famed nomic idea of the inherent warmth, hospitality and friendliness of Punjabi people.  
Purusharth: An important concept within Hindu philosophy that defines the ethics and morals of hard 
work. As a philosophy that emphasises the benefits that accrue from diligent and sincere work, it is 
closely related to the idea of karma.  
Ramayana: This along with the Mahabharata comprises the core of popular Hindu mythology. The 
Ramayana narrates the life of Lord Ram; a major deity within the Hindu religion and the politics of 
Hindu nationalism. Like the Mahabharata, the Ramayana constitutes an important treatise on culture, 
politics, statecraft and ethics. There are numerous versions of the Ramayana written in a variety of 
South Asian and South-East Asian languages. 
RSS: An acronym that stands for the, ‘Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’ or ‘National Volunteers 
Organisation’. The RSS is a paramilitary Hindu nationalist organisation that aspires to an ethnically 
pure Hindu nation-state. The organisation is inspired by and closely resembles inter-war European 
fascist organisations such as the Hitler Youth. It was founded on September 27, 1925 by K.B. 
Hedgewar. The RSS is the forebear and titular leader of the Sangh Parivar.  
Sangh Parivar: A ‘parivar’ or ‘family’ of Hindu nationalist organisations. This ‘family’ of organisations 
gets its name from the ‘Sangh’ (organisation) in the name of the RSS. The Sangh Parivar includes Hindu 
nationalist political parties such as the BJP, ‘cultural organisations’ such as the VHP, Bajrang Dal and 
RSS, and student-organisations such as ABVP (Akhil Bharitya Vidhyarthi Parishad or All India Student 
Council). 
Sati: The now outlawed Hindu ritual of burning alive a widow on her husband’s funeral pyre. 
Scheduled Caste: Often abbreviated as SC, Scheduled Caste is the legal term that the Government of 
India uses for Dalit or ‘untouchable’ castes granting them access to affirmative action policies.  
Scheduled Tribe: This is the term used by the Government of India for legally recognised and protected 
indigenous communities. Also see Adivasi.    
Tandoor: A traditional South Asian clay oven.  
The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019: Signed into law on August 9, 2019, this 
constitutional amendment changes the constitutional status of the erstwhile state of Jammu and 
Kashmir. It abrogates the special status and powers conferred on the state under Articles 35A and 370 
whilst also bifurcating the former state into the twin union territories of Jammu and Kashmir, and 
Ladakh.     
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Urs: Urs is a festival that marks the death anniversary of a Sufi saint in South Asia. These spiritual 
celebrations are attended by Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs.  
Varnashramadharma: Varnashramadharma is the system of Brahmanical order that connects a Hindu 
person’s caste (varna) to the duties and responsibilities (shrama and dharma) they must fulfil in life 
(Singh, B, 2020). It promises a theodicical justification for the caste system. 
VHP: An acronym that stands for Vishwa Hindu Parishad (Universal or World Hindu Council). It was 
founded in 1964 by M. S. Golwalkar, S. S. Apte and Swami Chinmayanand. The VHP constitutes an 
important part of Sangh Parivar. The VHP positions itself as a movement that seeks to consolidate 
Hindu spiritual and religious discourse within a common platform. Transnationalism constitutes an 
important part of the VHP’s cultural and political activities as it seeks to unite a single global Hindu-
fold (van der Veer, 1994). However, despite the cultural and spiritual veneer of the organisation, its 
involvement in pogroms and violence against minorities is well documented (ibid.; Mathur, 2014). 
Vibhajan: In Hindi, vibhajan means ‘division’. It is another one of the many colloquial terms used to 
refer to the Partition. Also see Batwara, Gadar and Kabadla. 
Watan: In Hindi/Urdu, depending on the context watan can mean either ‘nation’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘country’ 
or one’s ‘birthplace’.  
Zamindar: A land owner or landlord, specifically one who leases their land to tenant cultivators. The 
term implies wealth as well as caste and class privilege. 
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Prologue: The Linguistic Setting 
 
This dissertation is an ethnography of the memory of the Partition; of the afterlife of an historical 
rupture. It is the product of 14 months of intensive fieldwork in Delhi and its surrounding areas, where 
I located and worked with over 50 first-hand survivors of the 1947 Partition of India. For the most part 
my fieldwork involved drinking copious amounts of tea with my informants as we discussed politics, 
history and their quotidian life and thoughts. As a project that combines oral history with participant 
observation, this dissertation relies heavily on the recording, transcription, interpretation and 
translation of the words of my informants. It is for this reason that detailing the ethnic and linguistic 
setting of my research gains added relevance.  
Being a third-generation Partition migrant, my connection to the Partition is deeply intimate. The 
imprint of this personal connection is visible throughout my research, shaping my search for 
informants as well as my engagement with theory. Due to the snowballing nature of my search for 
informants – that branched out into the kith and kin networks of my family’s elders – all of my 
informants hail from the Derajat region and the North-West Frontier Province. Thus, the stories I have 
documented here tell the story of the Partition as it unfolded in this north-western region of Pakistan.  
Derajat is the plural of the Urdu word dera, meaning ‘base’ or ‘settlement’. The Derajat region is 
located in the area where the Pakistani provinces of Punjab, Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa 
(formerly North-West Frontier Province) meet. The Derajat region is identified as a culturally distinct 
region, partly due to the fact that it is home to the Saraiki language. The historical districts of Dera 
Ghazi Khan, Dera Ismail Khan, Quetta, Mianwali and Multan, are most closely associated with the 
Derajat region and the Saraiki language (Hashmi and Majeed, 2014). However, as my informants 
continuously reminded me, Saraiki is something of an umbrella term for the closely related dialects of 
Derawali, Mianwali-boli (or Mianwali-dialect) and Multani. These dialects also bear a close 
resemblance to Punjabi. After all the Derajat region is situated in the north-western backwaters of 
Punjab. Today, Saraiki is the major language of this region (in Pakistan) and is spoken by approximately 
25 to 40 million people (ibid.). 
North-west of the Derajat region, in the North-West Frontier Province, the main languages spoken 
were Pashto, Persian and Urdu. My informants from Bannu and other remote parts of this province 
saw themselves as neither Saraiki nor Punjabi, but as Pashtuns and/or Pathans. As my key informant 
Pooran Chand told me, in the years immediately following the Partition, the Frontier refugees asserted 
their ethnic identity partly through their refusal to marry into Punjabi families.  
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However, much has changed in the post-independence, post-Partition context. Although remembered 
by the survivors of the Partition and some of their children, these regional identities have been 
subsumed within a larger Punjabi and Indian cultural identity. The grandchildren of Partition survivors, 
that is, the people of my generation, identify as Punjabi or Delhiites or whatever other local Indian 
identity they consider relevant. None of the people of my generation speak Saraiki or any of its 
dialects. Among the families of my informants, Hindi appeared to have replaced these dialects as the 
mother tongue. This is in contrast to Pakistan where Saraiki has emerged as a slow-burning ethnic 
question of sorts, complete with the demand for a Saraiki province (Butt and Ahmed, 2016).  
The only settings where I observed an explicit emphasis on these (legacy) regional identities was in 
the activities of the organisations formed by Partition refugees, namely the All India Mianwali District 
Association and the All India Derawal Sahayak Sabha (‘Volunteer Assembly’). These volunteer-based 
organisations were founded by Mianwali and Derawal Partition refugees in the 1950s with the explicit 
purpose of resettling their respective communities. However, by 2017 these organisations had 
become a mere shadow of their former selves. Almost all of their active members were aged 60 and 
above, with little to no involvement of young and middle-aged people. Although these organisations 
still organised annual meet-ups for their members, the general tone of these events can be best 
described by what Michael Herzfeld (2005) has elsewhere referred to as a nostalgia for real 
community. Nevertheless, these organisations and their events were instrumental in my search for 
informants.  
As a result of these transformations in culture and identity over the last 70 years since the Partition, 
my interviews and fieldwork interactions were almost entirely conducted in Hindi. Although I have a 
loose grasp of the Saraiki dialects and Punjabi, Hindi was the language in which I (and my informants) 
felt most comfortable conversing. However, given the diversity of the linguistic context of my 
research, other languages too often made an appearance in the speech of my informants. At times, 
either for dramatic effect or subconsciously, my informants spoke the occasional sentence or phrase 
in English, Urdu, Saraiki or Punjabi. Notwithstanding such instances, Hindi was predominantly the 
language in which my fieldwork was conducted.   
Having been fluently bilingual in Hindi and English from an early age, I was able to transcribe and 
translate my informants’ words with ease. My larger concern around translation in this context was 
not regarding my ability to convert words from one language into another, but, to preserve the 
literariness, emotions and intended meaning of my informants’ speech. Therefore, the challenge of 
translation lay in confronting translation as an added layer of interpretation.  
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I have endeavoured to preserve the emic vocabulary of my informants as far as possible. Readers will 
observe numerous instances in this dissertation where I have preserved the Hindi/Punjabi/Urdu words 
of my informants and explained their meanings in accompanying footnotes and square brackets. I 
have done this for words and phrases that either do not have a direct English translation and/or for 
particularly stirring words and phrases that convey something of the literariness or emotive context 
of my informants’ speech.  
Paying attention to the literariness of my informants’ speech has also informed my engagement with 
theory. This is most visible in Chapter 2 where my analysis of the theodicical discourse of sacrifice 
partly hinges on the deconstruction of the gendered connotations of my informants’ use of the word 
‘purusharth’. The translation and interpretation of this word, in particular, is part of a larger dialogue 
with my informants and their memories of the Partition.  
In my transliterations of these vernacular words and phrases I have strived for phonetic accuracy. 
Dispensing with the use of diacritics, I have written these words phonetically using the Roman 
alphabet. There is nothing novel or controversial about this. Almost every English-speaking Indian 
netizen would have encountered such transliterations in the form of mass-forwarded vernacular 
jokes. Wherever I was in doubt regarding the ‘correct’ transliteration of a word, I merely turned to the 
vast literature on South Asia for guidance. In this way, my transliteration of vernacular words follows 
colloquial linguistic practices and former scholarly transliterations. Occasionally, I also sought my 
mother and my grandaunt Anjali’s advice on the translation and transliteration of particular words.   
Ultimately, by preserving some of the literariness of the speech of my informants’, I have tried to 
convey the individualised and personalised tone of these narratives of the Partition. There is no master 
narrative of the Partition. What one finds instead is a constellation of independent voices that 
contextualise, organise, localise and mobilise their memory in relation to certain common frames of 
reference whilst remembering their past life and experiences. As an ethnography of the last 
generation of Partition survivors, I consider the documentation of this polyphonous voicing an 
important scholarly objective. Although I could not possibly accommodate the voices of all of my 
informants within this dissertation, I hope that my work will sustain our ongoing dialogue with the 




Introduction: Death and the Problem of Theodicy 
 
‘Death exists, not as the opposite but as a part of life. It's a cliché translated into words, but at the time I felt it 
not as words but as that knot of air inside me. Death exists - in a paperweight, in four red and white balls on a 
pool table - and we go on living and breathing it into our lungs like fine dust.  
[…]  
By living our lives, we nurture death. True as this might be, it was only one of the truths we had to learn. What I 
learned from Naoko's death was this: no truth can cure the sadness we feel from losing a loved one. No truth, 
no sincerity, no strength, no kindness, can cure that sorrow. All we can do is see that sadness through to the 
end and learn something from it, but what we learn will be no help in facing the next sadness that comes to us 
without warning.’ 
Haruki Murakami (2001: 31, 327) 
 
This dissertation is primarily about death and suffering. This dissertation is an ethnography of the 
memory of the 1947 Partition of India and how its survivors make sense of death and suffering in this 
context, decades after the fact. Although I worked with close to 50 informants while compiling this 
dissertation, there was one person whose death was instrumental in the conceptualisation of this 
overarching theme: my grandaunt Sneh. 
My grandaunt Sneh died on the night of June 7, 2018. Her death came as a complete shock. Earlier 
that night, we had spoken on the phone and made plans for the following day. But it was not to be. 
She had a heart attack later that night and by the time her children drove her to the hospital, it was 
already too late. It was all over in a little less than an hour.   
Through the course of my fieldwork, she and I had become quite close. She was the last surviving 
sibling of my late maternal grandmother. But growing up, I had not had the chance to spend much 
time with her. That year that I spent living in Delhi, she affectionately imposed a grandmotherly 
relationship on me. She would call me frequently to check up on me and would get annoyed if we 
went a week without talking on the phone. It was almost always my fault!  
Sneh, or Nani Massi as I used to call her, was born in 1946 in Rajanpur, district Dera Ghazi Khan (now 
in Punjab, Pakistan). She was only an infant during the Partition. The youngest of four siblings (by quite 
a distance), she was relatively shielded from the chaos of the time. She remembered growing up in 
Kingsway Camp (Delhi) and later in the resettlement colony of Palwal; a satellite town 60 kilometres 
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from the national capital, Delhi. Her father – my great-grandfather – Chaudhry Pooran Chand1 was a 
renowned lawyer of his time. He was even appointed the Resettlement Commissioner of this area. Till 
as late as 2018, a certain generation of people in Palwal still remembered how he had spearheaded 
the resettlement process in this area. As his last surviving child, Nani Massi quietly embodied his 
legacy.  
In her youth, she had been something of a rebel. In contrast to the sheltered upbringing my 
grandmother had received, Nani Massi had enjoyed a degree of freedom and independence that was 
quite unusual in the context of its time. She was 11 years younger than my grandmother. This meant 
that Nani Massi was in school when my grandmother got married. Although only a teenager at the 
time, she would travel alone on public transport, from Palwal to Delhi, to visit them. As she described 
it, she had been fairly ‘chust’ (street-smart) all through her life. Even after marriage, she often made 
her way on her own, sometimes even with a child or two on her hip. She also remembered the times 
when she and her husband had undertaken entire road-trips on their motorcycle, often with their 
children balanced finely between them. She loved remembering the spontaneity and free-spiritedness 
of her younger days.    
Ultimately, it was her failing health that changed everything. The last ten years of her life were marked 
by a steady decline in her health. The slide had begun soon after my grandmother’s passing, in 2006 
and intensified after her husband’s death in 2010. By 2017, her health was dire. Her stomach and face 
had swollen up alarmingly. She could barely walk now. And even with a stick for support, just hobbling 
around her home left her breathless. While she was still quite sharp, her near-complete bed-rest had 
impacted her mental health.  
Yet, she did not let her failing health stop her from becoming a part of my fieldwork. She used her vast 
network of friends and family to find me a number of informants. And, whenever she found me an 
informant, she insisted on accompanying me to their house. So, as I made numerous trips to Delhi and 
Palwal, she came with me. She would not have it any other way.  
Those long drives are some of the fondest memories I have of her. Away from the rest of the family, 
she spoke her mind. Unfiltered. Nani Massi and I rarely saw eye-to-eye on anything but it was through 
these conversations that we truly bonded. She told me about her quarrels with her children and we 
gossiped ad infinitum about the petty politics of her household. She also shared her memories of my 
grandparents and of my mother’s childhood. It was in one of those conversations that she told me 
                                                            
1 As a mark of respect, I bequeathed his name, as a pseudonym, to an informant who was like a grandfather to 
me, during my fieldwork.  
15 
 
that she saw a lot of my mother in me; that like her, I am self-reliant and independent. This was 
important to her.  
Another time, she shared one of her best kept secrets, that she had a fondness for drink. She told me 
that often after she and uncle (her husband) had put the kids to bed, they would have a glass of scotch 
together. She had never touched alcohol outside the home or in anyone else’s presence. Her 
‘transgressions’ had remained safely ensconced within the four walls of her household. She still had a 
half-bottle of scotch hidden safely in her TV cabinet. After we got home that day, we had half a peg 
together, for old time’s sake.  
Looking back, I feel these trips were like the second coming of her younger days. They gave her an 
excuse to get out of the house and back on the road. They were a partial return to the restless rhythms 
of her youth. They gave her an excuse to rekindle old friendships and acquaintances; to meet people 
one last time. A final hurrah! 
During my fieldwork in Faridabad I fell into a routine where, after having spent an evening talking to 
a group of informants in Rose Garden, I would drop by her house for a chat. Her house was just a five 
minute drive from the park. True to form, she always had a box of sweets and lemonade ready for me. 
We’d sit together, have a chat and I’d make fun of whatever melodramatic soap opera she happened 
to be watching at the time. For her part, she would tease me about my receding hairline and warn me 
that no one would want to marry a bald man like me. Sometimes she’d call on me for lifts to the 
market. But for the most part, we would just sit together, catch up – gossip even – and then I’d return 
to my aunt and uncle’s house just in time for dinner.  
Her sudden death was a profoundly dislocating experience. Where, in life, she had had a great impact 
on my fieldwork, in death, she came to fundamentally structure my engagement with theory. On a 
basic level, her death reminded me of the fragility of life, especially that of my informants, the elderly; 
the last generation of Partition survivors. But on a deeper level, her death marked the beginning of 
my serious engagement with the philosophy of death and suffering: theodicy.  
It was during her funerary rituals that I first observed theodicy at work. Everyone in my family had 
their own story about her death. Some of my relatives framed her death as the result of long-time 
neglect. Her strained relations with her children, especially one of her sons, was common knowledge. 
She had also spent her last years visibly struggling with her health while no one appeared to have 
offered any substantial help. To them, her death was symbolic of a larger societal problem: the general 
neglect and mistreatment of the elderly. Others found comfort in the fact that she had not suffered; 
that her death had been swift and thereby relatively painless. Emphasising the alleged painlessness of 
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her death – its lack of suffering – they contrasted her death with those of other relatives who had not 
been so ‘fortunate’. And some others, focused on the large number of mourners who had attended 
her chautha2. They found comfort in the way that this reinforced a sense of community; that not only 
was she loved and respected by the community but also, that the community had turned out to pay 
their final respects. Through the recursive retelling of these stories in shared settings, they combined 
to create a narrative that sought to reconcile the life she had lived with the death she had suffered. 
On a deeper level, these narratives grappled with the overwhelming force of two related questions: 
‘why/how had she died?’ and ‘why do bad things happen to good people?’  
This essentially is the problem of theodicy: the attempt to reconcile death and suffering with belief in 
a meaningful cosmos (a nomos: the order of things). Traditionally, theodicy comprised a body of 
knowledge that asked how evil can exist despite a truly universal, benevolent deity (Herzfeld, 1992). 
Peter Berger et al. (1974: 166) define theodicy as, ‘any explanation of human events that bestows 
meaning upon the experiences of suffering and evil.’ The term ‘theodicy’ was developed by Leibnez in 
his attempts to reconcile suffering, misfortune and death with belief in a just and benevolent deity 
(Simko, 2012). Max Weber (1965) built on Leibnez’s work to use the term in a sociological sense to, 
‘describe interpretive vocabularies, religious or secular, that explain evil and suffering’ (Simko, 2012: 
881).  
Weber (1965) understood theodicy as a way of reifying belief despite one’s lived experience of a 
flawed world. Iain Wilkinson (2013: 129) writes that Weber posited that, ‘the social character of entire 
societies may be conditioned by repeated attempts to come to terms with “the experience of the 
irrationality of the world” as encountered in acute instances of human suffering.’ Building on Weber’s 
largely religion-focussed work on theodicy, Michael Herzfeld (1992) argues that the goal of secular 
theodicy is somewhat more pragmatic. For Herzfeld (ibid.: 7), secular theodicy, ‘provides people with 
social means of coping with disappointment.’  
According to Peter Berger (1967), every nomos implies theodicy. The term nomos refers to the order 
of things (ibid.). In the context of religion, nomos is a ‘sacred canopy’ that provides a sense of what a 
meaningful existence is; what life on Earth is all about (ibid.). We may consider belief in god (or any 
other such transcendent benevolent deities) as an example of a nomos. Nomos embodies the sense 
in which we live in a meaningful universe; one that provides a sense of purpose to our lives. The nomos 
makes sense of the world, or rather, is the way in which the world makes sense and is sensed. That is, 
                                                            
2 In Hinduism, the fourth day following a person’s death is the main funerary event. Here, a large number of 
mourners are invited to attend and pay their respects to an urn filled with the ashes of the deceased.  
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the ‘nomos’ in Berger’s terms is comparable to the ‘episteme’ (Foucault, 2002), or ‘paradigm’ (Kuhn, 
1996). 
However, nomos is not inherent in nature. It is an order or meaning that is imposed upon reality by 
human beings. Because the nomos is a human imposition, it inevitably fails. Certain events possess 
the potential to fracture the nomos. Events that defy the meaningful order assumed by the nomos – 
such as random, chaotic and asymmetrical experiences of death, suffering and misfortune – possess 
the potential to expose the nomos for what it is: an imagined reality.  
Berger (1967: 53) understands theodicy as an institutionalised activity that protects the established 
nomos from, ‘recurrent intrusion into individual and collective experience of the anomic (or, if one 
prefers, denomizing) phenomenon of suffering, evil and, above all, death.’ Everyday phrases such as, 
‘Nothing can happen without God's permission,’ and ‘It is the will of God,’ represent basic theodicies 
that attempt to explain the randomness of death, suffering and misfortune, by reference to a 
transcendental deity (ibid.). In doing so, such theodicies attempt to rationalise the unequal 
distribution of suffering within the order of the nomos (ibid.). Yet, where the understanding of 
suffering as god’s will represents a fatalistic acceptance of it, the modern approach to suffering is one 
that aims to minimise it (Wilkinson, 2013). Wilkinson (ibid.) argues that this rejection of fatalism is 
visible in the philosophical tendency to characterise the violent atrocities and mass human suffering 
(that includes wars, genocides, poverty, droughts, famines and pandemics) of the last hundred years 
as one of ‘useless suffering’ (Levinas, 1988). Where the uselessness of suffering implies the collapse 
of the meaningfulness of the cosmos – the fracturing of a nomos – theodicy attempts to rationalise 
suffering within interpretive frameworks to transcend the uselessness (or futility) of one’s suffering.  
I have mentioned the term ‘transcendence’ a few times in the preceding paragraphs and now wish to 
clarify both the meaning of the term and its relation to theodicy. Drawing on a Weberian (1965, 2013) 
understanding of theodicy, Herzfeld (1992) establishes the link between the need for theodicy and 
the idea of transcendence. This is the idea that, ‘a moral principle, or a deity, could transcend the 
specifics of time and place’ (ibid.: 6). The issue of transcendence lies at the heart of the problem of 
theodicy. As Weber frames it:  
‘the more the development [of religion] tends toward the conception of a transcendental 
unitary god who is universal, the more there arises the problem of how the extraordinary 
power of such a god may be reconciled with the imperfection of the world that he has created 
and rules over.’  
(Weber, 1965: 138-9) 
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Theodicies that explain suffering by reference to the unknowable will of god or the balancing of an 
invisible karmic account, use transcendence to answer the question of theodicy. In Christianity, this 
takes the form of salvation (Herzfeld, 1992).  
The theodicies posited by my relatives were everyday theodicies that attempted to balance Nani 
Massi’s suffering and misfortune against her ‘fortunately painless’ death. Stories allegedly evidencing 
her children’s neglect of her were often followed by comments such as, ‘May God never show such 
days [or this fate] to anyone.’ Against this the fact that her death had been relatively quick and painless 
was seen as something of a heavenly reward. Death is inevitable but a painful death (‘suffering’) is 
not. While her death itself remained a singular misfortune, the manner of her dying was seen as a 
blessing of sorts. On more than one occasion, Poonam, my eldest aunt, said this is how she wished to 
die; that is, either through something ‘major’ and ‘quick’ or painlessly, in her sleep. In this way, by 
balancing the misfortune of her last years against the ‘fortune’ of her sudden death, my relatives 
retrospectively resolved Nani Massi’s karmic account.  
This task of resolution was given increased urgency by the fact that her children’s neglect of her health 
was seen as the primary cause for her untimely demise. By emphasising the painlessness of her death, 
as well as the fact that all of her funerary rituals had been well attended, they sought to rescue her 
from a ‘bad’, ‘asocial’ death3. Shoring up a sense of community also helped preserve belief in the 
inherent goodness of humanity; a nomos. Adding impetus to this task was also an implicit sense of 
their own guilt. After all, the very people who accused her children of neglect in private, had rarely 
ever visited her themselves. 
I watched this recursive and reflexive mobilisation of memory for the task of theodicy from a sceptical 
distance. But, in the midst of grieving my grandaunt, I found that I too had begun to subscribe to a 
form of theodicy. In the weeks and months that immediately followed her death, I found myself 
repeatedly thinking about her. Unbidden, random snippets of conversations from the past, memories 
and conversations I had never considered particularly significant became meaningful as I struggled to 
frame her death against a larger philosophy of a meaningful existence. The theodicy to which I was 
adhering was fatalistically stoic; acknowledging the inherent meaninglessness of life, death and 
suffering. And, in support of this, I found myself repetitively recalling memories that confirmed Nani 
Massi’s own acceptance of the inevitability of death. On more than one occasion, she had told me 
how she felt she had nothing left to live for. And, on all of those occasions I had tried my best to remind 
                                                            
3 My use of these terms deliberately invokes Nadia Seremetakis’ (1991) ethnographic work on mourning rituals 
in Inner Mani, Greece. Seremetakis (ibid.) describes a ‘good’ death as one that involves a public and vocal 
display of mourning. By contrast, a ‘bad’ death is an ‘asocial’ death; one signified by the absence of mourners 
and mourning. In Section 2.4, I use this idea of a ‘bad’ death in relation to the Partition of India. 
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her of the many events she could hope to look forward to: weddings, great-grandchildren, and even 
my graduation. ‘You have to live long enough to call me Dr Kohli,’ I had told her on more than one 
occasion. But death is a funny thing. The very fatalism that had disturbed me at the time, became a 
comfort in her death. She was at peace now, I reminded myself whilst gently cautioning myself against 
probing that train of thought any further.  
It was this intimate experience of death that brought my attention to the problem of theodicy in the 
context of the Partition. As South Asia moves towards a time when the Partition passes from a living 
memory to an archived history, the ensuing transition has given way to a boom of Partition oral 
history. Starting from 1998, the last 23 years have seen the growth of a wave of oral historical work 
on the Partition; one that has included the establishment of online oral history archives such as The 
1947 Partition Archive and more recently, the Partition Museum in Amritsar. Just as Nani Massi’s 
death had led to a flood of memory, the inevitable death of the last generation of Partition survivors 
has similarly led to a wave of remembrance. As we begin to lose touch with a living history, it becomes 
even more important to make sense of it; to lay it to rest.     
In this idea that the ‘death’ of memory evokes remembrance, there is the implicit glimmer of Pierre 
Nora’s (1992) ideas on memory and history. Writing in the 1990s, French historian Pierre Nora (ibid.: 
1) famously declared the death of memory by stating that, ‘Memory is constantly on our lips because 
it no longer exists.’ Nora’s (ibid.) pronouncement of the extinction of milieu of memory – environments 
where memory forms a meaningful part of everyday life – was accompanied, unrelatedly, by Francis 
Fukuyama (1992) who, that very year, proclaimed the end of history itself. Fukuyuma was triumphant 
in his declaration, while Nora lamented (prematurely) the obliteration of ‘memory’ by the seemingly 
all-consuming tides of ‘history’. 
Read in 2020, these proclamations of the death of things seem less like insights on history and memory 
and more a reflection of the strangely dislocating global transformations of that time. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union and with it, the end of the Cold War, inaugurated a new world order almost 
overnight. These bold pronouncements seem to the echo the dislocation produced by the swift 
collapse of political formations that seemed – until the 1980s – as unshakeable as memory and history 
themselves.  
In observing that the last 20 or so years have produced a wave of oral history I do not intend to 
proclaim the death or the end of anything. My point is entirely different. In pointing out that the 
inevitable death of the last generation of Partition survivors has sparked a public turn to 
remembrance, I argue that the vast body of literature on the Partition of India comprises a long 
ongoing search for theodicy. Just as the flood of memory provoked by Nani Massi’s passing sought to 
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reconcile her death with belief in a meaningful cosmos (a nomos), so too, successive waves of 
literature on the Partition have sought to reconcile the unimaginable death and suffering unleashed 
by this rupture, with the nomos that is the idea of India.  
Having delineated this theodicical arc of Partition Studies, I then position my own ethnography of the 
memory of the Partition in relation to it. I argue that Hindu nationalism serves as a form of theodicy 
for my Hindu upper-caste informants’ experience of the death and suffering of the Partition. 
Transcending the ‘uselessness’ of their suffering through its nationalist idioms of ‘sacrifice’ and 
‘martyrdom’, Hindu nationalism helps rationalise death and suffering. However, before I posit 
nationalism as a form of secular theodicy, it is important for me to outline the theodicical imperatives 
implicit within the vast body of literature on South Asian Partition Studies.  
 
 
Partition Studies and the Search for Theodicy 
 
In this section I provide a brief overview of the development of Partition Studies in the context of 
South Asia. In re-framing the historical development of this discipline as an implicitly theodicical 
endeavour, I aim to draw attention to how this discipline has sought to understand and rationalise the 
suffering of the Partition. Here, I argue that the vast body of literature on the Partition constitutes a 
search for theodicy; the attempt to make sense of mass suffering. My review of literature here is 
guided by the implicit understanding of the Partition as a historical rupture that fundamentally does 
not make sense. It is against this denomizing quality of the Partition, that the search for meaning 
becomes necessary. 
South Asian Partition Studies has developed over successive waves. The first wave of Partition Studies 
focused entirely on the high-politics of the Partition (Dube, 2015). Turning away from the human 
suffering of the Partition, these analyses focused primarily on archival research. This first wave of 
Partition Studies literature is noteworthy for the rhetoric of blame that it implicitly employs (Pandey, 
2001). In analysing the actions of the influential personalities involved (and the political formations 
they represented) in the making of the Partition – Lord Mountbatten, Cyril Radcliffe, Mahatma Gandhi, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar4 and Sardar Vallabhai Patel – scholars 
have sought to identify the sources of ‘good’ and ‘evil’.  
                                                            
4 Ambedkar’s position within this pantheon of politicians is quite interesting. As a freedom fighter, the 
foremost Dalit leader of the time, a scholar, a lawyer par excellence and the head of India’s Constituent 
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Percival Spear’s (1952) India, Pakistan and the West is one of the best known works of this period. 
Spear’s (1952) book inaugurates the historiographical framework that became something of a 
common sense reading of the Partition (Dube, 2015). In contrast to the ‘sectarian impulses’ of the All-
India Muslim League, Spear (1962) saw the Congress as representative of the diversity of South Asia. 
Spear’s (ibid.) analysis pitted the ‘secular’ nationalism of the Congress against the Muslim nationalism 
of the All-India Muslim League to argue that the Partition was the result of the irreconcilability of these 
twin nationalisms (Dube, 2015). This narrative presents the League as the driver of Partition and the 
Congress as the voice for unity (ibid.).  
However, this simplistic mould of analysis has subsequently received heavy criticism. Pankhuree Dube 
(ibid.) critiques this argument as essentialist for the way in which it imagines Hindus and Muslims as 
two immiscible nations that had been confrontationally cohabiting South Asia for centuries. This 
perspective involves a backhanded voicing of the logic of the Two-Nation Theory (ibid.). Such analyses 
fail to consider entire communities, publics and even individuals with whom such binary juxtapositions 
might not resonate- such as Dalits or communists (ibid.) This argument also neglects the Hindu 
hegemony implicit within the Congress’ ‘secular’ nationalism (ibid.). Dube writes:  
‘The flaw in Congress’ secular self-representation was that their emphasis on unity was 
predicated on Hindu hegemony and majoritarianism. In effect, Partition historiography made 
certain positions seem natural.’ 
(ibid.: 58) 
Spear’s historiographical analysis was followed by Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre (1975), David 
Page (1982), Ayesha Jalal (1985), Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh (2009), Rajmohan Gandhi (1986), 
H.M Seervai (2005) and Stanley Wolpert (2006), to name a few. This body of literature represents a 
consistent attempt to understand the rupture that is the Partition through a study of the main 
organisations and personalities involved in the process. Seervai (2005) in particular focuses on the 
constitutional aspects of nation-state formation that the Partition entailed. Another noteworthy piece 
of work in this area is Ramachandra Guha’s (2018) recent biography of Mahatma Gandhi that 
tangentially touches on the latter’s opposition to the Partition.   
                                                            
Assembly, Ambedkar was always in thick of things. Although largely neglected in common sense narratives of 
the Partition, Ambedkar’s writings have experienced a remarkable revival in recent years. Part of the reason 
for this is that Ambedkar provided some of the sharpest critiques of upper-caste Hindu orthodoxy and Hindu 
nationalism at the time. With the rise of the Hindu far-right, Ambedkar’s writings have been proven 
increasingly prescient and relevant.    
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These causal examinations of the Partition represent a theodicical scholarly effort to make sense of 
the Partition. Deploying the rhetoric of blame, they examine the historical record to determine a guilty 
person or party and thereby, determine the source of evil. Partition, from this perspective, is largely 
construed as a purely ‘political event’ of nation-state formation. In these analyses, the horrors of the 
Partition receive only tangential attention as the Partition itself is often inchoately framed as the 
unfortunate by-product of decolonisation. With the exception of Talbot and Singh (2009), these 
analyses largely neglect engagement with the specificity of Partition violence due to its ‘complexity’. 
This is a symptom of most of the historiographical work on the Partition and is a consequence of its 
neat separation of archival history from the lived experience of the Partition (Pandey, 2001). As 
Gyanendra Pandey (ibid.: 6) observes, the violence of the Partition has been ‘othered’ from Indian 
history as ‘someone else’s history- or even, not history at all’. These causal, historiographical analyses 
of the Partition present its violence as an aberration to a nomic understanding of ‘secular’ India. And 
in so doing, they provide a theodicy of the ‘secular’ Indian state.  
While early historiographical analyses occupied themselves with an examination of Partition high-
politics, the mantle of documenting the lived experience of the Partition was taken up by literature 
and cinema. In this way, a rich body of art has sprung up around the Partition, articulating the ‘small 
voice of history’; in stark contrast to the at times apathetic, officious voicing of historiographical 
inquiries. For many of these artists, the turn to the Partition was motivated by ‘Parrēsia’ (Foucault, 
2019); the desire to ‘speak truth to power’. The overwhelming majority of these artists were 
themselves survivors of the Partition. In giving voice to their pain, they were the first – and for almost 
half a century – the only public tradition mourning the death and suffering of the Partition.  
I use the phrase ‘small voice of history’, to deliberately invoke Ranajit Guha’s (2002b) critique of the 
way history-writing is implicated in reproducing the rationality of the state5 and the consequent 
erasure of subaltern narratives. This is evident in the treatment of the Partition as a ‘political’ or 
‘constitutional’ event – to the neglect of the suffering of ordinary people – in much of the 
historiographical work on the Partition. Identifying this ‘statist’ bias as a central theme of most history-
writing, Guha (2002a: 73) wrote, ‘The noise of World-history and its statist concerns has made 
historiography insensitive to the sighs and whispers of everyday life.’ Guha (ibid.) instead calls for a 
writing of history that in documenting the past pays attention to the rhythms of everyday life. Partha 
Chatterjee summarises Guha’s critique best when he writes that Guha:  
                                                            
5 Guha’s (2002a, 2002b) critique here can be connected to the work of Eric Hobsbawm (2000), Etienne Balibar 
(2002) and Yannis Hamilakis (2007), who similarly identify the role history and archaeology play in nationalist 
projects as well as in reifying the hegemony of the state.  
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‘often makes the suggestion that the methods of the historian are inadequate for this purpose 
and that one should turn to the poet and the fiction writer to learn how to represent in 
language the lived presence of historicality in everyday practice’  
(Chatterjee, 2002: 16) 
My own engagement with literary and cinematic representations of the Partition, in this section, has 
been inspired by Guha’s critique. Moreover, in this context, subsequent waves of oral historical and 
ethnographic work on the Partition appear to have drawn their inspiration from its early artistic 
representations.  
The legendary Urdu poet and communist thinker Faiz Ahmed Faiz was among the first to voice the 
ambiguousness of a freedom besmirched by the horrors of the Partition. First published in August 
1947, Faiz’s (2017) seminal poem, Subh-e Azadi (The Dawn of Freedom) juxtaposed the celebratory 
attainment of ‘freedom’ in South Asia with the denomizing violence of the Partition. Faiz’s poem 
begins by describing Independence as a, ‘smeared’, ‘spotted’ and ‘night-bitten dawn’ that, ‘isn’t surely 
the dawn we waited for so eagerly’ (ibid.: 38). Poetically describing how the ethnonational divide came 
to overshadow decolonisation, Faiz’s poem ends on a mournful note, observing the incompleteness 
and futility of a ‘freedom’ fraught with the violence and anxieties of the Partition. He wrote: 
 ‘The weight of the night hasn’t lifted yet 
The moment for the emancipation of the eyes 
and the heart hasn’t come yet 
Let’s go on, we haven’t reached the destination yet’ 
(ibid.: 39)   
Contemporaneous with Faiz was Amrita Pritam’s celebrated nazm6 Ajj Waris Shah Nu (An Ode to Waris 
Shah). Pritam wrote the nazm on a scrap piece of paper while travelling on a refugee-train to India 
(Datta, 2017: 70-1). Channelling the depth of her despair at the violence she was witnessing all around 
her, Pritam implored the eighteenth-century Punjabi, Sufi poet Waris Shah – the writer of Heer7 – to 
rise from his grave and address the suffering of a ‘million daughters’ of Punjab (ibid.; Khurana, 2019). 
The nazm reads as follows:  
‘Today, I call Waris Shah,  
                                                            
6 A genre of Urdu poetry that is often written in a rhyming verse. 
7 Heer is the tragic tale of the star-crossed lovers Heer and Ranjha. 
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“Speak from your grave”  
And turn today, 
the book of love’s next affectionate page 
  
once, a daughter of Punjab cried  
and you wrote a wailing saga  
Today, a million daughters, cry to you,  
Waris Shah Rise! 
 
 O’ narrator of the grieving; rise! look  
at your Punjab Today,  
fields are lined with corpses,  
and blood fills the Chenab.’ 
(Pritam, 2009: 7) 
Pritam was among the first to voice a woman’s perspective of the Partition (Khurana, 2019). Pritam’s 
words resonated with people such that refugees living in camps would cry while reading the nazm 
while some would even, ‘tie the nazm into a knot and wear it as a taveez (amulet)’ (Datta, 2017: 71). 
Her nazm continues to be sung, even today, at the Urs8 of Waris Shah (ibid.). Despite its resonance 
among survivors of the Partition, the nazm also received criticism from religious quarters (ibid.). Some 
Hindus and Sikhs raised objection with the fact that in giving voice to Waris Shah, Pritam had given 
voice to a Muslim – a community they saw as the perpetrators of Partition violence (ibid.). A section 
of conservative Sikhs also claimed that as a Sikh woman herself, Pritam should have instead given 
voice to Guru Nanak, the first Sikh Guru (ibid.). 
Yet, these criticisms were merely a fundamentalist backlash against the nazm’s invocation of the 
nomos of syncretic Punjab. In invoking the Sufi Waris Shah to observe the horrors of the Partition, 
Pritam’s nazm speaks to the denomizing character of the event; of the fracturing of the nomos of a 
                                                            
8 Urs is a festival that marks the death anniversary of a Sufi saint in South Asia. Waris Shah was a Sufi poet of 
the Chisti order. 
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syncretic India and Punjab. It is this symbolic death – the death of a syncretic society – that she calls 
Waris Shah to witness, which makes the nazm a bold political statement.  
This denomizing experience of the Partition was explored further by Saadat Hasan Manto in the 
unusual novella, Siyah Hashiye (Black Marginalia). First published in October 1948, Siyah Hashiye does 
not provide a grand narrative of the Partition, but instead explores the futility of its death and suffering 
through fragmentary vignettes of violence (Misri, 2014). The title Siyah Hashiye or black marginalia is 
a reference to the black margins within which the newspapers of the day enclosed pieces of bad news 
(ibid.). In their brevity, these vignettes convey something of the immediacy of the violence of the 
Partition. Manto’s vignettes use irony, sarcasm and dark humour to convey a contemporaneous 
experience of the collapse of a moral universe. For example, one of the vignettes, titled ‘Invitation’ 
reads as follows: 
 ‘Invitation 
The fire had razed the entire mohalla [neighbourhood] to the ground. Only one shop had 
escaped its ravages. The hoarding hanging outside the shop read: “A complete range of 
building material sold here.”’ 
(Manto and Ratan, 1985: 31) 
Like Faiz, Manto often juxtaposes the euphoric achievement of decolonisation against the apocalyptic 
violence of the Partition. Deepti Misri (2014: 25) writes that in doing so, Manto hopes to evoke from 
his readers a, ‘cheerless laugh that resounds throughout the collection, as sketch after sketch 
dramatizes the cosmic irony of a bloody Partition that had been proposed as a solution to communal 
tensions [ethnonationalism].’  
Another way in which Manto expresses the denomizing quality of the Partition is through the theme 
of ‘insanity’. The vignettes of Siyah Hashiye represent the violence of the Partition as ‘madness’; as a 
series of events so shocking in their barbarity and routineness to lose all sense of meaning and 
rationality. Here, the fragmentary character of these vignettes further emphasises the ‘senselessness’ 
of the violence, forcing the reader to confront the uselessness of suffering. Manto (2012) takes this a 
step further in the short story Toba Tek Singh9, where he writes about the Partition of the inmates in 
a Lahore asylum. Toba Tek Singh is a deeply affective tale that satirises the Partition as ‘madness’ by 
telling a story about the Partition of the ‘insane’ (Kala and Sarin, 2018). Manto’s satire ironically 
                                                            
9 Alok Sarin and Sanjeev Jain (2018) list Manto’s description of the emotional impact of the Partition in Toba 
Tek Singh as one of the inspirations behind the compilation of their edited volume, The Psychological Impact of 
the Partition of India.  
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observes the ‘insanity’ of the time by conjuring a story where the only morally good characters to be 
found are those deemed ‘clinically insane’. His prose prompts reflection on a world where violence 
and the impulse to partition has become so normative that peace seems a function of insanity. It is in 
these chiasmic juxtapositions – of the insanity of the Partition and the Partition of ‘insanity’ – that 
Manto’s prose articulates the fracturing of a nomos.  
Manto’s disavowal of the Partition as ‘madness’ also prompts reflection on a theodicical question that 
has been raised elsewhere by Veena Das (1997). Das (ibid.) has written forcefully about the profound 
contradiction of seeing meaning in suffering. Where the rigours of academia stipulate that we offer 
explanations for all social phenomena (including genocide), some such as Levinas (1988) have 
eloquently stated that the violent horrors of the twentieth-century cannot be seen as comprising 
anything other than ‘useless suffering’. Levinas (ibid.) argues that the sheer magnitude of violence, 
such as the Holocaust and the Second World War (and perhaps even the Partition), puts an end to 
traditional theories of theodicy.  
While sociologists like Zygmunt Bauman (1989) explain the Holocaust as the result of modernity – of 
extreme state fetishism, biopolitics, bureaucratic rationality, extreme objectivity, and the nostalgia for 
holism (lebensraum, homogeneity, eugenics, herrenvolk) – Levinas (1988) argues that to study the 
testimonies of Holocaust survivors and make models which make sense of their suffering, 
‘“normalizes” that which cannot be normalized’ (Das, 1997: 568). Consequently, to see events such as 
the Partition as the failure of the state – as the collapse of law and order or the ‘improper 
implementation’ of the transfer and bifurcation of power – is to find theories of theodicy or salvational 
hopes in the very institutions which were responsible for creating the conditions of suffering (ibid.).  
Das (ibid.) argues that this merely comprises an exercise of subtle power that reifies the institution(s) 
while locking the victims in frozen positions. Through a fragmentary account of the Partition as 
madness and nothing but madness, Manto offers no such theodicy or salvational hope. In fact, 
Manto’s irony and dark humour relies on an inherent understanding of the suffering of the Partition 
as ‘useless’.  
In contrast to Manto’s use of irony and dark humour, celebrated Sikh journalist and former Rajya 
Sabha MP Khushwant Singh’s (2009) Train To Pakistan (first published in 1956), focuses on the 
escalating retributive violence of the Partition. Singh’s novel tells the story of the deterioration of 
‘communal’ harmony in the fictional Punjabi border-village of Mano Majra. His novel portrays the 
retributive exchange of death trains, the cynicism and corruption within the police force and a 
lingering nostalgia for the famed neighbourly ideal of punjabiyat (refer Section 3.3 for more on this). 
For many Partition survivors, including my key informant Bhanwarilal, Singh’s (ibid.) Train to Pakistan 
27 
 
has endured as one of the most accurate representations of the violence and displacement of the 
Partition.  
Another noteworthy novel of this period was Bhisham Sahni’s (2001) Tamas (Darkness). Originally 
written in Hindi and first published in 1974, Sahni’s (2001) novel is set amid the flight of Hindus and 
Sikhs from Pakistan. Sahni’s work makes two important advances on Singh’s (2009) novel. Firstly, it 
attempts to understand something of the Dalit experience of the Partition through his protagonist 
Nathu, a man of the Hindu Chamar caste. Secondly, through the character of Statistics Babu – a 
damning caricature of the average bureaucrat – Sahni subtly critiques the apathy of the bureaucratic 
(and even historiographical) style of thinking about the Partition; one that evades engagement with 
the suffering of people by speaking only of numbers and statistics (Misri, 2014). In a particularly stark 
dialogue, Sahni – through the voice of Statistics Babu speaking to Partition survivors – writes: 
‘I want figures, only figures, nothing but figures. Why don’t you understand? You start 
narrating an endless tale of woe and suffering. I am not here to listen to the whole 
“Ramayana.” Give me figures—how many dead, how many wounded, how much loss of 
property and goods. That is all.’  
(Statistics Babu quoted in Sahni, 2001: 316-7) 
Statistics Babu’s abruptness was symbolic of what Sahni perceived as the state’s apathy towards 
Partition survivors10. This feeling of a perceived apathy towards their suffering and displacement 
continues to resonate with many Partition survivors. This is something I explore deeply in this 
dissertation through my engagement with the recurrent theme of ressentiment in Chapters 2 and 3.  
Tamas was made into a television film in 1988 by director Govind Nihalani. This, however, was not 
Indian cinema’s first engagement with the Partition. Other films such as Chhalia (1960), Dharmputra 
(1961), Subarnarekha (1965) and Garam Hawa (1974) had similarly depicted stories of the Partition 
on celluloid (Deccan Herald, 2019a). Among these, Garam Hawa (Hot Winds) deserves a special 
mention for its portrayal of the anxieties as well as dilemmas of citizenship and belonging faced by 
north Indian Muslims (ibid.).   
Many of these early artistic endeavours served as precursors to the subsequent wave of Partition oral 
history. Here, Amrita Pritam’s (2009) Pinjar (The Skeleton) stands head and shoulders above the rest. 
First published in Punjabi in the year 1950, Pinjar was a bold, pioneering novel that sought to 
document the plight of women during the Partition. Pinjar tells the story of Pooro, a Hindu girl, who 
                                                            
10 However, in his later dialogues and actions, Statistics Babu is unable to resist being drawn towards 
confronting the human aspect of the Partition. 
28 
 
is abducted and raped by Rashida, a Muslim man, sometime before the Partition. Although Pooro finds 
a way to escape and return to her family, she is shunned by them due to the ‘shame’ and ‘dishonour’ 
her rape and abduction implies. Pooro then returns to Rashida, lamenting that her abductor has 
become her only relation in the world. When the Partition occurs, Pooro’s family leaves for India. 
Pooro and Rashida are brought closer as they help Lajo, an abducted Hindu woman, return to her 
husband Ram Chand. And, although Pooro’s brother returns to ‘recover’ her, she chooses to stay with 
Rashida, her abductor and husband, reminding herself that, ‘Whether one is a Hindu girl or a Muslim 
one, whosoever reaches her destination, she carries along my soul also’ (ibid.: 56). 
Pritam’s (ibid.) poetic turn of phrase combined with Pinjar’s heavy subject matter makes it a deeply 
moving read. Far ahead of its time, Pritam’s feminist prose articulates a damning critique of a woman’s 
place in a patriarchal society; especially on the margins of competing ethnonationalist patriarchies. 
For example, in a particularly stirring paragraph, Pritam writes about Pooro’s conflicted sense of 
belonging; a crisis she resolves by observing that she is nothing but a pinjar, a skeleton, an empty 
frame. She writes: 
‘In her dreams, when she met her old friends and played in her parents’ home, everyone still 
called her Pooro. At other times she was Hamida. It was a double life: Hamida by day, Pooro 
by night. In reality, she was neither one nor the other, she was just a skeleton, without a shape 
or a name.’ 
(ibid.: 18) 
Later in the novel, Pritam writes about Pooro’s hatred of her own son in some detail. For Pooro, her 
son is a reminder of her abduction and rape; of a marriage in which she is literally held captive. 
Describing Pooro’s thoughts while she breastfeeds her son, Pritam compares masculinity to a dog 
gnawing on the bone, consuming the essence of femininity. She writes: 
‘He had been planted inside her by force, nourished inside her womb against her will – and 
was now sucking the milk from her breasts, whether she liked it or not. 
The thought went round and round in her head with insidious insistence: This boy … this boy’s 
father … all mankind … all men … men who gnaw a woman’s body like a dog gnawing a bone 
and like a dog consuming it.’ 
(ibid.: 21) 
The imprint of Pritam’s (ibid.) scathing critique of masculinity and the patriarchy is visible in the oral 
historical/ethnographic works of Urvashi Butalia (2000) and, Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin (1998). 
29 
 
Butalia’s (2000) The Other Side of Silence and Menon and Bhasin’s (1998) Borders and Boundaries 
emerged out of the same oral history project, and decisively altered the course of South Asian Partition 
Studies. Their work was not only among the first oral historical works on the Partition but was also 
among the first to provide a feminist reading of the Partition. In doing so, they were among the first 
to incorporate the ‘small voice of history’ (Guha, 2002b) within South Asian Partition Studies.   
Documenting the experience of ‘abducted’ women as well as the Indian and Pakistani state’s 
‘recovery’ operations, Butalia (2000) and Menon and Bhasin (1998) – like Amrita Pritam – argued that 
in the cases of many ‘abducted’ women, returning them to unaccepting families often amounted to a 
second displacement. ‘Recovery’ in these contexts served only to assuage the patriarchal pride of the 
newly independent nation-states whilst often uprooting women from a home where – although not 
of their choosing – some had nevertheless managed to start a new life for themselves (ibid.). The 
stories of these women evoked the conflicting dualities of Pooro’s life in Pinjar.  
Published a little over 50 years after the Partition, this turn to Partition oral history was driven by an 
implicit ‘politics of recognition’ (Wilkinson, 2013); that is, by the need to bear witness to and 
acknowledge suffering. The inchoate theodicical nature of their project can be grasped from their 
recognition of the fact that although the Partition remained a ‘living memory’, the Partition was also 
characterised by a complete lack of official commemoration and memorialisation (Butalia, 2000). 
Through their oral history, Butalia (ibid.) and Menon and Bhasin (1998) sought to lift this veil of silence 
by prompting reflection on a troubled past. And, in doing so, provide some form of resolution (read 
theodicy) to this unresolved memory. 
Their engagement with Partition oral history was also prompted by their experience of the 1984 anti-
Sikh pogroms. The events of 1984 and the heightened ethnonational tensions and violence of the late 
1980s and 1990s11 had a profoundly denomizing impact. In their fieldwork, Butalia, Menon and Bhasin 
found that for their Sikh informants, the violence of 1984 was like a second-coming of the Partition. 
That is, the violence of 1984 resembled 1947 in the gory, proximate nature of its violence such that 
survivors of the Partition were involuntarily reminded of these horrors of their past (Butalia, 2000).  
In observing this, the work of Butalia, Menon and Bhasin also hinted at deeper, inchoate links between 
the Partition and subsequent episodes of ethnonational violence. This period of violence exacerbated 
and exposed an underlying crisis of belonging and citizenship that had been ignited in 1947 by the 
Partition. That the violence of 1984 organically reminded survivors of the events of 1947 expresses 
the denomizing quality of both ruptures. This is particularly visible in the memories of Butalia’s (2000) 
                                                            




Sikh Partition survivors, for whom the violence of 1984 constituted a re-fracturing – or un-healing – of 
a fractured nomos that had been barely restored since 1947. 1984 not only re-opened these wounds 
but also re-fractured or redirected their gaze to an already fractured nomos. 
Butalia (2000) and Menon and Bhasin’s (1998) feminist perspective – a form of secular theodicy in 
itself – of the Partition moved past mainstream understandings of the Partition as a purely religious 
conflict. Observing the plight of women as that of individuals caught in the crossfire of competing 
ethnonationalist patriarchies, they problematized common sense understandings of the violence of 
the Partition. In particular, their work unsettled an established, common-sense theodicy of the death 
of women as ‘sacrifice’. Disputing the narrative of sacrifice in reference to the alleged sacrificial 
‘suicide’ of Hindu and Sikh women at Thoa Khalsa (and other sites), their work showed that women 
did not go to these deaths as willingly as popular memory suggested. Closer examinations of these 
memories through the families of Partition survivors, especially women, revealed that in their 
memory, the men presented the honour killings of women of their own community in the hallowed 
terms of martyrdom and sacrifice (refer Section 2.4 for more). However, in (rightfully) problematizing 
this theodicy, Butalia (2000) and Menon and Bhasin (1998) also implicitly confronted their readers 
with the uselessness of the Partition’s suffering.   
This pioneering foray into Partition oral history was followed by Gyanendra Pandey’s (2001) 
Remembering Partition. Pandey’s (ibid.) hybrid methodology combined oral history with archival, 
historiographical inquiry to produce an ethnographic history of the Partition. In doing so, Pandey 
(ibid.) sought to bridge the clinical separation between the two fields that had hitherto characterised 
South Asian Partition Studies. Pandey (ibid.) also devoted two chapters of his book towards integrating 
the violence and political events at the ‘national’ level into the ‘local’ and vice versa. Many of the main 
themes of Pandey’s work, such as the uneasy connection between Independence and Partition and 
the constitution of community through violence implicitly evoked themes that had been previously 
raised by poets and novelists (Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Amrita Pritam and Khushwant Singh, in this case) in 
their literary endeavours. Pandey’s (1990, 2001, 2009) work significantly influences the contours of 
my research. 
The year 2007 – marking 60 years since the Partition – appears to have been something of a watershed 
in South Asian Partition Studies with the publication of four important ethnographies: Veena Das’ 
(2007) Life and Words, Ravinder Kaur’s (2007) Since 1947, Yasmin Khan’s (2017a [2007]) The Great 
Partition and Vazira Zamindar’s (2007) The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia.  
In some ways, Veena Das’ (2007) work is a continuation of Butalia (2000) and Menon and Bhasin’s 
(1998) feminist exploration of the Partition. Menon and Bhasin (ibid.) argued that as objects of and 
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witnesses to violence, women retained the memory of loot, rape and plunder in their bodies, thus 
remembering it in different ways. Approaching this from an anthropological perspective, Das (2007) 
described this phenomenon as a ‘descent into the ordinary’ (refer Sections 2.4 and 2.5 for more). 
Through her ethnographic fieldwork, Das (ibid.) shows how women absolved this memory of violence 
within a quotidian experience of being ‘used’ and exploited by men, in a patriarchal society. That is, 
women rationalised the violence of the Partition as yet another manifestation of the everyday violence 
of patriarchy. Here, Das’ (ibid.) work is also evocative of Pooro’s reflections on masculinity and 
patriarchy, in Amrita Pritam’s (2009) Pinjar.  
Furthermore, building on Menon and Bhasin’s (1998) observations regarding the problematics of the 
‘recovery’ of unwilling women by the Indian and Pakistani states, Das (2007) argued that this operation 
was driven by the desire to restore ‘proper’ patriarchal authority over the nation’s fertile, female 
bodies. It is in this vein that Das (ibid.: 34) describes the violence of the Partition as a ‘war of fathers’; 
a depraved struggle to capture ‘enemy daughters’ whilst ‘recovering’ one’s own. Rationalising the 
suffering of the Partition as the violence of competing ethnonationalist patriarchies, this entire body 
of work articulates a powerful secular (feminist) theodicy.  
On the other hand, Ravinder Kaur’s (2007) work straddles the disciplinary boundaries between 
sociology, anthropology and history. Her work details the evacuation and rehabilitation of refugees, 
especially those from the North-West Frontier Province. In doing so, Kaur (ibid.) makes two important 
contributions to our understanding of the Partition. Firstly, her work dispels the myth that the 
evacuation of refugees and their rehabilitation was ‘chaotic’. Delineating the role of the state in this 
process, she problematizes a common sense understanding of the Partition. Secondly, building on this, 
Kaur (ibid.) observes how caste-Hindu refugees minimised the role of the state in their stories of their 
community’s rehabilitation. Kaur connects this narrative to the Punjabi community’s self-stereotyping 
as resilient and hard-working. Kaur contrasts this with the narratives of Dalit refugees, who despite 
having received less support from the state than caste-Hindu and Sikh refugees, appear significantly 
more grateful and appreciative of state interventions (Sen, 2012). Kaur’s arguments inform my own 
analysis of my informants’ narrative of ‘hard work as sacrifice’ as a form of theodicy (the subject of 
Chapter 2).   
Yasmin Khan’s (2017a) The Great Partition makes an important contribution to Partition Studies by 
attempting to make sense of the violence of the Partition. Khan (ibid.) disputes the common sense 
narrative that the Partition was an aberration to South Asian history. Instead, she locates the Partition 
within historical and political processes that had been ongoing at the time. Khan (ibid.) is especially 
critical of the deliberate ambiguity about the exact meaning of the ‘Pakistan’ being demanded by the 
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leaders of the Pakistan Movement. More significantly, Khan (ibid.) also draws attention to the 
question of missing perpetrators, observing that while we know much about the victims and their 
stories, not much has been written about those who perpetrated the violence of the Partition. This is 
a question I take up in Section 3.3, as I critique Partition oral history.  
Vazira Zamindar (2007) combines ethnographic enquiry with archival research to examine the ad-hoc 
manner in which South Asia’s borders were born out of ethnonationalist economic anxieties; a process 
of border-fortification that continued well into the 1950s. Zamindar focuses on the plight of North 
India’s Muslims who found themselves displaced and stateless, amidst this hegemonic spectacle of 
nation-making. In this, Zamindar’s ethnography is evocative of the film Garam Hawa (1974), which I 
have mentioned previously. Collecting oral histories from Delhi and Karachi, Zamindar’s work crosses 
over national borders to provide a comprehensive analysis of postcolonial state-formation. 
Furthermore, through her account of the bureaucratic violence of nation-state formation, Zamindar’s 
work prompts a reconsideration of what constitutes Partition violence. This question has assumed 
renewed relevance with the BJP’s passage of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act of 2019 and its 
proposed plan for a pan-India National Register of Citizens. I discuss this in some detail in the 
Conclusion.   
On the other hand, in Violence, Martyrdom, and Partition, Nonica Datta (2009) records a memory of 
the Partition where the Partition is neither described as a cataclysmic rupture, nor serves as a central 
orienting feature. Moving away from oral histories and ethnographies that study the Partition within 
the formulaic telos of nation-state formation, Datta’s book presents an account of local history that 
truly abides by the spirit of documenting, ‘the small voice of history’ (Guha, 2002b). Datta (2009) 
records the testimony of Subhashini (1914-2003), who was a prominent woman in the Haryana circle 
of Arya Samaj and served as the head of the Kanya Gurukul12 in Khanpur, Haryana. Subhashini 
remembers 1942 (the year of her father’s murder by Muslim pastoralists) and not 1947 as a rupture. 
In her testimony, 1947 is celebrated as the year she and her community avenged the death of her 
father through a vicious genocidal campaign against Muslim pastoralists. Observing this curious 
inversion of the seemingly stable terms used to routinely describe the Partition – ‘martyrdom’, 
‘sacrifice’, ‘trauma’, ‘tragedy’ and ‘revenge’ – in Subhashini’s testimony, Datta (ibid.) produces an 
astonishing subaltern history that organically defies the statist impulses implicit in most Partition 
historiography. 
Contemporaneous with Partition Studies’ commitment to listen to ‘the small voice of history’, in 
recent times, there has been growing interest in the Dalit experience of the Partition. While Butalia 
                                                            
12 A well-known institution devoted to the education of rural women. 
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(2000) was among the first to point to this absence – through her testimony of a Maya Rani, a Dalit 
woman, others have since grabbed the baton. Gyanendra Pandey (2009) has observed that although 
Dalits were positioned ambiguously in relation to the Hindu-fold, they were far from immune to the 
displacement and suffering of the Partition. Ravinder Kaur (2007) has documented the discrimination 
faced by Dalit refugees in the rehabilitation process; discrimination that ensured that even after the 
Partition Dalits continued to live on the margins of the postcolonial state. I return to these arguments 
in Sections 2.3 and 3.3.  
In the last decade, there has been a noticeable boom of Partition memory. The realisation that the 
last generation of Partition survivors is quietly slipping into oblivion has added impetus to the task of 
recording memory. The recognition that the Partition is fast transitioning from a ‘living memory’ to 
‘history’ has added urgency to the task of understanding this past. Ahmad Salim (2003) and 
Vishwajyoti Ghosh’s (2013) respective anthologies of Partition stories are good examples of this. 
Bringing together the stories and memoirs of a variety of individuals, these volumes attempt a 
staccato, polyphonous narration of the Partition.  
Aanchal Malhotra’s (2017) Remnants of a Separation attempts something similar by documenting the 
material culture of the Partition. Malhotra (ibid.) compiles 21 stories of objects that connect Partition 
survivors to their stories of migration. These artefacts range from everyday objects that some refugees 
migrated with to prized treasures and family heirlooms that some retrieved after the fact. Malhotra’s 
project has also led her to establish The Museum of Material Memory, a digital archive that uses 
material culture to record South Asian family histories. Malhotra’s archive has emerged alongside 
older, well-established digital oral history archives such as the 1947 Partition Archive and the Indian 
Memory Project. Meanwhile documentaries such as Mara Ahmed’s A Thin Wall (2015) and Gurinder 
Chadha’s India’s Partition: The Forgotten Story (2017) have given cinematic form to oral histories of 
the Partition.  
However, as I write in Chapter 3, I am intensely critical of most of this body of recent oral historical 
work. Nostalgically remembering the syncretic India that was destroyed by the ‘aberrational’ and 
‘senseless’ violence of the Partition, this recent body of accessible oral histories mobilises a kind of 
secular theodicy. The ‘secular’ character of this theodicy hinges on evading engagement with the 
Partition’s ethnonationalist violence. Meditating on the testimonies of Partition survivors, these oral 
histories revel in a narcissistic celebration of remembrance as healing. Remembering one of the 
darkest periods of the twentieth-century through the eyes of good-natured, loving, secular victims 
and witnesses, our faith in humanity – in a particular nomos – is restored through reminders that the 
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Partition was just ‘(high-)politics’. Assuming that all those who remember are victims, it implicitly 
constructs the violent perpetrators (and their hatred) as somehow located outside society itself.  
Rather than pierce the silences of the Partition – specifically the identity of the perpetrators of the 
violence – such oral histories do the opposite; trading critical engagement for the fuzzy, warm-
heartedness of remembrance for the sake of remembrance. It hesitates from exploring violence too 
deeply, settling instead for ‘balance’ and ‘even-handedness’. While at best, this produces repetitive, 
formulaic stories of loss and displacement, at its worst, it reifies rumour and hearsay feeding into the 
ethnonational biases of its audience.  
Specifically, my critique here pertains to a gap in the literature on the Partition. While some writers 
such as Butalia (2000), van der Veer (1994), Bacchetta (2000, 2019) and Pandey (2001) have observed 
the Hindu Right’s abuse of the memories of the Partition, scarce attention has been drawn to the 
resonance of the discourses of Hindu nationalism among Partition survivors. Here I am not referring 
to retributive violence alone – which has also received the attention of Khan (2017a) and Zamindar 
(2007) among others – but to the intertwining of the discourses of Hindu nationalism in the memories 
of caste-Hindu Partition survivors. The fact that many Partition survivors remember their past through 
ethnonationalist lenses makes remembering the Partition a particularly tricky prospect. 
Unlike many before me who have chosen to steer clear of the bigotry and ethnonationalism of 
Partition survivors to construct hopeful fictions of syncretism from the rubble of the past, I have 
chosen to turn this afterlife of the Partition into the object of my analysis. To a large degree, this 
involves the mobilisation of a hermeneutics of suspicion (Ricoeur, 1970). Put simply, my dissertation 
breaks with the established convention of ‘believing victims’ in order to examine the kinds of violence 
that narratives of victimhood and ‘healing’ license in this context. 
However, my decision to break ranks with the convention of believing victims needs careful 
clarification. First, allow me to clarify what I am not doing. In launching a hermeneutics of suspicion in 
this context, I am not proposing a universal counter-doctrine. Nor do I endorse the reactionary anti-
feminist, victim-blaming positions taken by many in response to the recent #MeToo campaign. In fact, 
I fully acknowledge contexts – current and historical – where believing victims and amplifying their 
voices helps speak truth to power. This includes sexual assault and harassment (of which the #MeToo 
campaign is an example), the history of slavery, lynching and segregation (and now police brutality) in 




In all of these contexts, believing victims is part of emancipatory movements towards social justice for 
the victims of history. Believing victims and amplifying their voices speaks truth to power because the 
erasure of survivor narratives involves a continuation of the violence of the past. After all, the denial 
of genocide is considered a continuation of genocide. But what of contexts where narratives of 
historical victimhood feed the retributive violence of fascist enterprises? What of contexts where the 
powers that be remember the violence of distant pasts in order to license persecution in the present?   
Let me clarify again that my stance in this dissertation does not in any way pertain to the 
aforementioned contexts. Rather, my point is entirely different. In breaking with this convention, I do 
not want to give vent to insensitive victim-blaming discourses but to rather draw attention to the 
specificities of the violence of the Partition. Unlike the aforementioned contexts, the Partition with its 
escalating retributive violence and lingering ethnonational divide – that has been cemented in the 
enmity of the nuclear-armed Indian and Pakistani states – does not involve an easy distinction 
between victims and perpetrators.  
For example, while Hindus and Sikhs were victims of genocidal violence in Pakistan, from 1947-48, 
they were also perpetrators of violence against Muslims in India during the same period. Many 
historians and anthropologists such as Pandey (2001), Zamindar (2007), Kaur (2007), Guha (2018), 
Talbot and Singh (2009) and Khan (2017a) have also noted the participation of Hindu and Sikh refugees 
in retributive violence against Muslims in India, particularly in Delhi. I too have observed the denial of 
this violence in the narratives of my Hindu Derawal informants in my MPhil thesis (Kohli, 2015). 
Furthermore, Zamindar (2007) has argued that the Partition’s retributive violence escalated due to 
the Indian state’s laws on evacuee property which stipulated that Muslims who had ‘vacated’ their 
homes – which had in turn been occupied by incoming Hindu and Sikh refugees – were no longer 
legally entitled to re-occupy them; irrespective of whether they had been forcibly evicted, voluntarily 
migrated to Pakistan or vacated in the hope of migration but decided to stay back anyway. This wrote 
into law a biopolitical calculus that directly linked the resettlement of Hindu and Sikh refugees in India 
to the eviction of Muslims and vice versa (ibid.).  
In the Indian context, remembering the Partition is made doubly difficult due to Modi and the BJP’s 
rise to high office. In this context, narratives of a historically conceived Hindu victimhood can be seen 
to directly feed into and license violence in the present. Also at issue here is the problematisation of 
a certain model of trauma that is derived from the Holocaust and the Vietnam War. Tracing the 
genealogy of trauma, Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman (2009) have argued that by giving the words 




‘The history of trauma is one that expresses, in the most concrete terms (by awarding 
compensation for an accident at work or a war wound, or more recently by providing 
treatment to victims of a violent event), a particular idea of the human being, of her or his [or 
their] relationship to the nation, and of the solidarity a society should have with its maimed, 
whether they are in the open for all to see or hidden away.’ 
(ibid.: 30) 
The trauma concept’s definition of ‘sickness’ entails an implicit definition of ‘health’ or ‘normality’. By 
defining the traumatised individual, the trauma concept implicitly defines that which is human. This 
definition of the ‘human’ goes beside its prescription for the treatment that they must be accorded 
by society (ibid.). The trauma concept highlights the extraordinary nature of the traumatic event to 
establish the ordinariness of its victim; their humanity (ibid.). In treating even violent perpetrators as 
patients who suffer from invisible psychological wounds, the trauma concept attempts to humanise 
the ‘inhumane’ (ibid.). The fact that remorseless perpetrators too can be said to suffer from the 
‘wounds’ of the violence in their past attributes to them a sense of humanity that their past actions 
may be said to have lacked (ibid.). It is the issue of suffering that most concerns trauma. 
Although the genealogy of trauma begins as a medical category that sought to avoid any moral 
differentiation between victim, perpetrator or witness – by focusing merely on the invisible 
psychological mark left by the traumatic event – trauma has now become a category of moral 
judgement that accords validity to victimhood (ibid.: 283). Trauma provides the words of victims a 
‘clinical authority based on moral premises’ (ibid.: 28). In this way the idea of trauma has emerged as 
a ‘universal language of a new politics of the intolerable’ (ibid.: 99). The trauma concept demands that 
we abandon all suspicion of its traumatised victims; treating them as the innocent patients of an 
invisible, indescribable affliction. After all, the politics of victimhood comprises an ‘anti-politics 
machine’ (Jeffery, 2006). 
As a part of everyday language, trauma, ‘has descriptive value, but more importantly prescriptive 
value, calling for action (clinical, economic and symbolic) and reparation’ (Fassin and Rechtman, 2009: 
153).  In the way that trauma provides definitions and prescriptions for sickness, health, suffering and 
humanity, the trauma concept in fact shares many of the characteristics of secular theodicy. 
Ultimately, in focusing on the idea of a shared humanity by virtue of the universal fact of suffering, 
the trauma concept functions much like an everyday theodicy that seeks to uphold belief in the innate 
goodness of humanity.  
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By breaking with the convention of believing victims, I am also interrupting the generalised and 
uncritical use of the word ‘trauma’ to describe my informants and their experience. To clarify, I am 
not disabusing the concept of ‘trauma’ nor arguing that the Partition was somehow not traumatic. 
Rather, in checking my use of the word, I am partially building on the work of Veena Das who has 
similarly stated that, ‘the model of trauma and witnessing that has been bequeathed to us from 
Holocaust studies cannot be simply transported to other contexts in which violence is embedded into 
different patterns of sociality’ (2007: 103). 
One only has to look at the honour killing of women during the Partition to see the value of Das’ 
argument. I have previously mentioned Butalia (2000), Menon and Bhasin (1998) and Das’ (2007) work 
on the experience of women during the Partition. Their feminist research has shown that women’s 
experience of the Partition included not only the use of rape and abduction as a weapon of war but 
also killing at the hands of male relatives for the sake of community ‘honour’. We might problematize 
‘trauma’ and ‘victimhood’ here by speaking of the men who coerced and even actively murdered the 
women of their own families and collectivities. Additionally, it is important to note here that the 
honour killing of women has persisted in collective memory as a memory of ‘heroic sacrifice’ and 
‘martyrdom’ (Pandey, 2001; Butalia, 2000; Menon and Bhasin, 1998; Das, 2007). This narrative 
continues to this day and was echoed by many of my informants; especially the men.  
How might we understand the ‘trauma’ and ‘victimhood’ of men in this context? The very men who 
may be seen as victims of this or that religious community might also have been perpetrators of 
gendered violence within their own collectivity; a violence that is certainly continued in memory by 
even those who were too young to have directly perpetrated violence. To speak of trauma in a 
generalised sense – along with the moral claim to victimhood that that implies – only serves as a 
continuation of this violence and even of its erasure as ‘violence’ (Misri, 2014). Similarly, amplifying 
memories of Hindu and Sikh survivors who – in their memories – present the Partition as the 
unprovoked and singular violence of Muslims, feeds into contemporary Hindu fascist rhetoric. Thus, 
legitimising islamophobic violence and Hindu fascism, in general, in the present.  
After all, as Yasmin Khan (2017b) notes, silence stalks these oral history archives; a silence of guilt and 
denial. This does not mean that I suspect all my informants to be killers or that I am intensely 
suspicious of their victim-status and biographies. However, it does mean that on occasion, within 
reason, I do marshal historiographical and ethnographic data and theory in opposition to some of the 
claims of my informants. This is visible in Chapter 2, for example, where I argue that my informants’ 
stories of hard work cannot be read literally. That they are in fact fables that in an attempt to provide 
a karmic justification of caste and class privilege, understate the state’s role in the rehabilitation of 
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refugees. In Chapter 3, Section 3.3 I retell the story of Dipankar, a Partition survivor who, by his own 
admission, spent his pre-Partition youth as an RSS volunteer, and was trained in street-fighting and 
the use of fire-arms to defend the ‘Hindu faith’ against Muslims. Yet, he also stresses that he was 
never part of an actual fight or any ‘real’ violence. His story forces one to consider how far we would 
be willing to trust the words of someone who spent their youth training for genocide. It is in an effort 
to explore these delicate specificities of the Partition that I stand by my decision to treat the narratives 
of my informants with reasonable suspicion.       
Therefore, in this dissertation, I speak of theodicies rather than traumas. Instead of studying suffering 
to determine trauma, in this dissertation, I am interested in understanding the interpretative 
frameworks Partition survivors use to rationalise their experiences with death and suffering. The 
foremost of these, for my informants, was Hindu nationalism.  
In this dissertation, I compile an ethnography of the way in which the Partition is remembered by the 
last generation of Partition survivors. As an ethnography of memory, my dissertation recognises the 
theodicical impulse implicit in the turn to remembering the Partition; including my own urge to 
understand this deeply personal history. In my fieldwork with upper-caste, middle-class Hindu 
Partition survivors in Delhi, I found that they deployed Hindu nationalism as a form of theodicy to 
rationalise the suffering of the Partition. Identifying Muslims as the chief provocateurs of the Partition, 
sanctifying the deaths of their co-religionists as ‘sacrifice’ and explaining their rehabilitation by 
recourse to karmic justifications of privilege, my informants used the philosophy of Hindu nationalism 
to understand the suffering of the Partition as well as their place within the newly independent (Hindu) 
nation. For them, the suffering of the Partition was merely a contemporary manifestation of a 
thousand year-old history of ‘Muslim invasions’ of India. Secure in a sense of victimhood that is derived 
from this Hindu nationalist understanding of Indian history they consistently voice the demand for 
reparations. The reparations my informants demand vary from demands for the official recognition of 
all Partition survivors as ‘martyrs’ and/or ‘freedom fighters’ and the retributive ethnic cleansing of 
Muslims from India. As I show in this dissertation, the latter is consistently proposed by my informants 
as something of a ‘final solution’ to what they see as India’s lingering ‘Muslim problem’.   
Wading through the heart of the silence around violence that characterises previous engagements 
(artistic and scholarly) with the Partition, my dissertation wonders how remembrance in this context 
might be said to lead to healing. Does remembrance even lead to healing? Is ‘healing’ even possible 
in the face of cataclysmic ruptures like the Partition? And, finally what does it mean to remember the 




Hindu Nationalism as Theodicy 
 
My interpretation of Hindu nationalism – or any other kind of nationalism – as a form of theodicy 
needs careful explanation. As stated previously this dissertation compiles an ethnography of the 
memory of the Partition; of the way that the Partition is remembered by the last generation of Indian 
Partition survivors. It is this objective that led me to pay attention to the theodicical quality of their 
memory of the Partition; a memory where their belief in Hindu nationalism actively rationalises the 
suffering of the Partition.    
To characterise the interventions of nationalism in memory as a form of theodicy propounds a certain 
view of memory. Taking my cue from Paul Connerton (1989) and Maurice Halbwachs (1992), in this 
dissertation I treat memory – including individual memory – as socially constructed. Halbwachs (ibid.) 
describes memory as the end of the process of remembrance (Kohli, 2015). Halbwachs (1992) 
describes the act of remembering as the process of arranging vignettes of the past into a meaningful 
discourse that is presented in reference to the present. Expanding on the social or ‘collective’ aspect 
of memory, Halbwachs (ibid.) demonstrated that individuals localise, contextualise, acquire and 
experience memory through their participation in social groups, whether based on kinship, social or 
cultural identity or any other kind of real or imagined community (see also Connerton, 1989: 36-38). 
Therefore, as Connerton (ibid.: 37) summarises Halbwachs’ principle contribution to critical memory 
studies, Halbwachs, ‘demonstrates that the idea of an individual memory, absolutely separate from 
social memory is an abstraction almost devoid of meaning.’   
This recognition of the social construction of memory also acknowledges the intertwining of the past 
and present in our experience of everyday life. Connerton (1989) details this link when he writes that 
because of the way we see our present as causally connected to the past, our experience of the 
present relies on a particular knowledge of the past. The fact that our experience of the present is 
shaped by the pasts to which we connect the present, also complicates the task of extracting 
something of the past from the present. As Connerton frames it: 
‘Hence, the difficulty of extracting our past from our present: not simply because present 
factors tend to influence – some might want to say distort – our recollections of the past, but 
also because past factors tend to influence, or distort, our experience of the present.’  
(ibid.: 2) 
This entanglement of the past and present brings to mind Walter Benjamin’s (2006) angelus novus – 
the angle of history – that faces backwards even as it lives forwards. It is this recognition of memory 
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as a malleable, social construction that characterises my engagement with the memories of my 
informants. Throughout this dissertation, chapter after chapter, I turn this quality of memory into the 
object of my study by exploring the various theodicical strands in the memories of my informants. My 
exploration of the memory of the Partition does not hope for a positivistic extraction of a ‘pure’ or 
‘authentic’ retelling of the event. Rather, in recognising that memory animates the body of the past 
with the spirit of the present, I pay attention to the interventions of contemporary majoritarian 
mobilisations in the memories of my informants. After all, the central question that structures my 
dissertation is this: What does it mean to remember the Partition in the time of fascism? 
It is this stark, singular question that drives my analysis of my informants’ Hindu nationalism as a form 
of theodicy for the suffering of the Partition. This question expresses a recognition of the intertwining 
of the past and the present in the memories of my informants; as the past is used to justify the current 
regime and the nationalism of the current regime is used to make sense of the past. Therefore, in 
posing this question, I recognise Connerton’s (ibid.: 3) insight that, ‘images of the past commonly 
legitimate a present social order.’ As I show in this dissertation, my informants draw on the 
‘knowledge’ of Hindu nationalism to not only sanctify ‘useless’ suffering as martyrdom and sacrifice, 
but also to draw on its historically conceived victimhood to demand a Hindu fascist state (and 
retributive genocide), as ‘justice’ or reparations for the suffering of the Partition.  
My discussion of Hindu nationalism as a form of theodicy builds on Michael Herzfeld’s (1992) 
description of nationalism as a form of modern, secular theodicy. In The Social Production of 
Indifference, Herzfeld (ibid.) draws attention to the ways in which European nationalism resembles 
religion. The heart of this resemblance lies in the idea of transcendence; a term I have discussed 
previously. In religion, the problem of theodicy is resolved through a moral principle (karma) or deity 
(god[s]) that transcends space and time; attempting to reconcile belief in the existence of the 
supernatural with the imperfection of the world. This allows one to use, for example, the unknowable 
will of God or a divine test of one’s character or faith to serve as explanations for the existence of evil 
and suffering in God’s own world. Humanity’s deliverance from sin and suffering – through either the 
grace of God or one’s own ‘good deeds’ – takes the form of salvation in some religious systems (ibid.).  
As Herzfeld (ibid.: 6) writes, ‘The secular equivalent of salvation is the idea of a patriotic and 
democratic community, one that tolerates neither graft nor oppression.’ It is against the latter 
injustices that nationalisms claim transcendent status; stabilising a national order that promises to 
guard against past injustices and present anxieties. According to him, nationalisms claim 
transcendence through their description of a single, totalising national identity that is held to be static 
over millennia. Although Herzfeld (ibid.) specifically qualifies European nationalism in his discussion 
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of transcendence, his comparison is especially relevant to the specificities of Hindu nationalism. This 
has much to do with Hindu nationalism’s place within modernity; the subject of the following section. 
However, on nationalism and transcendence, Herzfeld writes:  
‘Nationalisms all claim transcendence, however, in two important senses. First, internally they 
claim to transcend individual and local differences, uniting all citizens in a single, unitary 
identity. Second, the forms of most European (and many other) nationalisms transcend even 
their own national concerns, in that the principle of national identity is considered to underlie 
and infuse the particulars of nation and country.’ 
(ibid.: 6)  
Herzfeld’s description of the transcendence by a singular, national identity, is similar to Etienne 
Balibar’s (2002) critique of nationalism. Balibar (ibid.: 86) critiques nationalist history-writing as a 
‘retrospective illusion’. Balibar argues that the history of nations presents the nation’s establishment 
as the inevitable result of history. Invoking the nation-state as destiny, such a history retrospectively 
binds successive generations of individuals that have inhabited a rough area of land into a national 
community; presenting their development and struggles as a compounded realisation of the national 
struggle (ibid.). In a similar vein, Peter van der Veer (1994) has also identified nationalism’s impulse to 
present the nation as eternal, historical fact; as something that has always and will always exist.  
Where van der Veer and Balibar identify the retrospective, discursive construction of the nation 
through a particular form of history-writing, Herzfeld (1992) elucidates the theodicical function of this 
imagination. Herzfeld (ibid.) describes how nationalism, through national identity, transcends local 
differences and infuses the quotidian life of the nation. This addresses the heart of how nations 
imagine their national community13; the theodicy of nationalism attempting to stabilise the nomos 
that is the rule of law and freedom: the very idea of the nation and national character. At its core, this 
essentialism that imagines a stable kinship of the national community amidst the chaos and flux of 
history, relies on the conflation of biological and cultural essentialism (ibid.). The result is the ‘myth of 
                                                            
13 Through my phrasing, I deliberately seek to invoke Benedict Anderson’s (1983) Imagined Communities here. 
However, I have refrained from an overreliance on Anderson’s (ibid.) ideas due to my agreement with Herzfeld 
(1992, 2005) and van der Veer’s (1994) thoughtful critiques of Anderson. Both Herzfeld and van der Veer argue 
that while the nation is certainly imagined, there is far more specificity to the imagination of a particular 
nation. Shunning Anderson’s top-down formulation, both Herzfeld and van der Veer seek to pay attention to 
not only how nations are imagined but how these imaginations come to be accepted by the very people who 
are homogenised in this manner. Herzfeld and van der Veer pay attention to the internal contestations within 
these imagined national communities and, in doing so, produce a description of culture through the prism of 
power.    
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national character’, a doctrine that, ‘turns blood into destiny’ (ibid.: 22). In this way, national character 
– whose source is blood – functions as a form of predestination.  
Herzfeld’s description of the way nationalism provides transcendence is especially apt for Hindu 
nationalism. The Hindu nation is held together through the millennia by a perceived sense of historical 
victimhood. This historical victimhood – which I also detail in Section 1.3 – is the result of a nationalist 
history-writing that seeks to establish the Hindu nation as eternal fact whilst, simultaneously, 
delineating an ethnically pure Hindu nation within a multicultural milieu.  
The Hindu nationalist perception of Indian history as a series of foreign invasions does not see modern 
India (and its diversity) as a product of historical political and economic processes; of cultural 
admixture produced by migration, trade, pilgrimage and invasions. Rather, it describes (Hindu) India 
as an ‘abused’, ‘raped’ and ‘colonised’ land. It reduces the specificities of Indian history to one of a 
passive victimhood to the allegedly nefarious colonising designs of Muslims and the British. The Hindus 
as a nation take shape in the victimised shadow of this aforementioned narrative of ‘sectarian 
aggression’. It is this sense of historical victimhood that is seen to hold the Hindu nation – the land 
and the people – through the millennia; a national community that is made to seem self-evident 
through the fact of a common victimhood. Through this narrative of a ‘perennial struggle with barbaric 
outsiders’, the Hindu nation is seen to transcend time itself (van der Veer, 1994: 144).  
Consequently, the image of a prosperous and advanced ancient India – a glorious past preceding 
ruination by Muslims – is romanticised (ibid.). This narrative draws on an orientalist, colonial 
historiography that sought to legitimise British rule in South Asia by conjuring the image of an ancient 
India that stood despoiled by centuries of ruinous Muslim rule (ibid.; Cohn, 2000). Thus, delegitimising 
the ruling class it sought to replace. The general tone of this discourse can be grasped from the 
thoroughly unironic title of Arthur Llewellyn Basham’s (1954) book: The Wonder That Was India: a 
survey of the culture of the Indian sub-continent before the coming of the Muslims14. Hindu nationalism 
reproduces this discourse through something of an ersatz nostalgia – a nostalgia without lived 
experience (Appadurai, 1996) – and ‘restorative nostalgia’ – nostalgia that seeks to rebuild or return 
to the imagined past (Boym, 2001: 41). 
On the whole, this narrative establishes the foreignness of Muslims and Christians in relation to an 
innately Hindu India (van der Veer, 1994). Consequently, the presence of these minorities as seemingly 
influential electoral communities – through the myth that Muslims vote as a block for ‘anti-Hindu’ 
parties – feeds the perception that the liberation of India is far from complete (ibid.). Assertions of 
                                                            
14 Till as late as 2011 – when I took a first-year undergraduate module on Cultural History at Manipal 
University, India – this book was still considered recommended reading.  
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Islamic identity in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan also mirror and fuel the perception of a Hindu 
India besieged, both internally and externally, by a hostile ‘Muslim horde’ (ibid.). Peter van der Veer 
succinctly summarised this formulation from the perspective of Hindu nationalists when he wrote:  
‘When in power, they [Muslims] oppressed Hindus; now, out of power they continue to 
withhold fundamental rights from the Hindus via the democratic system, as well as to act as 
the agents of pan-Islamism on Indian soil.’ 
(ibid.: 10) 
In this way, liberal democracy itself is seen as the enemy and its dismantling takes on the guise of 
urgent national political reform. Meanwhile, this common historical experience is seen as the 
affirmation of the self-evidentially ‘peaceful’, ‘tolerant’ and ‘weak’ national character of the Hindu 
citizen. ‘Tolerance’ is inaccurately construed from a style of oriental discourse that omits attention to 
power in its description of the alleged ‘syncretism’ and infinite, universalist assimilatory tradition of 
Hindu spirituality (ibid.: 67-68). At its worst, the famed ‘tolerance’ of Hindus is presented as historical 
fact through a discourse that constructs the innate moral superiority of Hindus in the fact of their 
victimhood; establishing Hindus as both victims but also as ‘tolerant’ hosts (ibid.). One might ask why 
a collective historical memory of ‘invasion’, along with a politics for its redressal even exists if the 
Hindu-fold is the ‘tolerant’, assimilatory sponge that this narrative claims. The lie of ‘tolerance’ can be 
glimpsed also from the VHP’s stance, whose doctrine of ‘tolerance’ applies only to ‘Indian religions’ 
and not to ‘foreign’ religions (ibid.). The Hindu nationalist organisation aspires to convert Muslims and 
Christians (ibid.).  
This myth of the Hindu national character as peaceful, tolerant and weak is seen to infuse the 
quotidian life of the nation to the point of creating the ‘Muslim question’ that primarily occupies Hindu 
nationalist politics. Consequently, the ‘weakness’ or ‘peaceableness’ of the Hindu is framed as 
something to be overcome – through the militant aggression of Hindu nationalism – for the 
achievement of national greatness.  
In addition to transcending local differences and infusing the quotidian life of the nation with purpose, 
in the context of the memories of the Partition, Hindu nationalism provides transcendence in a third 
way. Hindu nationalism helps survivors of the Partition transcend the ‘uselessness’ of their suffering 
by recourse to the redemptive, sacrificial rhetoric of nationalism. Using the language of nationalism, 
my informants rationalise their own suffering as a ‘sacrifice’ to the (Hindu) nation and see the deaths 
of their kith and kin as ‘martyrdom’. In the context of the Partition, invoking their membership of the 
Hindu nation allows the transformation of ambiguous suffering – of the death, pain and displacement 
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endured on the way to the nation – into death and suffering in pursuit of, or, for the nation. The impact 
of theodicy here is the elevation from a ‘useless’, ambiguous death to a hallowed martyrdom in service 
of the Hindu nation.  
 
 
Modernity and Hindu Nationalism 
 
I now return to the question I posed in the previous section about what it means to remember the 
Partition in the time of fascism. While in my discussion of Hindu nationalism as a form of theodicy for 
the death and suffering of the Partition, I have elucidated the theoretical framework that guides my 
analysis, there is another dimension of this question that needs consideration. This is namely that of 
the role that the memory of the Partition plays in the Hindu fascist enterprise.  
The Partition and its memory lies at the heart of India’s ‘Muslim question’. As a relatively recent 
trauma, the Partition is seen by many as proof of the ‘truth’ of Hindu nationalism’s claims on history 
and also, of the alleged ‘untrustworthiness’ of Muslims (van der Veer, 1994). There is nothing new or 
brilliant about what I am saying here as this has also been articulated and studied by a number of 
scholars such as van der Veer (1994), Pandey (2001) and Das (2007), to name a few. Some of them, 
such as van der Veer (1994) – as mentioned previously – have also drawn attention to the way that 
Hindu nationalism perceives liberal democracy – and the state itself – to have been captured by 
Muslims and their ‘secular apologists’ (or ‘sickulars’ as they are derisively called by Hindu nationalist 
trolls).   
However, what is new about this moment is the rise of the Sangh Parivar’s15 Hindu nationalism to the 
status of a hegemonic ideology within Indian politics. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu 
nationalist party, the BJP, are currently enjoying their second term in office with little foreseeable 
threat to their electoral supremacy. Their rise adds renewed salience to an examination of the 
Partition’s memory, since the rhetoric of Hindu nationalism is no longer just rhetoric.  
For Hindu nationalists, the Partition is a historical trauma as well as a lesson for the future. In recent 
times, the BJP and the Sangh has consistently used Muslims to stoke demographic anxieties. Such 
demographic anxieties around the fertility of Muslims (allegedly due to polygamy) – akin to the 
European far-right’s ‘great replacement’ conspiracy theory – link religion and sexuality (van der Veer, 
                                                            
15 A ‘family’ of Hindu nationalist organisations that includes the BJP, RSS, VHP, Bajrang Dal, Hindu Mahasabha 
and many others. 
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1994). But this is also often linked to fears of a ‘second Partition’. In September 2018, Union Minister 
Giriraj Singh warned of a ‘second Partition’ of India in 2047 (Times Now, 2018). He argued that since 
the population of India has grown from 400 million to 1.3 billion, the population of ‘divisive figures’ (a 
dog-whistle for Muslims and ‘leftists’) has also grown to alarming levels (ibid.). In a BJP rally held in 
Delhi in July 2019, members of various Hindu nationalist organisations called for a new ‘population 
control’ law while others present at the rally alleged a ‘Muslim conspiracy’ to hijack India’s democracy 
through overpopulation (ThePrint, 2019). Deporting Muslims en-masse from the country and 
curtailing their human rights were some of the dystopian solutions that were fearlessly proposed at 
this rally (ibid.). With the passing of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019 – which excludes Muslims 
– and the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC) – a nationwide citizenship verification exercise 
– it is not difficult to see how this might be achieved.  
What these discourses also articulate is a ‘fatigue’ of (Appadurai, 2017) or ressentiment for liberal 
democracy. Weber (1965: 110) understood ressentiment as a form of ‘theodicy of the disprivileged’; 
as an attempt by ordinary people to accept their place within social hierarchies. As Jeffrey Olick (2007: 
157) writes, ‘Disprivilege, then, is compensated by righteous indignation at oppressors, though 
tempered by confidence in redemption of suffering.’ Ressentiment, therefore, is hatred and jealousy 
imbued with a moral content (Horwitz, 2018).  
In Neitzsche, Weber and Scheler’s work, ressentiment is the result of the failure of theodicy (Simko, 
2012: 884). As a form of theodicy that meditates on a centuries-long victimhood, Hindu nationalism 
not only fails to deliver on its promise of real salvation but, by meditating on a historical narrative of 
disprivilege, actively engenders ressentiment. Robert Horwitz (2018) identifies ressentiment as one of 
the primary drivers of the politics of the American far-right. In this dissertation, I similarly draw 
attention to the ressentiment that occupies the narratives of my informants and, the politics of Hindu 
nationalism in general.   
What I have described as Hindu nationalism’s ressentiment – a self-righteous rage that is directed at 
minorities and the liberal democracy seen to serve them – has been described by Arjun Appadurai 
(2017) as ‘democracy fatigue’. Appadurai (2019) identifies India as the leader and innovator of a global 
wave of authoritarianism; a wave whose impulses he locates in a crisis of national sovereignty. 
According to Appadurai (2017), it is due to the modern nation-state’s lack of sovereignty over its 
national economy in a diffuse and globalised world economy that states and leaders have turned 
towards cultural sovereignty. Cultural sovereignty in this context includes ethnonationalism, cultural 
majoritarianism and the politics of belonging and citizenship (ibid.). It is these that the modern nation-
state now seeks to control as fiercely as it once aspired to control and protect its national economy 
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(ibid.). In the turn towards such majoritarian mobilisation, democracy comes to be seen as a 
bureaucratic or institutional hurdle to the realisation of cultural sovereignty; of a kind of political, 
demographic siege from within. I have already identified this tendency within the discourses of Hindu 
nationalism.  
However, in identifying ‘democracy fatigue’ as a response to the transformations of globalisation, 
Appadurai (ibid.) does not posit this an anti-modern ‘reaction’ so much as he locates it within the 
larger contours of modernity and late-stage capitalism. There is a tendency – both in India and abroad 
– to view religious nationalism and the violence of the Partition as anti-modern reactions to non-
western encounters with modernity; as the resurgence or revival of ‘backward’, ‘regressive’ and 
‘tribal’ passions. In the case of my dissertation, my treatment of religious nationalism as a form of 
theodicy seems to further complicate the relation of my conclusions to modernity. After all, theodicy 
too – given its origins in theology – might be considered a pre-modern discursive tradition. 
At issue here is a particular Western discourse of modernity; one that constructs the traditional as its 
antithesis (van der Veer, 1994). In this understanding of modernity, while nationalism and nationalist 
thought are seen as products of modernity, religion is associated with that which modernity is posited 
to replace: tradition.  
In the larger discourse of European modernity, secularism functions as a, ‘metaphor for modern 
society’ (van der Veer, 2014: 11). This perspective also informed colonial policy. The British colonial 
administration positioned itself as the ‘neutral’, ‘secular’ arbiter of incessant, cyclical and irrational 
‘communal’ conflict16 (van der Veer, 1994). Contrasting themselves from the ‘absurd’ and ‘endless’ 
ritualism of Hindus and the ‘backward’, ‘bigoted’ and overly ‘revolutionary’ Muslim community, the 
British presented their ‘secular’ and ‘rational’ regime as a modernising force that would hold the fort 
until Indian intellectuals had developed the capacity to rule themselves (ibid.: 21). Part of this idea is 
continued in the nationalist thought of some Indian secularists such as Nehru, who believed that 
‘communalism’ would disappear with the modernisation of society (ibid.: 18).  
To a certain Eurocentric understanding of modernity, religious nationalism appears something of an 
oxymoron, even an impossibility; for combining the ‘traditional’ (religion) and the ‘modern’ 
(nationalism) in a way that modernity should not allow (ibid.). As van der Veer (ibid.: x) writes, ‘This 
discourse constitutes the traditional as its antithesis and interprets difference as backwardness. A 
crucial element of the discourse of modernity is the opposition of the religious to the secular.’ Thus, 
                                                            
16 Jonathan Swift’s (2003) classic novella, Gulliver’s Travels satirises precisely this colonial attitude; the 
comically large and ‘rational’ Gulliver literally looming over the irrational squabbles of the midget Lilliputians.  
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as van der Veer (ibid.) argues, understanding religious nationalism in India requires attention to 
tradition as well as the impact of orientalism and colonialism.  
To consider both simultaneously is important since locating religious nationalism purely within 
‘tradition’ leads to an essentialising discourse of difference, while to only study the impact of 
colonialism implies that Indians received their nationalist consciousness passively; lacking any agency 
(ibid.). The latter discourse is particularly problematic as in branding nationalism in the postcolonial 
landscape a colonial imposition – akin to a symptom of ‘false consciousness’ – well-meaning critics of 
nationalism and colonialism appear to deny the aspiration for autonomy and liberation located at the 
core of nationalist movements (Chatterjee, 1993). As van der Veer (1994, 2014) has argued, while 
imperial modernity has played a profound role in the development of societies like China and India, 
their nationalism both resembles but is also distinct from European nationalism. The larger point is to 
understand that nationalism is not the product of European modernity alone because modernity itself 
takes on distinctly indigenous forms in postcolonial settings.  
In order to understand religious nationalism in India, it is vital to define and trace the genealogy of the 
word that is most often used to describe it: ‘communalism’. In common usage, the word 
‘communalism’ denotes the opposite of ‘secularism’ and means, ‘a condition of suspicion, fear and 
hostility between members of different religious communities’ (Pandey, 1990: 6). In academia, the 
word ‘communal’ is used to describe political movements that use religion or religious community as 
an organising feature such that ethnonationalism (or religious nationalism), sectarianism and 
majoritarianism but also demands for ‘communal’ representation and affirmative action are all 
dubbed ‘communalism’ (ibid.).   
In his book, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India, Gyanendra Pandey (ibid.: 6) 
argues that ‘communalism’ is a form of colonial knowledge. Through a vast historiographical 
examination of the colonial context in which the usage of the term became common course, Pandey 
(ibid.) shows that in the ambiguity of its meanings, the term in fact merely conveys orientalist 
conceptions of the ‘otherness’ of Indian politics. After all, ‘communalism’ is never used in the same 
manner to describe facets of European politics (ibid.). To some degree, the description of religious 
nationalism as ‘communalism’ was a concerted colonial attempt to deny these movements their 
nationalist character in the age of nationalism (ibid.). Religious nationalism, therefore, was not seen 
as a nationalist struggle, but instead dubbed the ‘communal’ machinations of self-interested religious 
and ethnic groups (ibid.).  
The irony is that Indian secular nationalists have continued the colonial usage of this term to deride 
‘communalism’ – religious nationalism or ethnonationalism – as ‘antinational’ (Pandey, 1990; van der 
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Veer, 1994). The ‘secular’ nationalism of Gandhi and much of the Congress party in fact employs a 
Hindu discursive tradition (ibid.). This is especially visible in the ‘saintly’ posturing of Gandhi (ibid.). 
After all, Gandhi deliberately invoked Hindu spirituality and ‘tradition’ in his conception of Indian 
nationalism (ibid.). Some scholars such as van der Veer (ibid.), have identified Gandhi’s ‘moderate’ 
Hindu nationalism as the reason for the alienation of Muslims from the Congress’ ‘secular’ 
nationalism. Opposing views are held by sections of the Congress party – who brand Gandhi’s religious 
discourse as a spirituality that transcends religion – and Hindu nationalists (including some of my 
informants) who read Gandhi’s calls for inter-faith unity, especially during the Partition, as neglecting 
Hindus in favour of Muslims17.  
Consequently, the postcolonial state also appears to have inherited the colonial administration’s 
position – at least in theory – as the ‘neutral’ arbiter of ‘communal’ violence. This is visible most clearly 
in the continued, common sense description of pogroms and ethnic cleansing in India as ‘communal 
riots’. The use of the word ‘riot’ involves hidden political connotations about the nature of the violence 
being described (Ahmad, 2020). By virtue of India’s colonial history – where the colonisers saw 
themselves as ‘neutral’ guardians of law and order – the word ‘riot’ has been used to describe 
reciprocal violence between two communities (ibid.). In this, the Indian usage of the word differs from 
the way that the word is used across the world to describe a violent clash between citizens and the 
state (ibid.). A number of pogroms in India’s recent past have been effectively erased through the 
invocation of the word riot. This includes, but is not limited to, the 1984 anti-Sikh pogroms, the 2002 
anti-Muslim pogroms in Gujarat and most recently, the 2020 anti-Muslim pogroms in Delhi.  
Describing pogroms against a minority community as a ‘Hindu-Muslim riot’, for example, involves a 
false equalization of the gigantic power inequality between the two communities, presenting them as 
equally culpable for the violence (ibid.). In the case of the aforementioned pogroms, this is 
complicated by the state’s own participation in the violence (ibid.; Das, 2007; Ghassem-Fachandi, 
2010). The result is an account of violence that obscures power from the scene of the crime. Prof 
Ahmad (2020: 2-3) expresses something of this through his idea of the ‘ditto theory’. The ‘ditto theory’ 
describes a pervasive tendency within Indian society to present the violence of the majority and the 
minority as equal and indistinguishable halves of the same whole; as dittos of each other (ibid.). Here, 
sectarian violence is decontextualized, the participation of the state obscured and hard distinctions 
between victim and perpetrator erased under the guise of ‘balance’ and ‘nuance’. The result is an 
                                                            
17Nathuram Godse’s posthumously published testimony cites Gandhi’s ‘Muslim-pandering’, ‘secular’ 
nationalism for the Partition as justification for his decision to assassinate Gandhi (Godse, 2015). This is a 
classic example of the hard-liner Hindu nationalist stance on Gandhi.  
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account of the event that evades all engagement with the specificities of violence through a weasel-
worded invocation of its alleged ‘complexity’.  
In this way, the routine use of words such as ‘communalism’ – to describe religious nationalism – and 
‘riots’ – to describe its violence – mobilise an implicit diagnosis of religious nationalism and its relation 
to the state. Here, it is pertinent to recall van der Veer’s (1994) argument that the real difference 
between ‘communalism’ and the Congress’ ‘secularism’ is merely the political and demographic 
content of the nation that is imagined: an ethnocracy versus a multicultural liberal democracy, 
respectively. Both ultimately accept religious community as a central organising feature of Indian 
society (ibid.). Thus, secular and religious nationalism are better understood as ‘moderate’ and 
‘radical’ manifestations of nationalism (ibid.: 22).  
How then do we understand the religious nationalism that is Hindu nationalism? Hindu nationalism 
imagines all Hindus – wherever they be – to constitute a natural nation based on an ancient Aryan-
Vedic civilisation18 that dates back to approximately 1500 BCE. The ultimate ambition is that of the 
                                                            
18 The term Aryan-Vedic civilisation refers to the (auto-)orientalist belief that Hinduism was brought to India by 
ancient European settlers called the Aryans (Goodrick-Clarke, 2000; Thapar, 1996, 2015; van der Veer, 1994). 
This myth of the ‘true’ racial and ethnic origins of Hinduism is also known as the Aryan race theory. 
Nineteenth-century orientalist thinkers such as Max Mueller believed that the Aryans invaded South Asia and, 
in doing so established an advanced ancient civilisation there (Thapar, 1996). Mueller credited the Aryans with 
developing the Vedic Sanskrit language and also used the Aryan invasion theory to explain India’s caste system 
(ibid.). According to him, the caste system originated as a system of racial segregation such that modern-day 
upper-castes and Brahmans were said to be descendants of the victorious Aryans, while the lower-castes and 
Dalits were said to be descendants of the vanquished non-Aryan dasas (ibid.).  
Orientalist reconstructions of Aryan history sought to establish ancient India’s connection to early European 
history to unearth common origins, ‘untouched by the intervention of the Semitic peoples and languages’ 
(ibid.: 6). Running parallel to the aforementioned British colonialist discourses of John Stuart Mill, this 
orientalist myth of the European and Asian split of a single united Aryan ancestor race provided colonised 
upper-caste Indians with ‘status’ and ‘self-esteem’ whilst also simultaneously acknowledging the inherent 
racial and cultural superiority of Europe (ibid.: 7). Between the 1920s and 1940s, common belief in Aryan race 
theory meant that German Nazis found a natural ally in (upper-caste) Hindu nationalists (Goodrick-Clarke, 
2000).  
However, while European thinkers believed that the Aryans colonised India, the RSS believes that the Aryans 
were neither invaders nor colonisers, but were instead the ‘original Hindus’ (Thapar, 1996: 9). Prof Romila 
Thapar details the RSS stance on the Aryans as follows: 
‘[T]he original Hindus were the Aryans, a distinctive people indigenous to India. Caste Hindus or Hindu 
Aryas are their descendants. There was no Aryan invasion since the Aryans were indigenous to India 
and therefore no confrontation among the people of India. The Aryans spoke Sanskrit and were 
responsible for the spread of Aryan civilisation from India to the west. Confrontations came with the 
arrival of foreigners such as the Muslims, the Christians and more recently, the communists.’ 
(ibid.: 9) 
In this way, the RSS frames the Aryan-Vedic people as the ‘original Hindus’ who have since been harassed by 
waves of ‘foreign invaders’. This discourse establishes Muslims and Christians as un-Indian. However, there is 
some ambiguity in this discourse regarding caste-Hindus and Aryans. Specifically, regarding only caste-Hindus 
as the ‘true’ descendants of the Aryans also excludes lower-castes and Dalits from being considered as real 
Hindus (ibid.). But, conversely for upper-caste Hindus and Brahmans claiming descent via the Aryans is pivotal 
to the legitimisation of their caste privilege as historical (and biological) fact. Yet, the pragmatic quotidian 
concerns of the RSS demand that the definition of ‘Aryan descent’ be expanded to include all Hindus, thus 
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creation of a Hindu Rashtra (state). In line with its aforementioned view of history, the Hindu Rashtra 
promises to liberate Hindus from their hitherto historical state of oppression and secure their 
supremacy – and the ‘eternal glory’ of Hinduism – through the ‘permanent’ institutions of the state. 
The latter impulse is also borne out in Hindu nationalism’s quintessentially ‘modern’ urge to prove the 
‘facts’ of its belief as embodied in scripture: be they references to ‘historical’ events or ‘scientific’ 
practices and innovations (ibid.). What is observable in the process is the entrenchment of modernity; 
visible in the co-optation of the sciences of modernity – archaeology, history and philology (ibid.) – to 
serve, ‘the most powerful ideology of modernity (nationalism)’ (Hamilakis, 2007: 15). In this way, while 
Hindu nationalism constitutes the revival of a ‘native’ identity – one based on religious community 
and discourse – the idioms of its articulation are familiar to those of European nationalism: one nation, 
one people.   
This formulation, however, should not be mistaken for the view that Hindu nationalism represents the 
invasion of tradition by modernity; an invasion that will ultimately resolve itself in the ‘inevitable’ 
modernisation and secularisation of society (van der Veer, 1994). Rather, Hindu nationalism – and 
religious nationalism in India – has emerged out of religious discourse, practice and a colonial policy 
of political representation and census-taking based on religious community (ibid.; Cohn, 2010). As 
opposed to the ‘slave’ of European modernity or an ‘improper’ adoption of modernity, Hindu 
nationalism must be seen as a product of the course of Asian modernity (van der Veer, 2014). That is, 
a modernity which is as much the result of native agency as it has been shaped by its encounter with 
imperial modernity (ibid.).  
This also raises the question of Hindutva – or Hindu nationalism’s – relation to Hinduism. That is, how 
much of Hinduism informs Hindu nationalism? In other words, this is the delicate issue of the degree 
to which religious nationalism – or a fundamentalism – may be said to overlap with its religion. One 
argument that is often offered in response to this is epitomised by Ashis Nandy’s (1997: 157) view that 
Hindutva cannibalises the ‘inherently tolerant’ belief system of Hinduism in service of the ‘global 
nation-state system’. Nandy distinguishes Hindutva from Hinduism in the following manner: 
‘Speaking pessimistically, Hindutva will be the end of Hinduism. Hinduism is the faith by which 
a majority of Indians still live. Hindutva is the ideology of a part of the upper-caste, lower-
middle class Indians, though it has now spread to large parts of the urban middle classes. The 
ideology is an attack on Hinduism and an attempt to protect the flanks of a minority 
consciousness which the democratic process is threatening to corner.’ 
                                                            
including the lower-castes and Dalits (ibid.). Doing so would bolster the numerical superiority of those 




Nandy’s (1990) definition of the ‘faith’ that is Hinduism is based on a view of the religion as an infinitely 
‘tolerant’ way of life. Against this inherent ‘syncretism’, Nandy (ibid.) sees the ideology of Hindutva as 
an outside intervention that radicalises a section of the faithful. However, as van der Veer (1994: 197-
199) has argued, Nandy’s argument hinges on a separation of politics from culture and religion from 
nationalism; separations that simply do not hold up to reality. In effect, Nandy’s opinions comprise a 
back-handed voicing of the doctrine of ‘Hindu tolerance’ that has its genealogy in the early Hindu 
nationalist discourses of Swami Vivekananda (ibid.).  
While I disagree with Nandy’s argument, I also recognise that the content of my disagreement raises 
the historiographical question of Hindu nationalism’s genealogy in relation to modernity and 
indigenous religious discourse. After all, I have sketched Hindu nationalism’s relation to modernity in 
far clearer terms than its relation to religious discourse; despite having held the two equally 
responsible. Ultimately, the Hinduism versus Hindu nationalism debate raises an uncomfortable 
epistemological question to which I propose no clear answer. Indeed, I would argue a clear answer to 
this lies beyond the scope of my dissertation. After all, my dissertation is an ethnography of memory 
that engages with Hindu nationalism in the capacity that the latter features as a form of theodicy. 
However, one answer is provided by van der Veer (ibid.) and Bernard Cohn (2000). Van der Veer (1994) 
argues that while regional, ethnic, caste and religious differences (and indeed localised conflict) 
existed before the advent of colonialism, colonial technologies of governance did much to solidify the 
latter two as the hegemonic modes of political expression. Bernard Cohn (2010: 224-254) has shown 
how colonial censuses rigidified caste stratifications by creating a body of orientalist knowledge that 
the British believed held the key to ruling India; knowledge that in being used to guide policy and 
governance became something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Similarly, the roots of India’s religious 
nationalism are located in the British turn to electoral representation based on religious community 
(van der Veer, 1994). Therefore, while some of the Hindu-Muslim divide pre-dates colonialism and 
these respective religious nationalisms draw on religious discourse, colonial interventions can be said 
to have played an equal role in its consolidation. This is neither an argument in favour of the ‘clash of 
civilisations’ and ‘ancient hatreds’ style narrative nor an endorsement of the view that religious 
nationalism (and indeed all postcolonial nationalisms) are a mere colonial imposition.  
Another question that is often raised in relation to Hindu nationalism is the view that Hindu 
nationalism is a distraction or a distortion from the ‘real issues’ of the day. This often manifests in 
casual, quotidian diagnoses of the BJP’s hyper nationalism and islamophobia as merely distractions 
from their government’s failings. I disagree with such monocausal diagnoses. While Hindu nationalists 
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in India make liberal use of digital technologies for the purpose of propaganda and misinformation 
(Appadurai, 2019) creating a ‘Nazi conscience’ (Koonz, 2003) in the process, this is not an end in itself.  
Van der Veer (1994: ix) argues that Hindu nationalism and other religious nationalisms should not be 
seen as, ‘ideological smoke screens that hide the real clash of material interests and social classes.’ 
Rather, Hindu nationalism must be seen as another expression for the aspiration of caste and class 
mobility. The latter is evident in the BJP’s economic nationalism; in Modi’s and the so-called ‘Gujarat 
Model’s’ promise of neoliberalism done right. Ann Kingsolver and Annapurna Pandey (2019) have 
observed how Modi’s ‘Make in India’ campaign invokes the symbolism of the colonial struggle – 
Gandhi’s Swadeshi movement – while simultaneously offering India’s marginalised workforce to global 
capital for the production of domestically manufactured and nationalistically branded goods. Through 
the discourse of ‘development’, Hindu nationalist organisations (including the BJP, RSS and VHP) have 
sought to attract diasporic investment (Mathur, 2014), whilst also echoing the desire for 
‘development’ and mobility among domestic audiences.  
Yet, this has also gone beside a militant nationalist campaign. Chandana Mathur (ibid.: 17) has noted 
the VHP’s success in redirecting funds raised in the US – including community and corporate donations 
– to RSS-affiliated Hindu nationalist organisations in India. In the 1980s and 90s money raised abroad 
directly contributed to a Hindu nationalist ‘reconversion’ drive directed at Adivasi communities; the 
program also involved violence against Christian Adivasi communities and Muslims (ibid.). The 
complementarity of ‘development’ and violence in these discourses echoes the experience of Gujarat, 
where the 2002 pogrom and the increased ghettoization of Muslims went beside rampant 
neoliberalism.   
This seeming contradiction is compounded by Hindu nationalism’s propensity for violence against 
Dalits, Adivasis and Scheduled Castes. The use of beatings, lynchings and sexual violence against 
lower-caste Hindus as a disciplining tool is a well-documented reality; one that has only intensified 
under the current regime19. Yet upper-caste violence against lower-caste Hindus has gone beside a 
noticeable Hindu nationalist outreach towards Dalit, Scheduled Caste, OBC20 and Adivasi voters, since 
the 1980s (Ghassem-Fachandi, 2010). The VHP, RSS and BJP – at least on paper – claim commitment 
to the eradication of untouchability (van der Veer, 1994). This outreach, through ‘cultural awakening 
programmes’ and recruitment into Hindu nationalist organisations has yielded both votes and boots 
                                                            
19 According to government statistics, reported crimes against Dalits went up by 6% between 2009 and 2018, 
while in the last five years, 20.40% of all reported cases of Caste-based violence concerned sexual violence 
against Scheduled Caste women (The Hindu, 2018a). This, however, is merely a statistical breakdown of the 
cases that were reported, and in which caste was legally acknowledged as a factor contributing to the crime.   
20 OBC is a legally designated term that signifies some lower-castes as Other Backward Castes for the purposes 
of their inclusion in affirmative action policies.  
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on the ground. The participation of some members of Dalit, Scheduled Caste and Adivasi communities 
in pogroms against minorities has also been observed in recent times, especially in the pogroms of 
1984 (Das, 2007) and 2002 (Ghassem-Fachandi, 2010). In the case of the 2002 anti-Muslim pogrom in 
Gujarat, the participation of some members of Dalit, Adivasi and Scheduled Caste communities 
involved a spatial division of the labour of violence between castes, as well as a test and performance 
of their loyalty to the Hindu-fold (ibid.).  
How might we then reconcile the violence of Hindu nationalism with its aspirational imaginaries in a 
way that does not reduce its nationalism to an ideological smokescreen? How can we understand the 
violence of Hindu nationalism as anything but a distraction from ‘real’ material and economic 
concerns? After all, Hindu nationalism’s success in attracting subaltern Hindus and Adivasis to the 
Hindu-fold is an astonishing development considering endemic upper-caste violence against these 
groups. Moreover, the Sangh Parivar’s Hindu nationalism is built on the bedrock of a Brahmanical 
morality that hinges on cow protectionism, vegetarianism and the popularisation of Sanskrit and 
certain scripture such as Valmiki’s version of the Ramayana (van der Veer, 1994).  
One explanation may be found through a creative deployment of the legendary Indian anthropologist 
M.N. Srinivas’ (1966) idea of Sanskritisation. Srinivas (ibid.: 6) defines Sanskritisation as, ‘the process 
by which a “low” Hindu caste, or tribal or other group, changes its customs, ritual, ideology, and way 
of life in the direction of a high, and frequently, “twice-born” caste.’ Although not specifically posited 
in relation to Hindu nationalism, Sanskritisation locates an aspirational imaginary at the heart of 
subaltern adoption of upper-caste Hindu (nationalist) culture. Aspiration and not false-consciousness 
is located as the driver of social change. We might think of Sanskritisation as a tactical acceptance of 
assimilation and integration by subaltern Hindus in pursuit of the aspiration for mobility.    
Sanskritisation can be seen at work in the Sangh Parivar’s success in recruiting some lower-caste 
Hindus into the Hindu-fold. Sanskritisation is embodied by the two Hindu nationalists – Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi and President Ram Nath Kovind – who currently hold the highest offices in the land. 
Long-time RSS members, Modi – a celibate, vegetarian and OBC – and Kovind – a vegetarian Dalit – 
embody the Sangh’s Sanskritisation project. Although subaltern Hindus themselves, they actively 
practice a Hindu nationalist politics that turns Brahmanical morality into state policy whilst integrating 
lower-castes within the Hindu-fold. For subaltern Hindus and Adivasis, integration into the Hindu-fold 
is a sign of mobility whilst simultaneously consolidating the numerical might of the Hindu-fold. By 
actively recruiting Dalits, Scheduled Castes and Adivasis, Hindutva’s Sanskritisation creates the illusion 
of the ‘annihilation of caste’ (to appropriate the title of B.R. Ambedkar’s (2014) seminal book) whilst 
in fact consolidating Brahmanical hegemony under the homogenising banner of the Hindu-fold.  
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Violence occupies a central position in this aspirational imaginary due to what Appadurai (2019) has 
identified as the ‘syndrome of aspirational hatred.’ Appadurai (ibid.) diagnoses the violence of the 
Hindu Right, India’s rampant sexual violence and looming fascism – as embodied in laws such as the 
CAA and a proposed national-NRC – as ‘aspirational hatred’. While the word ‘aspiration’ is normally 
used in the context of social mobility, Appadurai (ibid.) uses it in this context to emphasise how the 
ruling party has normalised hatred and violence in mainstream society to the extent that violence has 
become a vehicle of social mobility. After all, as Appadurai (ibid.) says, ‘When we are ruled by thieves, 
killers and rapists, who enjoy immunity, it is no surprise that many begin to believe that hate can take 
you nowhere but up.’  
While Appadurai (ibid.) is right in theorising the violence of the Hindu Right as ‘aspirational hatred’, 
he is incorrect in according this a recent innovation. The Hindu Right’s activism since the 1980s reveals 
that its violence is neither distraction nor distortion but the very means by which the aspiration for 
mobility is expressed. It is and has been an ‘aspirational hatred’ for quite some time. For those who 
resist the Hindu-fold – from within or outside – its violence is a warning, a threat and a disciplining 
tool (Banaji, 2018). For those who partake in it, its violence bears the guise of empowerment; a 
performance of one’s citizenship within the Hindu nation. The ‘aspiration’ was always there. All that 
the current dispensation has done is to recruit the institutions of the state themselves towards this 
end. Aspirational hatred is no longer just a darkness lurking within Indian society; it is the state itself. 
This recognition of religious nationalism (and its violence) located within religious discourse and 
modernity makes my engagement with theodicy all the more meaningful.  
 
 
Partition, Violence and Modernity 
 
Thus far, in this section, I have located Hindu nationalism within modernity and identified the 
specificity of its politics as the leader and innovator of a global wave of authoritarianism. In concluding 
this Introduction, I want to locate the Partition within modernity and offer a definition of violence. I 
consider this an important statement given the wide prevalence of a Euro-American view that violence 
in the Global South is somehow endemic, cyclical, irrational and inevitable. This view has also been 
internalised to a significant degree.  
While the Partition of India is squarely located within the horrors of the twentieth-century its violence 
is often construed as a product of ancient hatreds. However, the impulse to partition and transfer 
populations is not unique to the South Asian context. Rather, the partitioning of territory and 
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population transfers emerged in the early twentieth-century out of an aspiration to create perfectly 
homogenous, modern nation-states from heterogeneous territories (Özsu, 2014). Gellner (1983) has 
argued that modern, industrial societies – in contradistinction to agrarian societies – desire cultural 
and linguistic – and thereby national – homogeneity for the purposes of efficiency.   
The first recorded population transfer occurred between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire in 1913, 
at the end of the Second Balkan War (Özsu, 2014). In the Balkans, numerous such exchanges of 
populations sought to reverse a history of ethnic mixing that was seen as problematic to national unity 
and identity – and thereby detrimental to ‘efficiency’ (ibid.; Gellner, 1983). This precedent was 
continued in 1923 when, as part of the Treaty of Lausanne, the political and ethnic borders of the 
defeated Ottoman Empire were redrawn under the influence of Britain and France (Özsu, 2014). The 
Treaty stipulated a ‘compulsory’ transfer of ethnic minorities between Greece and Turkey (ibid.). The 
Greek-Turkish experiment with demographic engineering was cited by the Peel Commission of 1937 
as a ‘good precedent’, whilst proposing the Partition of Palestine into a Jewish and Arab state along 
with a transfer of population (Drew, 2017). The Peel Commission was also noteworthy for its use of 
overtly medicalised, biopolitical discourse in support of a population transfer (ibid.).  
The idea of surgically displacing an unwanted minority with the aim of promoting a well-ordered 
homogeneity captures the quintessentially modern, biopolitical impulses that underlie the logic used 
to justify partitions and population transfers (Bauman, 1989). Elsewhere, Marilyn Strathern (1992) has 
written extensively about how the Euro-American concept of ‘society’ is imagined as internally 
homogenous and self-same such that national societies are like the ‘individual’ person. Partitions and 
population transfers merely attempt to establish this imagined homogeneity as ‘facts on the ground’. 
However, in delineating the quintessentially ‘modern’ character of India’s Partition, I am not endorsing 
the bland liberal maxim that India’s ethnonationalism and Partition was purely the result of the British 
policy of ‘divide and rule’. Such a narrative others the violence of the Partition and erases the agency 
and culpability of the politicians, individuals and organisations that exacerbated and participated in 
the violence on the ground. I have previously alluded to the dual hand of colonial policy and indigenous 
religious discourse and histories in the emergence of India’s religious nationalisms. Here, I merely wish 
to locate the Partition and its transfer of population within modernity as a technology of governance 
that sought to produce ‘modern’ homogenous nation-states. It is in this sense that the Partition – with 
an implied and poorly estimated population transfer (Khan, 2017a) – as a solution to ethnic conflict, 
made sense to the colonial administration.  
But there is more specificity to this story as the homogeneity imagined by Muslim and Hindu 
nationalism does not easily translate into support for the Partition. In the opinion of the Congress 
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party and independent India’s nationalist history-writing, Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s Muslim league, is 
demonised as the one who espoused the ‘secessionist’ logic of the Partition (ibid.). Meanwhile, in 
Pakistan, Jinnah is regarded as a liberator; as the nation’s Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader) and Baba-i-
Qaum (Father of the Nation) (ibid.). Ayesha Jalal (1985), on the other hand, has argued that Jinnah 
was in fact a secular nationalist who merely used the demand for Pakistan as a bargaining tool. Fearful 
of the spectre of a de facto Hindu majoritarian rule, Jinnah’s politics is explained as an attempt to 
secure constitutionally guaranteed minority representation (ibid.). This argument is not without some 
merit considering that during its inception, the idea of Pakistan was a fundamentally non-territorial 
nation (Zamindar, 2007). While there is significant ambiguity around whether Jinnah and the Muslim 
League were serious about the Partition, the Partition that did occur was a disappointment to all 
parties involved (Khan, 2017a). 
However, on the whole, Muslim nationalism – much like Hindu nationalism – imagined an ethnically 
pure Muslim nation-state21.  This imagination was problematized during the Partition as the newly 
independent nation-state of Pakistan feared being overrun by north Indian Muslim refugees 
(Zamindar, 2007: 70-76). The provincial government of Sindh was in favour of restricting the numbers 
of refugees due to a lack of adequate resources for their rehabilitation (ibid.). In this, the government 
found itself facing a narrative of ‘sacrifice’, of the sacrifices that muhajirs (religious refugees) had made 
for Pakistan that were seen as entitling them to a place within the new nation (ibid.). Meanwhile, in 
India, legislations around ‘evacuee property’ stipulated that property evacuated by Muslims fleeing 
for Pakistan and then subsequently occupied by Hindu and Sikh refugees – irrespective of whether the 
Muslim owner had actually relocated to Pakistan – could not be dispossessed off the refugees (ibid.). 
In time, as the messy unresolved migration of the Partition descended into biopolitical concerns 
around ‘space’ and rehabilitation, India enacted a permit system to prevent the back-flow of north 
Indian Muslims (ibid.). This was reciprocated by Pakistan, and, in so doing, a harsh border and visa 
regime took shape as an attempt to stabilise the movement of people (ibid.). In this way, a Partition 
that was partly predicated on creating ethnic homogeneity was ironically interrupted for having 
created too much migration.  
Meanwhile the Hindu nationalist organisations, the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha advocated Hindu 
supremacy, but did not specifically desire the Partition of ‘Undivided India’ (Akhand Bharat). In the 
1930s, India’s Hindu nationalist movement was itself emerging as a strong political force, having 
positioned itself in opposition to Gandhi’s ‘secular’ nationalism, Ambedkar’s anti-Brahman Dalit-
                                                            
21 In fact, in Urdu and Persian, the word ‘pak’ – the first syllable of Pakistan – means ‘pure’. This is one 
interpretation of the name Pakistan.   
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emancipatory politics and the ‘Muslim-threat’ embodied by Jinnah’s Muslim league (Goodrick-Clarke, 
2000). Hindu nationalism was best articulated by V.D. Savarkar (of the Hindu Mahasabha) who opined 
Hindutva (Hindu-ness) as an ethnic nationalism that aspired to a Hindu-Aryan nation (ibid.). Although 
not supportive of Partition, Savarkar nevertheless held that Hindus and Muslims constituted two 
immiscible nations (ibid.).  
The RSS ideologue M.S. Golwalkar (the leader of the RSS from the year 1940) sheds more light on the 
Hindu nationalist solution to the ‘minority problem’. A self-confessed admirer of Hitler and Nazi 
Germany, Golwalkar (1939) saw Hitler’s persecution of the Jews as a ‘great lesson’ that Hindus could 
‘learn’ and ‘profit’ from (Goodrick-Clarke, 2000). The following is an excerpt from Golwalkar’s 
biography, We or Our Nation Defined: 
‘German national pride has now become the topic of the day. To keep up the purity of the 
Race and its culture, Germany shocked the world by her purging the country of the Semitic 
races— the Jews. Race pride at its highest has been manifested here. Germany has also shown 
how well nigh impossible it is for Races and cultures, having differences going to the root, to 
be assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindusthan to learn and profit 
by.’ 
(Golwalkar, 1939: 87-88) 
For Golwalkar, Muslims, Christians and communists constituted a grave threat to the Hindu nation 
and its culture and values (Guha, 2013: 371). His reference to Nazi Germany’s ‘purging’ – a word that 
implies ‘purification’ through violence and suffering – of its minorities outlines an ominous vision for 
India’s religious minorities. Although Golwalkar positioned himself as an advocate of a Hindu 
nationality that he located within an ancient tradition, the Hindu nation he ultimately envisioned took 
as its inspiration Nazi Germany; a nation-state postcolonial thinkers such as Aimé Césaire (1972) have 
located as the end-point of European nationalism and modernity.  
My objective in making the impulses of modernity explicit within Muslim and Hindu nationalism and 
also a larger genealogy of population transfers, is an attempt at locating the Partition squarely within 
the twentieth-century’s world historical events. Locating the Partition is not an issue of 
contemporaneity – of an event that happened alongside others – but of identifying a larger political 
and historical landscape of which the Partition and its violence was and is a part. The larger point here 
is that the horrific violence of the Partition is not the result of an innate ‘tribal-ness’ of South Asia but, 
is rather coterminous with a larger history of the mutual exchange and ‘unmixing’ of populations in 
pursuit of ethnic supremacy and national unity.  
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Having located the impulse to Partition within modernity, I now want to turn my gaze to violence. 
What is violence and how might we understand it? One way of thinking about violence is elaborated 
by Deepti Misri (2014). Misri (ibid.: 9) argues that, ‘every writing (or representation) of violence is also 
a “reading” (or interpretation) of violence’. Misri’s (ibid.) Beyond Partition, predominantly focuses on 
representations and narrativizations of the violence of the nation-state as found in literature, ‘high 
art’, public performance and visual art. Misri’s (ibid.: 9) work is guided by the idea that, ‘violence “on 
the streets,” as it were, is of a piece with the shifting ways in which something called “violence” is 
conceptualized and represented within culture.’  
Misri qualifies her argument by reference to the killing of women by their own families during the 
Partition of India. She argues that the murder of female relatives for ‘honour’ was sanctioned and 
glorified by existing cultural notions about ‘honour’ and ‘sacrifice’. Misri analogises these killings to 
the tradition of sati: the ritual practice of burning alive a widow on her husband’s funeral pyre. While 
a narrative of ‘sacrifice’ and ‘honour’ presents these ‘deaths’ as altruistic suicide, the concerted 
interruption of this narrative by feminist scholars has led to the recognition of violence in this context. 
Thus, Misri argues that representations of violence simultaneously involve an interpretation of the 
violence being represented (or erased). For Misri (ibid. 9), violence then is, ‘a historically and socially 
specific process that moves in the realm of discourse and helps construct it.’ 
In seeing representation as constitutive of violence – an approach that also guides scholarly definitions 
of genocide denial as a continuation of genocide – Misri (ibid.) treats violence as performative. Here, 
she follows Anupama Roy’s (2009: 240) advice against a ‘purely instrumental’ or ‘utilitarian’ definition 
of violence. Roy (ibid.) makes this argument in relation to her research on caste-based atrocities 
against Dalits. Roy writes: 
‘In attributing to violence a purely instrumental or utilitarian function— seeing it as a reaction 
to Dalit economic mobility or political mobilization of Dalits—we ignore the fact that violence 
continues regardless of efficacy because it is also pedagogical instruction in a symbolic order 
obscured by modern state forms and discourses. The brutal ritual desecration of the gendered 
Dalit body is a technology of violence that resurrects archaic forms of sexual violence and 
punishment in direct proportion to the politicization of Dalits.’ 
(ibid.: 240) 
Misri’s (2014) idea of the performativity of violence also builds on Allen Feldman’s (1997: 36) view of 
violence as, ‘second representation’. Examining the aesthetics of terror, Feldman (ibid.: 36) argues 
that, ‘the act of violence can be a visualizing apparatus, a lens, and a narrativizing frame all at once.’ 
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Due to the fact that violence is already a narrativizing frame – one that embodies an aesthetic of terror 
that draws on culture – violence is easily absorbed into collective memory (ibid.). Although Feldman 
specifically speaks of Northern Ireland, he expresses an insight into violence than can be seen to have 
universal applicability:  
‘The wrack and ruin of dead, wounded, maimed bodies and buildings is already a 
representational configuration, a created or artificed scene that is prepared in advance for an 
ex post facto second representation by the media and various apologetics or condemnations. 
Typification and mimesis allow violence to function as collective memory because violence is 
grounded on the moral aesthetics of reenactment in Northern Ireland. The meaning and 
memory of any political act is prepared in advance by an accumulation of mimetic moments 
and reenactments that weave together fate and fatality.’ 
(ibid.: 36-7) 
In the Indian context, Marxist historian Prof Tanika Sarkar (2002: 2872) similarly elaborates on the 
performativity of Hindu nationalist violence, describing it as a ‘carnivalesque’ violence performed to 
serve real and imagined audiences. Writing in response to the anti-Muslim pogroms of Gujarat in 2002, 
Sarkar (ibid.) details a ‘semiotics of terror’ within the violence of the Hindu Right. According to Sarkar 
(ibid.: 2874), the discourses of Hindutva reveal, ‘a dark sexual obsession about allegedly ultra-virile 
Muslim male bodies and over-fertile Muslim female ones’. She connects this violence to a history of 
gendered victimhood; a history that demands that its revenge be similarly sexed. Elsewhere, Paola 
Bacchetta (2000) too has noted the gendered nature of Hindu nationalism’s conception of history; a 
history of ‘Muslim domination’ that is perceived as a failure of Hindu masculinity.  
In response to this history of emasculation, sexual violence and murder perform a revenge that is 
richly semiotic. There is the ‘dishonour’ of the act itself, the satisfaction of ‘forbidden desire’, the 
physical destruction of the other’s reproductive capacity, the punishment of the ‘fertile female body’ 
through torture and finally murder, to stem the demographic growth of the ‘other’ (Sarkar, 2000: 
2876). Furthermore, the burning of the corpses of victims serves to not only destroy evidence but also 
to deny them a proper Islamic burial (ibid.). Using the Hindu funerary practice of burning, the ‘Other’ 
is literally and symbolically purged from the land; a ‘purifying’ act that may also be seen as a 
posthumous conversion (ibid.).  
While Sarkar details the semiotics that this violence performs, Appadurai (1998) offers a related 
interpretation that establishes a link between violence and the processes of globalization. Writing 
specifically about this kind of gory, proximate, bodily violence, Appadurai (ibid.: 919) coins the term 
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‘vivisectionist violence’. Appadurai (ibid.) posits ‘vivisectionist violence’ as a form of bodily 
examination that responds to the ‘uncertainty’ of globalisation. According to him, ‘the most horrible 
forms of ethnocidal violence are mechanisms for producing persons out of what are otherwise diffuse, 
large-scale labels that have effects but no locations’ (ibid.: 919). Through censuses and other 
population management tools of the state, globalisation disappears individuals within the labels of 
large-scale identities (ibid.). 
Appadurai theorises vivisectionist violence as an attempt at establishing ‘certainty’ of the identity of 
the victim amid the uncertainty of globalization. He argues that globalization through its intensity, 
speed and scale of the movement of people, and material and ideological elements breeds 
uncertainty. These uncertainties range from demographic anxieties produced by the proximate 
presence of ethnic others within the body politic to uncertainties around establishing the identity of 
one’s ethnic enemies. Appadurai’s discussion of the hidden, secretive and treacherous presence of 
the other within one’s society draws on Zygmunt Bauman’s (1997) discussion of ‘the Stranger’.  
Such demographic anxieties are especially visible in Hindu nationalist discourses. These range from 
the fear of being ‘replaced’ by over-fertile Muslims to the fear of having their own members recruited 
to the task of this demographic replacement through conversion and even marriage (‘Love Jihad’). The 
result is a Hindu nationalism that feels besieged from the inside and outside; surrounded by the hidden 
presence of lower-caste ‘Others’, communists, proximate enemy religions and neighbouring enemy 
nation-states. Amid this landscape of uncertainty, secrecy and treachery, violence creates, ‘a macabre 
form of certainty’, even intimacy, through a search for an otherness situated in the body (Appadurai, 
1998: 909).  
However, Appadurai (ibid.) clarifies that vivisectionist violence does not only concern the elimination 
of uncertainty through a macabre form of proximate ‘dead certainty’. Rather, he links the turn to 
vivisectionist violence to, ‘circumstances where the lived experience of large labels becomes unstable, 
indeterminate, and socially volatile, so that violent action can become one means of satisfying one's 
sense of one's categorical self’ (ibid.: 922).    
In this way, aside from performing a ‘semiotics of terror’, vivisectionist violence can also be seen as 
the performance of the unity of the Hindu-fold. Shakuntala Banaji (2018) expresses something of this 
through her idea of ‘vigilante publics’. Banaji (ibid.) uses the term to describe the co-optation of large 
numbers of Dalits and Jains towards the cause of Hindu nationalism. Building on the work of Sarkar 
and Appadurai, among others, Banaji (ibid.) theorises the Hindu Right’s propensity for spectacular, 
gory and public acts of violence as a form of communication; serving as a call to mobilisation for some 
and a warning to others. Banaji (ibid.) also notes the widespread use of modern information 
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communication technologies in the dissemination of videos of violence as well as propaganda 
messages.  
Through his aforementioned idea of ‘aspirational hatred’, Appadurai (2019) draws attention to how 
the BJP’s Hindu nationalism has fast bridged the gap between the ‘fascism of law’ with the ‘fascism of 
the streets’. While the latter has historically marked its enemies for public execution, the former has 
now emerged onto the scene to provide absolute immunity to routinized mob violence. Under Modi, 
Muslims (and to a similar extent dalits) have been ‘open game’ for a while now. If the spate of cow 
lynchings over the last 6 years prove anything, it is this: we are witnessing the return of The Mob.  
Now when I use that word to describe this violence I am specifically connecting it to memories of the 
Partition where The Mob is something of an enigma. In the grammar of Partition narratives, The Mob 
almost functions like a proper noun. It needs no introduction or explanation: “The Mob came to our 
house”, “Or we heard The Mob”. To its survivors, those are both descriptions and explanations of 
violence.  
The Mob is seen popularly as a headless mass of violent hooligans that will destroy everything in their 
path. But The Mob is anything but. The Partition presents myriad examples of the tactical – even 
‘thoughtful’ – use of ethnonationalist violence for personal retribution and aspirations. For example, 
Urvashi Butalia (2000) documents stories of mobs that abducted elderly widows and then forced them 
to adopt sons of the other community so that these men could inherit their property.  
The coordination of The Mob was also visible in the rape and murder of 8 year old Asifa in April 2018, 
by five Hindu nationalists in Kathua, Jammu (Fareed, 2018). Asifa was kidnapped, sedated and raped 
repeatedly over the course of two days, in a temple and then killed (ibid.). After the incident came to 
light, the Jammu Bar Association tried to obstruct the filing of a chargesheet, alleging that it was biased 
against Hindu Dogras (Ahmad, M, 2018a). Furthermore, two BJP ministers in the then Jammu and 
Kashmir government led a flag march in support of the rapists (ibid.). Asifa came from the nomadic 
Bakkarwal community and later investigations revealed that this was done to her in an attempt to 
scare the Bakkarwal community from coming to Kathua ever again (Fareed, 2018). They succeeded. 
The intersection of sexual and sectarian violence here seems like something that would have 
happened during the Partition.  
And so when one really gets down to it, one finds that The Mob is rational to a fault. Its violence has 
a clear set of objectives; whether that’s to inherit the property of widows, to drive Muslims off the 
land or more recently, to terrorise university students into silence. The Mob then is a precipitated 
force that establishes a new rule of law through the generous use of violence. The Mob has a clear 
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conception of history; a laundry list of historical injustices to avenge. The Mob has a clear set of 
political objectives in mind: the realisation of a Hindu nation. It isn’t the breakdown of law and order 
but the imposition of a new sectarian order. There is a creative impulse at its core. 
Violence is therefore many things. It is a performative, ‘narrativizing frame’ (Feldman, 1997) with an 
embodied ‘semiotics of terror’ (Sarkar, 2002) that often seeks to establish ‘certainty’ through gory, 
vivisectionist proximity (Appadurai, 1998). At its core, the destruction of violence is a creative process 
that seeks to create order; to give physical form to an imagined homogeneity. Additionally, narratives 
of violence are also interpretations of violence (Misri, 2014). 
In this dissertation I draw on this understanding of violence in a myriad ways. For example, in Chapter 
2, my analysis of my informants’ discourse of sacrifice as a form of theodicy is driven by the insight 
that memories of violence implicitly embody an interpretation of the event. In Chapter 3, I examine 
how violence constitutes the formation of national community (Pandey, 2001). Violence as a 
‘narrativizing frame’ – both in the act and its representation after the fact (Feldman, 1997) – visualises 
community (Pandey, 2001). Violence happens and is only seen to have happened at the borders of 
community (ibid.). That is, violence – the act – is not only a performance of community, but violence 
– in representation – creates and maintains those boundaries (ibid.). Pandey (ibid.) argues that 
violence can happen only at the borders of the community; it is located outside it. It polices those 
borders by being remembered in collective memory as having happened to or outside the community, 
but never within it. Meanwhile, the violence that occurs within communities – such as the gendered 
violence against women during the Partition – is memorialised not as ‘violence’ but as ‘sacrifice’ or 
‘martyrdom’; as death in service of the collectivity (ibid.; Misri, 2014). Therefore, violence as a 




Overview of Chapters 
 
As stated previously, this dissertation argues that to the survivors of the Partition, Hindu nationalism 
functions as a form of theodicy that rationalises their experience of violence, suffering and 
displacement. This dissertation is composed of three gigantic chapters that might be better thought 
of as ‘parts’ or ‘volumes’ in themselves. The chapters of this dissertation represent a chronological 
progression from the immediacy of the suffering of the Partition, to the years of patient hard work 
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and recovery that followed, to the ressentiment and questions of healing that have been left in the 
wake of this experience.  
In Chapter 1 entitled, ‘Maps and Memory: The Nostalgic Cartographers from Pakistan’, I begin my 
ethnography of the memory of the Partition by writing about my informants’ hand-drawn maps. This 
chapter documents three unusual ethnographic encounters with Partition survivors who drew maps 
of their abandoned homeland. As the memory of the division of a land, hand-drawn maps seem a 
fitting motif for remembering the Partition.  
Using the work of Michel de Certeau (1984), I argue that these maps represent the spatialisation of 
memory and the memorialisation of space. Drawing a picture of their abandoned homes and cities 
from memory, my informants articulate a memory of space while memorialising it. These maps are 
not merely maps – the two-dimensional representation of a geographic area – but are better 
understood as ‘speech acts’ or ‘acts of enunciation’ (ibid.: 119). Narrated in the structure of a ‘tour’ 
or ‘itinerary’, these maps do not just describe the lay of the land, but rather articulate a memory of 
space that meanders through the abandoned paths of their past life, encountering with it memories 
of deceased friends, relatives and even former lovers. My informants’ memory-maps do not follow a 
set formula of remembrance. Rather, the three memory maps I discuss in this chapter could not be 
more different. In fact, showcasing the rich, organic diversity of these narratives is part of my objective 
here. As I have written previously, there is no one master narrative of the Partition. There are as many 
retellings of the Partition – if not more – as there are people. 
However, Chapter 1 also serves an important secondary purpose to this dissertation: that of setting 
the scene. Chapter 1 begins with a discussion of the grandparent-like relationships I formed with my 
informants during the course of my fieldwork. This is followed by an intimate glimpse into the site of 
my fieldwork: Delhi and its surrounding National Capital Region. I consider this an important 
foregrounding section given my earlier discussion of Connerton (1989) and Halbwachs’ (1992) work 
on memory and nostalgia. Since the process of remembrance reanimates the body of the past with 
the spirit of the present, it is important to provide a rich description of the present within which my 
informants remember the Partition.  
There are two ways in which Chapter 1 accomplishes this. Firstly, in Section 1.3, I discuss the 
contestations around history that dominate the contemporary cityscapes of north India. This is 
specifically a discussion of Hindu nationalism’s claims on history. These claims are made relevant to 
my discussion of memory since my informants interpret the Partition as the continuation of a 
thousand-year old history of ‘Muslim aggression’ against ‘innocent’, ‘Hindu India’. We may consider 
this the contested past of the present in which the Partition is remembered. On the other hand, in 
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Section 1.4, I provide an ethnographic account of my field site and the way in which the landscape of 
Delhi evokes memories of the Partition. Through this seemingly clunky but necessary dual-
foregrounding, Chapter 1 introduces many of the political and historical issues that appear in the 
Partition memories of my informants. Meanwhile, my informants’ hand-drawn maps provide a rich 
glimpse into the diverse ways in which the Partition is remembered by its survivors.  
In Chapter 2, entitled, ‘Sacrifice and Suffering: The Purusharth of Refugees’, I truly begin my discussion 
of Hindu nationalism as a form of theodicy of the Partition. This chapter focuses on a discourse that 
was popularly articulated by my informants, that their hard work (or purusharth) following the 
Partition constituted a ‘sacrifice’ to the nation. My informants repeatedly emphasised this discourse 
using fable-like tales extolling the virtues of hard work and cleverness. However, my informants’ 
description of hard work as a ‘sacrifice’, is in fact part of a larger discourse of sacrifice and martyrdom 
that encompasses not only the death and suffering of the Partition but also the honour killings of 
women co-religionists. Using Weber’s (1965, 2013) insights on theodicy and karma, I argue that my 
informants’ discourse of sacrifice constitutes a form of theodicy that seeks to transcend the 
uselessness of their suffering. I also argue that my informants’ narrative of ‘hard work as sacrifice’ 
constitutes a karmic justification of their current privilege.  
Examining the gendered nature of this discourse constitutes a major theme in this chapter. Building 
on the work of Das (2007), Seremetakis (1991), Butalia (2000) and Menon and Bhasin (1998) I argue 
that the discourse of sacrifice is a specifically masculine discourse of mourning. Furthermore, in this 
chapter, I also contrast the stories of hard work told to me by male informants with those told by 
women informants. Although many of these women held full-time jobs and ran businesses in the 
aftermath of the Partition, their hard work receives little acknowledgement in the larger discourse of 
‘hard work as sacrifice’. Here, building on Das’ (2007) work, I argue that just as women absorbed the 
memory of the violence of the Partition within the ordinary experience of being a woman in a 
patriarchal society, so too, they play an equal and active part in obscuring their own hard work within 
descriptions of quotidian domestic life.  
Finally, in Chapter 3, entitled, ‘Remembrance and Healing: Reflections on the Post-Partition Context’, 
I confront the question of what it means to remember the Partition in the time of fascism. As its title 
suggests, this chapter wonders whether remembering the Partition can be considered truly healing 
given the rise of Hindu fascism in India. Engaging in a critique of Partition oral history, this chapter 
argues that the notion of ‘speaking out’ as ‘healing’ is little more than a form of narcissistic theodicy. 
Juxtaposing oral history’s celebration of the nostalgia of Partition survivors against their islamophobia, 
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this chapter explores the ressentiment that animates these narratives. My analysis of ressentiment 




Chapter 1. Maps and Memory: The Nostalgic Cartographers from 
Pakistan 
 
1.1. Introduction: Relationships and Metaphors 
 
‘I remember the whole map of the place, so much so that even their [Pakistani] staff which sits there, 
works there, would not know. Still I can draw the drawing of my house, my important places, my 
schools and my canal also. There we used to go for swimming every Sunday.’ 
     Om Prakash, May 24, 2015 
 
The trend of my informants drawing maps from memory was one of the most unexpected themes that 
emerged from my fieldwork. In many ways this had always been lurking in the background, visible in 
the way that some of my informants stressed the fidelity of their memory by claiming that they could 
draw maps from memory. It was not until I interviewed my late grandfather’s best friend Dayaram 
that such claims became anything more than a metaphor. In my very first interview, back in May 2015 
– when I was conducting oral history interviews for my MPhil thesis – my granduncle spoke about how 
he could draw a map of the city of Dera Ghazi Khan – his ancestral city – from memory. 
Om Prakash, my maternal granduncle, migrated to India from Pakistan on August 8, 1947; 9 days 
before the details of the Radcliffe Line were made public (Kohli, 2015: 26). Om Prakash was the second 
eldest of six siblings (my late grandfather being the eldest). At the time of the Partition, he was 16 
years of age and had just completed his 10th grade Metric examination. His parents, my great-
grandparents, decided to move to Delhi on the advice of a relative based in Delhi. They chose to leave 
before the formal announcement of the borders, to pre-empt the chaos of Partition. The plan was 
that once the situation had normalised, they would return to Dera Ghazi Khan22. They never did. 
Witnessing the chaos in the countryside first-hand, as they rode the train from Multan to Bathinda, 
was their first inkling that the situation was far worse than they had anticipated. As ethnonational 
tensions flared into full-blown genocide and the newly independent states of India and Pakistan 
established competing, oppressive visa regimes, their temporary move to Delhi was made permanent.  
                                                            
22 People in that part of Punjab, already knew that their districts would be part of Pakistan. It was only the 
border towns and villages whose fate, vis-à-vis the border, was unknown. Thus, migrating before the 
announcement of the border made sense for some people, given the uncertainty of the situation.  
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When I began studying the Partition in 2015, my granduncle was the first person I interviewed23. He 
was 84 years old at the time and in relatively good health. I interviewed him in his bedroom. He sat 
on the edge of the bed, while I sat on a camel stool, directly facing him. For distraction, he turned on 
the match and muted the TV. The Indian Premier League was in full-swing at the time. From time to 
time we’d both glance at the TV and exchange a few words about the match. This mix of idle cricket-
chatter interspersed with heavy memories of the Partition made for an interesting cocktail.  
Throughout the conversation, I was directly looking up at him. This minor detail, coupled with the fact 
that he is an elder and the reigning patriarch of our family, meant that I felt relatively powerless. He 
was the expert in this situation; the one in power. This reality of interviewing stood in stark contrast 
to everything I had learnt about research, till then. After all it is often assumed that the researcher – 
the one who asks the questions, the one who writes about this encounter – is in power (Clifford, 1986; 
Stanley, 1996). Yet, my granduncle had a different interpretation of this situation. As he repeatedly 
told some of our family members, I had come to ‘learn’ from him about the Partition. He saw himself 
as an expert contributing to the arc of my research via his expert knowledge – his lived experience – 
on the subject. As the ‘expert’ in that context, he exercised his power by often chiding me for asking 
questions that he felt stated the obvious. Given my lack of experience and severe social awkwardness, 
I never looked at these moments as the starting point for a critique of common-sense. Instead, I felt 
chastised even while transcribing these dialogues.  
This experience of powerlessness, of being perceived as the ‘student’ that ‘learns’ is a common yet 
unacknowledged experience of most ethnographic fieldwork. It is especially relevant to research that 
involves interviewing. Charles Briggs (1986) details a similar experience from his fieldwork in Mexico. 
While interviewing Silvianita and George López, an elderly couple, on the subject of New Mexican 
Spanish and carving, Briggs found his initial interactions ‘strained’ and ‘relatively unproductive’. He 
later discovered that the reason for this fractious relationship was a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the nature of knowledge exchange at the heart of their interactions. While Briggs thought that he 
was ‘interviewing’ the Lópezes, the Lópezes instead considered Briggs their student. As far as the 
Lópezes were concerned, Briggs had come to learn carving from them. Reflecting on how this affected 
his interviews, Briggs (ibid.: 103) wrote, ‘What they were really trying to get across in fact, was that I 
had to learn to respect them as elders as well as to discover which questions were relevant to them 
and the basic cultural assumptions that underlie the answers.’ 
My granduncle may have been the first informant to think of me as his student but he was not the 
last; not by a mile. The paternalistic and often overbearing behaviour of my informants, towards me, 
                                                            
23 When I began my doctoral fieldwork in July 2017, he was once again the first Partition survivor I spoke to. 
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presented a unique set of dialogical complexities. What I was experiencing here – a tension I found 
myself navigating throughout my fieldwork – was a clash of divergent expectations caused by the 
layering of two very distinct types of relationships: kinship and researcher-informant relations. Being 
in a grandparent-like relationship with most of my informants meant that I was expected to listen and 
learn. In this sense, their narratives were didactic; rich in moral instruction. As familial elders, they 
enthusiastically took on the role of ‘teaching’ me their experience, passing on their knowledge and 
our shared history. The sharing of their narratives and life histories in this context bore resemblance 
to the more general phenomenon of grandparents and older relatives ‘lecturing’ the children of their 
family about the olden days.  
Received, recorded and transcribed in this manner, their stories were not just ethnographic evidence 
but were also part of a cultural inheritance. This was something my informants were consciously 
aware of and became one of the many reasons that we were able to relate to each other easily. For 
example, during my fieldwork in Faridabad (where I immersed myself within a group of Partition 
survivors) Chetan, an informant, remarked that like me, he too had spent many an evening sitting 
beside his elders listening to stories of the ‘olden days’. This didactic quality of the stories of my 
informants is most visible in Chapter 2, in their stories of hard work as sacrifice. These stories were 
not merely a retelling of my informants’ lived experience but were also rich in moral instruction. My 
informants’ stories of sacrifice and hard work in the years immediately following the Partition 
comprised fable-like life lessons; they were intended to impart these values to me and my generation.  
While in theory this complemented my ethnographic practice perfectly, the lived reality of this 
dynamic was far more complex. At times, I felt a distinct sense of powerlessness. Burdened by the 
kinship context, I often felt unable to effectively disagree with them. This dialogical context, of being 
like a grandchild to them (a familial student of sorts), made it almost impossible for me to challenge 
the rumours, conspiracy theories, bigotry and superstitions that informed some of their discourses. 
On the few occasions where I did voice my disagreement, my arguments were rarely taken seriously. 
My informants routinely emphasised their age and their first-hand experience; their memories of 
history.  
At times, I experienced these disagreements as an affront to my own knowledge on the subject; a 
challenge to my status. They would qualify their bigotry by invoking their first-hand experience with 
comments such as, ‘We have seen the Partition,’ and ‘We have seen what Muslims can do.’ What do 
you know about this, you have only read about this in books, their arguments implied; contrasting my 
research with the superior claims of having witnessed the ‘savage other’ first-hand. Interestingly, 
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there was something almost ethnographic about their insistence on the superior epistemological 
claims of first-hand witnessing.  
This encounter with informants who actively spoke back and positioned themselves as the true 
authority on this subject, stood in stark contrast to how the ethics bureaucracy of my university had 
characterised my informants. The ethics form I had submitted at my university had made me reflect 
on the power imbalances involved in my research. The ethics committee had treated my informants 
– the elders of my community – as ‘vulnerable’ individuals who needed to be protected from me, the 
researcher. In constructing my informants as ‘vulnerable’ subjects, the ethics bureaucracy had 
stripped them of the agency and moral authority they in fact enjoy in their society. Meanwhile, I, the 
researcher, was constructed as the all-powerful party in this exchange of knowledge and was asked 
for lengthy assurances guaranteeing the responsible treatment and representation of my informants.  
Concerns around the power imbalances involved in anthropological research and representation have 
been at the centre of the discipline at least since Marcus and Fischer’s (1986) announcement of a crisis 
of representation in the discipline. The crisis of representation refers to George Marcus (1999), James 
Clifford (1986) and Johannes Fabian’s (2002) critiques of anthropology’s processes of knowledge 
production. Clifford (1986) and Fabian (2002), among other critics, have drawn attention to the 
duplicitousness of anthropology’s literary techniques such as its use of positivistic prose (Maynard and 
Cahnmann-Taylor, 2010). As Kent Maynard and Melisa Cahnmann-Taylor (ibid.: 2) write, ‘Passive voice 
or declarative sentences, third-person constructions, and jargon as a talisman of authority, invocations 
of the royal “we” or “they”—all abet magisterial, suspect approaches to authenticity.’ The crisis of 
representation sought to draw attention to how the process of writing itself has become a substantial 
part of methodological reflection; prompting reflexive analysis of how we study that which we study 
(ibid.; Clifford, 1986). After all as Kent Maynard and Melisa Cahnmann-Taylor (2010: 3) remind us, ‘We 
do not represent ethnographic reality; we create it in our texts.’  
Anthropological representations of their cultural subjects were problematic, it was argued, due not 
only to their epistemological unrepresentativeness but also due to the fact that they might often be 
so detached and abstracted from the fieldwork context so as to be unrecognisable to the individuals 
whose lives and cultures they discussed (Clifford, 1986; Fabian 2002; Stanley, 1996). Additionally, 
Fabian (2002) argued that anthropologists use time asynchronously in relation to their subjects, often 
fixing them in static time-frames to present their societies as timeless, composite wholes easily 
observable to the all-seeing gaze of the anthropologist. These critiques of anthropology, specifically 
cultural anthropology, question its tendency to normalise a notion of objectivity that is based on 
detachment in time, space and representation. 
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Here, I do not intend to argue against the crisis of representation (whose epistemological critiques I 
consider essential reading for any student of anthropology), but merely to trouble some of its 
assumptions about the nature of power relations involved in ethnographic practice; specifically 
fieldwork. The crisis of representation is a genuine and urgent epistemological crisis within 
anthropology, but, it is not as universal a crisis as Marcus and Fischer (1986) argue. While the 
anthropologist’s power of representation is indisputable, the act of representation merely comprises 
one (albeit substantial) portion of ethnographic practice. In my experience, I found that my familial 
and kin-like ties to my informants constrained my power in fieldwork settings. As stated previously, 
not only did kinship relations undercut my power as the ‘expert’ in conversation, but also came with 
an implied responsibility and accountability to my kin-network, even in the act of representation. My 
argument here – which pertains specifically to the dialogical complexities I encountered during 
fieldwork as a native/indigenous anthropologist – is that the idea of an all-powerful researcher is an 
oversimplification of the power dynamics involved in fieldwork. Narcissistic and self-aggrandising to a 
large degree, this idea emanates from an outdated view of anthropology as a discipline where white 
western researchers study distant, ‘exotic’ subjects in former colonies. At its core lies a Eurocentric 
assumption of a neat and insurmountable separation between the self that studies and the other that 
is the subject under study. Although this assumption was presumably the target of the crisis of 
representation’s critique, it ironically ended up being reinscribed by it.  
Lila Abu-Lughod (1991) argues that Marcus and Fischer’s (1986) discussion of the crisis of 
representation is lop-sided as it excludes feminists, ‘halfies’ and native/indigenous anthropologists. At 
issue is the fact that in its analyses of the epistemology of anthropology, the crisis of representation’s 
argument relies on an assumed separation between the self and the other (ibid.). This ‘self’ in 
anthropology, is imagined in opposition to the ‘other’ that it studies. This clear demarcation of the 
‘self’ from the ‘other’ is a result of anthropology’s history as a western, colonial discipline that studies 
the non-west. Abu-Lughod (ibid.) notes that the popularisation of ethnography within other disciplines 
of the social sciences such as sociology, history and geography has resulted in an identity crisis within 
anthropology. For example, American anthropologists conducting their fieldwork in American settings 
often wonder whether, ‘they have not blurred the disciplinary boundaries between anthropology and 
other fields’ (ibid.: 467). Doubling down on the study of ‘found others’ or making those that they study 
seem like distant others is one of the ways in which anthropologists emphasise disciplinary relevance 
(ibid.).    
Like the crisis of representation, here too lies the assumption that one cannot critically study familiar 
and familial environs. This tautological argument imagines anthropology as a study of the other while 
simultaneously assuming that it is distance from the other that gives anthropology its critical edge. 
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Feminist anthropologists such as Marilyn Strathern (1987) complicate this discussion further by 
arguing that the ‘self’ in anthropology is as much a construction as the ‘other’. Abu-Lughod (1991) 
adds that in addition to being a construction, the ‘self’ is also positioned. Adding this caveat to James 
Clifford’s (1986) discussion of the unrepresentativeness of ethnographic representations, Abu-Lughod 
(1991: 469) emphasises the need for the recognition of these representations as not just ‘partial 
truths’ but also ‘positioned truths’.  
In my fieldwork, I found that while being in a kin-like relation involved conceding power, it also brought 
with it a fresh set of responsibilities. As their kin, it made me pause, listen, reflect and reconsider 
where I might have otherwise rushed into critique. I found myself emotionally drawn to them and 
their lives; invested in the redemptive qualities of their life history narratives. I felt a sense of 
responsibility for the way I would represent them in subsequent writing. By stating this I do not mean 
to imply that other anthropologists do not experience these tensions. But I am doing so to emphasise 
that this layering of kinship and informant relations added an additional moral weight to my decision 
to orient my writing around a vociferous critique of the interventions of Hindu nationalism in these 
discourses. That I chose to disagree with their politics, that I was disgusted by some of the discourses 
I encountered, was made all the more significant because of our kin-like relation.  
My feeling of outrage at the saffronisation24 of India – the singular emotion that motivates my doctoral 
research – was made all the more significant by my proximity and intimacy to the subject matter. 
Seeing the fascism within my own home and kinship networks made it impossible for me to turn away 
from it; to write about something else. There was no more ground left to be ceded. To write about 
Hindu fascism in this context meant writing about my kith and kin. To not do so would have been a 
craven act of hypocrisy.  
In The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau (1984) analogises memory to a bird that lays its 
eggs in another’s nest. He writes, ‘Like those birds that lay their eggs only in other species' nests, 
memory produces in a place that does not belong to it’ (ibid.: 87). De Certeau’s analogy is profoundly 
relevant in this context, for the way in which it identifies the experience of displacement as crucial to 
the resurgence of memory.  
Looking back, I find that it was my migration to Ireland that made my familial memories of the Partition 
relevant to my identity. In those initial months in Ireland, as I struggled to grasp my new-found racial 
identity – I had never thought of myself as a brown man until I became a brown man in Ireland – it 
                                                            
24 Saffronisation is a neologism that refers to the Hindu nationalist political-social-cultural project to transform 
India into a Hindu fascist nation-state. The neologism draws its name from Hinduism’s association with the 
colour saffron.  
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was my Pakistani neighbours Adeen and Mahvish who despite not being of home reminded me most 
of home. And just like that, my connection to the Partition, my Pakistani heritage, became relevant. 
Studying race and nationalism in the classroom had made questions of belonging more relevant closer 
to home. This ‘egg’ of memory had hatched in a foreign nest; the personal had begun to animate the 
political.  
Just as the displacement of migration provoked my engagement with memories of the Partition, 
similarly for my informants, their memories of Pakistan took shape in India; a land in which all things 
Pakistani are seen to not belong. Our shared experience of migration (along with their literal and 
metaphorical displacements), also served as a point of relation.  
Subjecting my grandaunts, granduncles and grandparent-like informants to my anthropological gaze, 
I felt the neat distinctions between the self and the other blur. What was also blurred in the process 
was the distinction between the ethnographic and the personal. In fact, for me, the personal was 
made ethnographic and the ethnographic, personal. Strangers I met in the field became grandparents 
in the process of long-winded discussions on their lives and the Partition. And, it was in becoming kin-
like relations that they became key informants. For a project such as this, that relies so heavily on 
building rapport and trust with one’s informants, the ethnographic might not even exist (at least not 
in the same way) without the personal. After all, it was my family’s connection to the history of the 
Partition that gave me the context, the passion and access to be in this space to observe what I did.  
This blurring of the personal and ethnographic, of the self and the other, of the personal and the 
political, is something Ruth Behar (1996) writes about while reflecting on her experience of studying 
peasant traditions through the eyes of her grandfather and familial strangers in the Spanish village of 
Santa Maria del Monte. Behar found that in subjecting her grandfather to her anthropological gaze, 
in seeing him as a ‘site of memory’, she was drawn closer to others like him in the village. Following 
his death during her fieldwork, Behar found discussing his death and the societal transformations that 
the death of this generation symbolically marked for the history of the village, cathartic as well as 
ethnographically productive. Meanwhile the process of studying a shared past meant that she and her 
informants were beginning to see themselves as ‘historically conceived’, but of a history similarly 
received from one’s elders (ibid.: 62). For my work and Behar’s, such points of relation, these 
understandings of a history shared and received from elders who are also our informants, ultimately 
makes the distinction between the self and the other irrelevant. We share not just a history, but the 
debris of worlds lost to us both. And it is that shared sense of loss, as much as a shared culture, that 
makes us kin. 
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To a large degree it was this emotional engagement with the Partition and my informants that was 
lacking in that first interview with my granduncle; a certain seduction of narrative that later 
increasingly led me to wander ‘off the script’. This obsessive urge to explore the meanings of these 
memories, drove me to pay more attention to the literariness of these narratives. I wish I had thought 
of giving my granduncle pen and paper to draw a map when he subtly hinted at being able to do so. I 
remember how his fingers had itched to draw while he described the segregated layout of Dera Ghazi 
Khan to me. Sitting opposite me, on his bed, his voice took on a sombre tone as he told me how the 
city’s Hindus and Muslims lived in segregated neighbourhoods.  
‘There was a dividing line like this, there used to be a road that was dividing the two 
communities. One was the Muslim area and the other one was the Hindu area. And Hindus I 
think, I don’t remember any Hindu lived among Muslims.’  
(Om Prakash quoted in Kohli, 2015: 35) 
As he said this, his index finger ominously drew a line on the bed, followed by other lines that met it 
at right angles. I did not know it at the time, but this is roughly how the streets of Dera Ghazi Khan are 
laid out: a central road cutting the city in half, as smaller connecting roads from neighbourhoods neatly 
laid out in square and rectangular grids, meet it at right angles.  At a later stage in that same interview, 
my granduncle remarked:  
‘I remember the whole map [layout] of the place, so much so that even their [Pakistan] staff 
which sits there, works there, would not know. Still I can draw the drawing of my house, my 
important places, my schools and my canal also. There we used to go for swimming every 
Sunday.’  
Om Prakash, 24/05/2015 
I wonder now how differently that conversation would have progressed had I placed a pen and paper 
in his hand and said, ‘Go on, nana-chacha25, draw me a map.’  
                                                            
25Maternal granduncle  
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1.2. Theorising Maps: Conceptions of Place, Space and Time  
 
‘Stories about places are makeshift things. They are composed with the world’s debris’ 
Michel de Certeau (1984: 107) 
 
The memory of the Partition of India, is fundamentally, the memory of the division of a land. It is the 
memory of a line drawn across the land; of a border reified in people’s hearts and minds. This chapter 
analyses memories of the Partition through the perspective of memory maps that some of my 
informants spontaneously drew. These were maps that my informants felt inspired to draw in the 
process of remembering the homes and villages they had left behind in Pakistan. These diagrams of 
abandoned ancestral homes and the street-grids of towns and districts they had inhabited in Pakistan, 
were drawn by my informants as part of the process of remembering the Partition. There was 
something beautifully organic yet evocative about the act of explaining memories by reference to 
hand-drawn maps. On their simplest level, these memory maps are diagrams of home; documents of 
displacement. On a deeper level, remembering the Partition through such quotidian memorialisations 
of space represents a distinctly spatial turn in memory.   
However, before I begin to analyse the narrative intricacies of these maps, I want to contextualise 
these narratives against a discussion of history. As stated previously, my discussion of history includes 
the way that the Partition of India has transformed the city of Delhi, as well as a discussion of some of 
the contestations around history and architecture that occupy the contemporary cityscape of Delhi 
(and much of north India). These contestations are given a sense of urgency by the way in which my 
informants use these ‘histories’ to contextualise their own suffering. In this way, my discussion in this 
chapter specifically, and this dissertation in general, weaves ethnographic and historical material 
together just as the past and the present are interwoven in the lives and narratives of my informants.  
Using the informal maps of my informants as the subject of my analysis, I explore the nexus between 
conceptions of place and memory. The crux of my argument in this chapter is that these informal maps 
represent compressions of time. In drawing maps of homes and cities they had to leave behind, in 
recounting decades of their lives by reference to these diagrams, my informants compress years of 
lived experience into a two-dimensional grid. After all, conceptions of space, place and memory are 
ultimately vehicles for the expression of temporality. 
The theory I use in support of this argument relies heavily on de Certeau’s (1984) The Practice of 
Everyday Life. Anthropology’s engagement with de Certeau’s work has been fleeting (Napolitano and 
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Pratten, 2007). The work of Faubion (1993), Ferme (2001), Hernandez (2002) and Ivy (1995) are a few 
rare examples of ethnographic work that defy this trend (Napolitano and Pratten, 2007). Despite his 
poststructuralist theorisations of power and resistance, de Certeau’s work has not received the same 
level of attention in the British and American schools of anthropology as his compatriots Michel 
Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu (Mitchell, 2007; Napolitano and Pratten, 2007). Anthropology’s neglect 
of de Certeau is surprising considering that the general themes of de Certeau’s theorisations (action, 
system, resistance and space) have been the subject of much anthropological inquiry.  
Foucault’s (1980, 1995) scholarship and James Scott’s (1985) work on ‘everyday forms of resistance’ 
inspired ethnographic work that sought to document the workings of power and resistance in 
quotidian settings (Mitchell, 2007). Scott’s (1985) work on resistance among Malaysian peasants, Abu-
Lughod’s (1990) ethnography of Bedouin women’s resistance of traditionalism through the wearing 
of lingerie and Comaroff’s (1985) work on new evangelical churches follows this theoretical framework 
that documents quotidian forms of resistance (Mitchell, 2007). However, Ortner (1995: 190) argues 
that such accounts of resistance are often ‘ethnographically thin’. Ortner (ibid.) posits that in 
presenting these acts of resistance as the only significant actions of individuals, these ethnographies 
gloss over the internal politics of the subaltern groups within which these actions are located26. A 
single-minded focus on documenting everyday resistance ultimately prevents a comprehensive 
analysis of human subjectivity from taking shape (ibid.; Mitchell, 2007).    
Mitchell (ibid.) notes the similarities between de Certeau (1984) and Ortner’s (1995) critique of 
Foucault (1980, 1995) and Bourdieu (1977). De Certeau (1984: 56) critiques their discussion of a 
subjectivity that seemingly produces action and subject position independently from the subject, as 
docta ignorantia- ‘a cleverness that does not recognise itself as such.’ De Certeau therefore, offers an 
alternative theorisation of action, system and resistance which does not rely on the assumption of 
‘originary will’; the prime target of Ortner’s critique (Mitchell, 2007: 103). De Certeau’s account of 
power is also less totalising than Foucault’s (ibid.).  
De Certeau (1984) defines the system/action dialectic as strategies and tactics. Strategies are the 
actions of the powerful, aimed at establishing control. Strategies emanate from and are deployed 
towards the realisation of abstract models. Therefore, strategies are deployed by institutions in a 
panoptic position. De Certeau theorises a panoptic position as one where an institution separates 
itself from its environment; the panopticon rising high above the ground to survey its jurisdiction: 
clearly demarcating itself from ‘the other’ upon which its power is exercised. De Certeau (ibid.: 36) 
                                                            
26 Ortner’s (1995) critique here is comparable to Marshal Sahlins’ (2002: 20-23) argument that making 
everything into ‘resistance’ constitutes a ‘functionalism’ of power. 
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describes this as a Cartesian attitude and identifies it as, ‘the typical attitude of modern science, 
politics, and military strategy.’ Mitchell (2007: 99) writes that, ‘Strategies establish as “other” that 
which they survey, so that their effects – politics, economics, science and technology – eschew the 
uncertainties and complexities of everyday life.’ 
By contrast, tactics are the resistive techniques of ‘the other’ - everyday individuals - when confronted 
with the panoptic power of strategies (de Certeau, 1984). Tactics are by definition, survivalist. They 
emanate from an impulse of ‘making do’ (ibid.: 29). Ian Buchanan (2000: 108) has noted the similarity 
between de Certeau’s idea of ‘making do’ and the Marxist dictum that, ‘people make history, but not 
in conditions of their own choosing.’ In a similar vein, tactics are produced within the discursive space 
offered by strategies – whose power while panoptic, is not absolute (de Certeau, 1984). Tactics lack 
the power to make strategies of their own (the power to make ‘conditions’); they are characterised 
by appropriation instead. Tactics appropriate the very ground built by strategies. Where the building 
of a city street-grid (replete with detailed transportation maps to help navigate it) represents a 
function of strategy, paralysing the city’s traffic using a mass protest along an arterial route is an 
example of ‘tactics’. Tactics involve using the resources and material of strategy against its own aims.  
However, tactics are not always as dramatic as my example of a city-paralysing protest suggests. They 
are often discrete appropriations of space and time that subtly subvert some of the effects of the 
scriptural economy. The scriptural economy is composed of the ‘official institutions of writing culture’ 
(Highmore, 2007: 22). The institutions that comprise the scriptural economy include the bureaucracy, 
the military, universities and other institutions of the state (de Certeau, 1984). Thus, an act as simple 
as time-theft at one’s job represents an example of ‘tactics’.   
Similarly, de Certeau’s (ibid.: 94-104) discussion of the space of the city is split between the city as an 
‘urban fact’ (anthropological space) and the ‘concept of the city’ (geometric space). We can compare 
the ‘concept of the city’ to the abstract models for whose realisation strategies are enacted. This is a 
God-like, panoptic perspective of the city that renders this chaotic, unstable mass of life and space 
manageable to the bureaucratic eye (Buchanan, 2000). However, this is ultimately a construct; a wilful 
projection akin to Said’s (1978) interpretation of ‘the Orient’ (Buchanan, 2000). Like Orientalism, 
imagining the city as a composite entity, with well-directed and manageable flows of goods, people 
and their exchanges, makes the city manageable (ibid.). Contrasted with this is the individual’s 
experience of the city, that is transient and lacking a ‘readable identity’ (de Certeau, 1984: 95). Far 
removed in experience from the city envisioned as geometric space, this experience is defined by the 
chaos of quotidian life; a chaos that is open to appropriation (Buchanan, 2000).  
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Space, according to de Certeau (1984), is always open and subject to appropriation. Space in this sense 
refers not to empty land but to spatialisation (ibid.). It is the appropriation of space – the use of it – 
that makes space perceivable. To that end, movement itself (walking) is a tactic, for it appropriates 
the space of the city. This is not a romanticization of walking as revolution, as much as it is a recognition 
of the possibility of infinite spatial experiences. As de Certeau (ibid.: 118) writes, ‘there are as many 
spaces as there are distinct spatial experiences’. Describing de Certeau’s theorisations of space, 
Buchanan (2000: 112) writes, ‘space is “in” perception, at the same time as it is what is perceived by 
perception.’ In this way, de Certeau identifies a diverse array of tactics (that is, spatial experiences) 
that fall outside the panopticism of modern society. The field of resistance here is infinitely plural; 
represented in the endless possibilities of spatial experiences. After all for de Certeau (1984: 136), 
‘plurality is originary.’ 
Ben Highmore (2007) identifies an inescapable heteroglossia and plurality underlying de Certeau’s 
theorisations of culture and everyday life. Highmore (ibid.: 14) suggests using de Certeau as a ‘meta-
methodology for writing culture.’ Highmore connects the heteroglossia in de Certeau’s strategies, 
tactics and scriptural economy, to Mikhail Bakhtin’s literary criticism:  
‘While Bakhtin emphasises the always unfinished and partial unity of culture, which is always 
facing (and being partly undone by) the ineradicable presence of heteroglossia, de Certeau’s 
epistemologically more sceptical understanding posits something akin to heteroglossia as an 
invisible but insistent substrate of a culture that seems on the face of it more regulated.’ 
(ibid.: 22) 
According to Highmore, the epistemological scepticism underlying the heteroglossia and plurality of 
de Certeau’s work suggests that one of the ways out of anthropology’s epistemological crisis – a crisis 
that at its heart emanates from the desire to get to the real – might be through increased engagement 
with epistemological scepticism. A stormy crossing through the very heart of the epistemological 
muddle, as it were.  
It is this recognition in de Certeau’s work of the diverse, rich and polyphonous aspect of everyday life 
that makes his theory ideal for my discussion of the memory maps of my informants. De Certeau’s 
theorisation of tactics and appropriation also focuses on the appropriation of space, place and maps. 
He does not provide a single grand theory, so much as he provides a ‘theology’ of everyday life 
(Mitchell, 2007). Through his phenomenological approach, de Certeau provides key insights that are 
easily atomizable to the understanding of individual experiences. His theory helps express the 
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emotional resonance of my informants’ memory maps, the narratives they are part of and the 
polyphonous discourse they produce. 
However, before I get into the theory in relation to this, it is important to clarify my usage of certain 
key terms and the ways in which they relate to each other. My usage of the term ‘place’ is in line with 
Nancy Munn’s (2013: 360) definition of place as a tangible location with unique features and qualities 
that are, ‘invested with different layers and kinds of identities.’ Munn (ibid.: 360) characterises place 
as ‘meaningful forms in process.’ Place is constantly subject to incorporation into human practices and 
the social and cultural worlds they comprise, such as, ‘people’s actions, expectations, pasts, and sense 
of their pasts.’ (ibid.: 360) 
Sometimes, in this chapter, I draw on literature pertaining to the anthropology of landscape. The 
relation of place to landscape is best understood as the relation of a sentence to a paragraph. That is, 
a constellation of related places, comprise a landscape. It is in this sense, that Tilley and Cameron-
Daum (2017: 2) define a landscape as, ‘a set of relationships between places in which meaning is 
grounded in existential consciousness, event, history and association.’ In this chapter, my use of the 
word landscape and its neologism cityscape, is in line with this idea of landscape as a complex plurality 
of related places and their meanings.   
Closely related to both these categories, ‘place’ and ‘landscape’, is the term ‘place-world’. In his 
ethnography of Western Apache conceptions of place, Basso (1996) describes place-worlds as the end-
result of place-making. Basso (ibid.: 6) defines place-making as, ‘an adventitious fleshing out of 
historical material that culminates in a posited state of affairs, a particular universe of objects and 
events – a place-world – wherein portions of the past are brought into being.’ While ‘place’ refers to 
a geographical location with dynamic symbolic meanings, the term ‘place-world’ describes those 
meanings and significances as an abstract semiotic universe whose relation to reality is grounded in 
its association to this tangible location: the place. ‘Place’ identifies location coordinates (albeit of a 
location with a deeper significance), ‘place-world’ defines these symbolic meanings as they are 
embedded in their milieu while ‘landscape’ describes ‘places’ and ‘place-worlds’ in their relatedness 
and plurality.   
What then is the relation of ‘place’ to ‘space’? As stated earlier, space, for de Certeau (1984), is 
spatialisation. Perceiving space brings it into perception. Space is ‘practiced place’ (ibid.: 117). As de 
Certeau (ibid.: 117) describes it, ‘Space occurs as the effect produced by the operations that orient it, 
situate it, temporalize it.’ Using the example of a street, de Certeau (ibid.: 117) writes that, ‘the street 
geometrically defined by urban planning is transformed into a space by walkers.’ For de Certeau, it is 
stories that transform space into place and vice versa. Therefore, space is a semiotic construct. After 
79 
 
all, space here is not just a Cartesian definition of space as physical fact, but is rather that of a human, 
anthropological experience of space: spatialisation.  
Implicit within de Certeau’s theorisation of space and tactics is the presence of the human body. 
Strategies and maps – Cartesian technologies of the scriptural economy – are places without bodies. 
Tactics and space (as spatialisation), on the other hand, are embodied places. It is the lived experience 
– an embodied experience – that sets them apart from the products of the scriptural economy. And, 
lurking within this idea of space as embodied or ‘practiced place’ (ibid.: 117) is the notion of intimacy.  
It is helpful here to briefly turn our attention to Gaston Bachelard. Bachelard (1994) does not 
distinguish between space and place, preferring instead to use ‘space’ to describe both. For ‘spaces’ 
of familiarity such as a home, Bachelard (ibid.: 9) uses the moniker ‘spaces of intimacy’ or ‘intimate 
spaces’. In doing so, Bachelard individualises the difference between space and place, making place a 
function of intimacy; of the familial and of familiarity. Intimacy is a function of knowledge.  
I am delineating this highly abstract relation between space, place and intimacy to foreground a key 
idea in de Certeau’s phenomenology: that of ‘stories’. Since space is spatialisation – and, a semiotic 
construct – de Certeau prefers to speak of spatial experiences as stories. The inclusion of stories in 
this schema is de Certeau’s solution to the problem of infinite relations to space or ‘distinct spatial 
experiences’ (Buchanan, 2000: 112). De Certeau (1984) sees the relationship between stories, place 
and space as fluid and multidirectional. Stories, ‘transform places into spaces or spaces into places’ 
(ibid.: 118). He sees the forms of these relationships as ‘numberless’ and categorises the product of 
this playful interplay between these forces as ‘fanning out in a spectrum’ (ibid.: 118). De Certeau’s 
(ibid.: 118) idea of stories describes ‘ways of being’ rather than ‘states of being’. Buchanan (2000: 112) 
argues that stories as embodied spatial experiences, ‘rewrite spatiality in terms of perspective to give 
it a more thoroughly active voice.’ It provides a theoretical prescription for the unpacking of everyday 
relations to space that puts the individual and individual relations at the centre of its frame.    
History, memory, personal narratives, oral cultures, mythology, and the like, are all fundamentally 
stories, as is the experience of life itself. De Certeau’s theoretical scheme incorporates the flexibility 
and creativity of quotidian life, allowing for its application to the understanding of a myriad 
individualised associations to space and place. This idea that stories (with all of the ambiguity and 
flexibility that the word allows) act as the catalyst for transformations in conceptions of place and 
space, is an important insight.  
It is useful here to also briefly foreground the relationship between stories and time. Stories in so far 
as they are narratives, make and reflect the making of time; the socio-cultural expression of 
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temporality. The story composes temporality itself, giving space and place graspable form (de Certeau, 
1984). Anthropologists such as Nancy Munn (1992) and Kristina Wirtz (2016) have long been aware of 
the relationship between conceptions of space and time, and narratives. Wirtz (ibid.: 343) notes that 
behind anthropology’s growing curiosity in stories of the past (memory and historical imagination) 
and place-making, lies an acknowledgement of the relatedness of ‘temporal and spatial imaginaries’. 
Here, I do not intend to suggest that the story is temporality itself, but to acknowledge it as a form of 
the expression of temporality.  
Stories play a ‘magisterial’ role in the life of space (de Certeau, 1984: 123). It is the story that delimits 
space, providing it shape and form by delineating its boundaries; separating ‘legitimate space’ from 
its ‘alien exteriority’ (ibid.: 126). The act of spatialisation that activates space also demarcates it from 
its surroundings; from that which is not this space.  
The relationship de Certeau establishes between stories, space and time is comparable to Bachelard’s 
(1994) poetic observation on the ability of space to compress time. He writes, ‘In its countless alveoli 
space contains compressed time. That is what space is for’ (ibid.: 8). Space – through its relation to 
the ‘story’ – reflects the accumulation or the making of time; sometimes through historicity, 
sometimes through memory. In the following section on Maps and Memory, I build on these 
theoretical insights into space, to outline the theoretical framework that informs my discussion of 
ethnographic evidence.  
 
 
Maps and Memory 
 
Previously in this chapter, I have discussed de Certeau’s theorisation of strategies and tactics. De 
Certeau considers mapmaking as a product of ‘strategies’. Analogising the aerial-view of Manhattan’s 
streets to a map, de Certeau (1984: 92) reflects on how the urge to mapmaking is spurred by the, ‘lust 
to be a viewpoint and nothing more.’ There is a panoptic, Cartesian impulse at play. He contrasts this 
panoptic function – a strategy; a form of control of the scriptural economy – with walking. As stated 
previously, he describes walking as a ‘tactic’, for the way in which pedestrians appropriate space for 
their own ends.  
While this analysis of the power and knowledge nexus that produces maps, is relevant to the analysis 
of maps produced by academics, journalists, writers and institutions (of the state or otherwise), the 
study of maps drawn (or used) by individuals while sharing their memories requires greater attention 
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to the social and cultural aspects of these places. Memory maps such as these are closer to walking – 
the appropriation of space – in the way that they capture the map-maker’s relation to the place being 
represented. In these maps, the mapmaker while rendering the place in the form of a two-dimensional 
grid is still always part of the scene; representing past appropriations of it from memory. We can think 
of these maps then as memories of walking translated onto paper.  
Elaborating on the theme of maps, de Certeau differentiates between maps and tours. According to 
de Certeau, individuals do not draw maps (in the Cartesian sense of the word), so much as they 
articulate tours. A map drawn in the philosophy of the tour does not merely present the lay of the 
land. It does not merely show that A is located beside B. Instead it is ‘a speech act’ or ‘an act of 
enunciation’ (ibid.: 119). The map, as tour, presupposes an itinerary that guides you from one location 
to another. It is fundamentally a route. However, the map retains some of its Cartesian qualities. 
Despite its structure as an itinerary (‘a discursive series of operations’), the map remains a map (‘a 
plane projection totalizing observations’); thus combining, ‘two symbolic and anthropological 
languages of space’ (ibid.: 119).  
Following on from this, I treat the memory maps of my informants as a ‘speech act’. In the case of my 
informants, the ‘tour’ of their memory maps weaves through abandoned homes and cities. It follows 
an itinerary that semantically recreates childhood journeys. For example, while listening to my 
informant Dayaram, I had the distinct feeling of being guided through the streets of Dera Ghazi Khan. 
Together we figuratively traversed the Cartesian street-grid, momentarily losing ourselves in his story 
– a history – of space.  
Yet, at its heart, these memory maps remain documents of displacement. They are ‘an act of 
enunciation’ but also an enunciation that articulates the experience of displacement. In the previous 
section, I had briefly drawn attention to de Certeau’s (ibid.: 87) conception of memory as something 
that, ‘produces in a place that does not belong to it.’ This theoretical insight is relevant here since it is 
their displacement from Pakistan that evokes these discourses. The impossibility of return ferments 
memory. The urge to return, to witness the homeland for oneself, to show the homeland to familial 
strangers spurs the momentary Cartesian turn. Yet, the Cartesian quality of their maps is blunted by 
their intimacy to it. It is after all their homeland that they draw. They are as much a part of this story 
as the land itself.  
However, this is not to say that authority or power is entirely absent from the scene. There is one level 
of the authority of lived experience; the claim to have really known this land like only a local can. The 
urge to embark on tours is also an expression of existential angst; to embark on tours while one still 
can. But there is another kind of authority at play: the authority of a former landlord (a zamindar). It 
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is this, I suspect, that drives the turn to the Cartesian discourse of mapmaking; the remembered 
authority of a landlord surveying his former lands.  
To paraphrase the title of Gayatri Spivak’s (2010) iconic essay, one might ask: can the subaltern draw 
maps? And, if so, what might a subaltern discourse of mapmaking look like? To some, the question 
might be a moot one for the zamindar was himself subaltern to the colonial imaginary. Ultimately, an 
individual’s subalterity depends on the positionality of the gaze. But, in relation to Guha’s (2002b) idea 
of the ‘small voice of history’ and de Certeau’s (1984) idea of ‘tactics’ and ‘tours’, these maps may be 
considered a subaltern discourse of mapmaking; as the spatial imaginary of quotidian people.   
In closing my discussion here, I want to foreground the existential angst that underlines the memory 
of the Partition as well as this project. My turn to documenting the memory of the Partition was 
spurred by the realisation that 2010-19 was possibly the last decade within which it might have been 
possible to meet first-hand survivors of the Partition. Where their decline due to old age spurs the 
turn to nostalgia and memory maps, the same force provoked in me the urgency to bear witness to 
their narratives. We were both, after all, just responding to the threat of erasure: the erasure of a 
memory and of life itself. 
  
 
An Ethnography of Memory 
 
In this sub-section of this chapter, I outline the shape of my discussion in the rest of this chapter. My 
analysis of my informants’ memory maps includes a brief historiography of the historically contested 
north Indian landscape and in particular, the cityscape of Delhi. This discussion is necessitated by a 
second insight into memory that can be gained from de Certeau’s idea of memory as an egg that 
hatches in the nest of ‘the other’. In emphasising the displacement that produces memory, he also 
emphasises the effect this exteriority has on the shape and form of memory. As de Certeau (1984: 87) 
continues, ‘It [memory] receives its form and its implantation from external circumstances, even if it 
furnishes the con-tent (the missing detail).’ De Certeau sees displacement (whether in space or time) 
as a fundamental trigger to the production of memory. In this way, de Certeau (1984) summarises a 
key insight of critical memory studies, namely that memory is a social construction whose narrative 




Here, I am recapping what I have previously discussed in the Introduction in relation to the 
intertwining of the past and present in our conception of both. Frankish and Bradbury (2012: 305) 
note that the process of remembrance involves assembling one’s memories into a narrative that gives 
a sense of, ‘who we were, who we are and who we could possibly be.’ Memory then, is a personal 
statement understood in reverse (ibid.; Kohli, 2015). In a sentiment similar to de Certeau’s (1984: 87) 
idea of memory receiving its form from ‘external circumstances’, Michael Roth (2012: 85) notes that 
memory, ‘transforms the past as a condition of retaining it.’ Halbwachs (1992) identifies this as the 
intervention of ‘collective’ frames of remembrance. Memory comes to be shaped by these ‘collective’ 
social frames within which it is (re-)constructed (ibid.). As I have stated previously, memory is recalled, 
localised, experienced and accessed within society (Connerton, 1989; Halbwachs, 1992) 
Nostalgia – the bitter-sweet longing for one’s past – shares this quality of memory (Boym, 2001). 
Nostalgia is intertwined with collective memories, as it builds off and reifies existing frames of 
remembrance (ibid.). After all, as Svetlana Boym (ibid.: 50) writes, ‘The nostalgic rendezvous with 
oneself is not always a private affair’. Boym (ibid.: xiii) describes nostalgia as, ‘a sentiment of loss and 
displacement, but […] also a romance with one's own fantasy.’ Nostalgia is the process of creating, 
‘perfect memories of imperfect worlds’ (Finlay, 2004: 150). However, nostalgia contains within it a 
‘utopian dimension’ (Boym, 2001: xiii). Yet, nostalgia’s poetic desire for utopia is not directed at the 
future (ibid.). Nostalgia is at times directed at the past but at other times yearns to escape the 
totalising binary of the past and the future. As Boym (ibid.: xiii) observes, ‘The nostalgic feels stifled 
within the conventional confines of time and space.’ In this way the longing for utopia at the heart of 
nostalgia articulates the desire to rebel against temporality, or to recuperate it against itself.   
This idea is particularly relevant because of its relation to my previous discussion of space, time and 
temporality. In a larger sense, Boym’s work on nostalgia examines the tension between personal 
memory and other forms of memory. This is a tension that characterises my own writing on the 
Partition here. In fact, my work gives contestations around Partition historiography and medieval 
Indian history a sense of urgency, as I bring them in conversation with memories of the Partition and 
India’s steady progress towards a Hindu fascist state. It is due to this quality of memory, to re-animate 
the body of the past using the spirit of the present that makes it essential to study the cityscape within 
which my informants remember their abandoned ancestral homes and towns. This cityscape, shaped 
by thousands of years of history, is as much a part of these narratives as the distant Pakistani towns 
and villages whose maps they drew.  
However, because our experience of the present is dependent on the pasts to which we subscribe 
(Connerton, 1989), it is important to discuss the contested past of the landscape this cityscape is part 
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of, alongside the ethnographic present. In Section 1.3 I explore some of these contestations over 
history. The medieval monuments of Delhi and north India quietly memorialise the legacies of the 
many monarchs who have held sway over the region. However, courtesy the religious nature of the 
Partition, many of these monuments are seen to memorialise the history of the loot, rape and plunder 
of ‘Hindu India’ at the hands of ‘Muslim barbarians’. Contextualised against this backdrop, the 
Partition is considered by many of my informants as the most recent example of a 1000 year old 
history of ‘Muslim violence’.  
In recent times, the Hindu Right has focused its ire on Mughal monuments and place-names. 
Therefore, my discussion here also focuses on contestations around architecture and historical sites. 
Robert Bevan (2006) notes that architecture functions as a repository of memory. Architecture, 
through the cultural history it embodies, takes on a ‘totemic quality’, which includes signalling the 
neighbourhoods of friend or foe (ibid.: 8). As Bevan (ibid.: 134) writes, ‘Memories are always vying for 
physical expression, creating as one Israeli historian puts it, “intimate enemies”.’ But, more 
significantly, buildings themselves become the enemy and thus, the ethnic cleansing of the enemy 
includes the destruction of their architecture and vice versa (ibid.). 
This genocidal ambition to destroy the cultural artefacts of the ‘other’ are in turn derived from a sense 
of historical victimhood; from the need to recover one’s future from the past by exacting revenge. 
French historian Pierre Nora (1989: 15) writes that, ‘A people or a group who perceive themselves as 
having been marginalised in traditional history are habitually haunted by the need to recover their 
buried past.’ This sense of historical victimhood derived from this centuries-long ‘history’ of 
subjugation is crucial to my discussion of victimhood and mob violence, in Chapter 3. The desire to 
reclaim this landscape – through revisionism, demolition and construction – may be seen as an 
example of what Boym (2001: 41) terms ‘restorative nostalgia’: a nostalgia that seeks to ‘restore’ or 
rebuild an imagined past as part of a larger movement of national redemption. 
In Section 1.4, I detail the ethnographic present in which I recorded these stories of the Partition. 
Contemporary Delhi is a cityscape which Partition survivors have built for themselves. Created as a 
result of the Partition-era refugee exodus, this is a Delhi that has been appropriated by Punjabi 
refugees. My discussion here includes an overview of how Partition refugees came to shape the city’s 
expansion in the years that followed the Partition; as refugee camps grew into sprawling middle-class 
suburbs. However, the majority of this section focuses on my ethnographic fieldwork in Faridabad: a 
satellite town of Delhi. Modern-day Faridabad took shape when the government of India decided to 
use the town to re-settle 50,000 refugees from the North-West Frontier Province (henceforth, NWFP). 
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Even today, the New Industrial Township (NIT) area of Faridabad remains a veritable site of memory 
(lieux de mémoire).   
My usage of the term sites of memory is a reference to Pierre Nora’s (1992) controversial work on 
memory and history. Nora’s seven-volume collection Les Lieux de Mémoire (the sites of memory) 
compiles a meticulous list of sites and artefacts that embody French national memory. Nora (ibid.: 1) 
writes that, ‘Memory is constantly on our lips because it no longer exists.’ Nora (ibid.: 1) argues that 
modernisation along with the modern turn to historicization have obliterated milieux de mémoire or 
social settings in which, ‘memory is a real part of everyday experience.’ Nora interprets the 
proliferation of archives, commemorations and museums as the death of spontaneous memory. For 
Nora (ibid.: 7) such commemorations of history are necessitated by the degeneration of memory, 
because, ‘such things no longer happen as a matter of course.’ 
Nora’s (1989, 1992) theorisation assumes that a universal ‘acceleration of history’ is responsible for 
the annihilation of ‘real’ or ‘true memory’ as embodied in milieux de mémoire (Schäuble, 2014). 
Implicit here is the juxtaposition of memory and history such that the presence of history annihilates 
memory, while the presence of memory signifies the absence of a historical consciousness (ibid.). 
However, as Michaela Schäuble (ibid.: 155) writes, ‘Contrary to Nora’s much criticised argument, 
however, the prevalence of ‘memory’ over ‘history’ […] by no means excludes a local historiographical 
consciousness.’ In my fieldwork, I found that historical and political discourses informed the Partition 
memories of my informants such that I was ultimately documenting a memory of history as well as a 
history of memory. In this setting, where memory was informed by a historiographical consciousness 
while understandings of history were themselves derived from the memory of first hand experiences 
of history, it was impossible (and futile) to draw a neat distinction between history and memory.  
However, unlike Pierre Nora (1989, 1992) who understands sites of memory as isolated islands 
besieged by the onslaught of an unstoppable tide of ‘history’, I use the term much like Ruth Behar 
(1996) does when she identifies her grandfather as a site of memory. The NIT area of Faridabad struck 
me as a site of memory for its lively community of Partition survivors, as well as a number of discrete 
places and place names that subtly evoked the neighbourhood’s connection to the Partition. Routinely 
socialising with a group of Partition survivors I befriended in Faridabad’s Rose Garden, I was led to 
observe the quiet life of this historical memory in our midst. As I detail in Section 1.4, NIT, Faridabad 
includes its very own memorial to the ‘martyrs’ of the Partition, as well as a couple of place names 
that memorialise its people’s connection to the legendary freedom fighter of the North-West Frontier 
Province: Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Together, Sections 1.3 and 1.4 describe the landscape within 
which the Partition is remembered by my informants.  
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From Sections 1.5 to 1.7 I present my informants’ memory maps in the form of ethnographic 
moments. Ethnography, is a type of writing and not just a research methodology. To some extent it is 
a research methodology in that it is a way of doing research, but ethnography in a larger sense is much 
more. Participant observation does not produce ethnography by default. Ethnography is a style of 
thinking moulded to specific contexts. It is a particular manner of observing and critiquing data; a way 
of presenting evidence. Ethnography is a unique style of representation and analysis; of thick 
description that often draws on fieldwork to take the readers to the scene.  
Ethnography is a relational practice. Not only do ethnographers learn about social relations by being 
part of and reproducing them, but ethnographic practice itself is shaped by the relationality between 
the space of observation and the domain of analysis. Marilyn Strathern (1999) argues that the space 
of ethnography is shaped by the division of these two fields of work – observation and analysis – the 
field and the desk27. The ethnographer, immersed in the space of observation is always pulled in (at-
least) two directions: towards their own theoretically informed research objectives and towards the 
preoccupations of the people they work with in the field (ibid.). In the field, the concerns and struggles 
of our informants tend to overshadow the theoretical preoccupations of the research proposal. 
Returning to the desk reverses this equation.  
An ethnographic moment then is a point of relation that joins the two, uniting, ‘the understood (what 
is analysed at the moment of observation) to the need to understand (what is observed at the moment 
of analysis)’ (ibid.: 6). According to Strathern (ibid.: 13), ‘The moment objectifies a certain observation 
and its accompanying analysis.’ Ethnographic texts reify these relations giving them graspable form 
(ibid.). Ethnographers are, after all, storytellers and one of the stories we frequently tell is the story 
that, ‘we were here.’ Within that larger tapestry that is the ethnographic text, individual ethnographic 
moments feature like threads. The way we make them crisscross each other and the threads of social 
theory, gives the text meaning.  
While Strathern invokes the ethnographic moment to evoke the ‘dazzle’ of ethnographic discovery, 
that is perhaps too dramatic a word for what I aim to accomplish here. My objective in discussing 
these memory maps as ethnographic moments is to bring out the polyphonous aspect of these 
narratives. I use the word polyphonous here in the sense of what Bakhtin (1984: 6) calls a polyphonous 
discourse, ‘a plurality of independent […] voices and consciousnesses.’ The narratives that I discuss in 
this chapter are as diverse as they could be. Each individual, each narrative presents a related, yet 
unique, relation to place. In their own unique manner, each of these moments provides a descriptive 
                                                            
27 Although, the two can almost never be cleanly separated in this manner, that is besides the point for now.  
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introduction to the larger themes and narratives that occupy the bulk of this dissertation. These 
narratives also provide diverse understandings of memory and place and their relation to each other.  
In Section 1.5, we meet Dayaram. Somewhere between that infinite chasm that separates forgetting 
and remembering, Dayaram takes to sketching a map of his home and his city. Recalled in the format 
of a ‘tour’, he shares his memories of Dera Ghazi Khan as a recursive itinerary that resembles the 
structure of a commute. In doing so, he remembers a spatial language he has not spoken in a very 
long time. 
In Section 1.6, through the maps of Rajaram, we witness the last glimmers of the syncretic culture of 
undivided Punjab. His stories reveal an eroding fluid and pluralistic society that, in some ways, 
continued to quietly resist the polarisation of the Partition. Not only does his narrative have scholarly 
value, it is also an engrossing story in its own right.  
In Section 1.7, we encounter Sohan Chand and his map of Mianwali district. Sohan Chand refuses to 
speak about this map that he has drawn and put on display, in his office. Instead, it is the politics of 
blame and historical justice that interest him. This is what he wants to talk about. Yet Sohan Chand’s 
conception of his suffering as one within a 1200 year-old arc of historical injustices is implicitly 
expressed in a spatial form; through the hand-drawn map hanging behind his desk. In memorialising 
this historical narrative through a representation of space, his map represents a compression of time 
itself.  
In The Poetics of Space, Bachelard (1994: 9) writes that, ‘Localising a memory in time, in the form of 
dates, is the task of a biographer. […] For a knowledge of intimacy, localization in the spaces of our 
intimacy is more urgent than determination of dates.’ It is this ‘knowledge of intimacy’ that this 
chapter strives for; an intimate peek into conceptions of place and space. The diverse voices that make 
up this chapter express their longing for and displacement from home in multiple ways. And, in doing 
so, their narratives capture the myriad ways in which people can relate to place. They represent a 
memorialisation of space and a spatialisation of memory. Ultimately, these maps and the stories they 
tell are an intimate part of the afterlife of the Partition. After all, ‘Partition’ itself collapses time and 
space into a single symbol that is both temporal and spatial. These afterimages of abandoned homes, 




1.3. Nostalgia, History and Architecture: Historical Contestations  
 
Previously in this dissertation, I have made two points that need recalling. Firstly, I have cited Paul 
Connerton’s (1989) argument that our experience of the present is partly shaped by the pasts to which 
we subscribe. Secondly, in the Introduction, I have written in some detail about how the Hindu 
nationalist imagination of a single, united and homogenous Hindu-fold rests heavily on blatant 
historical revisionism. In this section, I combine these ideas to discuss the historical contestations that 
occupy the Indian landscape. My discussion here is not intended to portray the ‘real truth’ of Indian 
history. Rather, I discuss these historical contestations as a way of foregrounding their appearance in 
the memories of my informants, later in this dissertation.  
I have previously mentioned Etienne Balibar (2002) and Peter van der Veer’s (1994) observations 
about the real and urgent need of nations to demonstrate the existence of the nation as an eternal 
fact. Hindu nationalism, like most forms of nationalism, looks towards history to establish the purity 
and homogeneity of its national community. In the introduction, I have briefly mentioned the Hindu 
nationalist view of Indian history as a series of Muslim and Christian invasions.  
However, the political currency accorded to this narrative has depended in large part, to the way that 
the VHP, RSS and BJP transformed Ayodhya’s Mughal-era mosque, the Babri Masjid, into a symbol of, 
‘the threatened Hindu majority’ (van der Veer, 1994: 7). The frighteningly successful Hindu nationalist 
campaign to replace this mosque with a ‘grand’ Hindu temple reveals much about Hindu nationalism’s 
use of history. The way in which the mosque has come to symbolise the past of the Hindu nation is 
intertwined with the drive to use the modern disciplines of archaeology, history and philology to 
demonstrate the Hindu nation as fact, both at the site of the mosque as well as across the Indian 
landscape. These contestations reveal much about the restorative nostalgia and victimhood that form 
the core of Hindu nationalism (and indeed most nationalisms). In this section, I begin with a brief 
overview of the Babri Masjid and use this as a springboard to explore other such contemporary 
contestations over history and architecture.  
 
 
Demolishing a Mughal Mosque 
 
The Babri Masjid was a sixteenth-century mosque in the holy city (for Hindus) of Ayodhya (Bacchetta, 
2000). It was built in 1528 by a general of the then Mughal Emperor Babur (van der Veer, 1994). The 
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Hindu Right has long believed that an ancient Hindu temple marking the birthplace of the Hindu deity 
Lord Ram, was demolished to make way for the mosque (Bacchetta, 2000). Ram is the demigod hero 
of the Hindu epic Ramayana. For the Hindu Right, and many practising Hindus across the ideological 
spectrum, the site of the mosque is sacred ground and is referred to as the Ram Janmabhoomi: the 
birthplace of Ram (ibid.). Moreover, as a temple town, Ayodhya is a site of pilgrimage for Hindus (van 
der Veer, 1994). 
On December 6, 1992 this mosque was demolished by an enraged mob of Hindutva activists, armed 
with swords, shovels and pickaxes (BBC, 2019c). The movement to demolish the mosque was led by 
prominent BJP leader L.K. Advani, who undertook a ‘rath yatra’ (chariot journey) across north India in 
the early 1990s to galvanise Hindu support for the replacement of the mosque with a ‘grand’ Ram 
temple (Ayyub, 2019a). Two of the BJP’s women Parliamentarians, Uma Bharti and Sadhvi Rithambara, 
also delivered fiery speeches, inciting violent mobs to action (Bacchetta, 2000). The mosque’s 
demolition led to one of the worst anti-Muslim pogroms in the country while the sectarian strife and 
Hindu hegemony that the demolition symbolically established, fundamentally redefined Indian politics 
(Ayyub, 2019a). It also triggered retributive attacks on Hindu temples in Pakistan, Bangladesh and the 
UK (van der Veer, 1994: xi).  
On November 9, 2019, the Supreme Court delivered its long-awaited judgement after decades of legal 
contestation over the ownership of the site of the former mosque (BBC, 2019c). Although the Supreme 
Court’s judgement held that the 1949 desecration and 1992 demolition of the mosque were a ‘serious 
violation of the law’, it nevertheless awarded the entire disputed site comprising 2.77 hectares to the 
Hindu side28 (Rajgopal, 2019). The court’s verdict also approved the construction of a Hindu temple 
on the site, concurring that the Hindus had a ‘better’ claim to the site’s ownership (ibid.). As an 
allegedly conciliatory gesture, Muslims were promised 5 hectares of land elsewhere for the 
construction of a mosque (BBC, 2019c). The Supreme Court’s decision was predominantly seen as a 
meek surrender to majoritarianism. 
However, the Babri mosque had not always been the site of intense contestation. Although the site of 
the mosque was regarded locally as the birthplace of Lord Ram, for most of its history it was just that: 
a local legend (van der Veer, 1994). Although there is a record of a ‘communal riot’ between Ayodhya’s 
Hindus and Muslims in 1855, this was only tangentially related to the Babri Masjid (ibid.: 153). The 
1855 dispute actually concerned the nearby Hanumangarhi temple which was seen to be occupying 
the space of a mosque (ibid.: 153). This dispute escalated in 1855 when Hindu ascetics attacked the 
                                                            
28 The plaintiffs in this case consisted of ‘Hindu cultural’ organisations closely affiliated with the far-right 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (The Wire, 2019b).  
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Babri Masjid in retaliation for the other temple-mosque dispute (ibid: 153). Over time, the Babri 
Masjid became the focus of this dispute.   
Following the ‘riot’ of 1855, the British colonial administration made attempts to appease Hindu 
religious sentiments by erecting a platform outside the Babri mosque (ibid.). Hindus could now offer 
their prayers outside the mosque, on the platform, while Muslims continued to pray inside the 
mosque (ibid.). After Partition and Independence, the Indian government locked the mosque, posted 
a guard outside it and declared the property out of bounds for both communities (ibid.). Following 
this, during the night of 22 and 23 December, 1949, an unidentified trespasser installed an image of 
Ram inside the mosque (ibid.: 2-3). As rumours of a ‘divine apparition’ spread, Ayodhya descended 
into ‘riots’ that were eventually quelled by the army (ibid.). The image of Ram was left undisturbed 
even as Hindu and Muslim community leaders approached the courts for legal acquisition of the site 
(ibid.).  
The temple-mosque issue next flared up 35 years later in 1984, when the VHP launched a ‘Tala Kholo’ 
(‘open the lock’) campaign that demanded the reopening or unlocking of the site (ibid.). Although the 
VHP’s campaign attracted some support it was ultimately overshadowed by the assassination of the 
then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the anti-Sikh pogroms (ibid.) However, starting from the 
reopening of the mosque at the order of a Faizabad district court in 1986 (ibid.: 3), the temple-mosque 
issue became an important electoral issue; scripting with it, the rise and eventual dominance of the 
unequivocally pro-temple BJP.    
My interest in the Babri Masjid lies not in chronicling the history of the rise of the BJP, but in the way 
that the mosque has become a symbol of the Hindu nation’s past. Peter van der Veer (ibid.: 7) writes 
that, ‘By transforming the mosque in Ayodhya from a local shrine into a symbol of the threatened 
Hindu majority, however, the VHP has been instrumental in the homogenization of a national 
Hinduism.’ As a piece of sacred soil that is literally seen to have been ‘captured’ and ‘converted’ by 
Islam, Ayodhya’s Ram Janmabhoomi has come to symbolise the invasion and conversion of (Hindu) 
India by ‘Muslim invaders’.  
But, as Paola Bacchetta (2000) argues, Hindu nationalism’s ‘foreign invaders’ discourse is also a 
distinctly gendered discourse. For Hindu nationalists, the Babri Masjid is a symbol of the Hindu male 
failure to protect the mother-land from marauding ‘foreign’, ‘Muslim’ men (ibid.). This sentiment is 
made all the more visceral in this context given Lord Ram’s position, within scripture, as the ‘ideal’ 
man. Thus the presence of a mosque on the alleged birthplace of Ram is a doubly emasculating wound 
for Hindu nationalism’s fragile masculinity. This feeling of emasculation lies at the heart of the hyper-
masculine and violent movement to replace the mosque with a temple (ibid.). Where the mosque’s 
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violent demolition served as a redemptive act of retribution, its replacement hopes to restore the 
Hindu nation and Hindu men to their former, scriptural glory. Killing, raping and looting Muslims – in 
the midst of the temple campaign – further serves as a performative ‘awakening’ of the Hindu man 
and through him, the Hindu nation.   
Interestingly, the Babri Masjid’s symbolism for Hindus is mirrored by its symbolism for Muslims. 
According to van der Veer (1994), for Muslims, the mosque (and Indo-Islamic architecture in general) 
is a symbol of a former glory, the decline of a certain Indo-Islamic high-culture29 and a threatened 
present. The decline of the Mughals and with it, the decline of South Asia’s Muslim aristocracy is 
sometimes seen as symbolic of the decline of the Muslim community (ibid.).  
However, since the publication of van der Veer’s work, Ayodhya’s significance for Muslims has 
undergone some change. A number of journalists reporting from Ayodhya and other parts of India in 
the wake of the ground-breaking ceremony (‘Bhoomi Poojan’) of the Hindu Temple at the Ram 
Janmabhoomi site, observed a general feeling of weariness and alienation among Muslims, on this 
issue (Ayyub, 2020; Singh, V, 2020a). It was no longer the historical symbolism of the mosque that 
concerned them but the very real and urgent fear of an ascendant majoritarianism (and ‘aspirational 
hatred’). Furthermore, with the date of the ground-breaking ceremony – August 5, 2020 – also 
marking the one-year anniversary of The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, the date and 
the ceremony may well have symbolised the founding of the Hindu nation-state (Ayyub, 2020).  
For Hindu nationalists, victory in Ayodhya is merely one part of what is perceived as a much needed 
‘restoration’ of the Indian landscape. Understanding this necessitates an oeuvre into history, 
architecture and nostalgia. In the following section, I detail Hindu nationalism’s conception of Indian 
history and the ways in which its discourse draws on orientalist historiography. Following that I turn 
to a discussion of architecture where I first describe architecture’s relationship to memory and then 
detail some of the contemporary contestations over buildings.  
 
 
Hindu Nationalism and Orientalist Historiography 
 
As stated previously, in the discourses of Hindu nationalism, the ‘history’ of the Babri Masjid functions 
as a convenient short-hand for its conception of Indian history. The construction of the Babri Masjid 
                                                            
29 There is a strain of Muslim nationalism (predominantly to be found in Pakistan) that gloats over the former 
glories of Indo-Islamic rulers as the inherent weakness of Hindus (ibid.). However, this is almost non-existent in 
the contemporary Indian political landscape.  
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as a ‘historical trauma’ is located squarely in the middle of what is often dubbed the period of ‘Islamic’ 
rule in India. There is a tendency in Indian historiography to classify historical periods using the religion 
of the prominent monarchs of the time. Thus, Indian history is broadly classified into three periods: 
Hindu rule (circa 1000 BCE to 1200 CE), Islamic rule (circa 1200 CE to 1800 CE) and Christian rule (circa 
1800 CE to 1947) (van der Veer, 1994).  
This religious classification is a manner of colonial historiography unique to India. Eminent Indian 
historian Prof Romila Thapar (2009) points out that this kind of historiography first emerged in the 
eighteenth-century as a product of the writings of James Mill and Thomas Macaulay. Colonial 
historiography believed that Indians inherently lacked a historical consciousness and sought to 
‘excavate’ India’s past through their own study of history, anthropology and archaeology (van der 
Veer, 1994). This tone of discourse is best summarised through the title of Eric Wolf’s (1982) seminal 
work, Europe and the People Without History. That is, European Enlightenment discourses presented 
the non-European world as a timeless landscape lacking historical consciousness; as people without 
history (ibid.; Said, 1978). The colonial project was then presented as a civilising mission and a project 
of discovery: of new lands, peoples and history. 
In India, this brand of colonial historiography sought to ascribe to the people and the land, the religion 
of its ruling dynasty. Thus, for example, the India ruled by ‘Muslim’ Mughal monarchs is classified as 
‘Islamic’ while, the India ruled by the ‘Hindu’ Mauryan monarchs is classified as Hindu. This 
classification is problematic because it accords religious identity a primacy that is ahistorical (van der 
Veer, 1994). Moreover, just as the advent of British colonialism cannot be said to have ‘Christianised’ 
India, so too, the advent of ‘Islamic’ rulers cannot be said to have ‘Islamised’ India.  
As stated previously in the Introduction, colonial historiography demonised India’s former ‘foreign 
rulers’ – portraying them as particularly cruel, corrupt and barbaric – in an attempt to justify the 
enlightened character of their own regime (Thapar, 2009). Edward Said (1978) touches on this in his 
deconstruction of the trope of the oriental despot. Presenting the Mughals (and other ‘Muslim’ rulers) 
whom the British Empire had subjugated and replaced as self-absorbed despots was a ploy aimed at 
establishing the political legitimacy of the British Empire in India. In a larger sense, British colonialism 
saw itself as a ‘neutral’ authority whose primary task was to keep the peace between Hindus and 
Muslims (Ahmad, 2020). This perspective also assumed an irrational and eternal enmity between 
Hindus and Muslims (ibid.).  
Hindu nationalism has inherited much from colonial historiography. For the Hindu Right, the last 1200 
years of Indian history comprise a series of ‘foreign invasions’ and occupations by hordes of ‘anti-
Hindu invaders’ that sought to convert and subjugate India’s indigenous (‘homogenously Hindu’) 
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population. This trope of Muslims-as-foreign-invaders is part of the RSS’ typology of Indian Muslims. 
As Paula Bacchetta writes:  
‘Historically, the RSS has divided Indian Muslim men into three categories: 1. Muslims-as-
foreign-invaders, which designates upper class and political leadership; 2. Muslims-as-ex-
Hindu-converts, as lower caste; and 3. Hindu-Muslims, a more recent invention, designating 
hypothetical Muslims who, insofar as their conduct would be consistent with Hindu 
nationalism’s religious, nationalist, gender and sexual normativity, could be re-assimilated 
back into the Hindu nation.’ 
(Bacchetta, 2019: 387) 
The Hindu Right’s views on Indian history are an amalgamation of these two colonial tropes: 1) India 
before Islam, under the just and bountiful rule of Hindu Kings enjoyed a golden period of prosperity 
and peace; 2) All of Indian history is a series of foreign invasions by hostile military elites, the worst of 
whom are Muslims (Bacchetta, 2000). Taking this as the mould, all the Muslim monarchs and nobles 
who have ever held power in South Asia are presented as ‘barbaric foreign invaders’, who were 
interested only in the loot, subjugation and religious conversion of the people and land. For the Hindu 
Right, the Babri Masjid is a symbol of this history. 
However, discussions of the impact of colonial thought on Hindu nationalism raises deeper 
historiographical questions about the nature of the Hindu-Muslim divide. Was India before the British 
a syncretic paradise? If yes, if the British are the singular reason for ethnonationalism in India, then 
does this not give the colonial administration too much credit and the natives too little agency? If no, 
if Hindus and Muslims have never lived in peace, then does that not prove that the Partition was a 
sensible and justified attempt at securing long-term religious harmony?  
The truth, as is so often the case, is somewhere in the middle. The short answer to the above question 
is given by van der Veer as follows: 
‘No doubt, there are facts, such as the demolition of Hindu temples by Muslim rulers or taxes 
on infidels as well as Hindu resistance against such things that could be used to support the 
master narrative. But there are also other facts, such as patronage of Hindu shrines by Muslim 
rulers or vice versa, that problematize the story.’ 
(van der Veer, 1994: 151)  
Van der Veer’s argument is supported by the historiographical record. In his cultural historiography of 
the Mughal Empire, Rajeev Kinra (2014), explores the subject of Mughal civility and cosmopolitanism. 
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Kinra’s research goes beyond a focus on the fabled cosmopolitanism and culture of literary and artistic 
patronage of individual Mughal rulers such as Akbar. Kinra’s scholarship is interesting because using 
the comments of influential Enlightenment-era European commentators, he connects his analysis of 
the Mughals and their cosmopolitanism to a larger history of tolerance in global early modernity. In a 
significant observation that underscores the cosmopolitanism of the Mughal imperial project, Kinra 
writes that: 
‘At a time when English Catholics were barred by the Test Acts from attending university, 
joining parliament, or holding virtually any civic or military appointments, the Mughals not 
only tolerated but clearly seemed to encourage people from all faiths, and all corners of the 
world, to participate in their imperial project.’ 
(ibid.: 256) 
Similarly, Prof Irfan Habib (2016) – a pre-eminent historian of the Mughal-era – writes that the Mughal 
imperial courts were exemplars of cosmopolitanism. Studying the political economy of the Braj Bhum 
region30 - an area rich in Hindu temple heritage – Habib (2016) found that in addition to the sustained 
patronage of the local Amber House (vassal lords to the Mughals), the Imperial Court itself provided 
substantial financial aid in the form of generous land grants, for the construction of temples from 1565 
onwards (the reign of Emperor Akbar). Aid from the Imperial Court, continued even through the reign 
of Emperor Aurangzeb (ibid.).  
The historiographical evidence around Aurangzeb is interesting since Aurangzeb is largely regarded – 
even by secular essayists such as Jawaharlal Nehru (1946) – as a cruel, bigoted despot who turned 
back the clock in terms of cultural tolerance and royal patronage of the arts and sciences. Adding 
nuance to Aurangzeb’s history, Habib (2016) writes that Aurangzeb did indeed order the destruction 
of the Keshav Rai temple and had its idols transported to Agra where they were stepped on by 
worshippers at Princess Jahanara’s mosque. However, no temples in Vrindavan (Bruj Bhum) were 
destroyed and the Imperial Court continued to confirm land grants previously issued to House Amber 
(ibid.). Land grants were additionally reconfirmed multiple times during the reign of Aurangzeb, in 
1661, 1671, 1695 and 1707.  
Additionally, the charge that ‘Muslim invaders’ took to the looting and desecration of Hindu temples 
as part of a grand conspiracy to Islamize India’s Hindu majority, does not entirely hold up. Richard 
                                                            
30 Bruj Bhum also known as Brijbhoomi is the Mathura-Vrindavan region in Uttar Pradesh. This region is replete 
with Hindu temples and mythological significance. It also lies squarely in the middle of what is seen as the 
BJP’s core constituency today: the Hindi heartland belt. Mathura is located close to Agra (the former Mughal 
imperial capital) which makes the implications of Habib’s (2016) research even more interesting. 
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Eaton (2000) argues that since the sixth-century CE, temple desecration has remained a part of 
warfare, but not entirely for religious reasons. In fact, Hindu kings also desecrated the temples in the 
territories of rival Hindu Kings. Eaton (ibid.: 295) presents a long list of such historical examples that 
includes Pallava, Chalukya, Rashtrakuta and Bengali Hindu rulers, among others. Eaton argues that 
part of the reason that temples were attacked during times of war was because many medieval 
kingdoms stored their wealth in temples; thus making temples an attractive target. During inter-
dynastic conflicts, victorious Hindu kings often destroyed their rival’s patron idols as a symbolic 
declaration of the extension of their sovereignty. 
Furthermore, Habib (2009) adds that contrary to colonial historiography, considerable research on 
qualitative and other materials from the Mughal-era indicate that different sections of India society 
were more prosperous under the Mughals, in per capita terms, than under the British. Therefore, 
British colonial historiography on Mughals must also be seen in the context of what it was intended 
to do, i.e. provide an ideological justification for Empire.  
For Hindu nationalists, such a religion-centric historiography also reinscribes the essentialism on which 
their nationalism is based (van der Veer, 1994). Compressing incredibly diverse and antagonistic Hindu 
religious communities within a single homogenising label in the same breath as it essentialises the 
‘Muslim other’, this discourse secures the basis for nationalist mobilisation (ibid.). It is in the manner 
in which religious nationalism (or ethnonationalism) transforms localised conflict between some 
Hindus and Muslims in some places – conflict that may or may not be caused by religion, specifically – 
into a nationalised conflict between all Hindus and all Muslims everywhere, that modern nationalism 
differs from medieval conflicts of the past. Moreover, it erases internecine conflict within the Hindu-
fold such as conflict between divergent Hindu kingdoms, sects and castes.  
The effectiveness of these discourses are visible across a large section of Indian society today; 
including my informants. The Mughals are by and large considered barbaric despots and their 
monuments (including the Taj Mahal) are considered reminders of an ‘age of slavery’ (Bacchetta, 
2000). Some of my informants, such as Bhagwanti31, fearlessly stated that it was necessary to demolish 
the Taj Mahal in a manner similar to the demolition of the Babri Masjid. She believed that the Taj 
Mahal not only symbolised but also celebrated the history of the enslavement and subordination of 
Hindus. According to her such a symbol had no place in the Hindu nation.    
                                                            
31 I first interviewed Bhagwanti for my MPhil thesis. Her story can be found in Kohli (2015: 28-30). I recount 
fresh ethnographic evidence, in relation to her story, in Section 2.5, as part of my analysis of the gendered 
aspects of the discourse of sacrifice, martyrdom and hard work.   
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With Hindutva’s emergence as a hegemonic force in the Indian political landscape, its discourses have 
also found articulation in popular culture. In recent times, these historical discourses have been 
reinforced through mainstream cinema. Falling in line with the ideology of the ruling order, Bollywood 
has produced a number of historical epics that claim to excavate the ‘real’ history of India. Recent 
historical epics such as Bajirao Mastani, Padmaavat, Manikarnika, Panipat and Tanhaji reproduce the 
Muslims-as-foreign-invaders trope (Kohli and Dhawan, 2020b). These films follow the formula of 
juxtaposing virtuous Hindu monarchs against barbaric, fanatic Muslim invaders in cataclysmic battles 
(Kohli and Dhawan, 2020b).  
 
 
Architecture and Proximate Enemies 
 
In the previous section, I had briefly mentioned the idea that architecture functions as a repository of 
memory (Bevan, 2006). As the physical embodiment of cultural histories, architecture acquires a 
‘totemic quality’, signalling the neighbourhoods of friend or foe (ibid.: 8). I experienced this first-hand 
in Delhi, where the city’s Mughal monuments and mosques functioned as markers of ‘Muslim 
neighbourhoods’. Bevan (ibid.: 134) uses Israeli historian Meron Benvenisti’s (1995) phrase ‘intimate 
enemies’, to describe the seemingly paradoxical feelings of historical continuity and animosity that 
one’s proximity to the architecture of the ‘other’ provokes.  
Benvenisti (ibid.) first used the phrase ‘intimate enemies’ in the context of ethnic conflict in Palestine. 
Benvenisti argued that the conflict between Arab and Jewish communities in Israel-Palestine was an 
inter-communal conflict between two communities who share a deep attachment for the same piece 
of land. In this way, Benvenisti’s argument denied Israel’s settler-colonial history. Rather, Benvenisti 
argued that the Israel-Palestine conflict was the result of an ‘unfinished’ Partition that had created the 
present situation of antagonistic communities living beside each other as intimate enemies. In 
Benvenisti’s opinion, the solution to the conflict was not another partition in aspiration of twin-
ethnically homogenous states, but a single multi-ethnic state that would allow Jewish and Arab 
communities to share the land to which they both had an equal claim. Written in the post-Oslo Accords 
period of optimism and hope, Benvenisti’s ideas today seem delusional and anachronistic. Benvenisti’s 
own views have evolved significantly in the ensuing period; having grown from a previously left-Zionist 
stance to one progressively more critical of Israel (David Landy, 2020, personal communication, 05 
September). Moreover, Israel’s own transition to an apartheid state has meant that relations between 
Palestinians and Israeli citizens have become a lot less ‘intimate’.  
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While Benvenisti’s denial of Israel’s settler-colonial project makes his idea of ‘intimate enemies’ 
inaccurate for the Palestinian context, the phrase is an apt description of ethnonationalism in India. I 
merely propose one modification: that of replacing the word ‘intimate’ with ‘proximate’. After all, 
Benvenisti uses intimacy to indicate proximity; indexing the tenseness of antagonistic groups forced 
to live cheek-by-jowl. To me, the word ‘intimate’ implies knowledge (or familiarity), closeness (with or 
without physical proximity) but also affection. On the other hand, it is ‘proximate’ that correctly 
describes the physical closeness or topographic contiguity that is the subject of Benvenisti’s study.   
Robert Bevan (2006) connects the historical tradition embodied by architecture to Eric Hobsbwam’s 
(2000) theorisation of the invention of tradition. Hobsbawm (ibid.) argues that the invention of new 
traditions, including the resurrection of ancient symbols and place names and any number of 
nationalist symbols and rituals, ‘activate’ the imagined community by establishing continuity with an 
imagined past. In this sense, the various Indo-Islamic monuments scattered across north India are 
perceived to be expressing continuity with India’s ‘Islamic’ past and are therefore treated with varying 
degrees of disdain, neglect and even destruction. In fact, the presence of proximate enemies itself 
points to this ‘unfinished’ quality of the Partition (Bevan, 2006).  
Bevan (ibid.) argues that the demolition of the Mughal-era Babri Masjid is a good example of the kinds 
of violence and tensions that proximate enemies provoke and sustain. In such contexts, architectural 
sites function not only as markers of the proximity of one’s enemies but are also in and of themselves 
the ‘enemy’. In this way, the genocidal project to eliminate the ‘other’ from the land also includes the 
destruction of the architecture and place names that symbolise their cultural heritage.  
The truth of Bevan’s (ibid.) argument is borne out by the fact that the 2002 Gujarat pogrom and the 
2020 Delhi pogrom involved the vandalisation and destruction of mosques (Ghassem-Fachandi, 2010; 
Ahmed, 2020). The violence of the Gujarat pogrom included the bulldozing of the sixteenth-century 
Isanpur Dargah in Vatva (Ahmedabad) along with a number of other mosques and shrines (Ghassem-
Fachandi, 2010: 162). Like the demolition of the Babri Masjid, this violence specifically identified 
buildings as the ‘enemy’.  
 
 
Demolition and ‘Restoration’: The Nostalgia of Hindutva 
 
So far, numerous times in this dissertation I have mentioned nationalism’s imagination of the nation 
as eternal fact. I have also connected this to modernity. Specifically, in relation to Hindu nationalism, 
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I have also alluded to its co-optation of archaeology, history and philology to establish Hindu 
mythology as ‘history’; as the national past. However, this is not an end in itself. Nationalism or 
nationalist discourse does not simply rest at having imagined or ‘proved’ its past. It seeks to 
memorialise it (Balibar, 2002), ‘activate’ it (Hobsbawm, 2000) and in doing so, ‘restore’ the nation to 
that glorious past (Boym, 2001). Building on my discussion thus far, in this sub-section, I use Boym’s 
(ibid.: 41) idea of ‘restorative nostalgia’ to detail Hindu nationalism’s ultimate ambition: to ‘restore’ 
the land to a glorious Hindu past32.  
In emphasising restorative nostalgia in this context, I want to draw attention to the creative impulse 
inherent within Hindu nationalism’s demolition of architecture. That is, demolition is not merely 
violence with the sole objective of destruction – although destruction is an objective – but is instead 
part of the ‘restoration’ of a glorious past. This process is polytemporal; pointing backwards to history 
but also simultaneously pointing forwards to the future. Destruction, in this context, is not only the 
erasure of a past, but is also the foreclosing of a future.  
My discussion of this creative impulse inherent in Hindu nationalism is inspired by Said’s (1978) work 
on orientalism. Writing in a completely different context, Said (ibid.: 14) observed that the internal 
constraints imposed upon writers and thinkers by the dominant discourse of orientalism, ‘were 
productive, not unilaterally inhibiting’. That is, the discourse of orientalism (or any other discourse) is 
experienced by its thinkers not only as an ideological limitation but also as an inspiration for creativity. 
Similarly, at the core of the act of imagining the nation and its history, lies a creative, generative 
                                                            
32 While Boym’s work and the vast body of literature on the sociology/anthropology of nostalgia offers this 
interpretive framework, an alternative approach is offered by James Faubion (1993) through his discussion of 
metalepsis. Drawing on de Certeau’s (1984) idea of strategies vs tactics, Faubion (1993) explores the meanings 
and histories embedded in the architecture of the metropolis. Faubion does this through an exploration of the 
related ideas of introjective and projective metalepsis. According to Faubion:  
‘Introjective metalepsis sacrifices the integrity of the present “to an idealised past.” It absorbs the 
present into the past, and so has the effect of renovating or renewing the past. Literarily, it involves 
the “substitution of [historically] late words for earlier words in an anterior trope.” As a figure of 
social and cultural action, it most often involves the use of contemporary, of “modern” tools in the 
repairing or the reinvigoration of “tradition”.’  
(ibid.: 85) 
On the other hand, ‘Projective metalepsis executes a “distancing a projecting of the past” and so an 
identification either with a new present or a yet unrealized future’ (ibid.: 85). Contrary to introjective 
metalepsis, projective metalepsis involves the substitution of ‘early’ words for ‘late’ words (ibid.: 85). Faubion 
writes that, ‘As a figure of social and cultural action, it [projective metalepsis] involves the use of shreds and 
patches of traditions in order to enrich, to fill out the present or the future’ (ibid.: 85).  
Faubion’s discussion of metalepsis observes the entangling of the past and present. While his discussion of 
introjective metalepsis concerns the nostalgic pursuit of an idealised past – something Boym (2001: 41) 
describes not-dissimilarly as ‘restorative nostalgia’ – his discussion of projective metalepsis complements 
Hobsbawm’s (2000) discussion of the ‘invention of tradition’. Therefore, my discussion of the politics of 
memory here can be seen to run parallel to Faubion’s discussion of metaleptic semiotic processes in the 
context of Athens’ rich cultural heritage.    
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impulse. Once again, as I have been doing thus far, in this section, I will begin by discussing demolition 
and restoration in the context of the Babri Masjid and then, move on to other similar examples.  
The Hindu nationalist campaign to replace the Babri Masjid with a ‘grand’ Hindu temple was the 
starting point of an intense debate on the political use of history. As one of India’s most renowned 
historians, Prof Romila Thapar (1991) was among those who consistently and vociferously argued that 
there was no evidence to support the Hindu Right’s assertions. Similarly, a group of historians working 
in the Jawaharlal Nehru University’s Centre for Historical Studies released a pamphlet in 1989, 
opposing the ‘political abuse of history’ by Hindu nationalist organisations such as the VHP (van der 
Veer, 1995: 874).  
However, the debate around the ‘political abuse of history’ appears to miss a key aspect of Hindu 
nationalism. That is, this debate around the historicity of Hindu nationalism’s claims is not just a 
debate about historical facts per se. Rather, in the way that the question of the historicity of an ancient 
Ram temple at the site of the mosque is linked to its demolition, this debate is in fact about whether 
or not the demolition of the mosque was justified. But, there is an additional twist. Hindu nationalism 
seeks to prove the existence of an ancient Hindu temple at this site not only to justify its own violence, 
but to also legitimise its ‘restorative’ construction of a temple at the site of the mosque. The objective 
here is a larger national restoration, of which the temple-mosque debate is merely one point of 
contention. Demolition and obscurantism, in this context, are the means to this end; part of a larger 
project of national ‘revival’. I am emphasising this – perhaps even to the point of stating the obvious 
– because in the discussion that follows, it is easy to miss the forest for the trees.  
In the court proceedings that followed the demolition of the Babri Masjid, archaeological evidence 
from the Archaeological Survey of India was sought as a form of validation of a particular national past 
(Varghese, 2018). In 2003, the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) conducted a six-month long court-
ordered excavation of the site and concluded that a Hindu temple had existed beneath the mosque 
(Mahaprashasta, 2019). The ASI’s conclusions were touted by the Hindu Right as ‘proof’ of their faith 
that the site was indeed the birthplace of Lord Ram. However, the ASI-study came under heavy 
criticism for its strong majoritarian bias. Most prominently, the ASI’s conclusions were criticised by 
Supriya Varma (Professor of Archaeology at Jawaharlal Nehru University) and Jaya Menon (Head of 
the Department of History at Shiv Nadar University). Varma and Menon (2010) argued that the 
evidence collected by the ASI did not support its claims. They argued that the underlying structures 
excavated by the ASI resemble either Buddhist stupas or smaller mosques (ibid.). Varma and Menon 
(2010) also criticised the methodology of the ASI study.  
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While the Supreme Court accepted the ASI’s conclusions, a major part of its judgement was based on 
‘faith and beliefs’ along with social and religious practices (Srinivas, 2019). The court chose to treat 
the deity Ram Lalla (baby Lord Ram) as a juristic entity, recognising a certain set of rights and duties 
that the deity was entitled to by the sheer fact of the Hindus faith in it (ibid.). In doing so, the court 
anthropomorphised the faith of Hindus in the deity, giving it legal shape and form.  
Senior Deputy Editor of The Frontline, T.K. Rajalakshmi focused her critique on the Supreme Court 
judgement’s neglect of historical evidence, writing:  
‘The court clearly does not question the basis of the faith and belief despite ample historical 
evidence presented by historians time and again pointing out that there was no overwhelming 
proof of the place or the exact spot as being the birthplace of Lord Ram.’  
(Rajalakshmi, 2019) 
Perhaps, the court’s lack of interest in the nitty-gritties of historical evidence can be better understood 
not as a neglect of evidence but as the institution’s decision to answer the call to play its part in the 
nationalist revival that is afoot. The court cannot be said to have neglected ‘evidence’ but rather, has 
chosen to hierarchize the majoritarian faith of Hindus over all else. This is an important caveat, since 
despite holding the mosque’s demolition by a violent Hindu mob as a criminal act, the court 
nevertheless chose to institutionalise the violence by according legal imprimatur to the work of 
replacing the 400-year old mosque with a Hindu temple. Rana Ayyub (2019a) poignantly observed that 
in inviting the violent, murderous Hindu mob of 1992 to celebrate a major political victory rather than 
atone for their crimes, the Indian state has enshrined the second-grade status of its Muslim citizens in 
law.  
But, what the Indian state has also done is an act of ‘restoration’. As a proximate enemy, the mosque 
necessitated demolition and replacement by a ‘grand’ Hindu temple. The violence was meant not only 
to appease Hindu majoritarian sentiments, but was also instrumental to the eventual establishment 
of a Hindu state. The ongoing state-approved construction of the Hindu temple – at the site of the 
erstwhile mosque – is a potent symbol of India’s slide into a Hindu fascist state. 
The Hindu Right’s use of history and archaeology are best understood through Eric Hobsbawm’s (1992) 
classic quote on the intimate relation between history and nationalism. Hobsbawm (ibid.: 3) famously 
wrote, ‘Historians are to nationalism what poppy-growers in Pakistan are to heroin-addicts: we supply 
the essential raw material for the market.’ In this way, Hobsbawm (1992, 2000) observes the tendency 
of nationalist movements to co-opt history and archaeology for the imagination of a national past that 
is consistent with the homogenising discourses of their nationalism.   
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Hamilakis (2007) writes that since the rise of Nazism in Europe, archaeologists and historians have, at 
numerous moments in history, expressed concern about the co-optation of their science for 
nationalist objectives. While Hamilakis (ibid.) ignores the colonial use of archaeology and history, his 
larger point is extremely valid, in that dramatic re-imaginings of the nation by nationalist movements, 
require a re-imagination of the national past.  
Etienne Balibar (2002: 220) articulates this connection between history and nationalism in his 
observation that the history of all nations is a ‘retrospective illusion’. In this way, history serves as an 
effective tool for the regulation of a nation’s memory. Consequently, the emergence of new national 
movements require the writing of fresh histories that reify the emerging nationalist consciousness 
with a historical consciousness. This is essentially an attempt at establishing moral and political 
legitimacy through the construction of genealogy.  This is visible in the way that India’s turn to Hindu 
nationalism has required a boisterous revisionism of India’s plural past; creating a homogenous past 
that proves the ‘truth’ of the political claims of Hindu nationalism.  
As stated previously, what is also visible in the process is the co-optation of the sciences of modernity 
– archaeology, history and philology – towards the objectives of nationalism – itself a product of 
modernity (Hamilakis, 2007). Etienne Balibar (2002) observes that archaeological artefacts, sites and 
monuments are constantly involved in the ‘nationalization of society’. The ‘nationalization of society’ 
also implies that the nation is a ‘work in progress’ (Hamilakis, 2007: 18). Like any social construction, 
the nation is one that must be (re-)imagined and performed as part of one’s daily life (ibid.: 18). 
Hamilakis sees archaeology as a site of nationalist contestation such that: 
‘The device of archaeology (and not simply the monuments and artefacts) is fundamental to 
the national imagination; it is a device that produces facts on the ground, the experiential and 
physical national truths. It creates regimes of truth for the nation.’    
(ibid.: 294) 
In this, we see the Janus-face of the nationalist project that looks into the future whilst simultaneously 
facing the past (Anderson, 1991). The result is an ‘ordered and sanitized national memory’ that leaves 
behind a landscape of oblivion populated with the forgotten images of a complex, diverse and 
fragmented past (Hamilakis, 2007: 294). Like the Babri Masjid, the fulfilment of the national project 
requires the total annihilation of some of these fragments – these proximate enemies – so that others 
might take their place.  
In the South Asian context, one of the things that complicates this task is the unfinished quality of the 
Partitions of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Erin Riggs and Zahida Rehman Jat (2016: 139) write that 
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the concept of the nation-state, ‘works to affix essentialist understandings of national belonging to 
different places.’ At the time of Partition, India and Pakistan were diverse and to a large degree, 
syncretic societies, rather than culturally homogenous nations whose populations could be surgically 
separated from one another. But the retributive violence of the Partition sought to create ‘facts on 
the grounds’.  
Partition refugees and the formalised transfer of population that they were part of, embody the 
essentialism of these constructions; having been forced to move to the ‘correct’ nation. But, in doing 
so, Partition refugees were brought face to face with a material landscape shaped by a hybridity and 
confluence that stood – and continues to stand – at odds with the essentialism embodied by their 
experience. Where refugees fleeing to India were confronted with India’s ‘Islamic’ past – most 
prominently in the form of the monuments and ruins dating back to the years of the Delhi Sultanate 
and Mughal Empire – refugees fleeing to Pakistan encountered a plethora of Hindu temples and 
famous Sikh shrines such as Gurdwara Darbar Sahib Kartarpur, Panja Sahib and Nankana Sahib (ibid.). 
These architectural sites, while embodying a syncretic past, also became markers of the trauma of 
displacement (ibid.).   
The manipulation of architecture to make a statement about the national past is not an entirely new 
development. One of the earliest examples of this was the Indian state’s decision to rebuild the 
Somanatha Temple in Veraval, Gujarat. The temple’s foundation stone was laid on May 11, 1950 by 
the then Indian President Dr Rajendra Prasad and its construction was completed the following year 
(Thapar, 2015; van der Veer, 1994). The shrine at the heart of the Somanatha Temple is estimated to 
be over a 1000 years old (Thapar, 2015). Throughout its history, the temple has been destroyed and 
rebuilt a number of times (ibid.).  
However, despite a certain basic perceived similarity between Somanatha and Ayodhya – that of 
ancient Hindu shrines seen as having been under attack from ‘Muslim invaders’ – there are also a 
number of differences. Unlike Ayodhya, there is a detailed historical record of the continuous 
destruction and looting of the Somanatha Temple by a number of kings and warlords that includes 
Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni (in 1026 CE); Alaf Khan, a general in Sultan Alauddin Khilji’s army (1297 CE); 
and the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb (in 1669 CE), among others (Thapar, 2015; van der Veer, 1994: 
150). There is also historical evidence of the mugging of pilgrims on their way to and from the temple 
by Hindu kings, chieftains and warlords (Thapar, 2015). Yet, interestingly, the first time that the many 
destructions of Somanatha were referred to as a ‘Hindu tragedy’ was not in India but in the House of 
Commons, in the UK (Thapar, 2015). The main source for this narrative were the triumphalist accounts 
of these events in Turkish and Persian chronicles (ibid.). This narrative suited the kind of orientalist, 
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colonial historiography I have detailed previously; a historiography that portrayed Muslims as the 
source of all evil in Indian history to justify colonialism as well as divide Hindu and Muslim populations 
(ibid.). Additionally, in the case of the Somanatha Temple, archaeologists raised objections against the 
manner of its reconstruction. Their objections primarily concerned the government’s decision to 
demolish the temple’s historical ruins in order to clear the land for the (re-)construction of a new 
edifice (van der Veer, 1994: 149-151).  
As van der Veer (ibid.) observes, in rebuilding the Somanatha Temple, the Indian state made an 
important statement on the national past. Archaeology was used in this context not to unearth the 
material culture surrounding the life and politics of the temple and its destruction, but to fill in the 
gaps in an overarching master narrative of the eternal enmity between ‘iconoclast Muslims’ and 
‘Hindu idol worshippers’ (ibid.: 151; Thapar, 2015). Against this narrative, rebuilding the Somanatha 
Temple – as one of the first acts of a newly independent and Partitioned state – made a deeply 
symbolic statement of Hindu India’s liberation from the ‘Muslim invader’. As van der Veer (1994) 
shows, in spearheading the process to rebuild the temple, Mahatma Gandhi and Sardar Patel were 
consciously aware of the political statement being made.  
In recent times, a steadily snowballing Hindu nationalism has sought to ‘unearth’ and ‘revive’ other 
such Hindu pasts. Through state-sponsored archaeological projects and nationalist hyperbole, Hindu 
nationalists have sought to focus on whatever little evidence there is of the ‘proto-historic’, ‘pre-
Islamic’ period (Rajagopalan, 2011). The attempt is one to connect new Hindu India to a Hindu past; 
erasing the perceived embarrassment and emasculation of medieval Indian history with the imagined 
wonders of ancient India (ibid.). The destruction and neglect of monuments and the changing of place-
names to those derived from Hindu epics, attempts to forcefully calibrate the incongruous landscape 
of a historically plural India to one that fit its homogenous Hindu avatar. Consequently, the ‘Muslim’ 
monuments of north India are turned into ‘necrophilic spaces’, unused and unconnected to the people 
of the present (Taneja, 2013). However, even as it creates a waste-land of memory (both material and 
otherwise), the national re-imagining of the past is at its core, a creative process. Gratuitously 
manipulating and ‘restoring’ the Hindu past, this project has sought to inscribe imagined histories into 
the brick and mortar of the nation’s landscapes and cityscapes.  
In the last six years of its rule, the Modi government has sought to imprint a Hindu nationalist history 
upon the Indian landscape. One of these projects is the BJP (and the Sangh Parivar’s) ambition to 
excavate the Ram Setu in an attempt to prove its human origins (Vikas, 2017). The Ram Setu is a 
submerged land-bridge connecting India and Sri Lanka. According to the Hindu epic Ramayana, it is 
believed to have been built by Lord Ram as he sought to invade the kingdom of (Sri) Lanka, where his 
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wife was being held captive. In the Supreme Court, the Modi government has argued against the 
‘destruction’ of the ‘monument’ for the creation of a commercial shipping corridor (Financial Express, 
2019a). The government has also sought to unsuccessfully commission the Indian Council of Historical 
Research (ICHR) for an archaeological excavation of the site (Vikas, 2017). BJP MP and lawyer 
Subramanian Swami33 has petitioned the Supreme Court and issued numerous pleas to the 
government arguing that the Ram Sethu qualifies all of the legal conditions to be officially declared a 
National Heritage Monument (Pandya, 2020).  
The Central government along with the BJP-led state governments have also approached the 
construction of statues of Hindu nationalist icons with great gusto. Foremost among these has been 
the construction of the ‘Statue of Unity’; a 182-metre tall statue of Sardar Vallabhai Patel: Indian 
freedom fighter, moderate Hindu nationalist and Congress politician (Hindustan Times, 2019). The 
statue is itself mired in a larger campaign of historical revisionism that has sought to pit Patel ‘the 
unifier’ against Jawaharlal Nehru, the ‘corrupt dynast’ (Vincent, 2019). What is conveniently forgotten 
in the process is Patel’s aversion of the RSS and his decision to ban the organisation in 1948 over the 
latter’s role in Mahatma Gandhi’s assassination (Guha, 2018; The Wire, 2018).  
The ‘Statue of Unity’ is being followed by other statues that all seek to lay claim to the title of the 
world’s tallest statue. In 2018, the then BJP-led Maharashtra state government announced the 
construction of ‘Shiv Smarak’ - a gigantic memorial statue dedicated to the seventeenth-century Hindu 
king and sub-nationalist icon, Emperor Shivaji (India Today, 2018). The proposed 212 metres tall statue 
will be built on an artificial island (that is itself yet to be constructed) situated off the coast of Mumbai 
(ibid.; Bhardwaj, 2019).  
Meanwhile, the BJP’s Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath has in turn promised to build a 251 
metres tall statue of the Hindu deity Lord Ram (Arnimesh, 2020). Other Hindu historical and 
mythological figures whose statues have been erected include a statue of the Hindu King Prithviraj 
Chauhan, in Delhi in 2011 (Rajagopalan, 2011). Prithviraj Chauhan is remembered by Hindu 
nationalists as the ‘last Hindu King’ since the end of his reign – in 1192 CE – is seen to have been 
followed by India’s period of ‘Islamic rule’ (ibid.).  
The BJP and Janata Dal (United) coalition-government in Bihar has also announced plans for the 
installation of a statue of Maharana Pratap (Kumar, M, 2020). Maharan Pratap – a sixteenth-century 
                                                            




Rajput monarch – is remembered by the Hindu Right as a ‘great patriot’ for having resisted the 
suzerainty of the Mughal Empire in its years of ascendancy (ibid.).  
The construction of these statues is itself part of a larger campaign to saffronise the Indian landscape; 
a project that has also included the renaming of towns and cities. As stated previously, this campaign 
is a good example of what Hobsbawm (2000) has described as the invention of tradition. Packaging its 
historical revisionism and restorative nostalgia as the ‘excavation’ of hitherto suppressed/repressed 
histories, it seeks to express continuity with a Hindu past. Using a ‘Hindu past’ to create a ‘Hindu 
present’, it expresses the hope for a glorious future for the Hindu nation.  
Place names form an important part of this, since, ‘they naturally document and reflect a locality's 
heritage and identity’ (Ahmad, R, 2018). Place names, thus, are much more than just ‘tokens’ and 
‘markers’ that delineate place (Connerton, 2009: 10). Where they are ‘semantically transparent’, such 
as in the case of the Western Apache, they evoke folklore and form an inseparable part of the culture’s 
cosmology (ibid.: 10; Basso, 1996). However, as Paul Connerton (2009: 10) writes, ‘More usually, 
place-names are semantically opaque: they cover the past of a place, half-hide a history.’ 
However, the very need to preserve, revive and defend this ‘Hindu past’ lays bare the process of its 
invention. As Hobsbawm (2000: 7-8) writes, ‘the very appearance of movements for the defence and 
revival of traditions, ‘traditionalist’ or otherwise, indicates such a break.’ After all, living traditions do 
not need majoritarian mobilisations campaigning for their reinstatement. But, as I have said 
previously, in this campaign ‘facts’ are besides the point. The real objective is the legitimation of the 
present regime and its aspiration for the future on the basis of the imagination of a ‘Hindu’ past. 
A good example of the BJP’s drive to ‘restore’ the Hindu past through the changing of place names is 
the BJP ruled Haryana state government’s decision in April 2016, to rename the city of Gurgaon to 
Gurugram. In an official press release, the government justified the name change by stating the city’s 
connection to Hindu scripture and mythology via the Bhagwat Gita:  
‘Haryana is a historic land of the Bhagwat Gita and Gurgaon had been a centre of learning. It 
had been known as Gurugram since the times of Guru Dronacharya. Gurgaon was a great 
centre of education’  
(India Today, 2016). 
Here, the aspiration to ‘develop’ the city of Gurgaon was enacted not through real material work 
towards social justice, but rather by ‘excavating’ the city’s mythological status as a centre of learning. 
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Elsewhere, the BJP has sought to rename places with ‘Muslim place-names’. Here, the ‘restoration’ or 
revival of the Hindu nation is predicated on the destruction of the cultural histories of its proximate 
enemies. For example, in 2018, the BJP-ruled Uttar Pradesh state government renamed the city of 
Allahabad to Prayagraj; justifying the action as the correction of a 400 year old historical injustice 
(Pandey, 2018). The BJP claims the original, ancient city of Prayagraj was renamed Ilhabas – which 
then became Allahabad over time – in 1575 CE by the Mughal Emperor Akbar (ibid.). However, 
historical evidence suggests that the Ilhabas Akbar established was adjacent to a small town called 
Prayagraj (ibid.). 
Similarly, the UP government has renamed the historic Mughalsarai Junction Railway Station after the 
Hindutva ideologue Deen Dayal Upadhyay (ibid.; Ahmad, R, 2018) while other infrastructural projects 
strategically named after Hindutva ideologues such as V.D. Savarkar, are also underway (Sayeed, 
2020). The Faizabad district, home to the cities of Faizabad and Ayodhya, was renamed Ayodhya 
district, to reflect its Hindu character (Ahmad, R, 2018). Additionally, in the recently concluded 
Hyderabad Municipal Corporation elections, the BJP promised to rename the city ‘Bhagyanagar’, if 
elected to power (Lasania, 2020). The irony is that the Bhagyalaxmi temple from which the name is 
derived, and whose glory the BJP aspires to ‘restore’, is itself an illegal encroachment on Hyderabad’s 
foremost historical monument: the Charminar (ibid.). Photographic evidence from the 1940s and 
1950s proves the temple’s illegal emergence in the 1960s (ibid.).   
In addition to this the Hindu Right has also made generous use of propaganda (disseminated through 
mass-forwarded social media messages) aimed at establishing the scientific and historical credentials 
of Hindu scripture. One of the most notable instances of this occurred in the early 2000s, when the 
Hindu Right began to disseminate a digitally manipulated image that claimed to show archaeologists 
of the National Geographic Society excavating the skeleton of a race of superhumans (asuras) 
mentioned in the Hindu epic Mahabharata (Owen, 2007). The hoax became so pervasive worldwide 
that it forced the National Geographic Society to issue a clarification, debunking the myth (ibid.). The 
image continues to make sporadic reappearances on WhatsApp. 
More significantly, Prime Minister Modi has been quoted numerous times propounding his belief that 
ancient Vedic-Indians were adept at genetic science, plastic surgery and in vitro fertilisation (Sharma, 
K, 2019). As examples, Modi cited the Hindu deity Lord Ganesh (a deity with the body of a man and 
the head of an elephant) and Karna (a major character in the Mahabharata) (ibid.). Such discourses 
aimed at propounding the glory of ancient India while establishing Hindu belief and mythology as fact, 
have flowed down to all levels of the Hindu nationalist ecosystem. The five-day Indian Science 
Congress held in January 2019 is another example of this. Papers presented at the conference 
107 
 
questioned the theories of Albert Einstein and Isaac Newton while postulating that ancient Indians 
practised stem cell technology (ibid.).  
Thus, through pseudo-scientific hyperbole, destruction, (re-)construction and renaming of places, the 
BJP has sought to establish modern India’s continuity with a Hindu mythological past. Where 
archaeology is co-opted into proving the ‘truth’ of scripture, everyday place-names spatially anchor 
this continuity with an imagined past. The Hindu nationalist claim is one that seeks to present India as 
the creation of solely Hindus. This requires a radical reworking of the Indian landscape, especially in 
Delhi and north India where ‘pre-Islamic’ architecture is relatively scarce (Riggs and Jat, 2016). The 
turn towards Hindu nationalist architecture and place-names then comprises a deliberate campaign 
to reconvert the land; establishing majoritarian aspirations through facts on the ground. In some 
cases, such as with Delhi’s famous Qutub Minar mosque, this has involved a literal conversion of 
monuments through yajnas (Hindu purification ceremonies) conducted by Hindu nationalists 
(Rajagopalan, 2011). As invented traditions are given physical form, the mythic mass of Hindu 
nationalist aspirations begin to coalesce into a Hindu state. Such is the ethnographic present in which 






1.4. The Ethnographic Present: The Delhi of Partition Refugees 
 
In this section, I provide a thick description of my field site Delhi; the ethnographic present in which 
the Partition is remembered. Putting together a mosaic of serendipitous ethnographic encounters, I 
observe the interplay between place, space and memory. The ethnographic evidence that informs this 
section shows the way in which encounters with the cityscape of Delhi are also encounters with the 
afterlife of the Partition.  
In a city as old as Delhi, memory and history are tools that one uses to read the land. Scratch the 
surface and these coagulated sediments of time reveal themselves. The latter half of this section 
focuses on the history of the resettlement of refugees from the North-West Frontier Province, in 
Faridabad. As I have stated previously, Faridabad is a veritable millieux of memory; a place where the 
Partition remains a meaningful, living memory that is part of everyday life.  
 
 
Delhi and the Partition 
 
The Partition of India remains the largest episode of retributive genocide and mass displacement in 
history (Aiyar, 1995). It is estimated that between 200,000 and 2 million people were killed in the 
retributive violence that ensued, while between 10 to 17 million people were displaced in a haphazard 
transfer of population (Brass, 2003; Khwaja et al., 2009). In the process, approximately 3.4 million 
refugees went missing (Khwaja et al., 2009). What began as a haphazard migration for safety – as 
people found themselves on the ‘wrong’ side of the border – was later formalised between India and 
Pakistan as a transfer of population (Bharadwaj and Mirza, 2019). 
While the Partition of India involved the division of territories in the east and west, my research 
specifically focuses on Hindu refugees from the north-western Pakistani districts of Mianwali, Dera 
Ghazi Khan, Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Quetta (Balochistan), Multan and Mianwali. Barring a brief trip 
to Dehradun, the overwhelming majority of Partition survivors I spoke to live in Delhi and the 
surrounding National Capital Region. I clarify this at the outset to make it clear that my research 
focuses specifically on the western Partition and specifically, this particular area of west Punjab. The 
absence of stories from Bengal, Assam, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Sindh and Jammu and Kashmir is not 
indicative of a blind spot, but the result of a deliberate focus on the memories of my own ethnic 
community and kin.    
109 
 
As part of my fieldwork for this project, I spent 14 months in Delhi. Delhi was the obvious site for my 
fieldwork because my own family’s Partition survivors and their friends are settled there. Delhi had 
also received the lion’s share of refugees from West Pakistan. Citing a Hindustan Times report filed on 
August 21, 1947, Amita Kumari (2013: 62) writes that 120,000 refugees had entered the city by then, 
adding to Delhi’s existing population of 917,939 residents (as per the 1941 Census). Documenting the 
demographic and cultural changes that transpired in Delhi following the Partition, Thomas Krafft 
(1993: 95) writes that between 1947 and 1951, 329,000 Muslim refugees left Delhi while 495,000 
Hindu and Sikh refugees arrived in the city. While Krafft (ibid.: 95) calculates the resulting population 
increase at 166,000 residents, the 1951 census of Delhi calculated the city’s population at 1,744,072, 
of which refugees comprised 28.4% of the population (Datta, 1986: 443; Kumari, 2013: 62). In the 
decade following the Partition, a significant number of refugees (including some of my informants), 
who had been allotted compensatory agricultural land in rural Punjab sold their landholdings and 
migrated to Delhi. In the post-Partition years, Delhi emerged as an attractive destination due to the 
capital city’s government jobs and flourishing markets.  
Therefore, as a result of the Partition, refugees came to comprise a major portion of Delhi’s 
population, subsequently reshaping the city. In recent times a significant body of literature has 
emerged documenting and analysing the demographic changes that followed the Partition, along with 
its impact on the architecture of cities in South Asia. Corruccini and Kaur (1990) use a genealogical 
approach to measure demographic changes among a sample of 5000 Punjabis. Hill et al. (2008) 
analyses the British India Census of 1931, 1941, and the respective 1951 Censuses of India and 
Pakistan to document the population growth rates and losses as well as the distinct religious 
homogenization that followed the Partition, at the district level. The broad sweeping nature of these 
demographic changes and the economic and cultural transformations that followed, meant that 
different places were affected in different ways. Studies in architecture, such as Sahni (2003), for 
example, apply this demographic information to the study of Amritsar. Sahni’s (ibid.) doctoral thesis 
observes that Amritsar’s separation from its sister city of Lahore, along with the demographic changes 
caused by the Partition, and the political upheaval of the 1980s, led to a change in the city’s identity 
from one associated with industry to one associated with its sixteenth-century avatar as the holiest 
Sikh shrine. 
There is also a significant body of literature that observes the development and positive socio-
economic trends that followed the arrival of refugees. Bharadwaj and Mirza (2019) observe that in the 
decades following the Partition, north Indian districts which received a high number of Partition 
refugees, experienced a year on year higher agricultural yield. Bharadwaj and Mirza (ibid.: 2) observe 
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that, ‘Between 1957 and 2009, districts that had a greater refugee presence saw average annual wheat 
yields increase by 9.4% compared to low refugee districts’.  
Chattha (2009) uses data from Partition violence and flows of migration to conduct a comparative 
study of the development of the Pakistani cities of Sialkot and Gujranwala between the years 1947-
1961. Chattha’s (ibid.) doctoral thesis examines the transformation of the socio-economic landscape 
of these two cities caused by Partition-related out-migration of the Hindu and Sikh mercantile class. 
Chattha (ibid.) also examines the role of refugees and local skilled craftsmen in the rebuilding of the 
economies of these cities.  
Similarly, V.N. Datta’s (1986) analysis of the impact of Punjabi refugees on the development and 
expansion of Delhi-NCR into the principal urban hub of modern India, follows a similar discursive arc. 
In fact, Frykenberg’s (1986) volume, Delhi Through the Ages – of which Datta’s chapter is a part – 
compiles the history of Delhi through the centuries. This volume is an important source for anyone 
interested in the history of Delhi. Datta (1986) examines how the influx of refugees into Delhi 
necessitated the building of neighbourhoods, markets and factories to rehome and provide 
employment to refugees.  
Datta’s work also briefly touches on Delhi’s Camp College. Camp College which operated in Kingsway 
Camp, Delhi, was affiliated to Punjab University and provided Partition refugees free access to higher 
education. My maternal grandfather, his younger brother (my granduncle Om Prakash), and 
numerous other informants completed their higher education there. The role of Camp College as an 
institution assisting the rehabilitation of refugees, cannot be overstated. My own status today owes a 
massive debt of gratitude to institutions such as this that rehabilitated members of my family back in 
the day.  
Datta’s (ibid.) work also acknowledges the complementary impact on Delhi’s development as a result 
of labour migration (mainly from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh) to Delhi starting from the mid-1950s. This 
rural to urban migration continues to this day and has been shaping India’s cities and politics in 
multitudinous ways worthy of their own concerted analyses. This body of literature that connects the 
arrival of refugees to positive socio-economic trends serves as an important lesson on the benefits 
that accrue to host economies from the successful and holistic accommodation of refugees and 
migrants. This is an important reminder in the context of the times we live in. 
The refugee crisis of the Partition was unique in that, here, the refugees were seen to ‘belong’ to the 
nation-state in which they sought refuge (Riggs and Jat, 2016). In fact, the crisis was a product of the 
very fact that they were seen to not belong in their ancestral towns and villages. However, the 
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homogeneity manufactured by the violence of the Partition was as alien to the land, as some Partition 
refugees were to Delhi. And the Delhi that came about as a result of the Partition was a far cry from 
the city’s pre-Partition avatar.  
Pre-Partition Delhi is often remembered as, ‘a city of the Muslims’ (Pandey, 2001: 135). Medieval Delhi 
was famed for its astonishing beauty, prosperity and gaiety (ibid.). This culture was itself in decline 
due to an extended tryst with colonial capitalism (ibid.). Nevertheless, the Delhi of the 1930s and 40s 
remained the hub of a decaying feudal high-culture. Pre-Partition Delhi was the world’s Urdu capital 
with a material culture that subtly invoked its former glory as the Mughal Imperial capital (Dalrymple, 
1993). Written in the year 1940, Ahmed Ali’s (2007) novel Twilight in Delhi provides a rare glimpse 
into the daily lives of pre-Partition Delhiwalas. The novel portrays a quasi-feudal society in decline as 
a result of colonialism and with it, an advancing modernity symbolised by the ideas of individualism 
and nationalism (Pandey, 2001). 
Partition tore this world asunder. Contemporaneous accounts of Delhi’s Partition violence state that 
the city descended into genocidal violence between 4th to 6th September (Pandey, 2001). What began 
as sporadic incidents of violence intensified into a systematic pogrom, as fighting spread from Qarol 
Bagh to the rest of the city (ibid.). It was believed that Hindu and Sikh refugees arriving from Pakistan 
were responsible for the violence; setting in motion an escalating cycle of retributive violence 
(Zamindar, 2007). It is estimated that as many as 20,000 Muslims were killed, while, ‘the dead lay 
rotting in the streets, because there was no one to collect and bury them’ (ibid.: 21). In the days and 
months that followed, refugee camps housing Hindus and Sikhs from West Pakistan emerged as fertile 
recruitment spaces for the RSS (Pandey, 2001: 137).  
This memory of Qarol Bagh as the epicentre of violence in Delhi is preserved by a seemingly innocuous 
place name. One of my informants, Gajendra Pal, remembered that Qarol Bagh’s famous Joshi Road 
and its Dr NC Joshi Memorial Hospital are named after Dr NC Joshi; a famous Indian surgeon. Gajendra 
Pal and his family were living on Joshi Road at the time, and witnessed the situation deteriorating, 
first-hand. Gajendra Pal remembered that Joshi Road is the street where Dr Joshi – a well-known 
medical doctor – was assassinated by Muslim assailants in September 1947. Gajendra Pal’s story is 
repeated on the Delhi Government’s official webpage for the Dr NC Joshi Memorial Hospital 
(Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, 2020).  
However, in Gajendra Pal’s retelling, it was the assassination that sparked the horrific riots that 
followed. Gajendra Pal’s narrative presents the anti-Muslim violence as the ‘reaction’ to an ‘action’. 
This is unlikely to be true since Dr Joshi was assassinated on September 8, 1947 (ibid.) while the 
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violence in Delhi is said to have begun sometime between the 4th to the 6th of September (Pandey, 
2001).  
In this, Gajendra Pal’s story differs sharply from the historical record which attributes the violence to 
the arrival of a large population of Hindu and Sikh refugees that sought revenge for what had 
happened to them in Pakistan (ibid.; Zamindar, 2007). As I write in Chapter 3, such narratives reflect 
a denial of the violence of one’s own community. Presenting the violence of their co-religionists purely 
as acts of self-defence or retaliation, they comprise a rhetoric of blame that assigns ‘responsibility’ for 
the Partition to the ‘other’.  
As a result of the violence and the migration of refugees into Delhi, the city came to be straddled with 
twin refugee crises (Pandey, 2001). On the one hand were the Muslims who had been made refugees 
in their own city, while, on the other hand, were the Hindu and Sikh refugees who had migrated to 
the city from across the border, in search of refuge (ibid.). Located at the intersection of competing 
ethnonationalist claims, these twin refugee populations were embroiled in a scramble for contested 
urban geography such that the rehabilitation of one appeared to justify and necessitate the 
displacement of the other (Zamindar, 2007).  
Gyanendra Pandey (2001) writes that the twin refugee populations scattered across the cityscape 
raised important questions about national belonging and community. Initially, the Indian government 
focused its resources on the refugee camps of Hindus and Sikhs; leaving the refugee camps of Muslims 
to fend for themselves (ibid.). This disparity is corroborated by various social workers who observed a 
stark difference in the living conditions of the refugee camps of Hindus and Sikhs, in comparison to 
Muslims (ibid.). In fact, it was only after a large Muslim refugee population emerged that the 
government even established an official refugee camp for them (ibid.).   
This approach to the management of Delhi’s refugee crisis produced a governmental response that 
followed the biopolitical doctrine of, ‘make live, let die’ (Zamindar, 2007). In the worst weeks of the 
refugee crisis, while the Indian government had distributed thousands of blankets and quilts in the 
Hindu and Sikh refugee camps, the Muslim refugee camps received nothing (Pandey, 2001). The 
blankets themselves were only symbolic markers of a larger shift in the borders of community within 
the new nation. The police too became openly partisan (ibid.; Zamindar, 2007); a dark fact of Delhi’s 
history that was repeated in the anti-Sikh pogroms of 1984 (Das, 2007) and the anti-Muslims pogroms 
of February 2020 (Ahmad, 2020).  
Delhi’s Muslim residents became de facto foreigners in their own homes as the Indian government 
abrogated its humanitarian responsibility towards them; treating them as Pakistani citizens in waiting 
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(Pandey, 2001; Zamindar, 2007). This collapse of law and order, the chance to occupy ‘abandoned’ 
property and the implicit involvement of the local police meant that the newly arrived refugees from 
Pakistan had an incentive to target Delhi’s Muslims (ibid.).   
This situation persisted until Mahatma Gandhi moved to Delhi, in mid-September 1947 (Pandey, 
2001). Gandhi persuaded the Indian government to treat Delhi’s Muslim refugees as their own citizens 
(ibid.). A speech Gandhi delivered on September 13 at Delhi’s Purana Qila – the Old Fort had become 
a massive Muslim refugee camp – was instrumental in this change (ibid.: 140-141). It was only 
following this speech that the Indian government changed tack, stating unequivocally that these de 
facto refugee camps were our camps and that people in them were our citizens- should they choose 
to stay (ibid.). Gandhi also sought to restore inter-faith harmony to the city by delivering a number of 
public addresses where he sought to emphasise the value of diversity (ibid.). Although Gandhi’s public 
addresses restored some semblance of calm, Delhi continued to simmer for months afterwards. In 
January 1948, it descended into chaos again, prompting Gandhi to start another fast unto death (his 
last) and address prayer gatherings (Guha, 2018). However, violence in Delhi stopped only after 
Gandhi’s assassination on January 30, 1948; as the city appeared to recoil from its own violence in 
disgust (ibid.).    
The Delhi that emerged after the Partition was a changed city. The violence had begun to redraw the 
borders of national belonging. Neither Delhi nor India would ever be the same again. I return to this 
idea of violence and representations of violence as a method of boundary-marking in Section 3.3. For 
the moment, I want to focus on the way that the violence of the Partition fundamentally transformed 
the city of Delhi.   
The transfer of population radically changed Delhi. As stated earlier, Delhi’s large Hindu and Sikh 
refugee population brought far reaching changes to the cityscape. The city’s refugee camps and 
rehabilitation colonies emerged as Delhi’s new residential and commercial hubs (Kaur, 2007). Delhi’s 
culture too underwent a radical transformation. The city that was once considered the world’s Urdu 
capital came to adopt Hindi as its lingua franca.  
Yet, interestingly, my informants’ memories of those initial days and weeks in Delhi (and surrounding 
parts of north India) also reveals a memory of un-belonging. Coming from the rural hinterlands of 
Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the overwhelming majority of my informants 
did not speak Hindi at that time. They could not read the script either. They spoke between them 
Urdu, regional dialects of Saraiki, Punjabi, Pashto and some English and Persian. To the Hindu locals 
of Delhi and north India, their material culture resembled that of Muslims. In fact, in their salwar 
kameez, my informants were considered so similar to Muslims that some were advised by their Sikh 
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friends to wear a kara34, to mark them out as ‘allies’ to Hindu and Sikh mobs. Such anecdotes also 
provide a glimpse into the kind of mob violence Delhi witnessed during this period. 
Thakar Das, a Partition survivor from Dera Ismail Khan (NWFP) recalled that the Hindu families living 
in Kurukshetra – the site of his refugee camp – treated the Frontier refugees with disdain. ‘They 
thought we were Pakistanis. Muslims. Habshi-type’, Thakar Das remembered. The word ‘habshi’ 
translates to barbarian or savage. In common usage it is often specifically used to denigrate meat-
eating or, more moderately, the consumption of uncommon or exotic animals. Thakar Das said that it 
was only when they witnessed the (Hindu) religiosity of the refugees that the ethnic tensions began 
to ease. But even then, they were often taunted for being, ‘Pakistani’. The latter was a common insult 
that some said still remains in use. The informants I interviewed in Dehradun said that an unspoken 
divide between ‘Pakistani’ Punjabis and ‘Indian’ Punjabis persists even today in their chapter of the 
Arya Samaj.  
Where their displacement from Pakistan terminated certain place-worlds, it inadvertently led to the 
creation of others. The history of the Partition is writ large over the neighbourhoods of Delhi. Even 
today, certain neighbourhoods of Delhi are associated with Partition refugees and in this way have 
become inextricably entangled with the history of these communities. Kirti Nagar, Derawal Nagar, 
Kingsway Camp, Malviya Nagar and Lajpat Nagar, to name a few, are known as neighbourhoods that 
were created to resettle Partition refugees. Plots and houses in these neighbourhoods were 
specifically allotted to Partition refugees from Punjab, in compensation for the property they 
abandoned in Pakistan. Satellite towns around Delhi and other cities in Punjab, Haryana and UP were 
chosen for the resettlement of refugees.  
In an attempt to preserve the ‘regional affinity’ of Partition refugees, the Indian government chose to 
resettle refugees who belonged to a particular city, town or district in Pakistan, together, in one 
location in India (Jain, 1998: 104). As my informant Pooran Chand told me, ‘Those who came from 
Jhang [Pakistan] were allotted Rohtak. […] And those who came from Dera Ghazi Khan, they got 
Palwal, Gurgaon district. […] Us, Frontier-people got NIT Faridabad.’ 
L. C. Jain, a former bureaucrat and recipient of the Magsaysay Award in 1989, played a vital role in the 
development of the Faridabad Township, through his services in the Indian Cooperative Union and the 
Faridabad Development Board. Jain (ibid.) writes that in Faridabad the ‘regional affinity’ of refugees 
from the Frontier was preserved right down to the village level such that people from one village from 
the Frontier, were allotted houses beside each other in the same residential block in Faridabad. In 
                                                            
34 A simple metal bracelet worn by most Sikhs. It is a sacred symbol and a sign of one’s religiosity.  
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Faridabad, 5000 house sites were earmarked and further divided into 5 neighbourhoods with 1000 
sites each (ibid.: 104). Families were then listed according to their regions such as, Bannu, Kohat, 
Mardan, Dera Ismail Khan, Chitral, Swat and Amb and then allotted contiguous sites based on the 
villages they were from (ibid.: 104). My informants in Faridabad credited their community’s sense of 
kinship and unity to this system of allotment. This is a theme that recurs frequently in the narratives 
of my Faridabad informants.  
While Faridabad was deliberately built to preserve a sense of ‘regional affinity’, in other 
neighbourhoods, Partition refugees pursued this on their own terms. Despite not having been 
specifically built to resettle Partition refugees, Rajouri Garden (in Delhi) is considered a ‘Punjabi area’ 
due to the high concentration of Punjabis. Many of these are Partition survivors (and their 
descendants) who bought residential plots and shops there, in the 1950s and 1960s, using the money 
and property they had received from the government following the settlement of their claims for 
compensation. As my grandaunt Anjali and numerous other informants in Rajouri Garden, Kirti Nagar, 
Jangapura and Derawal Nagar told me, following their displacement from Pakistan, friends and 
families tried their best to stick together by purchasing plots and shops close to each other, whenever 
possible. This instinct to stick together – an instinct produced by an implicit feeling of foreignness – is 
eventually what gave Rajouri Garden its distinctly Punjabi character.  
Staying in Rajouri Garden with my grandaunt Anjali, I was able to experience the Punjabi-ness of this 
area for myself. There are two experiences from my time in Rajouri Garden that stand out in my mind. 
Once while accompanying my grandaunt to the grocery store on the night of Gurpurab, in Rajouri 
Garden, we came across a Multani woman practicing the unique Karva Chauth35 ritual associated with 
the Saraiki belt of Punjab; specifically the districts of Dera Ghazi Khan, Mianwali and Multani. Gurpurab 
is the birth anniversary of the first Sikh guru, Guru Nanak and falls on the first full moon of the Indian 
lunar month Kartik. In 2017, Gurpurab fell on November 4. Before we had even spotted the woman 
herself, my grandaunt had deduced her presence through the wheat diyas36 that had been placed all 
along the side of the street leading up to their home.  
My grandaunt pointed these out to me and explained their significance. As I knelt to photograph the 
diyas, the woman herself emerged from her house and began to see the full moon through a hole in 
a roti. After she had completed her ritual, my grandaunt approached her and struck up a conversation 
                                                            
35 Karva Chauth is a ritual observed by Hindu married women where they observe a fast from sunrise to 
sundown to pray for their husband’s long and prosperous life. The fast is broken only after the woman 
observing the fast has seen the rising moon through a sieve, followed by her husband’s face. In the Derawali 
(or more broadly, Saraiki) variation of this ritual, a hollowed out roti (flat-bread) is used instead of a sieve.   
36 Small oil lamp 
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that ended with us discussing our shared Pakistani heritage and my research project. While our family 
had migrated from Dera Ghazi Khan, hers had come from Multan. Like my grandaunt’s parents, her 
parents too had been living in Rajouri Garden since the 1960s. And just like that, a chance encounter 
on a full moon night had uncovered the strata of history on which this city rests uneasily.     
 
 





Figure 1.02: Performing the Derawali (Saraiki) Karva Chauth ritual. 
 
Explaining the ritual to me later, my grandaunt said that the traditional Karva Chauth full moon (which 
happens to be the full moon just before Gurpurab) is thought to have been cursed by the Hindu deity, 
Lord Ganesh. This is the reason it is seen through a sieve rather than with the naked eye. On the other 
hand, the Gurpurab moon is considered auspicious. For Sikhs, it is the most auspicious day of the year. 
Therefore, the Gurpurab moon is seen through a simple hole cut out in a roti. One does not need to 
shield one’s eyes from it.  
On another evening walk through the lively markets of Rajouri Garden, my grandaunt showed me the 
many communal tandoors that grace the streets around dinnertime. These are run by dhabas 
(roadside restaurants) and confectioners. One can bring semi-prepared rotis from home and pay the 
cook to finish them in the tandoor or buy naans and rotis from the dhaba itself. On chilly winter 
evenings it is a treat to stand beside a burning tandoor. In decades past, Rajouri Garden was awash 
with communal tandoors, one for almost every major street of every major residential block. These 
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were run by groups of residents on a not-for-profit basis; charging people just enough money to 
provide fuel for the tandoor.  
Communal tandoors and stoves were a common feature of refugee camps. As I write in Chapter 2, 
women Partition survivors have very fond memories of the bonds and friendships that were forged 
around the communal tandoors in those uncertain days. In the refugee camps, the women-folk of two 
to three households would pool in their resources to cook together. In this way, these tandoors also 
evoke the memory of the hard work of women during the Partition. Therefore, these communal 
tandoors quietly commemorate Delhi’s link to the Partition. Yet, the influence of the tandoor on the 
character of Rajouri Garden’s streets is waning. While the dhaba-run tandoors stoically hold their own, 
the truly community-run tandoors have all but vanished. Rajouri Garden’s transition from a Punjabi 
refugee enclave to a flourishing neoliberal market-area has eroded its sense of community, and with 
it, consigned the communal tandoor to a quiet, lonesome death. 
But Rajouri Garden is not the only place where one might unexpectedly encounter a layer of the city’s 
history. Sometimes even a serendipitous encounter with a particular street is enough to provoke a 
memory. This happened in February 2018 when I was driving to Shakti Nagar (a neighbourhood in 
north Delhi) with my key informant Bhanwarilal. We were on our way to meet Gangaram, a Partition 
survivor who had revisited Pakistan 22 times since the Partition. He was a close friend of Bhanwarilal. 
However, we ended up losing our way a short distance away from Gangaram’s house. The constantly 
expanding Metro-works and under construction flyovers had made the cityscape unrecognisable to 
Bhanwarilal’s eyes. Like every major urban space in the world, the cityscape of Delhi is an ever-
changing tapestry.  
Turning to Google Maps for help, we ended up being re-routed through Chaudhary Gulab Singh Marg- 
a street we would not have otherwise driven through. As we turned onto that street, Bhanwarilal 
excitedly remarked that once upon a time, this street used to be called Thandi Sadak (cold street). 
Bhanwarilal told me that his elder brother used to live beside the Ghanta Ghar Chowk (clock tower 
roundabout) not far from here. The house is still in their family and his nephew still lives there. His 
sister-in-law had recently passed away, in that house, at the age of 100.  
Bhanwarilal’s spontaneous turn to remembrance is itself an evocation of de Certeau’s (1984: 117) 
theorisation of space as, ‘practiced place.’ Bhanwarilal remembered that back when he was in school 
– in the 1940s – his parents would bring him here every summer. As Bhanwarilal explained, Thandi 
Sadak was a semantically transparent place name that remembered the way the street used to be, 
back in those days:   
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‘The name Thandi Sadak caught on because earlier there were trees upon trees on both sides 
of this road. There were so many trees that when we used to come on this street, a cool breeze 
would be constantly blowing through it- just like an AC. Because of that it was called Thandi 
Sadak.’ 
Other times the mere mention of the name of a particular neighbourhood to a Partition survivor is 
enough to trigger a memory. This is something I realised in a conversation with Falguni, an informant 
who is a distant relative and my late maternal grandparents’ neighbour in Faridabad. Falguni’s family 
used to live in the village of Karor Lal Esan, in district Layyah, in Punjab, Pakistan. They too are Derawals 
and their district was located between Dera Ghazi Khan and Mianwali. Falguni was 13 years old at the 
time of the Partition. Today, Falguni lives in the relatively newer residential ‘sectors’ of Faridabad.  
The city of Faridabad is laid out such that the newer and older sectors are demarcated by National 
Highway 19 (known locally as Mathura Road) which runs right across the middle of the city. The Sectors 
that lie west of the highway are the older parts of town, while the ones that lie on the east are newer, 
having been built in the 1970s and 80s. Even newer gated communities and bungalows have now 
come up on the eastern most edge of the city, on the east bank of the Agra canal. The Agra canal runs 
parallel to NH19 on what would have been considered the city’s eastern border, in the 1980s.  
Once, while I was in the middle of a conversation with Falguni, I got a call from Nani Massi. Nani Massi 
lived in Sector 3 of Faridabad’s NIT; one of the neighbourhoods built specifically to resettle Partition 
refugees. For Falguni, the mere mention of Nani Massi and her address, triggered a recall of the 
neighbourhood’s history. She immediately said, ‘That whole area has been built by our people’, 
referring to how refugees from the Frontier and Dera Ghazi Khan were settled there. She launched 
into a spontaneous narration of NIT Faridabad’s history, commenting that it was nothing but a fly-
infested jungle before the arrival of Partition refugees. She also talked about how tiny houses were 
there and how poor the construction was; the latter was a direct reference to the fact that these 
neighbourhoods had quite literally been built with the physical labour of the refugees whom they 
were intended to rehabilitate. In this way, the history of Delhi is imprinted on its localities. In a 
metropolis as old as Delhi, the land is a book that can only be read by those who speak the languages 
of memory and history. 
Nowhere is the coalescence of memory into a concrete, observable place-world more apparent than 
in NIT Faridabad. I got interested in the story of Faridabad due to my deeply emotional attachment 
with my key informant Pooran Chand. Pooran Chand was someone I happened to meet by chance. He 
was a friend of my Nani Massi’s acquaintance. The two would often greet each other on evening walks 
in the Rose Garden, in NIT Faridabad. I was given an introduction and time enough for an hour long 
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interview, and the rest as they say is history. Pooran Chand, very quickly, became one of my key 
informants and I, in turn, became his occasional evening walk partner. Many a times, I would just drop 
by the Rose Garden in the evenings to socialise with Pooran Chand. Despite having started out as 
complete strangers, our rapport came to be quite familial. Our conversations ranged from the 
Partition, to politics to even Indian cinema and the writings of Tagore. My conversations with Pooran 
Chand are peppered all through this dissertation, especially Section 3.4 where his pensive reflections 
on the impossibility of healing significantly inform my argument.  
Pooran Chand was part of a group of elderly men – all of them hailed from the Frontier – who would 
gather in the park in the evenings. Some of them would join us later in the evening after attending a 
satsang37. The satsang setting provided some of them with a rare opportunity to converse in their 
mother-tongue, Pashto. Spending time with Pooran Chand allowed me to become friends with them 
and I interviewed all of them, in turn. The result was a comprehensive insight into the life and history 
of this relatively close-knit community of Partition survivors. Everything from the memories of the 
resettlement process to the quiet memorials housed within the locality, demonstrate how the 
displacement of Partition refugees also led to the creation of new place worlds.       
 
 
Displacement, Rehabilitation and Remembrance: The Story of Faridabad 
 
The New Industrial Township (NIT) of Faridabad was allotted for the resettlement of the roughly 
50,000 refugees from the Frontier in 1949 (Jain, 1998). Yet the story of how Frontier refugees came 
to be resettled in Faridabad is not a simple one. As my informant Pooran Chand, and numerous other 
informants told me, refugees from the Frontier were initially housed in a massive refugee camp in 
Kurukshetra, Haryana. The government first offered them Alwar (Rajasthan) as a potential site of 
resettlement. Pooran Chand remembered that a small delegation of their community’s leaders/elders 
had gone to Alwar to visit the place but had returned unsatisfied. ‘People there [in Alwar] would do 
agriculture. And our people did not know this, generally,’ Pooran Chand explained. As a community of 
traders, businessmen and zamindars, the Frontier refugees felt that the agriculture oriented economy 
of Alwar would be unsuitable to their way of life.  
So, they refused and requested the government for an alternative site. A year passed and nothing 
changed. The Frontier refugees were not allotted another town or district and continued to live in the 
                                                            
37 A small religious (or spiritual) congregation that sings devotional songs and discusses scripture.  
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slum-like conditions of their tented refugee camps. Meanwhile, other refugee communities around 
them had either been resettled or were awaiting official sanction to move to their allotted districts.  
In the year 1949, the spontaneous outpouring of anger and resentment at this situation coalesced into 
a non-violent movement against the Indian government. Every day, all of the adult men in the 
Kurukshetra camp would take the train down to Delhi and walk 15 kilometres from the railway station 
to the Prime Minister’s residence at Teen Murti Bhavan to stage a peaceful demonstration outside its 
gates. At night, they would take the train back to Kurukshetra and return to the Prime Minister’s 
residence, the following morning. Pooran Chand described this as the first mass movement of 
independent India. He emotionally recalled making the same trek himself, at mid-day (along with 
other children) to give their fathers lunch, at the site of the demonstration. ‘All the men-folk would sit 
outside Nehru-kothi and there would be a lot of sloganeering also,’ Pooran Chand told me, his voice 
wavering and cracking with emotion. 
Pooran Chand always called Teen Murti Bhavan – Nehru’s official residence – as ‘Nehru-kothi’. Kothi 
is the Hindi word for mansion or bungalow and has rustic connotations. Today, Teen Murti Bhavan is 
a museum that memorialises the Indian struggle for independence. Its vast sprawling grounds also 
house one of Delhi’s most well-stocked research libraries as well as a convention centre and the Nehru 
Planetarium. The site also has a minor connection to Delhi’s medieval history, as it houses Kushak 
Mahal: a fourteenth-century hunting lodge used by Feroz Shah Tughlaq, the then Sultan of Delhi. 
During my fieldwork, I spent a considerable amount of my time studying in the library. There was 
something surreal about driving through the very gates outside which Pooran Chand and his 
community had protested, all those years back.  
 




Figure 1.04: Kushak Mahal- a fourteenth-century hunting lodge used by Feroz Shah Tughlaq, the 
then Sultan of Delhi.  
 
The demonstration outside Nehru’s residence continued for several days. Pooran Chand remembers 
how they would see officials helping Nehru enter and exit the premises through a side-gate; in order 
to avoid dealing with the protestors. Eventually, Nehru gave in to the demonstration and agreed to 
meet with the community’s leaders. There they made their grievances with Alwar known to the Prime 
Minister. In turn they were suggested three options in and around Delhi: Kalkaji Mandir, Bahadurgarh 
and Faridabad. After surveying all three places, the community’s leaders picked Faridabad. Pooran 
Chand said that they found the other two places rocky and barren. Kalkaji Mandir, or Nehru-place as 
the area is known today, is now a booming financial district of Delhi; a significant improvement on the 
barren, rocky landscape that the Frontier refugees surveyed. Remembering the reason they picked 
Faridabad, Pooran Chand said: 
‘So then they finally came to Faridabad, after a lot of wandering. So, in Faridabad [there were] 
mango trees, this bus stop is there na [indicates with his hand], here the trees were thick like 
a roof of trees, or a bridge. Meaning trees, and in our area trees were scanty, so they 
[elders/leaders] said [voice wavers with emotion] this place is very nice. The thinking was 
different at that time.’ 
This story of how the Frontier refugees were allotted Faridabad, was on the lips of everyone in Pooran 
Chand’s group of friends. But time has a strange sense of irony. Faridabad’s landscape today is an 
entirely different story. Large-scale deforestation in and around the city has turned it into a hot, dusty, 
desert-like town. I wonder what the ancestors would make of contemporary Faridabad… 
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According to L.C. Jain (1998), what unfolded in Faridabad was nothing short of an exciting experiment 
in community-based urban development. Prime Minister Nehru and the then President, Dr Rajendra 
Prasad were both active members of the Faridabad Development Board (ibid.). This New Industrial 
Township of Faridabad was developed with a spirit of cooperative federalism and included the consent 
of the local community leaders in almost all decisions (ibid.). As Pooran Chand told me numerous 
times, and as Jain (ibid.) too notes, the leaders of the Frontier refugees were strong, principled men 
who were quick to block any decision that might pose a detriment to their people. They took an active 
part in decisions on the crucial subjects of resettlement housing and employment. Initially, due to a 
lack of employment opportunities in Faridabad, refugees were engaged for manual labour. Some of 
the aforementioned neighbourhoods built in Delhi to resettle Partition refugees were built by refugees 
from the Frontier. In this way, Partition refugees were engaged in the work of their own resettlement; 
thus spurring a cycle of self-sufficiency. What it also created was a solidarity among refugees, as 
different refugee communities came to be involved in the rehabilitation work of others. 
Pooran Chand remembered those days of hard labour often. He also remembered how, Nehru’s 
friendship with Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan had translated into an affection for the people from the 
Frontier. The latter, in Pooran Chand’s opinion, was reflected in Nehru’s decision to pay the refugees 
bonus wages for their labour: 
‘So for this [employment] what the government did was, all the colonies that were built in 
Delhi, Lajpat Nagar, Malviya Nagar, Sarojini Nagar, all of these houses were built by our 
people. They would take us from here in trucks, for free, to labour. They would take us free. 
So they would bring us back for free also and for that we would get Rs 1.5, Re 1 we would get 
as a bonus from the government.’ 
With an eye at their long-term rehabilitation, the Faridabad Development Board came up with a 
monthly instalment plan that would allow the refugees to own the houses they were building in 
Faridabad (ibid.). The housing plots were 235 square yards each and were priced at Rs 1800 which was 
collected in the form of monthly instalments of Rs 6 over the course of 25 years (ibid.). Today, Rs 1800 
is worth roughly $25.  
Frontier refugees were initially paid Rs 2.5 for a day’s labour. Eventually, after some time the Re 1 
bonus was withdrawn. This led to the beginning of another agitation, as people stated their inability 
to pay the Rs 6 monthly instalment they owed the government for their houses (ibid.). Remembering 
their destitution at the time, Pooran Chand said, ‘We could not pay that amount also.’ Some families 
stopped paying their instalments altogether, effectively becoming squatters on their own property. 
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Matters escalated to the point where a police officer sent to execute the court’s eviction order was 
lynched by a mob of refugees.  
‘There was a big agitation and the courts also intervened, sent an inspector. […] To forcefully 
evict people. So the policeman and a crowd clashed against each other. People took the 
policeman’s pistol and then hit him. […] This happened in 1959, 60. The Inspector died and 2-
3 of our people died also. This is an old incident. […] In those days we had a lot of unity. If 
anything was happening to anyone, a crowd would gather instantly.’ 
Explaining the reason for their unity, Pooran Chand said that because in those days, the Frontier 
refugees would only marry amongst themselves, they were not just neighbours. They were kin. With 
intricate kinship networks running all through these residential blocks, it did not take long for the 
entire community to unite whenever something like this happened.  
These memories of their contestations with the Indian state always struck me as particularly 
interesting. On the one hand, such antagonistic confrontations revealed an implicit memory of un-
belonging; a reminder of their displacement and foreignness. On the other hand such memories 
comprise a narrative that invests the collective identity of their community with a moral content. It is 
in these moments of confrontation with the state – in protesting outside the Prime Minister’s 
residence and squatting while defaulting on monthly instalments – that the Frontier refugees ascribe 
moral attributes to their community. This community is described not in terms of common interests, 
but through the more enthralling discourse of a shared kinship. The use of the metaphor of family 
imbues a compelling moral content to their politics (Chatterjee, 2004; Herzfeld, 1992).   
Partha Chatterjee (2004: 57) writes that this process is a key principle of the ‘politics of the governed’. 
He argues that it is important to pay attention to the way political society38 is positioned in relation to 
the, ‘legal-political forms of the modern state itself’ (ibid.: 74). Therefore, he notes that, ‘to effectively 
                                                            
38 Partha Chatterjee (2004) draws a distinction between ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’. According to him, 
‘civil society’ – while not of the state – is led by elites and is organised. He writes, ‘Civil society then, restricted 
to a small section of culturally equipped citizens, represents in countries like India the high ground of 
modernity’ (ibid.: 41). By contrast, ‘political society’ lacks this organised and formalised character, and is 
thereby more difficult for the state to manage. Although the members of political society are notionally 
citizens of the state, the relationship they share with the state may not be one envisaged by the constitution 
(ibid.: 38). Inhabiting the margins of society – often even in the realms of ‘illegality’ (as the Frontier refugees, 
in the above instance) – the members of political society are not considered members of civil society by the 
institutions of the state, nor treated as such. Yet, the state is unable to ignore them. For Chatterjee, this 
distinction between civil and political society was necessitated by the reality of stark socio-economic 
inequalities in countries like India. As he observed, ‘Most of the inhabitants of India are only tenuously, and 
even then ambiguously and contextually, rights-bearing citizens in the sense imagined by the constitution’ 
(ibid.: 38). His idea of political society then attempts to observe the specificities of the political actions of the 
disprivileged and how they are in turn managed by the state. 
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make its claim in political society, a population group produced by governmentality must be invested 
with the moral content of community’ (ibid.: 74). 
Significantly, the Partition survivors of Faridabad, saw these protests as a continuation of the legacy 
of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his Khudai Khidmatgars. In Faridabad, the air was thick with fond 
memories of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. His memory was a kindly spectre that shadowed every 
conversation; a memory preserved by the land itself.  
 
 
The Memory of Badshah Khan: Fieldwork in the Shadow of B.K. Hospital 
 
The Rose Garden in which I would meet Pooran Chand and his friends, was located just around the 
corner from B.K. General Hospital which is Faridabad’s civil district hospital. B.K. Hospital and its 
adjoining B.K. Chowk (traffic square or roundabout), mark the area’s Partition-era connection to the 
Frontier. B.K. is an acronym for Badshah Khan. Badshah Khan along with Bacha Khan and Frontier 
Gandhi are some of the fond nicknames that Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan accumulated over a more than 
half-century long engagement with civil disobedience. Born in Peshawar, NWFP, Khan Abdul Ghaffar 
Khan was a Congress leader and Gandhian freedom fighter. Khan was an important part of the struggle 
against British colonialism. Defying all racial stereotypes of the Pathans as an irrationally violent and 
volatile people, Khan organised the Pathans of NWFP into a disciplined, non-violent anti-colonial 
movement (Banerjee, 2003). His organisation was called the Khudai Khidmatgars (servants of god) or 
red shirts (ibid.). Khan drew his inspiration from Mahatma Gandhi’s politics of non-violent resistance; 
a collaboration that ultimately earned him the title Frontier Gandhi (ibid.). Khan and his followers 
refused to accept the Frontier’s integration into Pakistan and continued to campaign for an 
independent Pathanistan (a country for Pathans), even after independence (ibid.).  
As I discovered during my time in Faridabad, B.K. Hospital’s semantically transparent place name was 
the portal to a sea of memories. As Pooran Chand told me: 
‘The meaning of Badshah Khan is that he was the King of Khans. Khans would call him Badshah 
Khan, because all the Pathans there [Frontier] were called Khan. So because of that BK 
Hospital they named Badshah Khan. They have kept a photo there, with Nehru, they 
inaugurated it on 5 June, 1951. I was standing there.’ 
To his credit, Pooran Chand’s memory of the date was so accurate that it helped me find a newspaper 
report of the hospital’s inauguration, in The Hindu’s newspaper archives. B.K. Hospital was 
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inaugurated by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Prime Minister Nehru on June 5, 1951 (The Hindu, 1951). 
Khan was in India at the time for medical reasons, having been released on bail, from Pakistan, on 
grounds of his ill health (ibid.). When I later told Pooran Chand that I had found this newspaper report, 
he said that he could still remember that day vividly. He had been a part of that large crowd that had 
gathered to witness the inauguration.  
Badshah Khan’s memory continues to touch a raw nerve with this generation of people. In December 
2017, Pooran Chand told me that there had been a massive controversy here, a few months back 
when the municipality had tried to drop the ‘B.K.’ from the hospital’s name. But, this had been 
opposed by the elders in large numbers, some of whom even wrote to the municipality in protest. 
Pooran Chand said that the authorities had dropped the ‘B.K.’ from the name, because none of them 
had any idea what it stood for. Instead, the authorities were puzzled that unlike other government 
hospitals in Haryana which are simply called District Civil Hospital, this one was called ‘B.K.’. The name 
change had been an attempt at the imposition of bureaucratic uniformity. However the name change 
was overturned after vociferous protests from the elders of the community. 
In NIT Faridabad, people still remember and revere Badshah Khan for his honest, principled and 
democratic politics. In fact, it was impossible to ever have a private conversation about Badshah Khan, 
in Rose Garden. The very mention of Badshah Khan would pique the interest of anyone within earshot, 
making them enthusiastically join the conversation, offering their memories and thoughts on the 
history of the Frontier. People remembered having seen the Khudai Khidmatgars marching down the 
streets of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan – in their famous red shirts – in the run-up to independence. In 
over a year of hanging out with Pooran Chand in Rose Garden, I never once saw him take Badshah 
Khan’s name without a crack in his voice, or a lump in his throat. Speaking of that day when he had 
seen Badshah Khan in Faridabad, Pooran Chand’s eyes filled with tears. Speaking of Badshah Khan 
would very quickly lead to a silence heavy with emotion.  
In a discursive trend that builds on an orientalist stereotype of Pathans as an inherently violent people, 
Badshah Khan and his Gandhian politics are regarded with equal parts of respect and surprise. 
Mukulika Banerjee (2003) notes that this ‘surprise’ can be observed even in Mahatma Gandhi and 
Nehru’s private deliberations on the success of the Khudai Khidmatgars. I too observed this trope in 
the memories of Pooran Chand and his friends. This is something on display in the following snippet 
of conversation, where we were discussing Badshah Khan’s legacy and his role in the independence 
movement.   
 PK: But he was very famous, and he had an immense amount of influence. 
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Pooran Chand [PC]: That is because [voice cracks with emotion] he went to jail a lot, and one 
time, in our area there is a Haripur [town], in Hazara. Hazara is a district, it [Haripur] is a tehsil 
of that. There he [Badshah Khan] had organised a session of the Congress. All the leaders of 
the Congress, this Nehru and all of them had come there. In Haripur, Frontier.  
AA [a friend of PC who was sitting beside us on the park bench at the time]: Haripur Hazara 
[nods] 
PC: Yes 
AA: It is a mountainous region 
PC: Organising a session there is not an easy thing. All the Pathans. One, he showed them [the 
Congress] that all the Pathans are my followers. No one made any trouble. And this is not a 
very old incident, I am unable to remember the year, must be 1938-39 only.  
This surprise at the Pathan turn to non-violent resistance is something that comes across quite 
strongly in the Congress’ dealings with Badshah Khan and the Khudai Khidmatgars (ibid.). What also 
comes across is a distrust of the durability of non-violent resistance among the Pathans (ibid.). Yet, 
this distrust is completely absent in the memories of Frontier refugees. The people of Pooran Chand’s 
generation proudly remember Badshah Khan’s commitment to non-violence and his desire for 
Pathanistan: a sovereign nation-state of Pathans, unaffiliated with the ethnonationalist Partition of 
India and Pakistan.  
Pooran Chand remembers how a referendum was conducted in the Frontier Province, to give people 
the chance to decide whether they wanted the Frontier to be a part of India or Pakistan, after the 
Partition. Badshah Khan as well as the then Congress-led provincial government of the Frontier 
Province (with Badshah Khan’s brother as Chief Minister) called for a boycott of the referendum, 
deeming it an unfair proposition (ibid.; Jain, 1998). The boycott, along with aggressive campaigning by 
the Muslim League in favour of Pakistan led to the Frontier Province voting in favour of Pakistan 
(Banerjee, 2003; Jain, 1998). The result was a series of communal flare-ups in the province, followed 
by the eventual exodus of Hindus and Sikhs.   
Remembering the boycott, Pooran Chand lamented that Badshah Khan had not raised the demand for 
Pathanistan louder. The dream of Pathanistan resonates with this generation even today; perhaps 
fuelled by the bitter memories of what happened instead: 
‘I do not know what would have happened. But I mean to say that we could have stayed there 
safely, because Muslims- Britishers had a habit of practicing divide and rule. […] And all of us 
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Hindu people, were taken forcefully to vote for that [Pakistan], they did not have proper 
voting anywhere. Partition, a line was drawn.’  
(Pooran Chand)   
All of Pooran Chand’s friends remember the rigging of the referendum. In their own quiet, sombre 
way, these memories question the conditions under which the Frontier was lumped with Pakistan for 
geopolitical convenience. Mukulika Banerjee (2003) notes that according to conventional logic, the 
Frontier, with its 96% Muslim population, would be the last place where one would hope to find 
contestations against belonging in Pakistan. Badshah Khan and the Khudai Khidmatgars emphasised 
their ideological identification with the Congress in the run-up to the Partition; making light of their 
geographical continuity with Pakistan (ibid.). Till as late as the 1990s, Khudai Khidmatgars continued 
to argue that if East and West Pakistan could be separated by the breadth of India then the Frontier 
too could be a part of India while being geographically separated from it by Pakistan (ibid.). The 
formulation of such claims also reveals the Frontier Province’s position on the peripheries of the India-
Pakistan ethnonationalist divide. As Banerjee (ibid.: 33) writes, ‘A frontier cannot be easily Partitioned 
because its very nature as a region of exchange does not allow it.’ 
Banerjee’s (ibid.) observation and my own research underscores the importance of this discussion on 
landscape and identity. Partition and its related contestations of history and national belonging are by 
no means the simplistic polarised discourses they are often made out to be. Following the Partition, 
Badshah Khan continued his campaign for an independent Pathanistan; and for his political activities, 
spent decades in Pakistani jails (ibid.). Banerjee (ibid.: 34) notes that despite being freedom fighters, 
the Khudai Khidmatgars and their leaders were branded traitors (due to their ties to the Congress) and 
spent more years in jail after independence, than they did before it. The Khudai Khidmatgar 
movement eventually petered out, leaving behind only a mirage of what might have been.  
 
 
A Shrine to Martyrdom: The Story of the Gurudwara Shahidane Gujrat Train 
 
Just as the B.K. Hospital and Chowk evoked the bittersweet memories of Badshah Khan, a more 
sombre memory was evoked by the nearby Gurudwara Shahidane Gujrat Train. This gurudwara (Sikh 
place of worship) was built in NIT, Faridabad in the 1950s, to memorialise the ‘martyrdom’ of those 
who died in the Gujrat Train massacre. The gurudwara’s name literally translates to, ‘Gurudwara of 
the Gujrat Train Martyrs’. The Gujrat Train massacre gets its name from the Gujrat railway station in 
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Pakistan. This is not to be confused with the state of Gujarat in India. In January 1948, a train full of 
Frontier refugees headed for India was massacred at this station. The killing was accompanied by the 
mass abduction of Hindu and Sikh women.  
According to Jain (1998: 78), the train left Bannu on January 10 and was attacked two days later, on 
the 12th, while waiting for a signal at Gujrat Railway Station in Pakistan. The massacre of this train was 
even noted in a diplomatic cable from Nehru to the Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Dated 
January 15, 1948, the diplomatic cable reads as follows:  
‘In the attack in Gujrat on the train carrying Hindu and Sikh refugees by tribesmen and Muslim 
refugees, sixty-one Indian soldiers fought gallantly until they ran out of ammunition and a 
large number of Hindu and Sikhs were killed. Of 2400 people in the train only 700 have arrived 
in Gujranwala [Pakistan] of whom a high proportion have been seriously injured. It is 
significant that these do not include any women who are reported to have been abducted en 
masse. I am informed that of the 1700, of whom there is no trace yet, the bulk have been 
killed, wounded or kidnapped.’ 
Diplomatic cable39 from Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan, quoted in Jain (ibid.: 14) 
The memories of this violence are as ever-present as those of Badshah Khan. Everyone of Pooran 
Chand’s generation is aware of the sad memory memorialised by the gurudwara’s semantically 
transparent name. During one of the many evenings I spent in the Rose Garden, I was introduced by 
Pooran Chand, to Mohan Lal. Mohan Lal was of Pooran Chand’s age and hailed from the town of 
Bannu. Mohan Lal had many fond memories of Bannu and considered it the ‘Switzerland’ of this 
region; a crown jewel of sorts. Mohan Lal also had a personal link to the history of the Gujrat Train, as 
not only had the train originated from Bannu, but his paternal uncle who was travelling by that train, 
was a witness to the massacre.  
Mohan Lal: A very sad incident had taken place during that time. Gujrat Train of 10 Number is 
what we call it. That, approximately 80% people had been killed by Muslims. ‘Get down!’, they 
got down… the people; people hid under the corpses. My chachaji [father’s brother] had told 
me this, he was in that train. And the cream of our city was in that train. The people who were 
quite rich. We were not that rich but in that the city’s rich people were mostly there, the rich 
people of our city had come by it. 
                                                            
39 With its precise round numbers, this diplomatic cable is a prime example of what Gyanendra Pandey (2001) 
describes as the imprint of rumour. I discuss this in some detail in Chapter 3, in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
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PK: All of them were in that train? 
ML: They were all killed, 80% people. After that the few who survived came to Faridabad, their 
memorial is in Faridabad even today. [A] Gurudwara in 5 number [Sector] is there by the name 
of Gujrat Train Gurudwara. 
PK: It’s been named Gujrat Train Gurudwara only? 
ML: Yes, that train was of number 10, it was a train of 10 number. It’s called the 10 number 
train. 
Chetan [seated beside us, joins the conversation]: It was of the date 10 [January, 1948]. That 
means the date of the train was 10, so…     
  
Figure 1.05: The Gurudwara Shahidane Gujrat Train in Sector 5, NIT, Faridabad. 
This gurudwara not only memorialises the victims of the Gujrat Train massacre but also, in a larger 
sense, serves as a memorial to all those who died during the Partition. I emphasise the latter due to 
the fact that until the inauguration of the Partition Museum in Amritsar in August 2017, India did not 
have a single museum, monument or memorial dedicated to the memory of those who died during 
the Partition (Butalia, 2000). In the absence of state memorials, sites of memory such as the 
Gurudwara Shahidane Gujrat Train have long filled this vacuum.  
It is in this context, that the use of the word ‘shahidane’ in the gurudwara’s name becomes interesting.     
The word shahidane translates to ‘martyrs of’. This memorialisation of the victims of Partition violence 
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as ‘martyrs’ of the nation is evocative of a larger discourse of sacrifice. As I argue in Chapter 2, this 
turn to the discourse of sacrifice is a form of theodicy that seeks to rationalise the ‘uselessness’ out of 
their suffering. Sanctifying their suffering through the heroic trope of martyrdom is also an attempt at 
recovering a sense of agency from the helplessness of their displacement. Through the turn to the 
discourse of martyrdom, their suffering is presented as a heroic act of sacrifice performed in service 
of the Hindu nation. What makes this theodicical discourse of sacrifice doubly interesting in the case 
of this gurudwara is its status as an active place of worship: the performance of a literal theodicy. I 
deconstruct this discourse in Chapter 2, and in Chapter 3 I connect this discourse of sacrifice and heroic 
martyrdom to victimhood and the thirst for vengeance.  
For now, I want to foreground the gurudwara’s theodicical discourse of sacrifice and martyrdom which 
comprises a major theme in the narratives of my informants. Furthermore, courtesy its active 
community of Partition survivors, NIT Faridabad comprises a veritable milieux of memory; a social 
environment where the memory of the Partition remains a meaningful part of everyday life.   
 
 
Listening to Ancestors: Ethnography Within a Milieux of Memory 
 
I began this chapter by reflecting on the familial qualities of my relationships with my informants. 
Before I delve into the ethnographic vignettes that analyse the memory maps of my informants, I want 
to briefly return to that thread. 
The time I spent conducting fieldwork in Faridabad, I learnt, was itself folded within traditional 
practices of remembrance. One evening, while talking to my informant Chetan, I learnt that so much 
of the local knowledge I was absorbing from these elders, had been passed down to them by their 
elders. Chetan, for example, was just 3 years old at the time of the Partition. He did not have any 
substantial memories of the Partition and whatever he knew now, had been learnt from talking to his 
elders; our shared ancestors. One evening, while we were sitting together on a bench in the Rose 
Garden and discussing the progress of my fieldwork, he smiled and said that, ‘We too would listen to 
our elders like this, at the age of 12 years, 15 years, we would sit with them at night.’ You and I are 
the same, he meant to say. And for a moment, it conjured in my mind the image of a teenaged Chetan 
sitting cross-legged beside his elders as they told him about the Partition and the strange and exotic 
Frontier Province that they had come from. 
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Chetan’s offhanded comment struck me as quite significant for it seemed to place my ethnographic 
practice within our community’s history. It also crystallised the realisation that my focus on participant 
observation – rather than one-off interviews – was quite endearing to my informants. I was an outlet 
for anecdotes, stories, discussions and rants that their children and grandchildren seldom had time 
for. But, more significantly, in learning the history of our community from my elders, I was also 
recreating the traditional practice of the oral transmission of knowledge. Listening to these memories 
was in itself the performance of a culture of memory. 
Where Pierre Nora (1992) perceives the death of memory in the construction of sites of memory, my 
fieldwork in Faridabad suggested that the opposite was true. That is, Faridabad as a millieux of 
memory served not to diminish the memory of the Partition, but to amplify it; to make it impossible 
to ignore. In Faridabad, as in Delhi as a whole, the land itself remembers. Meeting my informants just 
a few hundred metres away from Badshah Khan Hospital made it impossible to ignore the resonance 
of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s memory among this community. Similarly, the Gurudwara Shahidane 
Gujarat Train was both a product of and a contributor to the discourse of sacrifice I observed in the 
narratives of my informants. That is, these places and community were evocative of established 
grammars of remembrance. In fact, it is precisely because buildings and places evoke individual and 
collective practises of remembrance that they earn the distinction of proximate enemies in times of 
ethnic conflict.  
In my fieldwork, I encountered numerous such scattered places and place names that evoked the 
memory of the Partition. For example, my fieldwork also took me to Palwal, a town 30 kilometres 
south of Faridabad, on the road to Agra. In the years following the Partition, a number of refugees 
from the rural areas of district Dera Ghazi Khan (including my maternal grandmother’s family) were 
resettled in Palwal. Even today, Palwal’s main market is called ‘Camp Market’; a quiet reminder of its 
history as a Partition-era refugee camp.  
On the other side of the border, Lahore’s Sir Ganga Ram Hospital (built in 1921) is a famous example 
of the same. The hospital is named after its benefactor Sir Ganga Ram Aggarwal, who was the 
Executive Engineer and Town Planner of Lahore for the British Government, before the Partition 
(Tikekar, 2005). Following the near complete eviction of Hindus from the Pakistani half of Punjab, 
places like Lahore’s Sir Ganga Ram Hospital memorialise a kind of syncretism which seems 
inconceivable in South Asia, today. Such sites serve as subtle markers of the rupture that was the 
Partition.  
Having discussed historical contestations around place and space, as well as the memories embodied 
by place and space, I now turn my gaze to the way that my informants remember familiar places from 
133 
 
across the border. In the sections that follow, I analyse the maps drawn by some of my informants. 
Using the work of Michel de Certeau (1984: 119), I argue that these maps are best understood as 
‘speech acts’ or ‘acts of enunciation’. I analyse the rhetorical and semiotic intricacies through which 
these maps represent a memorialisation of space and a spatialisation of memory. These ethnographic 
vignettes continue my exploration of the connections between space and memory whilst 
acknowledging the plurality and heteroglossia inherent within narratives of Partition survivors. 
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1.5. A Life Forgotten and Remembered: Dayaram’s Memory of Dera Ghazi Khan 
 
‘But sometimes this-this head forgets. I can see the map in front of my eyes but I’m not a 
cartographer. [Chuckles] But yes, this is there that every 50 yards there was a chowk40. Bl-Blocks had 
been made- they were called blocks. I used to live in Block 10.’ 
 Dayaram 
 
I had heard volumes about Dayaram before I actually got the chance to meet him. My mother first 
mentioned him at the start of my fieldwork, in July 2017. Dayaram, she remembered, had been my 
grandfather’s dearest friend. They had been friends since their childhood in Dera Ghazi Khan; a 
friendship that had endured more than 60 years, until my grandfather’s demise in the year 1998. My 
mother remembered Dayaram as a sweet, fatherly old man who had shared a mischievous, almost 
boisterous friendship with my grandfather. They were like a bunch of lads in each other’s presence 
and loved to drink, smoke tobacco pipes, and play cards together. My mother guessed that Dayaram 
was my grandfather’s age which would make him at least 90 years old.  
Learning of him was easy enough, but finding him turned out to be a whole other matter altogether. 
While everyone in my family remembered him well, no one had heard from him in years. Ultimately, 
after three months of uncertainty and fruitless attempts, it was my grandaunt Anjali who cracked the 
case. One of her cousins who lived in Dehradun, had recently run into his son. Dayaram, we learnt, 
was alive and well. And so, finally, in the 2nd week of December, my grandaunt and I drove down to 
Dehradun to interview him. 
All the while, on the way to his house I had a great sense of anticipation. I imagined a day of bonhomie 
and bonding over the memories of my deceased grandparents. But, the reality of our meeting could 
not have been more different. When we arrived at his door, he struggled to recognise us at first. His 
wife, Urmila, recognised us and explained our acquaintance to him. It was much later in the day, when, 
as part of a broader conversation on the cityscape of Dera Ghazi Khan that he finally connected me to 
my grandfather; remembering fondly that he had learnt to smoke from my nana (maternal 
grandfather). 
At 93 years of age, Dayaram had been visibly withered by age. While incredibly tall – standing at over 
6 feet – there was a distinct frailty to his appearance. His voice, while still powerful, had a hoarseness 
                                                            
40 The Hindi/Urdu word for a traffic intersection or roundabout.  
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to it and he was prone to stammering in a way characteristic of the elderly. His hearing too had grown 
weak. It was his memory, however, that had been most affected by age. Oftentimes in the middle of 
a conversation he would find himself unable to recall certain details. As he admitted himself, ‘My 
memory has become very weak. I have even forgotten some of my relatives.’ As a whole his memory 
of Dera Ghazi Khan and the Partition was quite bare. This combined with the brevity of his turn of 
phrase made for an almost skeletal retelling of his life and journey.  
Dayaram was born in Dera Ghazi Khan on November 22, 1925. He passed his 10th grade Metric exam 
in 1944 and shortly after that, moved to Karachi to work for the British Indian Army’s Military Engineer 
Services (MES) corp. In August 1947, he had just returned from a visit to his parents, when the situation 
turned for the worst.  
‘I got posted to Karachi. [Some inaudible slurred words] The first bomb exploded in Lahore, I 
was in a train at the time. Then I reached Dera [Ghazi Khan] and stayed some 7-8 days and 
met everyone there. After that I returned to Karachi. It was in Karachi that the Partition 
started. Then in September, I Karachi… posting… what… some ship… by steamer. By steamer. 
From there, Karachi to ESD, Bombay. There is a Kandivali station in Bombay, Kandivali. That is 
where I got posted.’        
While he made his way from Karachi to Bombay by ship to report to his new posting, his parents and 
the rest of his family took the train to Delhi, from Multan. During this period, he lost touch with his 
parents for three years. In September, just before his official transfer orders to Bombay came through, 
he received a distressing letter from his parents.  
‘A letter arrived for me, from Multan, saying that we have reached Multan and that like this 
everyone is travelling in trains and that all these difficulties are happening. People were 
thirsting to drink water.’ 
That letter was the last he heard of them for the next 3 years. He later learnt that from Multan his 
parents had first gone to Delhi and then continued on to Patna to stay with his maternal uncle. They 
were eventually reunited when one of Dayaram’s MES colleagues serendipitously ran into his parents 
and put the family back in touch.  
Dayaram did not witness any bloodshed or violence because he had travelled by ship. Beyond the bare 
basics of his journey, he could not remember much of what had transpired along the way. He also 
could not remember what the mood in Dera Ghazi Khan had been like in 1947 (he had spent a week 
in the city just before the Partition). All he remembered was that he had spent that week hanging out 
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with his friends. He could not remember much about Karachi in the immediate aftermath of the 
Partition either. My conversation with Dayaram stands out in my mind partly because despite 
remembering his experience of the Partition, our conversation remained unusually apolitical. He 
displayed almost no interest in the politics of the Partition. When asked, he replied that he had never 
really had an interest in politics. However, our conversation took an interesting turn when in response 
to a question about Dera Ghazi Khan, he offered to draw me a map of the city. 
PK: Do you remember what Dera Ghazi Khan was like before the Partition? 
D: Yes, yes, yes-ji. 
PK: What all do you remember? 
D: Remember it very well. I remember it very well, what do you want to know? 
PK: Tell me everything you remember. What was your house like there, what was the city like? 
D: No, my house there, the system there was chau-chau-chaupar type. Every 50 yards there 
was a chowk. [Pause] I can draw a map. Do you have a pen? 
When his housekeeper had brought us paper and a pen, he began to draw me a map; explaining and 
remembering the city as he went along. At first, I understood his turn to mapmaking as a 
misinterpretation of my question. But, as the day progressed, his spontaneous turn to mapmaking 
seemed to betray a deeper impulse at play.  
‘It’s like this that, these here are chowks. Square. They were [public] squares. They had been 
built every 50 yards. This was the Municipal Committee. … These were bazars. This over here 
was a market. This was a vegetable market. Our house was here, over here. Every 50 yards 
there were these. Chowk. Square. Chaupar-type. They were split into chowks, block. They 
were called blocks. Block 10. I used to live in block 10. Block 10, just imagine this is block 10. 
There was an Arya Samaj over here.’ 
With pen in hand, Dayaram’s narration took on an unexpected exuberance and flair. As he began to 
remember the images and metaphors of his youth through the drawing of a map, his memories of 
Dera Ghazi Khan took on a distinctly spatial aspect. Michel de Certeau (1984: 110) writes that, ‘To 
practice space is thus to repeat the joyful and silent experience of childhood.’ This is visible in 
Dayaram’s narrative as he analogises the streets of Dera Ghazi Khan to a chaupar board.  
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Chaupar is a traditional Indian board game where the playing board is laid out in the shape of a square 
cross. The board itself is further divided into smaller cubes across which players move their pawns. In 
this way, the chaupar board resembles the layout of a planned city, with perpendicular streets 
intersecting each other at perfect right angles to create an intricate grid. This chaupar metaphor recurs 
numerous times in Dayaram’s descriptions as he remembers the city through the eyes of the child 
who grew up playing games in those streets.      
 
Figure 1.06: The map of Dera Ghazi Khan drawn by Dayaram. The city is laid out in the shape of a 
chaupar board. 
 
Figure 1.07: A fabric chaupar board, for comparison (Chopatfan, 2008)  
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Using this metaphor plucked from his childhood, he began to render the city in the shape of a chaupar 
board. He then began to populate this outline; colouring it with the scant remembered images of his 
childhood. Talking of these places in this way, became an excuse for talking about life in pre-Partition 
Dera Ghazi Khan. Drawing and pointing to places on the map, he told me what they were (a municipal 
committee, a park, a bazar) and then supplemented these with vignettes of everyday life. The 
reference to a chapter of the Arya Samaj – at the end of the excerpt above – segued into a conversation 
about the organisation and its presence there. Similarly, drawing his high school’s location on the map 
led to a conversation about his school days. He remembered how he would play hockey with his 
friends, around their chowk, after school.  
His narration acquired a newfound descriptiveness as he moved from drawing a map to detailing a 
social world. For example, when asked if he remembered what his house was like, he began by talking 
about shopping at the local vegetable market, and then went on to draw the layout of his house.   
‘This was Block 10. It was in a square. This was our house, here. Here, we used to go to this 
market, this vegetable market, just to roam around in the vegetable market. We used to go 
there to buy vegetables, there was no one selling, no cart… some… no… no one selling like this 
[street vendors], everyone used to go to the market. Over there… Cattle and everything was 
kept. This was my house, over here. And this, there were two rooms. [Long pause as he picks 
up a fresh page and starts drawing a layout of his house.] I keep forgetting… There were two 
rooms here. This was a lawn. This… lawn. The living room was here. This was a chowk. Over 
here tap… there was a government tap for water here. This room was a small room. This was 
the hall. This was the veranda, outside, it was open, open. This was the living room for 
meeting, it was a room. There were windows here. There was a door here. A door here. There 
was a tree here, it was a shami41 tree. Shami! This was a chowk, a chowk. Canal, no, the canal 
was over here. The bus-stand was here.’ 
                                                            
41 Prosopis cineraria, a flowering pea tree. The tree has religious significance for Hindus and is worshipped by 
some groups as part of the Dasahra festival. The Shami tree also makes numerous appearances in Hindu 




Figure 1.08: Dayaram’s drawing of the floor-plan of his childhood home (bottom) along with 
a sketch of the chowk their family lived on (top). 
As our conversation continued, the map served us both as a useful referential tool. As I began to frame 
my questions in relation to the places on the map, he would answer me by adding more detail to the 
map; thus embedding our conversation within this two-dimensional world. The most immediate effect 
of this was that Dayaram moved from talking about places to describing the routes to places. The 
revelation of this discursive structure was a demonstration of de Certeau’s theorisation of such 
personalised maps as tours that follow a predetermined itinerary.   
Each time his hand moved across the page and he added a new location to the map, he narrated the 
route to it. And each new location, each new route, led to a fresh story; a memory. Speaking of Dera 
Ghazi Khan’s relatively famous Gopinathji ka Mandir (Krishna temple) led to remembering how he 
would walk to the court every afternoon to deliver his father a home-cooked lunch. As we wandered 
down that familiar route, he also remembered the way to his nana (maternal grandfather) and 
chacha’s (paternal uncle) house. 
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‘In the afternoon, I would go till the court42, on foot, to give my father his lunch. [Draws and 
points to the court on the map] I would go till the court. Otherwise, I went till about here… to 
my nana’s house. This was nana’s route. [His fingers move over the map, momentarily 
illuminating the route] Go from here, here from this street. There were streets here. […] Now 
this is our street. Further ahead in the street, at the four-way intersection we would reach a 
bazar, over here. Our nana-ji lived over here, chacha-ji Lala Sunder Das, Lala Fateh Chand, 
lived here on this side. Dharam [my grandfather] lived over here, and further down on 
Dharam’s road [was] Tulle-wala Bazar. Now what else should I tell you? [laughs] Otherwise, 
we did not wander much. Stayed in control.’ 
All the while, Dayaram’s narration was accompanied by a steady repetition of the phrase, ‘There was 
a chowk every 50 yards.’ This phrase served a kind of reorienting function. Dayaram reflexively 
repeated it to himself, bringing our conversation back to the map from whatever tangent we had 
wandered off on; tangents triggered by the sharing of a new route. As a result of this reflexive narrative 
habit, our conversation assumed the structure of a commute. Each time he introduced me to a new 
location on the map, he reflexively returned home, to his chowk, to block 10, before we set out again, 
in a fresh direction. This recursive, commute-like structure of his narration is visible in the following 
excerpt: 
D: No, no. I used to go to Karnal in the holidays to meet them [his parents], now I don’t 
remember. [Pause and switches back to talking about Dera Ghazi Khan on his own] Now how 
do I explain this, this is the Municipal Committee, MC. [Pause] These were shops, here. And 
after coming here, here, you would again come across a chowk.  
PK: Yes, you said there was a chowk like this every 50 yards. 
D: Yes, at nearly about every 50 yards there was a chowk. Like this. [Draws and then points at 
two locations on the map] This is a bazar, this is a bazar. Here, in these streets, here my nana-
ji used to live. This was called Tulle-wala Bazar. I don’t know the full… Here is a vegetable 
market. The rest here were houses, the rest I don’t remember, they were all chowks I mean. 
They had made chowks like this. This is a bazar, come here, there is a chowk here. It is all a 
chowk, square. There are houses here. Here, our house was here. The hakim [traditional 
healer] used to live here. The doctor used to live here. His brother was a very famous doctor 
in the Tulle-wala Bazar. He was Doctor Seva Ram, I don’t know, don’t remember. They 
[chowks] were made like this. Then, ahead of this, they were made like this. Then ahead of 
                                                            
42 His father was a lawyer and continued his practice in Karnal, after the Partition. 
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that was again a chowk. It was chaupar-type. Now here these are all houses, all these are also 
houses. There were shops here, MC Road. Ok now, go here and there is a bazar. There is a 
bazar also and then go here and keep going and you reach the canal. 
PK: Didn’t you say you lived close to the canal? 
D: No no, not close-close, far-far. There must have been at least a distance of half a mile, must 
have been half a mile. MC Road, here was my house, the cinema was here. Then you’d reach 
the bazar. Then the garden. It used to be like that. The canal was here. From here we used to 
go on foot and reach the canal like that. [His finger lightly traces the route on the map] There 
was a chowk every 50 yards.  
Earlier in this chapter, I referred to de Certeau’s theorisation of walking as a ‘tactic’; an appropriation 
of space. De Certeau (1984: 102) analogises walking to a ‘wandering of the semantic’. For de Certeau 
(ibid.: 99) choosing a route is analogous to composing a ‘spatial turn of phrase’. To walk a city then is 
to speak everyday life using the spatial language of our surroundings. Every turn on the route is a 
sentence that composes the ‘rhetoric of walking’ (ibid.: 99). As stated previously, these maps can be 
understood as ‘speech acts’ or ‘acts of enunciation’ (ibid.: 119). They do not merely articulate the lay 
of the land – in the Cartesian method – but instead articulate a tour. This tour follows a predetermined 
itinerary that guides the listener from one location to another, recreating the routes of his past.   
In recalling the routes and streets of his childhood, Dayaram recalls the spatial language of his youth. 
It returns to him like a mother-tongue, bringing with it spatial turns of phrase he picked up as a child. 
The chaupar metaphor comes to him in this manner, making him playfully render those streets in the 
metaphor of the games he played on them as a child. The reflexive narrative structure of a commute 
recurs similarly; perhaps a reflex of parental reminders to always return home. And so, each time we 
begin a new tour, he makes sure we return home to the chowk; to his chowk.  
The chowk, both, as a generic component of Dera Ghazi Khan’s architecture, as well as the chowk in 
front of his house, occupies a central place in his memory of the city. He remembered that as a child, 
he had spent most of his time playing in the nearby chowks with his friends. He told me that to this 
day, whenever he had a dream about Dera Ghazi Khan, it was these familiar images of the local bazar, 
his school, his home and his chowk that he encountered. As the excerpt below reveals, the chowk 
itself has a special association to his childhood.  
 PK: Do you ever reminisce about Dera [Ghazi Khan]? 
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D: Yes, I do, sometimes I see the bazar in front of my eyes, sometimes I see it in my dreams, 
sometimes… 
PK: And what do you see in your dreams? 
D: Nothing really, just… Dera [Ghazi Khan]… nothing in particular. I never used to roam around 
much, never used to roam around, just around the house, the chowk, just the chowk that is 
there. Here there were 2 to 8 chowks, we used to play in just that area. We used to play in 
just that, amongst ourselves, I spent my childhood there. In the chowk. We never went 
anywhere else. Either school. Or sometimes to our relatives homes. Nana-nana also lived 
there and so did chacha. Everyone lived there.  
There was a poignancy to his words, as he reflected on having spent his childhood at this chowk. To 
him, that chowk symbolised the simplicity of childhood and the security of home; the focal point of 
his life. It was to this chowk that he returned, no matter where he went. And now, in retelling his 
memories, he returns to that chowk reflexively, before we wander off again; down some other 
forgotten street in search of a memory.  
This search – or shall we say tour – of Dayaram’s memories weaves through his abandoned childhood 
home. It follows an itinerary that semantically recreates some of his childhood journeys. While 
listening to Dayaram, I had the distinct feeling of being guided through his streets of Dera Ghazi Khan. 
Together we figuratively traversed the Cartesian street-grid, momentarily losing ourselves in his story 
– a history – of space. Like his map, Dayaram’s memories also reveal a relatively bare grid. His 
recollections were almost entirely devoid of anecdotes and characters. He remembered some of his 
elders but admitted, that with the passage of time, he had forgotten much, including their faces.  
The Dera Ghazi Khan of his memory comes across as an eerily uninhabited city. The homes, buildings 
and streets are there to see but one does not encounter any people in them. One hears the chaotic 
sounds of the bazar and the cheerful chatter of kids at play but never once do we encounter these 
individuals. A walk through Dayaram’s memory is ultimately a lonely walk through a haunted city. We 
all contain, within us, similar haunted places. They are the ghosts of the places we abandoned never 
to return. As de Certeau (ibid.: 108) writes, ‘There is no place that is not haunted by many different 






Dayaram’s connection to my nana – my maternal grandfather – is the reason that meeting him was 
such a special experience. As stated previously, Dayaram did not recognise me or connect me to my 
nana, at first. And, in this, one could not fault him. I was 5 years old when my nana, passed on, due to 
a massive heart-attack; the cumulative result of chain-smoking and heavy-drinking. Following that, 
Dayaram and his family had fallen out of touch with ours.   
Dayaram and I had been talking for a couple of hours before I brought up my grandfather, again. ‘So, 
were you nana’s classmate?’ I asked him shyly, taking advantage of a momentary lull in our 
conversation. ‘What’s that?’ he blinked back in surprise. I decided to press the issue. ‘Did you know 
nana from Dera Ghazi Khan?’ I asked, despite already knowing the answer to the question. ‘Know 
whom?’ he retorted in confusion. ‘Did you know my nana from Dera Ghazi Khan?’ I asked again, this 
time speaking loudly and slowly for his benefit. ‘What was his name?’ he asked. ‘Dharam Pal Nangia,’ 
I answered.  
‘I don’t remember truly. If something of your father’s face comes before my eyes, I might be able to 
remember. If he is from Dera Ghazi Khan then he must be… where did he live before that?’ Dayaram 
fixed me with an intense stare. I could tell that he was genuinely trying to remember. ‘He was from 
Dera Ghazi Khan itself.’  
‘I don’t, I did not know him in Dera (Ghazi Khan),’ he remarked dismissively. ‘You didn’t know him in 
Dera?’ I exclaimed with surprise tinged with disappointment. ‘No! I think maybe not in Dera, maybe 
in Karachi… Dharam Pal Nangia… Where does he live now, your father?’  
‘He’s passed away now,’ I answered, my voice dropping to a solemn whisper. ‘Where did your father 
live here?’ he asked again, correcting his tense. From across the other end of the room, unbeknownst 
to me, my grandaunt had been following this brief exchange. She interjected now and shouted across, 
‘Chaman Lal Nangia- the one who sold shoes.’ Unlike me, she’d understood that all this while, Dayaram 
had been asking me for my nana’s father’s name, so he could connect father to son.  
‘Oh yes, now I remember! He, he used to live in Block 6,’ Dayaram exclaimed excitedly, his memories 
returning to him in a rush. ‘Yes, I knew him. From there, I knew him from there only. Oh, so you are 
Dharam Pal Nangia’s…’ 
‘Yes,’ I answered, with a smile and affirming nod of the head. Dayaram continued excitedly, speaking 
a lot faster than he had before, ‘Lawyer, he used to live in the house opposite a lawyer. I knew him 
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from there. Now I remember. I’ve remembered his face now. […] Short, he was quite short. […] 
Sometimes I am reminded of him. I… he taught me how to smoke. Now I remember. […] He used to 
play cards with me. […] Dharam has come here also, to this house. He sat where you are sitting now 
and played cards with me here.’ 
Later, he showed me my family’s ancestral home on his map. Interestingly, I never asked him to. We 
were talking about the Arya Samaj in Dera Ghazi Khan when he, off his own accord, showed me the 
house.  
‘Yes, there was one Arya Samaj, one Sanatan Dharam. The Sanatan Dharam was separate, 
over here. It was here, in these streets. This is the Arya Samaj. [Pointing to the map] This is 
the canal. [Points to the map again, pause] From here we used to walk to the canal. Every 
week, people would gather over there, playing amongst themselves… Perform all sorts of 
stunts. I remember all the places that I have seen. Dharam [my nana]… I used to live here, 
Dharam lived... This is the bazar, Dharam lived here. Over here. [Traces the route with his 
finger and points at a place not far from his own house]’ 
And just like that, our hearts warmed, our kinship established, we continued talking about Dera Ghazi 














1.6. The Long Goodbye: Rajaram’s Memory of Displacement 
 
‘Aside from name, we had dharti43 there. Do you understand dharti? We, we had land. […] We had 
horses. We had three buffaloes, cows. And three houses. Where are we now? And the biggest thing is 
that there was a befikri [carefreeness] there. There was no tension.’   
Rajaram 
 
Rajaram was one of the people I spent a lot of time with, during my numerous trips to Gurgaon. 
Gurgaon is part of the National Capital Region of Delhi (NCR); adjoining New Delhi on its south-western 
border. A sprawling metropolis in its own right, Gurgaon is characterised by a Janus-faced 
architecture; pitting its modern high-rise buildings, upmarket shopping malls and MNC office-blocks 
against crowded, rustic residential neighbourhoods. Rajaram’s home and shop were located in rural 
Gurgaon, a short distance from the national highway connecting Gurgaon to Delhi’s Dhaula Kuan.  
Rajaram was part of a large community of Partition survivors who live in Gurgaon, today. Some of 
them had been resettled here by the government, while others, like Rajaram, had sold the agricultural 
land they had been allotted in neighbouring districts, and moved to Gurgaon for employment. I came 
in contact with him, in June 2018, towards the end of my fieldwork, through Sanjay. Sanjay was the 
father-in-law of a relative of my grandaunt, Anjali.  
It was Aman, Sanjay’s son who introduced me to Rajaram. Both Rajaram and Aman were in the printing 
business, in the same market. Rajaram’s shop had remained unchanged for the last 20 years and, for 
the most part, catered mainly to the printing needs of the local Arya Samaj branch. Aman had seen 
Rajaram in the market several times and knew of him, as an acquaintance. When he learnt from his 
father that I was looking for people of this age group, in our community, he immediately thought of 
Rajaram and put me in touch with him. 
At almost 6 feet tall and 91 years of age, Rajaram struck an awe-inspiring sight. Ever-punctual, Rajaram 
would always open his shop at 9am on the dot, every morning, and spend about 3 hours supervising 
business. He would always be neatly turned out in a white pyjama, paired with crisply ironed kurtas 
in an assortment of soothing earthy shades. While his face was pock-marked and showed signs of 
ageing, he held himself stiffly; with a gentlemanly grace and dignity.  
                                                            
43 Earth or land 
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Rajaram’s Hindi was a treat for the ears. He spoke Hindi in an extremely polished accent with a 
pedigree of grammar and diction that hinted at a background in Sanskrit. But it was his honest and 
upfront personality that endeared him to me. Unlike most of my other informants, he did not censor 
himself while talking about his youth, venturing even into the so-called taboo subjects of romance and 
sexuality. In the process, his stories revealed a rare, authentic glimpse into the syncretic culture of 
pre-Partition Punjab. His stories reveal the Partition’s disruption of an eroding fluid and pluralistic 
society. 
Rajaram had had an interesting life. He had been a lifelong member of the Arya Samaj, having joined 
the organisation in 1939 – at the age of 12 – under the influence of one of his school teachers. This 
had left a visibly deep impact on his worldview. He credited the Arya Samaj for his firm grounding in 
Hindi scripture which included a comprehensive knowledge of Hindu mythology and scripture, 
including the Vedas and the Shastras. The influence of the Arya Samaj was also reflected in the décor 
of his shop. His shop was plain and simple for the most part, with dusty old shelves and open racks 
adorning all the walls. The only wall hangings visible were two wall calendars featuring the prominent 
Arya Samaj ideologues Swami Vivekananda and Swami Dayanand Saraswati. 
Rajaram was born on April 2, 1927 in the village of Choti Zareen, district Dera Ghazi Khan. His 
hometown was 19 miles from the city of Dera Ghazi Khan. Rajaram considered Dera Ghazi Khan the 
most peaceful district of Punjab – even during the Partition. According to Rajaram, Dera Ghazi Khan’s 
location in the political backwaters of Punjab as well as the Muslim League’s absence from Rajaram’s 
village meant that only one low-intensity pogrom occurred there, during this period: on August 31, 
1947.  
Rajaram also credited the area’s ruling noble family, the Legharis, with maintaining the peace. He 
remembered the Leghari family as the masters of that region, especially his town. In his reckoning, 
the Legharis were an especially cultured family. He said, ‘Let me tell you, our town belonged to Nawab 
Muhammad Jamal Khan. He was a minister in the government of Sir Sikander Hayat Khan. And his… 
grandson became Pakistan’s President… [Farooq Ahmad Khan] Leghari.’ Remembering the violence in 
Choti – on the night of August 31, 1947 – Rajaram singled out the Legharis for praise: 
 ‘Our town was attacked. The Nawab-sahab’s nephew was there, both his sons were outside 
[the district]. So he saved the city otherwise our girls would have been abducted. The place 
from where they [the mob] were passing, there the crops belonged to Haji Mohammad Ali 
Khan and he drew his pistol and he had some Muslims with him. They seized their [the mob’s] 
guns first, Haji-sahab did. A lot of their servants were Pathans so when they saw they are here 
they created a ruckus in the meantime, a thousand people… Some from our town… Those who 
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were killed in the bazar, were killed, but they did not let Muslims enter our neighbourhood. 
[…] Then at night the Nawab-zada [Princeling] arrived, Mohammad Khan. Then they [Muslims] 
got scared. That they [Legharis] will smoke them out. Then they [mob] did not come.’ 
Following this skirmish, news of an impending transfer of population – or kabadla, as Rajaram referred 
to it in Urdu – reached the district. As a precaution against the complete annihilation of their lineage, 
his family took the difficult decision of travelling separately. Rajaram (along with his wife) was among 
the 3 married siblings who were sent to Dera Ghazi Khan ahead of the rest of their family. After 
spending a few days in Dera Ghazi Khan, a military regiment was posted in Choti to facilitate the safe 
evacuation of Hindus and Sikhs to the city. A truck-convoy was formed to evacuate the village’s Hindu 
and Sikh population, across the 21 kilometre stretch from Choti to Dera Ghazi Khan. Rajaram laid 
emphasis on the fact that the Nawab’s son Mohammad Khan Leghari (whom he calls Nawab-zada) 
and Haji Mohammad Ali Khan personally accompanied the military-refugee convoy in their cars, to 
prevent the soldiers from conspiring with the Muslim villages that fell en-route.  
‘The army was in cahoots with them [Muslim villagers]. That day they [Muslim villagers] did 
not kill us, but they had come with sacks to loot us. So the nawab-zada [princeling] 
Mohammad Khan Leghari got to know. Even Haji Mohammad Ali Khan. So they sent the army 
ahead of us. The Kachhela community fell en-route. So they saw there were a lot of people 
there. They arrested and imprisoned some mischievous men. Beat them up. So for our 
convoy… Till 10 miles the Nawab-zada Mohammad Khan placed his car right in front. […] At 
the back, in the end, was the car of Haji Mohammad Khan. In this convoy then even the 
military personnel got scared. Because those two were Magistrates. So they tightened their 
belts. […] So that is how we were saved and reached Dera Ghazi Khan.’   
In Dera Ghazi Khan, the Hindu High School had been converted into a makeshift refugee camp. From 
there, the authorities then began to gradually move people to Muzzafargarh. In Muzzafargarh, a 
massive open ground had been converted into a refugee camp. There, Rajaram and his family had to 
wait for 10 days before they could get a train that would take them across the border. On their 11th 
day in the camp, they finally boarded an incredibly crowded train that took them across the Attari-
Wagah border and dropped them in Samru, a small town in Haryana close to Ambala. In Samru, they 
were officially registered as refugees; an event that marked the beginning of the slow and arduous 
process of rebuilding their lives. However their train journey had not been without incident: 
‘The army was in our train. In our train… at one point there was the fear of a fight, [between] 
the Baloch regiment [Pakistani] and the Dogra regiment [Indian], they came face to face. Some 
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people got off at the railway station in Okara. Okara was a place en-route. To drink and fill 
water. Okay? […] There they came face to face. But then both the commanders ordered a 
retreat. They knew that a train was standing in the previous station in Hindustan, two [trains], 
those two trains of Muslims would have been finished. [Pause, speaking in a playful, child-like 
tone] I sat on the roof the whole time. My wife was quite upset, she was crying. My 
grandmother made her understand that it’s just her fear and all that.’ 
Besides their reputation for having always preserved communal harmony in the district, Rajaram 
credited the Legharis, along with the British Superintendent of Police Durrant with inspiring the fear 
of the law in the people of Dera Ghazi Khan. In the conversations we had, he often contrasted this 
administrative acumen with Gurgaon, citing the latter’s high crime-rate and general perception of 
lawlessness.  
Nostalgia for the colonial administration is a fairly common sentiment amongst Partition survivors. In 
my MPhil thesis (Kohli, 2015), I had analysed this in some detail and connected the nostalgia for the 
colonial administration to a general feeling of disaffection with the present (Boym, 2001). Their 
nostalgia for colonial rule is also connected to the status and wealth they enjoyed in pre-Partition 
Punjab as zamindars (hereditary landlords). In this way, not only were they complicit in the smooth 
functioning of the colonial administration but also relied on the British colonial state to secure their 
wealth and privileges (Kohli, 2015). This disaffection with the present – of which the nostalgia for the 
colonial administration is a part – is the articulation of the yearning for simpler times; for the days of 
their childhood.  
This is visible in the following excerpt, where Rajaram remembers not only his family’s former wealth 
but also a feeling of befikri (carelessness).  
‘Aside from name, we had dharti there. Do you understand dharti? We, we had land. […] We 
had horses. We had three buffaloes, cows. And three houses. Where are we now? And the 
biggest thing is that there was a befikri [carefreeness] there. There was no tension. […] We do 
not have that much tension also here. The environment there was quite… good compared to 
here. We had friends there, we had acquaintances there, okay? There were Pathans there, 
Hindus also, but there were no Sikhs that side.’   
This feeling of ‘befikri’ or carefreeness rekindles that familiar idea of nostalgia as a longing for a simpler 
time (Boym, 2001). It resonates with Michael Roth’s (1993: 40) characterisation of modern nostalgia 
as a ‘maladjustment to adult life’; a pining for the simpler, slower times of one’s childhood. The latter 
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is borne – to some degree – out of disaffection with one’s present (Boym, 2001). This is visible in the 
way that speaking of Gurgaon’s high crime rate triggers Rajaram’s nostalgia for the British colonial 
administration.  
Rajaram’s nostalgia for Dera Ghazi Khan was also visible in his spontaneous turn to mapmaking. In the 
time that I knew him, Rajaram spontaneously took to mapmaking on two separate occasions. Both 
times his turn to mapmaking was spurred by the impulse to spatially demonstrate Dera Ghazi Khan’s 
grandeur. Having been 20 years old at the time of the Partition, he had travelled extensively across 
the district, in his youth. His stories reflect this life experience, as they go beyond the reductive lens 
of communal violence. His stories add to a certain mystical, idyllic quality that haunts the memory of 
Dera Ghazi Khan’s former inhabitants; a kind of ‘je ne sais quoi’ aura. This nostalgia for Dera Ghazi 
Khan is visible in the way that Rajaram moves from remembering the district to drawing a map of it.  
R: Dera Ghazi Khan [city], Jampur and Taunsa [also known as Taunsa Sharif] were three Tehsils. 
This Tehsil [Dera Ghazi Khan city] was ours, I never went to Taunsa, I saw Jampur and Rajanpur. 
The people from here were first class! Mostly businessmen. In Jampur, they were well-
educated. And lots of people there were doctors. And, in Rajanpur there were lawyers and 
doctors, Dera Ghazi Khan [city] also had lots of lawyers and doctors. So these were not issues. 
Dera Ghazi Khan was not a backward district.  
 PK: I believe they even had electricity there…? 
R: Yes, electricity, was there in the city [Dera Ghazi Khan], but not in our town. It was there in 
the city, it was there in the district. Our town was like this… [Pause] Do me a favour. [Asks for 
pen and paper and starts drawing a map]. This was Dariya-e-Sindh [River Indus]. This was Koh 
Suleiman. Just like how, here, there is that place called Mount Abu. Here, what is that in 
Rajasthan? Abu. Abu Road is a mountain. They call it that, no? Just like that… this was Koh 
Suleiman. This was the river, Indus. There was no bridge here. In the summers a steamer 
[boat] used to run and in the winters they would make a bridge using boats. [Pause, continues 
drawing] Muzaffargarh was here. [Pause, draws some more] The railway line would end here, 
at Muzaffargarh. This rail would run from Peshawar. And one would go till Calcutta. There was 




Figure 1.09: The map Rajaram drew on a scrap piece of paper, in our first encounter. The labelling on 
the map is in my handwriting and was dictated to me by him. 
Rajaram’s turn to map-making was spurred by the desire to convince me of Dera Ghazi Khan’s 
grandeur. While in our first meeting he took to mapmaking to refute any implication of backwardness 
to Dera Ghazi Khan, in our second meeting, his turn to map-making was foregrounded by the 
declaration that Dera Ghazi Khan was a city, ‘worth seeing’. What made this second, spontaneous turn 
to mapmaking even more interesting was that it was completely unrelated to the conversation we 
had been having until then. This time, he segued from a conversation about Partition violence in the 
district – including the story of a Hindu friend’s forced conversion and circumcision – to mapmaking. 
He moves from nostalgically remembering the administrative acumen of the British Empire to 
remembering how Dera Ghazi Khan was a city unlike any other. 
R: They circumcised him. They circumcised him at a big age. He was already married and they 
made him a Muslim. Fed him meat44. Then when the Dogra military arrived, finish. Not Dogra, 
Gorkha45. They spread throughout the village, the Muslims got scared. They would shoot at 
sight, anyone they saw rioting. So because of that rioting immediately stopped in Dera Ghazi 
Khan. They were coming by horse-trains, and he [Superintendent of Police Durrant] spread 
them throughout the zilla [district]. At our place there were ten men [Gorkha soldiers]. No 
                                                            
44 Forced conversion rituals such as this, during the Partition, involved the circumcision of Hindu and Sikh men 
as well as the force-feeding of beef. We may connect this to my previous discussion, in the Introduction, about 
violence and the body. 
45 There is some ambiguity around this as at a later point he refers to them as the Baloch military. 
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one had seen these Gorkhas before, I had also not seen them before, Nepalese. Gorkha are 
Nepalese. Because of that the district was majorly saved. There had never been Hindu-Muslim 
riots before. Neither had anyone’s girls been [abducted and raped]. Utterly magnificent, the 
city was also utterly magnificent, Dera Ghazi Khan. It was a city worth seeing. I have not seen 
a city like that here. 
PK: What was so different about it? 
R [asks for paper and pen and begins drawing]: This was the Dera Ghazi Khan bazar. It was the 
centre. This was a park. Very big. Inside this was an office of the Municipal Committee, very 
big. [Pauses to draw] This road went like this. And on this side of it were by-lanes. There was 
a second road like this. There was a market here. And families lived behind it. [Speaking slowly] 
This was the market. This is where the families lived. This was the third [block]. This was the 
fourth. This was the fifth. This was the sixth. Here in the sixth [block] was the Muslim market. 
[…] Here the Muslim families were more. There was a leather market here. Not shoes and all, 
animal skins. Do you understand animal skins? Cow, buffalo dies, cattle dies, theirs. […] But 
they did not make good leather there. Yes, they did make some, we used to wear shoes made 
from it, and in this market there was a shop. In the whole district. In the whole city, Flex 
company was there. [Pause, bringing his attention back to the map] And… [Points at a vacant 
spot on the map] I don’t remember what was here. [Pause, points at the place beside it] There 
was a bank here. There was only one bank there. Punjab National Bank. In the whole city. This 




Figure 1.10: The second map drawn by Rajaram. The labelling is in my handwriting and was dictated 
by him.  
In this way, Rajaram drew two maps of Dera Ghazi Khan on two separate occasions. Narrated in the 
structure of an itinerary, Rajaram’s map not only delineates the lay of the land, but through this act of 
delineation, recalls the rhythm of everyday life; a history of space. Like Dayaram, Rajaram’s map 
emerges as a ‘speech act’ or ‘act of enunciation’ (de Certeau, 1984: 119). Speaking of these places 
moves him to remember the rhythm of everyday life in Dera Ghazi Khan.  
Rajaram’s stories give us an insight into the tense, yet somewhat syncretic nature of life in Choti 
Zareen. We glimpse the plurality of this society through his stray references to aspects of everyday 
life. For example, pointing at the local gurudwara on the map, he tells us that this building was used 
as both a temple and a gurudwara by the village’s Hindus and Sikhs. Similarly, drawing Ghazi Ghat – 
the place for crossing the River Indus – on the map led to remembering the seasonal variation in the 
method of river crossing: boat bridges in the winter, steamers in the summer. Speaking of the boat 
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bridges led to remembering other modes of transport, which in turn led to memories of other routes 
and places.  
‘There were not as many cars there, we had horses. Every rich household owned horses. […] 
We had two horses. Our business was of cloth. We had two shops of cloth, in one myself and 
my [paternal] grandfather sat and in the other, my uncle and father sat. We had land as well. 
Which one? The kind in which you grow wheat, rice, etc. There was no proper [residential] 
colony there. Some people from our city, this is our River Indus is it not, from here another 
river diverged. This was called Dariya-e-Manka46. This, from here till here, was a barrage [dam] 
on this [draws a line across the canal]. Okay! From here, after crossing this barrage here, like 
this, then this [road] would lead to our city [traces the road to illustrate the route]. This road 
would lead straight to the end of the district.’ 
Unlike Dayaram, whose Dera Ghazi Khan was a haunting mirage of a half-forgotten childhood, 
Rajaram’s Dera Ghazi Khan was a rich universe populated by a host of characters. Rajaram had fond 
memories of the friends he had made in his youth. His stories of the friendships and amorous 
relationships between Hindus and Muslims paint a fascinatingly complex landscape of plurality, 
antagonism and even, ‘pollution’. And so, as we wandered through the map he had drawn, we began 
to encounter the people to whom his roots were connected. Foremost among these was his memory 
of his former lover, Matto.  
 
 
Purity and Corruption: Memories of Matto 
Almost every turn, every route in Rajaram’s map seemed to lead to Matto. This connection was 
foregrounded by Rajaram himself. When asked whether he ever finds himself thinking about the 
Partition in his everyday life, he began to talk about the relationships that the Partition had 
interrupted. 
                                                            
46 While Rajaram calls it Dariya-e-Manka, suggesting that it is a river, Google Maps reveals that the Manka is 
actually a canal that runs right through the city of Dera Ghazi Khan. The Manka Canal is the same canal that 
Dayaram mentioned in his narratives. In my MPhil thesis I had written about how my informants fondly 
recalled having spent many a Sunday swimming in the canal’s refreshing water and enjoying the fare of street 
food on offer there (Kohli, 2015).  
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‘What had to happen, happened. I remember some people, but that has nothing to do with 
the Partition, that’s a personal thing. […] I remember Matto, I remember Lallu Khan. I 
remember Tahir. I remember Ghulam Hussein. I remember a lot of my friends. I remember 
Rahim Baksh. His mother’s immense love for me, the way his wife would do aadaab47 when 
our paths happened to cross, all this I remember. But this has nothing do with this, with 
Partition. These are personal relationships.’ 
Matto was a Muslim woman whom Rajaram had dated before his marriage. Even though it had been 
71 years since he had last seen her, she still held a very special place in his heart. She was inextricably 
linked to his memories of district Dera Ghazi Khan. The first time Rajaram spoke of Matto, he did so in 
a nondescript way; cautiously gauging my interest. ‘There was one thing that happened in Dera Ghazi 
Khan that is worth noting,’ Rajaram remarked, soon after he had drawn a substantial part of his first 
map. When I expressed my interest, he picked up his pen and started drawing again. He re-introduced 
me to Choti Zareen, and told me about a big hospital just outside the village. This route was the first 
of many that led to Matto.  
R: Here, there was a big hospital. All the people who lived in the mountains or in the nearby 
farms, they had all come there. Some had relatives. Others had filled up the dharamshala 
[spiritual dwelling]. People used to send them home-cooked food [to help out]. But the 
hospital was quite far away, over here. [Points on the map to give me an idea of the distance] 
No Hindus would go there except the Arya Samajis. The Arya Samajis would go and help the 
people who came from outside – cut-up, beaten – with food and drink. I’ll tell you something 
personal. I do not know whether you would like to note this, in this [points at my Dictaphone] 
or not.’ 
PK: Tell me, do not worry about that. 
R: I was 18 years old. A woman had become infatuated with me, a Muslim. Her name was 
Matto. Whenever I would return home from my shop, on the way her… she… was a slave. The 
Nawab was her master. She would stay there at night. There was a shed, she would grab me 
and sit there. I would get annoyed. One day I told her, “Matto I’m engaged. My dada is still 
alive.” My dada was 6 feet tall. And he was quite hefty, meaning he would hit me… She said, 
Matto said “No. Your dada knows you and he knows me.” Okay, I’ll tell you one thing. Maybe 
you will say this is not possible but… [Pause] Matto and I did not have a sexual relationship. I 
                                                            
47 A manner of greeting. 
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told Matto, Matto said – you understand a bit of Urdu? Matto said your dada will say nothing 
because niyat saaf. Do you understand niyat saaf? Niyat saaf, mohabbat pak. Understood? 
The phrase, ‘Niyat saaf, mohabbat pak’, translates to, ‘Clean intentions, pure love.’ These words of 
Matto had left a deep impact on him. This was something of a motto for his relationship with Matto. 
Almost every time he spoke of Matto, he recalled these words. And, whenever he repeated this 
phrase, he would always reiterate that the love he and Matto had shared had been pure and free from 
the ‘corruption’ of sex.  
Returning to the story he had begun about the hospital, he said that one evening he and two other 
Arya Samaj volunteers were returning from the hospital in the evening when they ran into Matto. 
Matto was talking to Ghulam Azad jath48. ‘We were coming, so Ghulam Azad [upon seeing them] said, 
“Look kafir49 are coming.” […] “Kafir are coming, killing them is Shabbat50.”’ When Matto heard this, 
she intervened on Rajaram’s behalf. Matto reminded Ghulam Azad that in the past Rajaram had 
helped him out in his times of need. However, unmoved by this, Ghulam Azad bluntly declared that 
Rajaram is a kafir and must be killed. Hearing this, Matto tried to restrain Ghulam Azad by grabbing 
him from behind, pinning both his arms to his sides. As he described the scene, Rajaram showed me 
how Matto had grabbed Ghulam Azad.  
‘Matto grabbed him and said, “Rajaram, run.” He [Azad] had drawn an axe with the intention 
to kill, the axe fell. […] So Ghulam Azad was of short stature, she was strong, he was strong 
too but she was very strong, he kicked and Matto fell. But Matto did not let go. […] Matto – 
that coward [Azad] – he grabbed Matto by her hair and hit her against the axe. The axe had a 
[flat] side, had it been like this [indicates the sharp side of the axe] she would have died, would 
have been cut.’   
In the ensuing struggle, Rajaram and his two companions managed to safely escape Ghulam Azad’s 
wrath. Rajaram next saw Matto four days after the incident. Recalling the scene, he said, she had been 
bandaged in 4-5 places. They sat together in their usual spot and she told him her side of the story. 
She said that she continued to struggle even after Ghulam Azad hit her against the axe. During all this, 
she lost consciousness at some point, but only after having made sure that Rajaram and his friends 
had managed to get away. He ended his story by saying, ‘Matto made a big sacrifice for me. I 
                                                            
48 A jath, Rajaram explained, is someone who looks after camels.  
49 Arabic word for infidel or nonbeliever. 
50 His usage of this Hebrew word in this context is highly interesting. Shabbat is the Jewish day for ‘cessation’ 
or ‘peace’. Ghulam Azad/Haider’s usage of the word here implies that killing the ‘kafir’ Rajaram would be a 
sort of ‘holy’, ritually sanctioned service to God. 
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remember Matto even today. Our, that… connection, no sex.’ When I asked him, whether he had 
loved her, he replied that they had both loved each other. ‘And she made a sacrifice for me. Saved 
two people. This was a test of her purity, which she passed. […] How many years have passed, I still 
remember her, she is still alive in my heart.’ 
That was the last time Rajaram saw Matto. The ethnonational tensions visible in the story – particularly 
the reference to injured villagers sheltering in Choti’s hospital – indicate that this incident occurred 
around the time of the Partition. Rajaram was quite fond of telling this story and narrated it to me a 
number of times. Both times that Rajaram drew the map, he told me about Matto and how she had 
saved his life.  
In his memories of Matto, Rajaram repeatedly emphasised the ‘purity’ of their romance. According to 
Rajaram, it was the absence of sex that made their love pure. Rajaram established Matto’s purity by 
contrasting her with other Muslim women he had encountered in Dera Ghazi Khan. In this way, even 
as other routes on his maps evoked the retelling of other stories, they always ended with assertions 
of Matto’s ‘purity’. According to Rajaram, Matto was an exceptionally ‘pure’ woman in a society where 
Muslim women were largely ‘corrupt’. Rajaram said, ‘Now look, one woman [Matto], when Muslim 
women were sasti [cheap/loose], over there, some people would also loaf around with them, and 
scoundrels… Two women even tried a lot. Tried a lot. Three did.’  
Throughout the many hours we spent together, Rajaram told me about other women who had made 
advances on him, in his youth. He told me the story of a friend’s wife who had allegedly tried to force 
herself on him, offering to ‘educate him’ about sex prior to his wedding night. Rajaram claimed that 
she was a known adulterer and that his friend, her husband, divorced her soon after this incident. 
Rajaram also told me about Chander Dayi, a Muslim mid-wife who had made advances on him. In his 
retelling of the story, Rajaram presented himself as the unwitting victim of her ‘corrupt’ sexual 
advances. Speaking of the incident, Rajaram said that, ‘Chander Dayi was extremely beautiful. I did 
not know that she was corrupt.’ According to Rajaram, Chander Dayi had made advances on him 
shortly after he had dropped her home, following the successful delivery of his nephew. Recounting 
the moment when he denied her advances, he touched both his ears with his hands, in a colloquial 
gesture made in response to contact with sin, pollution or dirt.  
In another conversation, while talking about Matto, he mentioned that there was another woman in 
Matto’s neighbourhood who had shown an interest in him. He said that she had complained to Matto 
about how he would not give her any attention. When Matto scolded him for doing that, he replied, 
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‘I told Matto that she only wants to have sex with me. I will not do it. […] I explained it to her patiently, 
I said I’m about to get married, I’ll get maligned.’ Thereafter, Matto scolded her and told her to stay 
away from Rajaram.  
In this way, Rajaram racialised the sexuality of Muslim women, presenting them as the source of a 
malevolent ‘corruption’. Rajaram’s consistent use of the word ‘corruption’ in relation to Muslim 
women was a stark contrast to his use of the honorific ‘devi’ (goddess) when referring to Hindu women 
(with the exception of Matto). This was starkly visible in an exchange where Rajaram told me about 
his uncle’s Muslim mistress. This came up in a conversation where Rajaram claimed the total absence 
of sexual violence in Dera Ghazi Khan. ‘Had it [rape] happened in our city, they would have been shot. 
In our place, women were highly respected. There was corruption in Muslims. But there was no rape 
there,’ he said. When I asked him what he meant by ‘corruption’, he told me that his paternal uncle 
had ‘maintained’ a Muslim woman on his lands as a mistress. Explaining further, he added, ‘Corruption 
like this was there. Not that everyone in our city had kept [a mistress] like that. Then my grandfather 
got upset and forced him to give it up.’ It is somewhat revealing that he identifies the mistress (and 
not his uncle) as the source of ‘corruption’. 
Against this backdrop of ‘corruption’, Rajaram presented Matto as a beacon of virtue. For instance, he 
was quite fond of quoting a dialogue that Matto had once said on the status of their relationship. 
Matto had said, ‘It is not necessary that you [Rajaram] and I have sex. That is not our love. So khuda 
mohabbat-e-mohabbat khuda.’ This chiasmic proverb translates to, ‘God is love and love is God’. ‘She 
was illiterate but she still impressed me,’ Rajaram added. In a similar vein, he remarked another time 
that, ‘over there, there were all kinds of people. None were like Matto. Muslims, mostly, were corrupt 
women. I met one goddess, Matto.’ Matto was constructed as a ‘pure’ woman with a ‘pure’, asexual 
love. To some extent, his repeated emphasis on the asexual nature of their romance could be seen as 
an attempt to justify their relationship in the context of its time. In addition to belonging to different 
religions (and ethnonationalist communities) they were also separated by a stark class difference. 
Moreover, some of his stories imply that he kept in touch with Matto even after his engagement and 
marriage.  
Rajaram’s misogynist and xenophobic discourses in this context are evocative of Mary Douglas’ (1984) 
work on dirt as matter out of place. Douglas (ibid.) argues that the idea of pollution serves as an 
analogy for the social order. Rajaram’s discourses on sexuality perform a function of boundary-
maintenance; even if only retrospectively. In consistently representing Muslim women, through their 
sexuality, as ‘corrupt’, Rajaram explicitly brands them a sexual danger. The implication is not of 
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physical danger but a social danger: that of the unwanted admixture or dilution of social hierarchies. 
After all, as Douglas observes, ‘Patterns of sexual danger can be seen to express symmetry or 
hierarchy’ (ibid.: 3). It is this order or symmetry that their sexuality is seen to be threatening.  
Consequently, Rajaram consistently associates celibacy with purity. On a basic level, in reference to 
his affair with Matto, the ‘purity’ implied by celibacy could be seen as a defence against any implication 
of a moral transgression. But on a deeper level, celibacy implies purity precisely because it pre-empts 
the possibility of admixture; of matter being out of place. Celibacy prohibits sexual and bodily pollution 
and thereby maintains the boundaries and hierarchies that compose the social order. Celibacy, in this 
context, serves not only as a mark of the ‘purity’ of Rajaram and Matto’s love but also the precondition 
that enables it. It is only once he has denied any possibility of sexual pollution that he can speak about 
his love for Matto.   
Rajaram’s discourses on celibacy are also evocative of the cultural meanings of celibacy within the 
discourses of Hinduism and Hindu nationalism. These go beyond the obvious association of sex with 
sin; a near-universal moralisation. For example, Rajaram credited his Arya Samaji education for his 
‘self-control’. Once, when talking about the various women who had made advances on him in his 
youth, he remarked, ‘When women offer [sex] then it becomes very difficult to escape.’ An awkward 
silence followed as I pondered an appropriate response. Deciding to humour him, I replied, ‘But you 
managed to save yourself every time.’ ‘That is because of the Arya Samaj’, he replied. As stated 
previously, Rajaram had been an active member of the Arya Samaj for 79 years; having been 
introduced to the organisation at the age of 12. As a Hindu ‘reformist’ movement, the Arya Samaj has 
been instrumental in fostering a Hindu nationalist consciousness, in north India (especially Punjab), 
since the 1880s (Gundimeda and Ashwin, 2018; van der Veer, 1994). 
In this and other conversations about celibacy, Rajaram associated it with not just ‘purity’ but also 
‘strength’: both moral and physical. This discourse is evocative of the significance accorded to asexual 
or celibate masculinity within Hinduism; especially the strict patriarchal morality of the Arya Samaj. 
Celibacy and abstinence are considered important virtues in Hinduism while the brahmachari (celibate 
ascetic) man is often celebrated as the ideal Hindu man (Bacchetta, 2019). A brahmchari is not celibate 
merely for the sake of celibacy, but instead, his celibacy is the mark of the ‘purity’ of his resolve 
towards a noble task. 
Celibacy also appears prominently in the Hindu nationalist thought of the RSS. Leading RSS ideologues 
such as Golwalkar and Hegdewar imagined the Hindu citizen-body in purely masculine terms, as: ‘the 
men born in the land of Bharat [India]’ and ‘sons of the soil’ (ibid.: 382). In this way, the nation is 
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imagined solely as a ‘fraternity of men’ (McClintock, 1995). For the RSS, homosexuality is a threat due 
to its alleged disruption of homosocial male comradery (Bacchetta, 2019). However, interestingly, the 
operative binary here is not between hetero- and homo- sexuality but between a-sexuality and 
sexuality (ibid.). After all, for the RSS, the ideal Hindu man is a brahmachari- an asexual ascetic that 
severs all familial bonds in order to serve the Hindu nation and society (ibid.). This is an insight I return 
to in Chapter 2, as I point out the similarities between my informants’ discourses on sacrifice, hard 
work and masculinity and Modi’s image as a brahmachari.  
Therefore, Rajaram’s continuous insistence on the ‘purity’ of his love for Matto is an effort at 
boundary-maintenance that draws on the internalised Hindu nationalist discourses of the Arya Samaj 
and RSS. There is also an unmistakeable tinge of Hindu nationalism in Rajaram’s description of the 
sexuality of Muslim women as corrupt. It bears a similarity to the work of Kalpana Kannabiran (1996) 
who has argued elsewhere that Hindu nationalist discourses about the promiscuity of Muslim women 
are part of a larger discursive pattern that establishes consent where none exists. In the long run, this 
discourse serves to justify their own sexual violence and moral transgressions against Muslim women 
(ibid.). Establishing the promiscuity and moral ‘corruption’ of Muslim women is equally a discourse of 
victimhood. Like Rajaram’s stories about ‘corrupt’ and ‘loose’ women, this discourse presents Hindu 




The Final Memories of Lallu Khan and Rahim Baksh 
Just as his final meeting with Matto remained his most vivid memory of her, Rajaram similarly 
remembered the last times he had met his other friends Lallu Khan and Rahim Baksh. As he drew these 
maps of his abandoned homeland, these emotional farewells emerged out of its tangents. Having 
drawn the hospital beside which he last saw Matto, he returned to Chotti Zareen and began telling 
me about the ‘shandaar’ (grand) people he had known there. Remembering Lallu Khan, Rajaram told 
me that he was a dear friend of his father’s and had been like an uncle to him.  
The last time Rajaram saw Lallu Khan was shortly after the violence in Choti. By then, Rajaram, his 
wife, and two other siblings had moved to Dera Ghazi Khan city; temporarily separating from the rest 
of their family. When Lallu Khan heard that Rajaram’s family was about to migrate to India, he drove 
out to Dera Ghazi Khan to meet Rajaram. The story of their last meeting is especially poignant. 
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Confronted with the gloom of their inevitable separation the two men share a memorable last meal 
together. 
‘He [Lallu Khan] knocked on our door. My wife asked me, “Who is it?” […] There, in our place, 
we used to observe the purdah. During the day, husband-wife could not speak to each other. 
[…] I said, “It’s Lallu Khan.” She went inside. He came, I touched his feet. He was overcome 
with emotion. [Voice drops to a whisper] I said, “Chacha 2-3 of us brothers are here.” He said, 
“Alright, now you can’t come to Choti, but I can come to your house.” He sat with us, had 
food. He had brought two bottles of ghee51. He said, I didn’t bring chicken because you don’t 
eat. And he brought a thaan52 of cloth. I asked him, “Why did you bring this, chacha?” He said, 
“I didn’t know whether you would have any clothes left or not in the journey. You can get 
these stitched.” We had a house, he sat for some time, ate food, then he said, “Rajaram, its 
night now, I’ll go.” […] When he was about to leave, she [wife] came out and placed her head 
on his feet. He gave her dua, after that I went to see him off. So he hugged me, I saw he had 
a long car, white, in that his tears were shimmering, falling like pearls. With great difficulty I 
met his eyes, he was crying. There was so much love. Between Hindu and Muslim. I’ll tell you 
another thing about our town. Those who had Muslim friends, during Eid, the one that has 
just gone by [Eid-ul-Fitr], vermicelli, desi ghee, jaggery or sugar, they would bring to our home. 
That day, we would make and feast on sawaiyan. Okay. On Diwali, we would give them […] 
one kilo dal.’ 
Lallu Khan’s thoughtful gifts to Rajaram (clarified butter and cloth) reflect his awareness of the difficult 
conditions that Partition refugees were being forced to endure at the time. Yet, despite the inter-faith 
unity symbolised by this, there are subtle allusions to ethnonational tensions. For example, when 
Rajaram talks about how Muslim and Hindu friends would exchange gifts of food during Eid and Diwali, 
he mentions that Muslims would gift them the raw materials to make sawaiyan (vermicelli). This is 
because Hindus considered Muslims mleccha (foreign or impure) and would not eat food cooked by 
Muslims (Kohli, 2015). Food or water, cooked or even touched by Muslims would be considered 
‘contaminated’ or ‘impure’ (ibid.). However, if Muslims brought the raw materials to Hindus, and the 
dish was then cooked by Hindus, then it would be considered fit for consumption (ibid.). These Hindu 
concerns around untouchability and ‘contamination’, even in the midst of festivities, are evidence of 
                                                            
51 Clarified butter 
52 A ‘thaan of cloth’ is a bundle of unstitched cloth. 
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the subtle stratifications and hierarchies that characterised pre-Partition society. This practice finds a 
mention even in the works of Ian Talbot (2006) and van der Veer (1994).  
Rajaram’s final encounter with Rahim Baksh conjures a moving scene, similar to his final encounter 
with Lallu Khan.  
‘When the riots occurred, I had a full beard. […] That time my hair had grown out as well. My 
friend Rahim Baksh was a barber. I said, I’m going to Rahim Baksh’s house. My dadi said, there 
are Muslim houses en-route. Even the army is not there now. I told my dadi not to worry, no 
one will kill me. [...] No one could go to Rahim Baksh’s house. He had captured it. He had a 
seating outside, whoever came sat there to talk. I knocked on the door. Rahim Baksh came, 
he opened the door. Closed it. I went inside. His wife- in their culture they don’t touch feet. 
When she saw me, aadaab. […] I reciprocated the greeting. […] She put two paranthas on the 
tandoor, put butter. Plate in hand. I ate it. When I was returning, we came outside, Rahim 
Baksh escorted me back home. Dadi sat him down. “Come Rahim-ba, it’s been ages since you 
came. Sit.” The big khajoor [date] I was telling you about, we brought that out, served with 
buttermilk. When he was about to leave, Rahim Baksh started crying. I asked, “What’s the 
matter Rahim Baksh?” He said, “You will leave. Where will I find such love? This love from 
dadi.” So there the relations were good. And in this regard I was quite advanced, I was friends 
with everyone.’   
It is precisely because of the violence of the Partition and simmering tensions that predated it, that 
Rajaram’s stories of life in Dera Ghazi Khan, provide a fascinating glimpse into an eroding syncretic 
culture. Against the context of the Hindu practice of untouchability against Muslims, Rajaram’s stories 
of the last meals he shared with Lallu Khan and Rahim Baksh take on a symbolic significance that goes 
beyond the mere act of breaking bread. These stories memorialise a sense of equality and provide a 
final glimpse into a society that had not been completely polarised despite the chaos of the Partition. 
There is something hauntingly beautiful about these lingering afterimages of friendship amid the 
collapse of a nomos.  
 
Conclusion 
Rajaram’s maps of Dera Ghazi Khan comprise ‘speech acts’ or ‘acts of enunciation’ as theorised by de 
Certeau (1984: 119). These maps do not provide the lay of the land in a Cartesian sense, but comprise 
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a ‘rhetoric of walking’ (ibid.: 99). Told in the structure of an itinerary – a route – these maps paint an 
elaborate picture of a social world. In remembering his youth through the spatial metaphor of a map, 
his maps comprise a memorialisation of space and a spatialisation of memory. As I have emphasised 
throughout this ethnographic vignette, Rajaram’s stories provide a glimpse into the specificities of 
pre-Partition Punjab. His stories portray both the intimacy of some inter-faith relationships whilst also 
providing a glimpse into the hierarchies and tensions that simmered beneath them. 
In concluding this vignette, I want to focus briefly on Rajaram’s politics. Thus far we have seen that 
Rajaram had a number of Muslim friends – and his former lover Matto – whom he remembered fondly. 
Yet, this nostalgia for his former friends was complicated by Rajaram’s views on Partition high politics. 
Rajaram believed that Mahatma Gandhi’s hunger strikes in 1947 – an attempt to restore communal 
harmony to north India – ‘spoilt’ and ‘reversed’ the work of the Partition. Rajaram went so far as to 
say that it would have been better had all Muslims left India in 1947. Such views seemed an escalation 
of his categorisation of Muslim women as ‘corrupt’. 
However, despite the similarity of this formulation to the politics of the BJP, Rajaram disliked Modi – 
he considered him a ‘foul man’ – and considered modern-day cow vigilantes ‘murderers’ who had no 
actual respect for traditional Hindu values of cow protection. Yet, Rajaram agreed with the Arya Samaj 
and RSS’ core philosophy of the protection of cows. All that he left undefined was what cows needed 
to be protected from. Some of his views on the matter indicated that his idea of cow protection was 
closer to that of ‘care’. But even as he spoke of cow protection, he vehemently disagreed with the 
violent methods of contemporary cow-vigilantes. There was no doubt in his mind that these men were 
murderers. 
Rajaram also denounced the Two-Nation Theory and expressed his sympathy for the plight of Muslims 
who were driven out of India by Hindu and Sikh mobs. The latter was a significant acknowledgement 
of the violence by his own community during the Partition. However, this rare acknowledgement was 
itself undermined by his denial of any kind of ‘communal’ violence in Gurgaon. He claimed – falsely – 
that Gurgaon had not seen any kind of looting or bloodshed during the Partition. But at another 
moment he elegiacally remarked that before the Partition, the three-storey building opposite his shop 
had been an Idgah: a plot of land reserved for offering Eid prayers. In doing so, he exhibited the 
contradictory state of ‘knowing and not-knowing’ characteristic of denial (Cohen, 2001). After all, the 
denial of something paradoxically requires knowledge of it (ibid.).  
Such dissonant perspectives feature in the narratives of most Partition survivors. The apparent tension 
between my informants’ nostalgia for their abandoned homelands and childhood friends and the 
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burning desire for revenge is the focus of my analysis in Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, I explore the tension 
between these two seemingly dissonant perspectives as I explore the meaning of healing in the 
aftermath of the Partition.  
I want to conclude this vignette by remembering a moment that brought Rajaram’s ambiguous and 
contradictory feelings about the Partition to the fore. This moment occurred during our second 
meeting, on July 14, 2018. Rajaram had just finished narrating a story in relation to his map. A 
momentary silence took hold as we both pondered the words we had just exchanged. Feeling a bit 
fidgety, I turned back to the map he had just drawn. Pointing at a dot on the map, I idly asked, ‘You 
were saying your city was here, na?’ 
After a brief pause he said, ‘Our… Hindu-Muslim riots never happened there. There were no Christians 
in our district. In Dera Ghazi Khan. There were Sikhs. In the village Hindus would pray in the gurudwara. 
And there were Hindu-Muslim friendships.’  
Completely unrelated to my question, his reply took me by surprise. Looking up from the map, I asked, 
‘After coming here, you did not make any friends amongst the Muslims here…?’ 
He did not respond immediately. Instead, his hands went up to his eyes. His eyes had begun tearing 
up. He removed his glasses with one hand and wiped a tear out of his eye with the other. On the verge 
of breaking down, he did not answer me at all. He did not need to. In that moment, the Partition had 




1.7. The Rhetoric of Blame: The Story of Sohan Chand’s Map 
 
‘The biggest blunder, write this in the end, in this, the biggest blunder that has happened from Pandit 
Nehru, from Jawaharlal Nehru Prime Minister is […] Hindu officials and Muslim officials were 
transferred prior to the transferring of subjects.’ 
Sohan Chand 
 
I met Sohan Chand through the Adlakhas; my grandaunt Anjali’s close friends and neighbours. The 
Adlakhas were extremely active within the All India Mianwali District Association. The All India 
Mianwali District Association was formed by Partition refugees from the Mianwal district of Pakistan. 
A similar organisation called the All India Derawal Sahayak Sabha (volunteer assembly), had been 
formed by Partition refugees who were ethnic Derawals: geographic and cultural neighbours of the 
Mianwalis. Once pivotal in resettling their people, these organisations were now largely social and 
cultural spaces for the first and second generations of Partition survivors.  
Mr Adlakha was well placed within the organisation’s national committee as well as their local Rajouri 
Garden branch. Mrs Adlakha, on the other hand, was involved with the publication of the association’s 
monthly gazette. Thus, while the Adlakhas had only been infants at the time of the Partition, they 
knew a number of Partition survivors. The Adlakhas knew Sohan Chand through the Mianwali District 
Association. Sohan Chand lived in Ballabgarh and was a prominent figure in the association’s 
Ballabgarh branch. Ballabgarh is a small town 10 kilometres south of Faridabad. Sohan Chand had 
spent his life working as a government school teacher. Now retired, he split his time between the 
Mianwali Association and his responsibilities as the administrator of a local ashram53.  
I met Sohan Chand in August 2017, in his office in the ashram. Sohan Chand was about my height with 
a thin, bony build. He had a long face and hard set eyes that rarely softened enough to smile. He 
dressed like a retired civil servant, pairing plain half-sleeve shirts with khakhi or grey trousers. During 
the period that I knew him, Sohan Chand maintained a carefully grown shikha54; a sign of his religiosity 
and caste identity.  
                                                            
53 A religious retreat comparable to a monastery.  
54 The practice of shaving off the entire head except a single lock or tuft of hair, which is then allowed to grow 
indefinitely. This is done generally by Brahmans and related sub-castes for religious purposes. It is believed to 
attract ‘positive cosmic energy’.  
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His office was located in a large room which was also used on occasion, as a multi-purpose hall. The 
area around Sohan Chand’s desk was flush with the iconography of Hindu gods and goddesses. This 
included the idols of Hindu deities, religious posters and a wall calendar featuring deities. Hanging on 
the wall beside his desk was a large poster of the Arya Samaj ideologue Swami Vivekananda. 
Meanwhile, directly behind Sohan Chand hung a map of Mianwali district and the surrounding 
countryside. This map had been made by Sohan Chand himself. A note at the bottom of the map 





Figure 1.11: Sohan Chand’s map of district Mianwali and its neighbouring districts. The bottom-right 
corner of the map originally contained Sohan Chand’s real name. I have digitally modified this part of 
the picture to preserve his anonymity. 
 
Sohan Chand’s map resembles a map one might find in old publications. It looks like a cyclostyled, 
canvas-printed version of a hand drawn map. The borders of the districts in the map have been drawn 
by estimation, while, the wilfully meandering outline of the River Indus struggles to conform to the 
borders of the districts located on its banks. The map has an interesting spatial organisation too. While 
the map’s title indicates that district Mianwali (as on 1947) is the focus of the map, the map in fact 
depicts the districts which bordered Mianwali on the western bank of the River Indus: Dera Ghazi 
Khan, Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu and Kohat. The district and city of Mianwali lie on the eastern bank of 
the River Indus. In this map, Mianwali, along with the other prominent towns of the district such as 
Isakhel, Aluwall and Piplan appear only as minor features. Daryakhan, the town which Sohan Chand 
hails from, is placed just off the centre of the map. Interestingly, the map omits the eastern border of 
the district, choosing instead to focus only on the towns that lay on the railway line which ran north 
to south, along the eastern bank of the River Indus.      
In this section, I argue that Sohan Chand’s map of his abandoned homeland constitutes a symbolic 
rebellion against the Partition. Although Sohan Chand’s map had been drawn from memory, unlike 
Dayaram and Rajaram, his map was not drawn spontaneously in an interview. However, Sohan Chand 
was not interested in talking about the map or discussing the geography of Mianwali. He showed no 
interest in the questions I asked in that regard, rebuffing them as irrelevant. When I asked him 
whether he had made the map from memory, the answer I received was haughtily dismissive. ‘I know!’ 
he shouted, practically spitting the words acerbically in my face, ‘I know about everything [there].’ He 
similarly dismissed the other attempts I made at initiating a conversation about the map. His 
responses seemed to imply an element of common sense. To him, the turn to mapmaking seemed an 
obvious response to his experience of the Partition.  
Instead, it was the rhetoric of blame that most concerned him. Throughout the time we spent 
together, Sohan Chand continuously tried to draw my attention to the question of who was to blame 
for the Partition. Echoing the discourses of the Hindu Right, Sohan Chand saw the Partition and his 
victimhood, as the result of a 1200 year-old history of oppression by ‘Muslim invaders’. The map itself 
was a symbol of this. By memorialising the district borders and place names of his childhood, Sohan 
Chand’s map comprised a memorialisation of this sense of victimhood. This victimhood – and the 
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ressentiment it produced – was in turn articulated spatially; through this image of the land. In this way, 
the map simultaneously evoked his roots as well as the history that led to his displacement from it. 
This too was an act of enunciation; an articulation of his ‘roots’ and ‘routes’55.    
The rhetoric of blame that occupies Sohan Chand’s narrative was made explicit in the very beginning. 
Soon after he dismissed my interest in the map, he redirected my attention to what he considered a 
more suitable line of inquiry for my research. He said: 
‘The biggest blunder – write this in the end – in this [Partition], the biggest blunder that has 
happened from Pandit Nehru, from Jawaharlal Nehru Prime Minister is – now subjects 
[people] were exchanged that is fine, alright. Hindus came here, Muslims there. But, before 
this, before the subjects, before the creation of the state, officials of the Hindu, Hindu officials 
and Muslim officials were transferred prior to the transferring of subjects.’ 
Sohan Chand began his narration of his experience of the Partition with this quote and repeated it, at 
the end of it. In this way, his remembrance of the Partition was bracketed within what he identified 
as the reason for the violence of the Partition. This idea, that the violence of the Partition was the 
result of an administrative power-vacuum is one that one encounters routinely among Partition 
survivors as well as in literature.  
In one of the earliest surveys conducted on Partition violence in Punjab, the surveyor (and former 
bureaucrat) J Nanda observes the same. Nanda (1948: 29) remarks that, ‘The process of Partition in 
Punjab (and Bengal) involved the shuffling of personnel on communal lines in all ranks of the 
administration.’ According to him, this disturbed the delicate balance of communal power within the 
police (among other branches of the provincial administration) thus ensuring that officers stood to 
gain promotions and political favour in the newly created nation-states by aiding and abetting the 
dirty work of the Partition (ibid.). Nanda (ibid.: 29) also draws a parallel with the failure of the UN 
Partition Plan of Palestine, observing that the Partition Plan, ‘discretely omitted the setting up of a 
neutral police force strong enough for enforcing its division.’  
More recently, Yasmin Khan (2017a) has written about how the British Empire’s fast-tracked 
withdrawal from South Asia, in 1947, created a power vacuum that allowed genocidal violence to 
flourish. Khan (2017a, 2017b) also identifies Mountbatten’s lack of preparedness for the scale of the 
transfer of population, along with the organised violence of Hindu, Muslim and Sikh militias (and the 
                                                            
55 My use of the word ‘roots’ beside ‘routes’ is inspired by Sara Ahmed’s (1999) essay on narratives of 
migration, estrangement and belonging as a questions of one’s ‘roots’ vis-à-vis one’s ‘routes’. 
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complicity of the local police) as other major factors responsible for the scale of the violence. These 
arguments are supported by Zamindar (2007) whose ethnography observes the complicity of the 
police and the local administration in the displacement of Muslims from north India, during the 
Partition.  
I return to an examination of the representation of the violence of the Partition in Chapter 3. For now, 
I am interested in examining the significance of this discourse to the suffering of my informants. It is 
undeniable that ethnonational biases within the police exacerbated the Partition’s cycles of retributive 
violence. However, this discourse is itself part of the rhetoric of blame. As such, this discourse seeks 
to apportion blame and find causes for the unexplainable suffering that ensued. It is a form of theodicy 
that seeks salvation in the bureaucratic apparatus of the state.  
By bracketing the crux of his testimony within this insistence, Sohan Chand makes an important 
statement. He has no interest in quotidian acts of remembrance. It is justice he hungers for. This 
search for justice encapsulates the meaning he has drawn from his experience of the Partition. His 
remembrance of the Partition is made meaningful through his search for justice through the 
apportioning of blame. In the following section, I present a brief summary of Sohan Chand’s memories 
of the Partition. 
 
 
Sohan Chand’s Testimony 
Sohan Chand was born in 1932 in Daryakhan, Mianwali. Sohan Chand’s family was relatively wealthy 
at the time, having owned a substantial amount of agricultural land. According to Sohan Chand, 
Daryakhan had been both peaceful and prosperous before the Partition. The violence began when, on 
September 3, 1947, the Station House Officer in-charge of their town was abruptly transferred. As 
Sohan Chand said:  
‘[…] officials of the Hindu, Hindu officials and Muslim officials were transferred prior to the 
transferring of subjects. The result of this was that the Hindu officer who was sitting there, 
because of that fear, Muslims would be afraid [of him]. I’ll tell you one instance, Sardar Hari 
Singh was the SHO of our police station. Till the last moment if anything happened, if any strife 
occurred, he would go alone on a horse and fuck their mothers. Because of this Muslims were 
afraid of him. They were 87% we were only 13%. And we lived in the middle, in the city. In all 
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four directions there were Muslims upon Muslims. Khair anyhow56, the day he left from there, 
he boarded the Kundian Passenger [train], for Kundian Junction the Kundian Passenger would 
run from there in the evening at 4 o clock and at 6 o clock our gurudwara-temples were burnt 
down.’  
As the town went up in flames, the Baloch military was called in to suppress the violence. Yet, Sohan 
Chand remembered that the military acted in a partisan manner with some soldiers opening fire upon 
the town’s Hindus. Due to the scale of violence in Daryakhan, the town’s Hindus were moved to an ad 
hoc refugee camp that was established on the grounds of a temple. The military established a 
protective perimeter around the camp and installed sten guns on top of the temple. However, the 
following night, they were attacked by those very guns.  
‘At night the sten guns that had been installed on top of the temple for our protection, those 
sten guns fired on us. People ran helter-skelter, khair anyhow, my 3 dadas, grandfather- the 
middle one was my real, one was elder, one was younger. Younger was a Sikh, he had tied two 
turbans. He had hid his beard because Maharaja Patiala had done tit for tat, had taken revenge 
that if you send one train I will send two [pause] of corpses, of Muslims. So they [Muslims] 
had become against them, of Sikhs. Anyhow, he [granduncle] had picked up the boy here [his 
shoulder], the boy was small, the girl was bigger, she was holding his finger. But our dadi said 
look something is wrong, that guy who is approaching with a rifle from the guesthouse, he is 
British but he is in disguise. He had tied a blue-green tehmat and was wearing a kurta, he fired, 
he [granduncle] fell right there. His head bowed down to the ground like this, that boy 
escaped, the girl escaped- but the boy, the boy of 12-13 years he got caught in that, his entire 
skull was blown apart. How did his sister recognise him, by the Peshawari sandals- he was 
wearing them backwards.’   
Sohan Chand lost a granduncle and a cousin in that attack. Sohan Chand’s description of his 
granduncle’s corpse kneeling – almost reverentially, as if before a deity – immediately after being shot, 
imbues his death with a religious aura. It adds a degree of dignity to an otherwise gruesome death. 
Sohan Chand lost a number of close relatives during the Partition. One of his paternal aunts who was 
living with her husband in Ahluwaal in 1947, was murdered along with her entire family. Sohan 
Chand’s family learnt of their deaths a number of years after the Partition, through another family 
from Ahluwaal.  
                                                            
56 A transitional phrase he uses habitually. The word khair means ‘whatever’ or ‘anyway’.   
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Meanwhile, the night-time attack on Sohan Chand’s town, Daryakhan, was followed by more violence 
in the morning. This included murder, looting, arson and the abduction (and rape) of women. For the 
refugees in the temple-complex, their proximity to the military offered no respite either. Sohan Chand 
remembered a particularly cruel Subedar-Major (a military rank) who decided to subject the refugees 
to further humiliation.  
‘They opened the medical store of the university doctor, hakim [traditional healer] where they 
brought medicines, did cleaning-dressing [of wounds]. Then they made a request, the 
Subedar. […] At 7-7:30, at dawn, there was harsh sunlight, in our place. I told you there was 
no rainy season so despite being September the condition was bad. “Look bhai, whoever 
wants to convert, become a Muslim so they can keep sitting in the shade the rest can come in 
the sun.” [the Subedar-Major said] Clear Cut. Some of our families went, one Mehra family 
went. One or two other children went, khair anyhow.’ 
The Subedar-Major’s actions were contrasted by those of the Major in-charge of the troops. According 
to Sohan Chand, this Major was their only saving grace. Remembering him, Sohan Chand said, ‘God 
knows till the end we could not figure out whether that Major was Hindu or had been sent by God.’ 
Arriving the morning after his troops had opened fire on the temple-complex, the Major set about 
restoring discipline. He pulled up some of his men for the violence, and, personally led a contingent 
of troops that drove around the town and its neighbouring villages in an effort to ‘recover’ abducted 
women.  
Observing the complicity of his men in the violence, the Major decided that evacuation to Mianwali 
was the only way to ensure the safety of this refugee population. The refugees were packed into a 
cramped goods train that had been specially arranged for them. The Major along with some of his 
men, escorted the train across the troubled countryside. Converting his jeep into a railcar by removing 
the vehicle’s tyres – a unique feature of World War 2-era military jeeps – the Major provided their 
train with an armed escort. At the Shah Alam station, Sohan Chand’s train was attacked by a mob as 
some refugees disembarked from the train to find water. Although some refugees died in the attack, 
the military successfully fought off the mob.   
They reached the refugee camp close to Mianwali without any further incident. However, while 
entering the refugee camp, all of their valuables and possessions were seized by the soldiers who had 
been placed on duty. All that survived of their former wealth after that were some earrings that his 
aunt had hidden in his youngest cousin’s pockets. Sohan Chand does not remember how long they 
stayed in this camp, but it was sometime until they were evacuated to India.  
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Sohan Chand believed that it was during their stay at this camp that the Indian government was made 
aware of this humanitarian crisis. The result was the air-dropping of food into their camps and a swifter 
evacuation. Sohan Chand and his entire family once again had to endure a long train journey in an 
overcrowded compartment. Their final train journey was a harrowing encounter. They went without 
food and water for three days, as their train slowly made its way from Mianwali to Attari, India.  
‘Till 3 days, 72 hours I myself did not drink water. What else should I say? So from there as 
soon as our train started, once it reached Sargodha the military was changed. Gorkha military 
was assigned to us- Hindu military, specially for us. And Baloch military was sent back. There 
when we reached Lala Musa, so there […] in Lala Musa earlier also 1-2 trains had been 
slaughtered. So they made us lie down, everyone lay down. They would stop the train in the 
yard, lie down. We would be under control. In Sargodha. From Sargodha there was a daily 
connection to Lala Musa, Lala Musa Junction. Anyhow, we survived, nothing happened. Wires 
and all had been cut, from before from where trains had been slaughtered. From there the 
train moved. In Badami Bagh Lahore, you will wonder, we have ourselves had water where 
bones were dumped, corpses were dumped, from those fountains. Water… On the way in the 
train was the Baloch military, 1-1 glass of water from steam engine, coal engine locomotives 
were there. They gave us water from the locomotives, 1-1 glass for 10-10 rupees. […] Khair 
anyhow, then Badami Bagh, in Badami Bagh they would stop the train, then Attari came, Attari 
came, from there full... […] Now this was the happening in the middle, I have told you one 
tragedy the biggest blunder that comes to mind which is that government officials both Hindu 
and Muslim, instead of being sent first, instead of being transferred, should not have been 
sent before the subject. Had they been sent after the subject then some of this killing-
whatever could have been less.’  
Sohan Chand’s remarks about water describe not only the horrific conditions of their journey, but also 
articulate the humiliation of the experience of displacement. Having crossed the border at Attari, the 
family continued to the town of Bayana in the former Indian state of Bharatpur. Their family chose to 





Understanding the Map 
As stated previously, Sohan Chand bracketed his testimony within what he identified as the true cause 
of Partition violence: the premature transfer of civil servants. His remembrance of the Partition – of 
the deaths of his loved ones and the suffering (and humiliation) he endured during the Partition – is 
motivated by his desire for justice. In recounting his testimony to me, in this structure, he wants me 
to take up this issue. The monograph he expects from me is one that apportions blame to an act, an 
event, an institution, a person, something: a name towards which he can direct 70 years of fermented 
rage.  
Yet, Sohan Chand’s rage was not restricted to his experience of the Partition alone. For Sohan Chand, 
the Partition was merely the latest in what he saw as a thousand year long history of the oppression 
of Hindus by Muslims. For him, the Partition was short-hand for a much larger history of victimhood.  
Sohan Chand spontaneously spoke about this when asked whether he thought that the hatred 
unleashed by the Partition might one day lessen.  
PK: And this is what you were trying to tell me na that you do not want to pass on those 
feelings [of bitterness] to your children and the generations that follow? [Pause] But this 
hatred [of Muslims] linked to the Partition, that also you would like to limit to your 
generation? 
SC: Automatically this is bound to… It’s a time factor. Time automatically makes you forget. 
Forget or not, time on its own forgets.  
PK: Time does make you forget, time makes you forget everything. [Pause] So you think this 
hatred will lessen, going forward? 
SC: Arre, one thousand years they have committed atrocities, Muslims have, have ruled this 
country. Committed all manner of atrocities. So then this is nothing. [Pause] This is nothing. 
Thousands, thousands have been slaughtered, when Taimur-ling came, when Ahmed Shah 
Abdali came. This, that Aurangzeb what did he do? This, then, time buries itself, forgets. 
Where his earlier testimony singled out the premature transfer of civil servants as the cause for 
Partition violence, here he pins the blame on Muslims as a whole. I followed Sohan Chand’s oeuvre 
into history to get a fuller sense of his perspectives. When I asked him his opinion on recent comments 
from BJP leaders, wherein they called for the demolition of the Taj Mahal, he began by saying that he 
found these comments nonsensical. However, he also agreed with the rationale of this discourse, 
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arguing that most of India’s ‘Muslim monuments’ had been built on the site of demolished temples. 
Sohan Chand said: 
‘But this is true that they have demolished temples to build mosques, demolished temples to 
build tombs, all this has happened. But then this is also a heritage. […] But it is true that they 
demolished [temples] before building Qutub Minar, Jama Masjid also, Qutub Minar also, this 
is not how it should happen.’  
Thus, for Sohan Chand, the search for justice is not restricted to the Partition alone. Conceiving of the 
Partition as the result of a much broader history, the justice he seeks is also similarly broad. Sohan 
Chand’s burning desire for justice (and revenge) was also evident in his discourses on contemporary 
refugee populations. This discussion was indirectly related to his map in that it was a result of 
questions that his map provoked within me. Remembering the Partition underneath that map, I found 
myself continuously thinking about how being born outside the Indian state’s borders had affected his 
sense of identity. That is, as someone born outside the borders of India, in a time before the nation-
state had come into existence, in what ways did he conceive of himself as a member of the Indian 
nation? How did an individual older than the nation-state itself, conceive of his nationality? And, 
following on from that, had his experience as a refugee during the inception of this nation-state made 
him sympathetic to other similarly displaced people? Posing these questions that the map evoked, led 
to the following protracted discussion.  
PK: I had one or two more questions and then I won’t take any more of your time. [Pause and 
then suddenly with excitement] Yes, one very interesting thing about your story, you said that 
just before the Partition, there when Pakistan’s first Independence Day was celebrated that 
you were also a part of that celebration.  
SC: 14 August, on 14 August I was there. No… We did not know that Pakistan would be made 
that this would happen to us. Mahatma Gandhi in his talks had said that Pakistan would be 
created over my dead body. So that was our understanding that this would not happen to us, 
but it happened. 14 August day, Independent Pakistan Day, I, myself have celebrated. I had 
told you Shah Nawaz was Secretary of Muslim League and Ghulam Hussein was the President. 
Celebrated… We did not hope that this would happen to us.  
PK: So then what were the people of our community hoping for? That Pakistan would be 




SC: [softly] It would not come to this. 
PK: This much oppression would not happen. [Pause] Whatever happened was quite bad. Very 
bad. [Pause] And these fights over nations [I meant ethnonationalism] are ongoing, like 
Rohingya, look at that example. In Myanmar, there are so many Rohingya, they are being 
driven out, they are being killed. [Pause] These conflicts continue even today. [Long pause as 
I wait for a response] Are you following that situation of the Rohingyas? 
SC: [angrily retorts] What am I following? [Pause and asks confrontationally, tauntingly] What 
am I following? They are a burden on us. From all four directions these Muslims are crowding 
us, increasing-increasing [their] population, Jammu-Kashmir, in Jammu they have stuffed 
150,000 [Rohingya refugees]. Our own people that are about 300,000 are dumped there, over 
there, Kashmiri Brahman [Pandits], of the valley, in Jammu. 250,000-300,000 are dumped in 
Delhi, no one to ask about them. Now we must hug more of them [Muslims]! Whole 
Bangladesh, those that are in Bangladesh, Bangladeshi have come here. Rohingya are extra, 
the Myanmars have come, Burmese have come. They have spread everywhere and all the 
crime that is there, that is all from their hands. 
[Prolonged silence] 
PK: Yesterday I had gone to Rose Garden and there also I had found 2-4 people so I was talking 
to them about the Partition. And… So, they said something quite weird. They said that 
according to them, in Faridabad also next year there will be riots. I don’t know on what basis 
they said that but the situation is quite tense right now. 
SC: God will do good, whatever he says, God will do good. Bharat [India] has woken up 
somewhat, it will awaken, if God is with us then this century, twenty-first-century is ours, is 
our fathers’. Condition is if this government is allowed to stick around. [Pause] Because it is 
like this, till now we have been tolerating. Now when we want to bring our history to light, 
that what all oppressions have been committed against us [progressively more animated]. 
When Pakistan was created, they changed all the streets, cities named after Hindus and 
changed everything. And here we have pressed them against our chest. And now when we 
change one or two [place-names] then the snakes in their chest return. [Pause] So all this will 
happen, slowly-slowly it will happen. Literature will also be changed. 
Here, Sohan Chand constructs Rohingya and Bangladeshi refugees as threats to the Indian nation. He 
conceives their migration as merely the latest in a thousand-year long history of ‘foreign invasions’. 
He articulates the Hindutva discourse of victimhood, conceiving of himself (and by extension the Hindu 
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nation) as the victim of a thousand year old history of ‘Muslim aggression’. As stated previously, it is 
through this shared historical victimhood that the Hindu nation is given eternal form. Sohan Chand 
perceives the Hindu nation – and his own belonging within it – as the result of this shared victimhood. 
While the nation-state is a recent formation, the nation is considered an eternal fact; a seemingly 
natural formation constant through the centuries (Herzfeld, 1992). Because his sense of victimhood 
finds its roots in history, his search for justice – embodied in the rhetoric of blame – is also historically 
conceived. He wants justice not just for the excesses of the Partition but for a thousand year long 
history. In the process, it creates a sense of victimhood – a feeling of ressentiment – that imbues one’s 
own hatred and violence with the moral content of justice. 
Sohan Chand’s comments about the rising population of Muslims express fears of a conspiracy theory 
along the lines of the ‘great replacement’. As stated previously in the Introduction, these demographic 
anxieties are a staple of Hindu nationalism and are voiced not only by my informants but also by 
leaders of the BJP such as the Union Minister Giriraj Singh (ThePrint, 2019). 
What is interesting here is that this image of an India under siege – which Sohan Chand pulls out of 
the zeitgeist – is then connected back to the Partition. He reminds us of the way Hindus were driven 
off the land and their place-names and heritage erased permanently. Sohan Chand then uses this 
victimhood to justify the BJP’s campaign to saffronise the Indian landscape. Previously, in Section 1.3, 
I have drawn attention to how the BJP’s campaign to change place names and construct certain 
monuments and statues is driven by a restorative nostalgia that hopes to make the landscape 
congruent with its conception of the national past. By mobilising his victimhood in defense of this, 
Sohan Chand articulates the way in which this revisionist project is an act of creation fundamental to 
the establishment of a Hindu state. In a discourse that echoes the Brexit impulse of ‘taking back’ the 
country and the Trumpist promise to ‘Make America Great Again’, Sohan Chand presents the recent 
name-changes as an act of liberation. He presents this as the revelation of an oppressed history; a 
revelation that is also symbolic of the unshackling of a nation held hostage by proximate enemies. 
As stated in section 1.3, the changing of a place name involves the rewriting of history (Ahmad, R, 
2018). Conversely invoking place names and symbols drawn from heritage expresses continuity with 
particular pasts (Hobsbawm, 2000). Sohan Chand’s map sits somewhat dissonantly between these 
two impulses. This hand-drawn map is as much a map of west Punjab as it is an attempt to record the 
place-names that existed before the Partition. By memorialising the 1947 borders of Mianwali and 
thereby, his connection to them, this map functions as a document of his displacement. It expresses 
his continuity with the past, memorialising not just the space itself, but his displacement from it.  
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This act of enunciation is in part a denouncement of the Partition. That is, by memorialising the place 
names of his childhood, his map constitutes a symbolic rebellion against the Partition. In Pakistan, the 
Partition was followed by a wave of name-changing which deliberately targeted streets and 
neighbourhoods with Hindu names. As ‘purs’ became ‘abads’ in Pakistan, a comparable process is now 
unfolding in India. Thus as Lyallpur became Faisalabad in Pakistan (Burki, 2015), the district of Faizabad 
has now become Ayodhya in India. Coupled with the new nation-state borders and the gradual 
reconstitution of administrative units on all levels – tehsils, districts and provinces – such changes have 
transformed the modern-day maps of India and Pakistan beyond recognition. In this way, besides the 
displacement of millions of people, Partition-era ethnic cleansing has also nominally included the 
destruction of architecture and the renaming of places.  
Sohan Chand’s map symbolically resists this loss of cultural heritage by giving concrete form to his 
memory of space. It compresses time itself, embodying a particular understanding of a thousand years 
of history through the memorialisation of extinct borders and archaic place names. The map 
remembers the land of his birth just as it remembers his displacement from it. Seen in these terms, 
the BJP’s revisionist project and Sohan Chand’s map should oppose each other. But, the harmony of 
ideology makes them allies. For Sohan Chand, the BJP’s project is one of restoring a sense of historical 
justice. To its followers, this project of taking the land back from the so-called descendants of ‘Muslim 
invaders’ is not violence, but justice. And – as I discuss in the Conclusion to this dissertation – this 
discourse is also about finishing the unfinished work of the Partition.  
In conclusion, Sohan Chand’s push for the appropriation of blame – for justice – draws on a historically 
perceived sense of victimhood that far predates the Partition. While Sohan Chand’s map expresses 
continuity with the past, it also locates him, geographically and historically, within 1000 years of 
history. His map is evoked by and memorialises his experience of the Partition. It is a document of 
displacement. Yet, for him, the Partition is not just about the events of 1947. The Partition is the 
product of a 1000 year-old history. Articulating this complex discourse through a memory of space, 
this map in fact compresses 1000 years of history. After all, as stated previously in this chapter, ‘space 
contains compressed time’ (Bachelard, 1994: 8).  
Here, within its errantly sketched lines, Sohan Chand’s map compresses history itself. And, through 
this, it articulates a discourse of victimhood. This victimhood provides the impetus to the Hindu 
nationalist project. Such is the afterlife of the Partition, steadily irradiating the present; promising an 




1.8. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have strived for an intimate glimpse into conceptions of place and space. Using an 
anthropological and historical approach, I have contextualised the memory maps of my informants 
within contemporary contestations around history. In this way, my analysis has ranged from a 
historiographical discussion of the historical contestations that occupy the cityscapes of north India, 
to the millieux of memory of Faridabad’s Partition refugees, to the individualised relations to place 
and space that these memory maps represent. Together, my discussion encompasses the myriad ways 
in which space and place are conceived within the fabric of time.  
Each of the memory maps discussed in this chapter memorialises space and spatialises memory in 
related yet unique ways. My discussion of these memory maps has been in line with de Certeau’s 
(1984) idea of tactics. These memory maps appropriate the debris of a traumatic history – of political 
events beyond the control of ordinary individuals – to tell stories about space and place.  
This is evidenced, for example, in Sohan Chand’s map and its memorialisation of local place names. In 
having drawn the borders of the districts of Western Punjab from memory, Sohan Chand’s map 
memorialises a conception of space as it existed circa 1947. It is as much an attempt to record and 
memorialise these place-names, as it is a quotidian act of resistance to Partition-era ethnic cleansing. 
Like most traditional place-names, many of the place-names in South Asia subtly evoke an image of 
the past. Sohan Chand mobilises this memory to resist his community’s erasure from the land of his 
birth. However, even as Sohan Chand symbolically resists the history of the Partition, he vocalises his 
resistance within a Hindu nationalist narrative. Sohan Chand defends the saffronisation of place-
names in India by citing name changes in Pakistan as justification. Sohan Chand also repeats the Hindu 
Right’s conception of Indian history, constructing Hindu India as a 1000 years old victim of ‘Muslim 
violence’. He understands the Partition as merely the latest of these wanton acts of oppressions.  
Nevertheless, despite this, Sohan Chand’s map represents an appropriation of the political and 
historical space within which it exists; it resists the nationalist project of the ‘other’ while activating 
one of his own. Like any tactic, it merely carves out a space for survival, without really changing the 
conditions within which it exists (ibid.). In compressing a specific understanding of history through an 
image of space, the map compresses time itself. And, in doing so, it appropriates both space and time.   
On the other hand, Dayaram and Rajaram’s memory maps are of a different tone. Their maps are 
delivered as acts of speech, in the form of a tour through the land of their childhood. Here I have built 
on de Certeau’s (ibid.: 119) theorisation of maps as a ‘speech act’ or an ‘act of enunciation’. According 
to de Certeau, maps drawn by individuals do not just give the lay of the land (represent that location 
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X lies beside location Z) but also orient the gaze of their listener by taking them from X to Z. The 
orienting hand follows a pre-determined itinerary – one pulled from memory – to guide the listener(s) 
through the route. In this way, maps drawn by individuals take on the form of a tour; a route that also 
simultaneously receives its form from the cartographer’s roots. 
We see this vividly in Dayaram’s testimony, in the way in which he uses a metaphor plucked from his 
childhood to symbolically render the city’s street-grid. Remembering the streets of Dera Ghazi Khan 
by reference to the board-game Chaupar, he describes them using the game he played on those 
streets in his youth. The recursive structure of his routes – routes that begin and end with evocations 
of ‘Block 10’ – resemble the structure of former commutes. Thus, in this way, by drawing a map of 
Dera Ghazi Khan from memory, Dayaram begins to remember a spatial language – a ‘rhetoric of 
walking’ (ibid.: 99) – that he has not spoken in a very long time.  
In Rajaram’s maps, we encounter childhood friends and his memories of their final goodbyes. Against 
the backdrop of the richness and vibrancy of life in these places, the story of the Partition almost 
becomes secondary. The Partition is still part of the story, in fact the story of the pre-Partition era 
gains value purely because of what followed. However, it is not the Partition that is remembered, but 
the very things that it disrupted; the homes, the friendships and the society that it annihilated. Even 
as these narratives memorialise a privileged, Hindu zamindar lifestyle, there is still something 
inherently subversive about this mode of remembering the Partition. These hand-drawn maps of an 
abandoned homeland, these documents of displacement ultimately memorialise what was lost, and 
in doing so, quietly resist the violence of ethnonationalism.  
However, this resistance is itself enfeebled by the way in which it draws on the interpretative 
frameworks of nationalist history; adopting its form and structure for validation. We have seen this, 
for example, in Sohan Chand’s narrative and we see glimpses of the same in Rajaram’s discourses on 
the sexuality of Muslim women. It is for this reason that I have discussed these memory maps within 
de Certeau’s overarching theoretical framework of tactics and strategies. De Certeau’s idea of tactics 
as individualised acts of appropriation describes the subversiveness of these maps and narratives 
while allowing for their helplessness to effect large-scale discursive transformations. In doing so, these 
maps, like any tactic, appropriate existing narratives of history and memory, but are unable to alter 
the larger conditions within which the Partition is remembered. If on one level they symbolically resist 
the violence of nationalism then they also deny the violence of their own nations.  
A major objective of my discussion of the conceptions of space, place and memory, in this chapter, 
has been to provide thick description of my fieldwork context. My discussion of ethnographic evidence 
here richly foregrounds the contestations and tensions that occupy the rest of this dissertation. 
179 
 
Introducing some of my key informants while providing a glimpse into their personalised memory 
practices sets up my discussion of the afterlife of the Partition in the chapters that follow. The former 
also provides the reader a glimpse into the plurality of Partition narratives. I consider the heteroglossia 
that this produces – a plurality of voices and ways of relating to and remembering the Partition – an 
important aspect of this ethnography. Translating this polyphony into writing has been one of the 
main objectives of this chapter.  
In the following chapter, I analyse the discourse of sacrifice and martyrdom that occupies the stories 
of some of my informants. Remembering the months and years that followed the Partition, my 
informants told a number of fable-like stories about hard work and resilience. I argue that these stories 
in fact comprise a discourse of sacrifice and martyrdom. My analysis also deconstructs the gendered 
aspects of this discourse, observing how the hard work of men is given additional moral and political 









‘Only Punjabis know what we have undergone and what all sacrifices we have made. Murders took 
place, women jumped into wells to commit suicide, we cut off the heads of our daughters ourselves.’ 
Bhanwarilal 
 
‘Whatever you write, you should focus on the achievements, that what all have been the 
achievements of our community. If you write about suffering, then your [dissertation] might not be 
cleared. That might rub someone the wrong way,’ Jaideep advised me. On that chilly February 
morning, Jaideep, Bhanwarilal and I had found ourselves serendipitously congregating in Bhanwarilal’s 
bungalow in Mianwali Nagar, Delhi. Cups of tea and a plate of biscuits in hand, we had decided to sit 
on the terrace to bask in the weak wintry sunshine.  
Bhanwarilal, one of my key informants, had just recovered from a severe bout of ill-health. Jaideep 
and I had both happened to drop by at the same time, to check in on him. This was the first time I was 
meeting Jaideep. He was a neighbour and a distant relative of Bhanwarilal’s. At roughly 60 years old, 
Jaideep, like my parents, was part of the second generation of Partition migrants. His parents had 
witnessed the Partition first-hand and had moved to Delhi from Mianwali, in 1947.  
When Bhanwarilal told Jaideep that I was seeking out Delhi’s Partition survivors to record their stories, 
Jaideep became interested in my work. His advice to me, to focus on the ‘achievements’ of the 
Partition survivors came out of an interest in the narrative frame of my research. I tried to deflect his 
insistence by telling him that I was committed to writing the truth of what had happened during that 
time. Moreover, I argued, simply ignoring suffering does not mean that it did not happen.  
‘Not that… Suffering, in reality, now no one wants to read about it. You focus on the achievements- 
that what all they have built after Partition,’ Jaideep replied, doubling down on his insistence.  
This marked an interesting moment in this conversation as, up until then, Jaideep and Bhanwarilal had 
been arguing about Partition high-politics. While Bhanwarilal did not explicitly agree with Jaideep on 
this point about ‘achievements’, he did not disagree either; preferring instead to wear a silent, 
knowing smile. In any case, as a highly opinionated man and the reigning patriarch of his family, 
Bhanwarilal was not one to shy away from an argument, and, certainly not one to hesitate from 
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making his disagreement public. Yet, from the conversation that had transpired before, there was little 
doubt that Bhanwarilal agreed with the spirit of Jaideep’s words. If they disagreed anywhere, it was 
in Jaideep’s ability to separate ‘suffering’ from the ‘achievements’ of Partition survivors.  
Jaideep had begun our conversation about the Partition by asking me what I thought was the reason 
for the Partition. Jaideep’s insistence on the rhetoric of blame was similar to Sohan Chand’s. When I 
clarified that my project is ethnographic and not a politico-historical analysis meant to apportion 
blame to a particular leader or group, Jaideep began to give us his own answer.  
Using the analogy of a family, Jaideep explained that the most common reason for the division of 
families are brothers (or sibling rivalries). Jaideep then went on to state a popular Hindu nationalist 
conspiracy theory that alleges that Jawaharlal Nehru, Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Sheikh Abdullah were 
all sons of Motilal Nehru and were thereby, half-brothers. This conspiracy theory alleges that Motilal 
Nehru made a pact with the British to split British India into three portions, to be inherited in turn by 
each son: India for Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistan for Jinnah and Jammu and Kashmir for Sheikh Abdullah. 
This is a very popular conspiracy theory among middle-class Hindu nationalists in Delhi and one that I 
encountered at various points in my fieldwork. Ultimately, this conspiracy theory seeks to portray the 
Nehru-Gandhi family (and the Indian National Congress party by extension), as power-hungry dynasts 
who divided the country for personal gain. As Gangaram – a key informant whose story we encounter 
in Chapter 3 – said, the Partition was a simple case of, ‘gaddi ki bhook’ (the hunger for high-office). 
This conspiracy theory also implicitly articulates the RSS view that Gandhi’s non-violent anti-colonial 
movement was little more than a grandly staged ‘drama’.  
Before Jaideep could finish his retelling of this alternative history, he was interrupted first by me and 
then by Bhanwarilal. While I highlighted the obvious flaw that Motilal Nehru and Mohammed Ali 
Jinnah were only 14 years apart and were therefore extremely unlikely to be father and son (in 
addition to their respective family trees being remarkably well-documented by historians), 
Bhanwarilal used sarcasm and the authority of first-hand experience to denounce Jaideep’s argument.  
Beginning by reminding Jaideep of Sheikh Abdullah’s negligible role in the Independence movement 
and Partition, Bhanwarilal launched into a spectacular rant about the ‘sacrifices’ made by Punjabi 
refugees. He began by speaking in an angry and fast Mianwali-boli that later mellowed into Hindi. 
‘Partition te sirf jede Punjab da hoya’ (only our Punjab was partitioned), Bhanwarilal practically spat 
out the words. In a direct jibe at Jaideep – one that I had also heard him use for contemporary Indian 
politicians on occasion – Bhanwarilal said that the people here, in India today, do not know anything 
about the Partition. They never suffered because of it and were not affected by it. He then continued:  
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‘Only Punjabis know what we have undergone and what all sacrifices we have made. Murders 
took place, women jumped into wells to commit suicide, we cut off the heads of our daughters 
ourselves. But, on the other hand we also feel we came at a good time. There we would have 
stayed among Muslims as a minority. Although we were a minority, we would dominate them. 
All the financial power was ours. And what did we get here? What compensation did we get 
here? Land in place of land! We had 68 acres of our own there and here the whole Mianwali 
Nagar has been settled on 52 acres. Even in compensation they [government] said if you have 
[assets worth more than] Rs 10,000 then you will get 10,000. Ours was not worth 10,000 so 
we got nothing for that. We got nothing in compensation. We got agricultural land in Ambala, 
what would we do with that? There [in Pakistan] we had Muslims, they would work the crops 
and give them to us. Here [Ambala] we had kept someone but he would instead give us a bill 
and no profit at all. We sold it [land] for a pittance.’ 
[Emphases added] 
Here, Bhanwarilal begins by talking about sacrifice and suffering but also lays emphasis on 
‘compensation’ or reparations. This exchange between Jaideep, Bhanwarilal and myself, encapsulates 
the broad contours of the theme that I focus on in this chapter: sacrifice and stories of hard work. In 
the above exchange, while Jaideep describes the hard work of Punjabi refugees as their 
‘achievements', Bhanwarilal reframes this discourse as one of ‘sacrifice’. For Bhanwarilal, the suffering 
endured by his people during the Partition constitutes a sacrifice to the nation. Bhanwarilal’s 
understanding of the suffering entailed by the Partition includes the years of hardship that followed 
their displacement. Where Jaideep celebrates the latter as an ‘achievement’, imploring me to write 
about, ‘what all they have built after the Partition,’ Bhanwarilal sanctifies this story of hard work as a 
sacrifice. According to him, this sacrifice also merits just compensation. However, what they both 
agree on is the necessity of writing this story; of being remembered as heroes and martyrs.   
Bhanwarilal’s use of the word sacrifice captures an important nuance, here. The Punjabi refugee, in 
his narratives, was someone who not only laboured honestly and virtuously to overcome the poverty 
thrust upon him by the Partition, but whose hardship constituted a sacrifice to the nation. As is evident 
in the brief quote above, the wealth that the Punjabi migrant had left behind in Pakistan, the relatives 
who had been killed along the way, the women relatives whose ‘honour’ and ‘dignity’ he had 
‘protected’ by killing them with his own hands, were all part of an immense sacrifice he had made for 
the nation. The Punjabi refugee, in this construction is not just a hard-worker whose displacement has 
forced him into poverty, but someone who has actively sacrificed his wealth and privilege for the 
betterment of the nation. He is an unacknowledged martyr. Here, I deliberately use the word martyr 
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to draw on its archaic meaning of a person forced into suffering because of their religious beliefs. And, 
within this feeling of the lack of acknowledgement of one’s sacrifice is the desire for just 
compensation; a perceived neglect which is related to a bubbling ressentiment.  
As a discourse that rationalises the ‘uselessness’ out of their suffering, this discourse of sacrifice (and 
of hard work as a kind of sacrifice) is at its core a form of theodicy. As I have stated previously in the 
Introduction, theodicy is a body of knowledge that attempts to render assymetrical experiences with 
death, suffering and misfortune meaningful within a perceived social order: a nomos (Das, 1997; 
Herzfeld, 1992; Weber 1965, 2013). In describing my informants’ discourse of sacrifice as a form of 
theodicy, I use the word in a metaphorical and secular sense; as an interpretive frame that attempts 
to address the enduring question of the meaning of death and suffering.  
Emmanuel Levinas (1988) writes that the task of theodicy has been rendered more urgent by the 
bloody history of the twentieth-century. Levinas (ibid.) argues that the twentieth-century’s history of 
horrific war and genocidal violence can only be described as one of ‘useless suffering’. Levinas states:  
‘This is the century that in thirty years has known two World wars, the totalitarianisms of the 
right and left, Hitlerism and Stalinism, Hiroshima, the Gulag, and the genocides of Auschwitz 
and Cambodia. This is the century which is drawing to a close in the haunting memory of the 
return of everything signified by these barbaric names: suffering and evil are deliberately 
imposed, yet no reason sets limits to the exasperation of a reason become political and 
detached from all ethics.’ 
(ibid.: 161-2) 
As the single largest event of forced migration and retributive genocide in recorded history (Brass, 
2003), the Partition of India sits squarely within the twentieth-century’s list of horrors. The 
senselessness and savagery of the violence unleashed during this period evades all attempts at stable 
rationalisation. And, it is an attempt to reach such a discourse, to rationalise the uselessness out of 
their suffering that many of my informants turn to the discourses of Hindu nationalism. Describing 
their suffering as ‘sacrifice’, branding the futility of death ‘martyrdom’, they sanctify their blood, tears 
and sweat by offering them upon the altar of Hindu nationalism. Embodying a particular pedagogy of 
pain, Partition survivors express the invisible scars of their displacement in a myriad ways to underline 
their belonging within the Hindu nation. They are not refugees petitioning the state for support, 
acceptance and belonging, but hard-workers of the Hindu nation. Their blood and sweat is the fact of 
their belonging; their hard work, a performative document of fortitude. 
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In this chapter, I analyse my informants’ discourse of sacrifice. Integral to this discourse of sacrifice is 
their representation of their hard work as a kind of sacrifice. That is, in remembering the years that 
followed the Partition, my informants presented the hard work involved in rebuilding their lives (along 
with the suffering they endured during the Partition) as a sacrifice to the nation. However, before I 
begin to analyse this discourse, it is important to define hard work and, to locate it within Hindu 
philosophy.  
Purusharth is the Hindi word my informants used to describe their hard work; stressing that they are 
not sharanarthis (refugees) but purusharthis (hard-workers). Purusharth occupies a central space 
within Hinduism and is intimately linked to the Brahmanical order of varnashramadharma (Singh, B, 
2020). The varnashramadharma connects a Hindu person’s caste (varna) to the work and duties 
(shrama and dharma) they must perform in life (ibid.). In this way, purusharth is the semiotic sum of 
the four-fold values of Hinduism: Artha (meaning/essence), Kama (desire), Dharma (duty or the right 
way of living) and Moksa (enlightenment/emancipation) (ibid.; Devi, 2009). In his work on the theology 
of Vaishnavism (a Hindu sect), Charis (1994) defines purusharth as the ultimate goal of one’s life. On 
the other hand, while providing a cultural frame for understanding organisational behaviour in India, 
Jai Sinha (2002: 159) defines purusharth as ‘constant efforts’. These different yet related definitions 
of purusharth are similar to the adjectives that my informants used while explaining purusharth to me: 
determination, perseverance, hard work and the desire to succeed. Drawing on all of these related 
meanings, purusharth can be understood as ‘virtuous work’ and ‘work as virtue’, with its related 
qualities of persistence, honesty and sincerity.  
The philosophy of purusharth is closely related to the idea of karma. By constructing persistent and 
sincere hard work (or ‘struggle’) as a virtue, the philosophy of purusharth reifies the karmic philosophy 
that, ‘one reaps that which one sows’. In Weber’s (2013) sociology of religion, karma is a form of 
theodicy that provides a justification for good and bad fortune. After all, while theodicies attempt to 
render violence and suffering meaningful, they also provide explanations for good fortune (Mavelli, 
2016). Where the rationalisation of suffering is an attempt to answer the quintessentially human 
question of, ‘what did I do to deserve this?’, justifications of good fortune are aimed at presenting it 
as ‘legitimate fortune’ (ibid.). In the words of Max Weber: 
‘The fortunate is seldom satisfied with the fact of being fortunate. Beyond this, he needs to 
know that he has a right to his good fortune. He wants to be convinced that he “deserves” it, 
and above all, that he deserves it in comparison with others. He wishes to be allowed the 




(Weber, 2013: 271) 
Thus, as a performative document of fortitude, stories of purusharth serve as karmic justifications for 
good fortune. Rich in moral instruction, my informants’ stories of purusharth are akin to modern-day 
fables. They express moral truths about the virtues of hard work. However, in the way that my 
informants deploy the term, acts of street-smartness are also implicitly presented as purusharth. This 
conflation of these two seemingly contradictory terms is an important part of the stories of purusharth 
that we encounter in this chapter. This valourises the street-smartness of Partition survivors as 
‘virtuous hard work’. A redemptive narrative to its core, it presents street-smartness as purusharth to 
reconstruct their desperate struggle for survival in the morally instructive discourse of a fable.  
Stories of purusharth are part of how Partition survivors (especially those from Punjab) express and 
identify with their status as middle-class Hindu citizens of India. Narratives of hard work are rich in 
comments that disavow their status as refugees; that is, as ‘passive victims’ dependent on the ‘charity’ 
of the state. Instead, by emphasising how hard they worked to rebuild their lives, they not only express 
agency, but also position themselves as citizens deserving of their place within the state. We have 
worked hard to earn our present privilege, these stories seem to say. In doing so, this discourse 
presents their recovery from poverty as a story of legitimate mobility. These stories help explain their 
own unusually ‘good fortune’ in the context of India’s stark economic inequality. Implicit within this 
discourse is a memory of unbelonging within India, during the months and years immediately 
following the Partition. In a climate where they were seen as outsiders, as ‘refugees’ availing the 
‘undeserved charity’ of the Indian state, this discourse of being a hard-worker rather than a refugee, 
was also their way of asserting their belonging within the state.  
This dichotomy between hard-workers and refugees is illustrated in the following exchange between 
me and Bhanwarilal. This conversation took place on August 18, 2017, and served as my first 
introduction to this theme. In the exchange below, Bhanwarilal explains the words sharanarthi and 
purusharthi to me. Sharanarthi is best translated as refugee, as someone who seeks refuge (sharan). 
Its implicit meanings are brought out in Bhanwarilal’s words.    
PK: Ok, so I want to ask you one more thing. Going back to the Partition, you were saying 
sharan… Did the people of Haryana [Haryanvi] call you sharaniya…? 
B: Sharanarthi. 
PK: [Repeating it] Sharanarthi 
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B: Haryanvi did not say that. When we first came, everyone used to say they are sharanarthi. 
So after being called sharanarthi, in many places people started protesting [figuratively]. We 
started saying that we are not sharanarthi, we are purusharthi.  
 PK: What does purusharthi mean? 
B: We are earning through our purusharth. We are earning through our hard work [mehnat]. 
We are hard-working people. Sharanarthi is if we came to seek refuge [sharan] then 
sharanarthi; [vociferously] we are not that. We are recovering through our purusharth, we are 
recovering through our hard work. What refuge did they give us? Did they give us their 
houses? Or did they give us employment? We sat on the streets and sold rice, we sat on the 
streets and sold blankets, we sat on the streets and worked, and it is through that, that we 
have recovered. So we have done our purusharth, we have worked hard ourselves. There is a 
lot of difference between sharanarthi and purusharthi. 
PK: So they are opposites of a sort? 
B: Yes, that is why, if you actually see, the people who came, so they had been labelled 
sharanarthi but they were not sharanarthi, they were purusharthi. Using their purusharth they 
learnt to stand on their feet on their own. Today, if you consider we had a house there, 4 
houses or 10 houses, whatever, we had to abandon them. So after coming here, we rebuilt 
them through our own hard work. We did not ask them for anything. Did not ask anything 
from the government. We used our hard work to build our house. Established ourselves again 
through our hard work. Because ours was not a case of dependence like others who came in 
the beginning and got a room somewhere or two room flats were allotted to refugees as and 
when refugees came, they got and then later they [government] said alright lets regularise 
them, just deposit a little money. These were regularised at a cheap rate and they got. 90% or 
80% people that are there, they stood on their own purusharth. 10-20% were there whom 
government did, but which government could help everyone? The whole of the pranth 
[region] had got up from there and come here. And they went and settled in all of Hindustan 
[India], it was not like they settled only in Delhi so they could turn Delhi into a colony and give 
it to them. They went and spread in the whole of Hindustan. Wherever whoever got work they 
took it. And there they supported themselves, made a name for themselves, that look we did 
our hard work and made an identity for ourselves. We had 4 houses, 10 houses, adding 2-2 
we rebuilt it. […] How much did Government do? Nothing. The people who came, brought 
their luck with them, government did nothing special for them. This is definitely there that 
when Partition happened, it happened on our corpses. Happened on our property. We lost it 
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all and came. The people who were here, what did they lose? They lost nothing. They have 
not lost anything. […] This is why the people who came here they stood back up on their own 
feet, through their hard work, stood up through their honesty. Stood up through purusharth.  
Bhanwarilal begins by juxtaposing refugees and hard-workers, presenting them as polar opposites. 
While he consistently harps on the hard-working nature of Partition survivors he also questions what 
India did for these people. When framed against rhetorical questions such as, ‘What refuge did they 
give us?’, the narrative of hard work also becomes one of ressentiment. This is also visible in his 
comments towards the end when he asserts that the Partition, ‘happened on our corpses.’ His 
phrasing presents the Partition as an intimate tragedy. He contrasts this intimate suffering with that 
of the rest of the country, angrily observing that, ‘the people who were here, what did they lose? They 
lost nothing.’   
In the way that Bhanwarilal recounts his suffering in order to establish the justness of his demand for 
compensation – a common feature of this and his other remarks in this chapter – his discourse is 
evocative of another aspect of Weberian theodicy. Weber (2013: 353) notes that the demand for ‘just 
compensation’ is a consequence of theodicy. While theodicy rationalises ‘unjust suffering’ and 
presents the cosmos as well-ordered and ‘meaningful’, the meaningfulness of the cosmos posits that 
‘unjust suffering’ be rectified by ‘just compensation’, or justice (ibid.). That is, this demand is a 
consequence of the belief that one inhabits a meaningful world overseen by a benevolent deity. After 
all, in such a world, the unjust or unequal distribution of suffering would be compensated with 
appropriate justice.  
This theodicy inevitably fails. As stated previously in the Introduction, this failure of theodicy leads to 
the feelings of hatred, envy and revenge – a self-righteous, moral outrage – known as ressentiment 
(Olick, 2007; Simko, 2012). Weber (1965: 110) understood ressentiment as a form of ‘theodicy of the 
disprivileged’; as an attempt by ordinary people to rationalise their (lack of) status in life (also see 
Olick, 2007: 157). Disprivilege and suffering in the present is rationalised through the hope for ‘future 
compensation’ and/or the ‘desire for vengeance’ (Weber, 1965: 110). Weber writes that: 
‘In this theodicy of the disprivileged, [ressentiment] the moralistic quest serves as a device for 
compensating a conscious or unconscious desire for vengeance. This is connected in its origin 
with the faith in compensation, since once a religious conception of compensation has arisen, 
suffering may take on the quality of the religiously meritorious, in view of the belief that it 




However, Weber goes on to claim that due to the individuated understanding of suffering in Hinduism 
and Buddhism, ressentiment is not found in the believers of these religions. I disagree. While Weber’s 
view that Hinduism understands one’s suffering as pre-ordained punishment for the ‘sins’ of the 
individual is correct, in the narratives of my informants, the Partition is seen as a singularly exceptional 
period of collective suffering. That is, the suffering of the Partition is seen as collective, arbitrary and 
incomparable. Consequently, its survivors are unable to justify this cataclysmic episode of collective 
suffering – the misfortunes of their and others’ experience – by reference to their known and unknown 
past sins.  
This failure of traditional Hindu theodicy results in the turn towards Hindu nationalism as a form of 
theodicy. As I show in this dissertation (especially Chapter 3), Hindu nationalism as a form of theodicy 
is substantially motivated by the desire for vengeance; a desire that is itself legitimised by a visceral 
narrative of victimhood. This narrative (or theodicy) of a historically disprivileged Hindu nation finds 
its companion and equal in the ressentiment of Partition survivors. Yet, the ressentiment of Partition 
survivors goes deeper. A bubbling self-righteous outrage and jealousy, their ressentiment is directed 
against not only those who are held to be responsible for the suffering of the Partition – Muslims, the 
British (or Christians) and the leaders of the Congress party – but also all those who are seen to have 
not-suffered: the unfairly and undeservingly fortunate.  
The discourses of my informants in this chapter display a visceral hatred, jealousy and contempt for 
all those who have not had to endure the suffering of the Partition. In this and even the following 
chapter, we observe Partition survivors direct their ressentiment at those whom the Partition did not 
affect or displace, such as Indian Muslims, the Hindus of north India and even those generations born 
in India following the Partition. The latter are seen as the undeserving beneficiaries of the fruits 
accrued from the purusharth and sacrifices of Partition survivors. Bhanwarilal’s remarks earlier in this 
section (and in Section 2.4) and Mahendar’s comments in the following section are good examples of 
the ressentiment that my informants’ articulated against those who have not had to endure the violent 
suffering of the Partition.  
My informants’ ressentiment also relates to the redemptive aspect of their discourse of sacrifice. 
These stories of purusharth that present hard work as sacrifice are quintessentially redemptive stories 
that celebrate this community’s success and survival against all odds. These stories express pride in 
being a self-supported hard-worker while also emphasising their hard work as a performative 
document of fortitude. We belong because of our hard work and not your charity, their narrative 
stresses. Folded within this refusal to be remembered as ‘refugees’ is also a resentment of the welfare-
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state and welfarism in all its manifestations; a ressentiment of those who are seen to have been 
rewarded without suffering.   
However, in the stories of purusharth I retell later in this chapter, readers will observe an inherent 
essentialism. These stories of hard work not only justify current privilege but also construct the Punjabi 
community as inherently different; as innately hard-working. In this way, this emphasis on purusharth 
is comparable to the self-stereotyping discourse of national character. In fact, purusharth is seen as 
the singular defining quality of the Punjabi refugee. Herzfeld (1992) analogises conceptions of national 
character to the religious discourse of predestination57. Predestination is the Christian belief that all 
happenings on Earth follow the will of God and that this will is foreshadowed in the individual’s soul 
or character (ibid.). Similarly, the discourse of national character comprises a self-justifying, 
tautologous rhetoric wherein the ‘character’ of the nation is embodied in the blood of its citizens; 
evident in a history that is presented specifically in justification of the ‘truth’ of its national character 
(ibid.). One observes much of the same impulse at work in these stories of purusharth, as the Punjabi 
refugee is presented as innately hard-working, even as the experience of the abject poverty of 
Partition displacement is seen to have hardened them as individuals. Their purusharth is paradoxically 
an innate quality AND a product of their experience of the Partition. 
Ultimately, these stories of sacrifice and purusharth comprise a masculine discourse. Here, it is 
important for me to briefly clarify my use of masculine pronouns in some of the paragraphs in this 
section. My use of masculine pronouns is a conscious, political decision. It stems from the observation 
that these are stories told using masculine pronouns and that the main actors in these stories of 
purusharth are also always men. This is somewhat unsurprising considering that the 
varnashramadharma system to which the philosophy of purusharth is linked also provides a 
justification for (Brahman) patriarchal supremacy (Singh, B, 2020). Thus, stories of purusharth are 
essentially stories of men at work, or man-work. This idea of purusharth as ‘man-work’ is my own 
bilingual spin on the literal meaning of the word. Although the word purusharth comes from Sanskrit, 
in Hindi, the word purush means masculine or male. While the idea of purusharth is embedded in 
Hindu scripture, my characterisation of purusharth as man-work is both a bilingual pun and 
recognition of the masculine nature of this discourse. Ultimately, these stories of hard-working 
Punjabi refugees are the articulation of an innate idea of Punjabi masculinity. Stories of hard-working 
Punjabi men then are also stories of patriarchs who did all they could to take care of their families; 
including the sacrifice of women relatives.  
                                                            
57 Here, Herzfeld’s (1992) work builds on Max Weber’s (1965) work on Calvinism and the Protestant ethic.  
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Therefore, in this chapter, I deconstruct this discourse of sacrifice and the related way in which hard 
work is constructed as a kind of sacrifice. In Section 2.2, I retell my informants’ stories of hard work. 
In these didactic, fable-like stories, hard work is constructed as tough, physical and ‘menial’ labour; a 
‘doing whatever it took’ kind of attitude towards work and survival. These stories comprise the 
hegemonic centre of this discourse of sacrifice.   
In Section 2.3, I connect this discourse to the BJP’s politics of Hindutva or Hindu nationalism. 
Valourising the hard work of the individual whilst minimising the role of the state, these stories make 
an important political statement on the national past. In my analysis, I connect this discourse to 
neoliberalism, the politics of karni-bharni (‘reap as you sow’) and Modi’s image as a brahmachari who 
values ‘hard work’ over ‘Harvard’ (The Hindu, 2017a).   
In Section 2.4, I analyse the way in which the discourse of sacrifice comprises a specific, organic 
grammar of mourning. Sifting through a complex jumble of ethnographic evidence that ranges from 
the celebration of a patriarchal masculinity, to the description of the honour killings of women 
relatives as sacrifice, to interrogations of the meaning and price of freedom, I detail the theodicical 
impulses at work in this discourse. My discussion in this chapter includes an examination of the 
gendered dimension of mourning. 
And finally, in Section 2.5, I elaborate on the masculine nature of this discourse of sacrifice by turning 
to the stories of women. My discussion in this chapter follows from the claims of some of my male 
informants who spoke with pride about how they worked so hard to support their families such that 
‘their women’ did not have to do any work. The stories of women provide a counter-foil to this 
discourse. In this section, I use the stories of the domestic and commercial labour of women Partition 
survivors to counter the aforementioned masculine discourse of sacrifice. My objective here is 
twofold: to highlight the labour and contributions of women towards this Punjabi economic miracle 
and, to provide a rich contrast to these patriarchal narratives of the Partition. Veering away from 
dramatic masculine stories of blood, sweat and toil, the stories of women present a picture of a 
persistent domestic labour that is no less a story of purusharth than men’s, but is never labelled as 
such.  
My discussion in this regard builds on Veena Das’ (2007) seminal work on women’s experience of the 
Partition. Das observed that women incorporated their experience of the Partition’s violence – rape, 
murder and loot – into the ordinary experience of being a woman in a patriarchal society. As the sub-
title of Das’ book suggests, this constitutes a, ‘descent into the ordinary’. I apply this idea to my 
analysis of the stories of women. I argue that with the Partition and the termination of zamindari 
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privileges that it involved, the harsh physical labour of men was seen as a disruption of the ‘natural 
order’, while the domestic work of women was seen as a continuation of ‘ordinary’ life.  
It is in this context that I write substantially about the needlework of Punjabi women. Needlework was 
taught to Punjabi girls at a young age. Prior to the Partition, women sewed and knitted predominantly 
to satisfy domestic needs for clothes and household linen. However, this changed following the 
Partition, with women taking to needlework commercially as a substantial contribution to the 
household income. In this way, stories of purusharth neglect the stories of women such as Falguni and 
Bhagwanti who took to needlework commercially, in addition to their domestic responsibilities. I also 
document the stories of other women who worked in a wide variety of professions, often out-shining 
their husbands in terms of both rank and income. Yet, these stories are never told by their narrators 
as stories of purusharth. Rather, they are absolved within everyday understandings of wifely duties; 
the rhythm of ‘ordinary’ life. The stories of women quietly contest some aspects of the masculine 
discourse. Shunning the didactic, moralising tone of the stories of men, the stories of women often 






2.2. Stories of Purusharth- The Man-Workers of Punjab 
 
‘Hard work is a very big thing. We have worked hard, quite a lot. […] We have worked quite hard for 
our earning. We are getting the benefit of it even today, even today we are reaping it.’ 
Mahendar 
 
‘What work did you do?’ I asked Mahendar. At 81 years of age, Mahendar was one of the oldest 
members of the Arya Samaj in Dehradun. His friends Naagesh and Dilip, who were also 81 years of 
age, were with us in the room at the time, along with my grandaunt Anjali and Dilip’s friend, Ashok. 
Aged 68, Ashok was not a Partition survivor. However, when Dilip had casually mentioned my research 
and the purpose of my brief trip to Dehradun, he had decided to tag along. Dilip had invited us all to 
congregate in his office in the Arya Samaj branch there. As a result, what I had initially foreseen as a 
series of back-to-back one-on-one conversations had effectively turned into a focus group discussion.  
While Dilip, Mahendar and Naagesh respected each other’s turns, preferring to be silent while another 
was telling their story, Ashok loved to chip in with his insights as and when he saw relevant. As 
someone who had grown up in the shadow of the Partition, these stories of hard work and the 
economic miracle of the Punjabi community resonated with him deeply. When I posed my question 
to Mahendar, Dilip had just finished telling us about his family’s journey and his memories of the 
Partition. And now, I was politely quizzing Mahendar, in an effort to encourage him to share his story.  
‘Try to guess, what will a 12-13 year old boy do?’ Mahendar leaned in towards me, a mischievous glint 
in his eyes as he built up the suspense. 
‘Uncle [Dilip] was just telling us that he used to sell toffees in trains. Right?’ I nodded my head slightly 
in Dilip’s direction and received an affirming nod from him in return. During their initial days in India, 
Dilip had started selling toffees in the trains passing through the town of their refugee camp (Ambala). 
He had been 11-12 years old at the time and had had nothing else to do. This had seemed like a viable 
way of supplementing his family’s income. His story was reflective of the abject poverty that their 
wealthy, land-owning family had been reduced to, and, of the near-mythical determination of Punjabi 
refugees to take on any kind of work available. 
‘You won’t imagine!’ Here Mahendar paused dramatically and launched into an Urdu couplet. ‘Daana 
agar kuch martaba chaahe, mitta de apni asthi ko, mitta de apni asthi ko agar kuch martaba chaahe 
ke dana khwaab main milta hai gul o-gulzarta hai.’ Mahendar then began to explain its meaning:  
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‘A seed that you put in the soil will only blossom into a tree when it has buried itself in the 
soil; it will have to destroy itself. So we people have destroyed ourselves and started from 
zero. There is a thing that after many zeroes you get a one. We, Punjabi people who came, 
had a lot of self-confidence. Loads, even today. I am eighty-plus. Even today I have the 
confidence that if you throw me out of the house, by evening I would have put together five 
to seven rupees.’  
At this point, Ashok stepped in to agree with Mahendar and offer his own interpretation of this 
phenomenon of Punjabi self-confidence. 
‘This is a very strong feature that their self-confidence and their determination power, that 
was really commendable. This, the area they were from there [in Pakistan], they would have 
toiled hard there before coming here. So this is a common feature there that when they came 
here, then in these people the ambition to become bold, determined… See, what we call 
sankalp shakti, what we call determination power, that feature was extremely prominent in 
this community. And because of that, you see that refugees, the people who were called 
refugees, in those people you will see that how much ever they were suppressed, they 
rebounded that much higher.’ 
Nodding enthusiastically in agreement with Ashok’s Newtonian analogy, Mahendar said,  
‘In fact I will say that when people came from there [Pakistan], a kind of… What do I say…? 
Maybe if we had remained in Pakistan then there would have been people to nurture us, 
family would have supported us, so maybe people would not have been able to do so much. 
Today there are so many children who are nurtured well in the home, and studies are also 
progressing, TV is also there, but they are unable to do anything. They end up becoming 
useless. And us people, we came from there, no one was there to host us. Starting from zero, 
that is something else.’ 
For Punjabi refugees, stories of purusharth are not merely stories of the jobs and work they did in the 
immediate aftermath of the Partition, but in their retellings, have become part of the very essence of 
what it means to be Punjabi. This essentialism comprises a self-orientalising discourse. Often, as in the 
case of Ashok’s dialogue above, the innately hard-working character of Punjabis is connected to the 
harshness of a life of agriculture.  
Yet, this conception of the Punjabi national character is also a tautologous construction. On the one 
hand, Punjabi refugees – like Mahendar and Ashok – insist that Punjabis owe their innate self-
confidence and determination to the harshness of the land they originally hail from. On the other 
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hand, they present the Punjabi turn to purusharth as one necessitated by the experience of the 
Partition; of having been reduced to ‘zero’. In support of the second, Mahendar furnishes the analogy 
of the seed. He analogises the Punjabi refugee to a seed such that it is his destiny to destroy himself – 
through purusharth – in order to reap the fruits of his labour.  
Together, these examples show how the idea of national character functions as something of a 
predestination (Herzfeld, 1992). National character – purusharth or hard work in this context – is 
simultaneously the Punjabi’s innate quality – his destiny – and a behaviour learned in the face of 
adversity. Through an after-the-fact rationalisation that draws on a tautologous logic, the idea of 
national character functions as both a prophecy and an explanation for what transpired (ibid.). This 
articulation of the purusharthi character of the Punjabi as both explanation and prophecy, consistently 
recurs in the stories of my informants, in this chapter.   
Mahendar’s acknowledgement of his past privilege alongside his criticism of today’s allegedly molly-
coddled youth as ‘useless’, marks an interesting point in this conversation. His comment demonstrates 
how stories of hard work serve as a karmic rationalisation of inequality. By emphasising the self-made 
nature of his current survival and success, his stories of hard work serve to legitimise his past and 
current privilege. His stories present him as a hard-working citizen worthy of the wealth he enjoys 
(and used to enjoy) in a starkly unequal society. He contrasts the worthiness of this wealth and 
privilege with that of today’s youth. He contrasts the ‘uselessness’ of this generation with the 
resourcefulness of his generation, saying, ‘And us people, we came from there, no one was there to 
host us. Starting from zero, that is something else.’ Attributing their privilege to the hard work of his 
generation, he presents them as inherently unworthy of its enjoyment. 
When Mahendar remarks that today’s youth is unable to achieve anything despite access to television 
(or technology, in general), studies and a stable household, one detects a hint of ressentiment. As 
stated previously in this chapter, this discourse of sacrifice and hard work as sacrifice is rife with 
ressentiment. His juxtaposition of the hardship of his own childhood with the luxuries available to the 
modern child, betrays the ressentiment he feels towards those who have not had to suffer the 
hardship of the Partition. Here, the lack of suffering endured by the post-Partition generations is seen 
to have weakened them but also appears to disqualify them from the enjoyment of the comforts of 
modern life. That his own hard work is seen to exacerbate this inequality of suffering rankles him 
further.   
This need to provide a karmic justification for their current and former wealth and privilege, along 
with a quiet ressentiment of those who did not have to endure the suffering of the Partition, is visible 
in all of these stories of hard work, especially Mahendar’s. These stories possess a fable-like quality. 
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Rich in moral instruction about the virtues of purusharth, these stories represent attempts to 
overcome the chaotic, ‘useless suffering’ of the Partition through the construction of a nomos where 
good deeds accrue good fortune.  
Mahendar’s family migrated to India from Khushab, Pakistan, in 1947, at the height of Partition 
violence. They were forced to leave their home in the middle of the night, when news reached them 
of an arson attack on the town’s Hindu burial ground. The people who worked and slept there, along 
with the priest in charge, were burnt alive. Standing on the roof of their house that night, Mahendar 
and his family saw the smoke from that fire. That night, they packed their stuff and left. They made 
their way from Khushab to the refugee camp in Sargodha with some difficulty. From there they 
boarded a goods train which took 5-7 days to cross the border into India, and dropped them at Attari. 
From there, they went to a refugee camp in Kaithal, a small town in modern-day Haryana. Starting 
almost entirely from scratch in Kaithal, Mahendar’s father did not let them eat the food being served 
in the refugee camps. 
‘Let me tell you one thing, that in all the [refugee] camps the government would serve free 
food in them, but our father – we stayed so many months in the camps – he did not let us eat 
there. Did not let us eat free food in the camp. I remember even today. During the day we 
would go to Gurgaon to get vegetables to sell there [Kaithal], we would earn a full 2 rupees, 
and there we would put three bricks together, keep a pan on it and rotis would get cooked. 
So our father tried a lot that we would not have to eat free food. […] So during the day we 
have to earn, father said this. I will not let you eat for free. Whether you earn one rupee, or 
two rupees, you should earn during the day.’  
Shunning the charity of the state, Mahendar’s father instead taught him the value of work. The first 
time Mahendar brought money home was through his father’s help. His father purchased a crate of 
oranges from the wholesale market and set it beside a well-frequented road and told Mahendar to 
sell the whole crate. ‘But how will I do this?’ Mahendar asked him. ‘Just sell it,’ his father replied 
cryptically and left the scene. A gentleman then approached Mahendar, asking to buy an orange. 
Mahendar instead offered to sell them only by the dozen. Ultimately, charmed by young Mahendar, 
the gentleman bought two dozen oranges from him. And like that, Mahendar sold the whole crate of 
oranges.  
Some days later, while they were still living in Kaithal, a family friend offered Mahendar a loan of 12 
rupees and a business opportunity: wholesale vegetable trading. Under this man’s instruction, 
Mahendar began to make regular trips to their district headquarters, the nearby town of Kurukshetra. 
Mahendar would get the last train to Kurukshetra and spend the night sleeping on the railway station 
196 
 
there. Early in the morning he would visit the wholesale vegetable market (in order to get the best 
pick of vegetables) and spend the full 12 rupees there; collecting a variety of fruits and vegetables. 
Transporting the sacks of vegetables either on a rickshaw or a horse-carriage, Mahendar would then 
catch the 7am bus out of Kurukshetra and return to Kaithal by 8 a.m. There he would aggressively sell 
his stock in Kaithal’s vegetable market and try to earn at least 14 rupees from his sale. All this just for 
a 2 rupee profit.  
Mahendar chose work over school and plied his trade for a couple of years, while their family lived in 
the Kaithal refugee camp. Later, when his father’s compensation claim came through, they were 
allotted land in Ambala. In Ambala, Mahendar resumed his schooling. However, his family was still far 
from financially secure and could not even afford to pay his school fees. Remembering their poverty, 
Mahendar said: 
‘Every year my name was removed from school, every year I was scolded two-three times [for 
late payment of fees] and every year my fees was paid by a man from Uttar Pradesh. He gave 
me support. His name was Dr Bin Bihari Lal’ 
Dr Bin Bihari Lal was a dentist who lived in the neighbourhood. Mahendar had struck up an unlikely 
friendship with him on the streets and would greet him with a ‘Ram, Ram’ every morning, on his way 
to school. Dr Lal was passionate about education and supported Mahendar’s schooling for a couple of 
years. However, things took an unlikely turn when the headmaster of Mahendar’s school invited 
scholarship applications from the school’s underprivileged students. The headmaster rejected 
Mahendar’s application in the interview, citing Mahendar’s neatly turned out uniform. Someone so 
neatly dressed could not possibly be poor, the headmaster insinuated. However, for Mahendar, the 
shame of poverty had made it all the more necessary to be neatly turned out; a performative 
disavowal of his current status.  
‘My dressing style has been tip top from the beginning. Even though we had been ruined, I 
had only one pair of clothes, I would wear the t-shirt, wash my shorts and iron it in the evening. 
We did not have an iron at home. My uncle’s son had a dry-cleaning shop. So I had told him 
that before you close the iron for the night, at 10 or 9, give it to me. So I would go at 10, 9 and 
iron my clothes. Now when I would leave in the morning, it would look as if I was the son of a 
rich man with a nice pant-shirt.’  
With his scholarship application denied and no money at home to pay it with, Mahendar felt too 
ashamed to ask Dr Lal for the 2.5 rupees he needed to pay his fees. It was then that a classmate advised 
him to start riding a cycle rickshaw at night. His initial reaction to this suggestion was one of shame. 
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‘Will I not feel ashamed in riding this, I live inside the city after all?’ Mahendar had asked his friend. ‘If 
you feel ashamed then how will you study?’ came the reply.  
Swallowing his pride, Mahendar once again chose the path of purusharth. Mahendar’s classmate put 
him in touch with a guy who offered cycle rickshaws on hire. Mahendar then began to ride the 
rickshaw from 9 p.m. to midnight, two nights a week. In between rides, Mahendar would catch up on 
his studies. He would keep his books with him on the rickshaw and read them underneath the street 
lights, whenever he got a chance.   
‘You won’t believe, I would return exhausted at 12 in the night. It was winter then. You might 
not have gone to Ambala. In Ambala if you go to Ambala Cantonment, then beside Central Jail 
there is an incline, a climb. I have ridden up that with two people sitting in the rickshaw. I 
would not take one person alone. […] I remember, even today, I had begun to sweat in winter. 
And even in the end of December I would often remove my shirt; that’s how much I sweat.’ 
At night, Mahendar would wait outside the Ambala Railway Station for rides. As middle-aged men 
who saw Mahendar as a son, the other rickshaw riders adored him and gave him first preference 
whenever someone approached them for a lift. One night, while waiting outside the railway station, 
Mahendar’s headmaster and his wife approached them for a lift and were re-directed to Mahendar.  
‘They came out of there from the gate, so they sat them on my rickshaw. My whole face was 
covered, only my eyes were visible. It was winter. So they asked me how much, [and] in a low 
voice I said 2 rupees. So they thought that they have to tell me the address, tell me where to 
go. But I thought I have seen their house so I started for their house. They both sat, husband 
wife, and I started moving. They thought now I’ll ask for the house, now I’ll ask for the house, 
but I took them to their street and stopped the rickshaw outside their house. And without 
saying anything, asking any questions. So he said, “You did not ask me the address. You 
brought me straight to my house. How do you know this is my house?” I started crying, and I 
said, “I recognise you, but you do not recognise me.” He asked, “Who are you,” so I said 
Mahendar.  
[Voice chokes and starts crying. Tries to speak while sobbing]  
His wife started crying and hugged me and asked which class do you study in, I said 9th. “You 
study in 9th?” I started crying and she took me inside the house and said you are not going 
anywhere. They switched on the lights and we sat down. They were returning from a wedding 
so they gave me some sweets. […] Anyway, they gave me sweets and 2 rupees. She said now 
you will not go anywhere, go straight back home. Then the next day headmaster-saab called 
198 
 
me. I said when I wanted [the scholarship] you did not give it to me [starts crying], now I do 
not want it. I have left the home [figuratively] so I earn 1 rupee every day. I do not want this 
at all, forgive me. Maybe some other poor person… So he insisted a lot but I did not let him. I 
would work two days in a week so I would make 2.5 rupees. Then I never again asked for a fee 
waiver. And he respected this.’ 
Later, news of this incident reached Dr Bin Bihari Lal. Dr Lal had a long chat with Mahendar and made 
him understand that if he kept working like this, he would be unable to study. Dr Lal finally got through 
to Mahendar and convinced him to give up the rickshaw. Dr Lal then spoke to Mahendar’s headmaster 
and had his fees waived off for the remainder of his schooling. However, in retelling this story, 
Mahendar emphasised the respect he had earned through his purusharth. He said that Dr Lal had told 
him that he respected what Mahendar had done, but he could not let him continue doing this for his 
own good. Dr Lal also gave Mahendar a new goal to aim for: a rank position. Mahendar not only 
achieved that but also went on to complete his BA. Bringing his story to a close, Mahendar remarked 
that:    
‘Everything came to us with great difficulty. But I am proud of that. If we had stayed in 
Pakistan, whether our parents had taken care of us, or if we were independent, then we would 
not have done so much [work]. […] So the people from Pakistan did not come so easily. The 
people from Pakistan remember their stories even today. Even today we remember those 
stories.’  
Ashok provided the closing comments to Mahendar’s story by adding:  
‘Three things come out very clearly from your words. Self-esteem. Confidence. And 
Purusharth, the desire to achieve something. These 3-4 factors emerge from your story and 
they were common. The people of that time, if you will find something common in them, it is 
these 3-4 factors you will find.’ 
Mahendar’s stories follow the broad discursive contours of the stories of purusharth I encountered 
during my fieldwork. This idea of hard work as a redemptive sacrifice was a common thread running 
through these stories. Talk of the Partition commonly inspired the retelling of such redemptive stories 
of Purusharth; whether those of their own experience or that of others. In Mahendar’s stories, we 
observe a clear attempt at the karmic justification of wealth and privilege. His stories assert the moral 
and political claim that one sows that which one reaps but also that one must only reap that which one 
has sown. The latter is emphasised by him right at the beginning, when he remembers his father’s 
refusal to accept the free rations being distributed at their refugee camp. The moral of this anecdote 
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is reinforced in all of his stories, especially the tale of his serendipitous midnight encounter with his 
school’s headmaster. In this sense, these stories are also fables or morality tales.  
Additionally, Ashok’s implicit description of purusharth as, ‘the desire to achieve something’, adds a 
layer of complexity to our discussion of purusharth. Deviating slightly from the didactic, orthodox 
definition of ‘hard work as virtue’, Ashok’s phrasing adds ambition to this mix. As I found in my 
fieldwork, my informants often implicitly described other values such as ambition, cleverness and 
entrepreneurial instincts as purusharth. Clubbing these together, we can understand this mix of values 
as ‘street-smartness’.   
As with Mahendar’s stories of hard work, the stories of some of my informants also emphasised the 
street-smartness of the Punjabi refugee; literally recounting how he had managed to turn even dust 
into gold. Rajaram’s story of a Punjabi sugar-seller is a good example of this. Rajaram – whose story 
we encountered in Section 1.6 – told me the story of a Punjabi refugee who made a profit by selling 
sugar at cost-price. This appears to be a well-known Punjabi legend. In Since 1947, Ravinder Kaur 
(2007: 21-22) too makes a note of this legend. Like Mahendar, Rajaram too begins the sugar-seller’s 
tale by distancing the Punjabi community from the refugee label.  
 PK: Do you still consider yourself a refugee? 
 R: No. We did not believe that earlier and neither do we believe that now.  
 PK: When did this change? 
R: So we, our Punjabis did not accept that we are refugees, we are purusharthi. This Partition 
happened, because of that we had to come. We do not depend on them [local Indian people]. 
Let me tell you one more story, make sure you write it. The Punjabi never spread his hands in 
front of anyone that help me. [Spreads his hands in front of me to mimic a begging gesture] 
No Punjabi did. [Swipes the air with his index finger in a decisive, ‘No’.] 
PK: So they ate whatever they ate from their own hard work.    
R: Yes, whatever they ate, stayed hungry also. Did not drink milk, did not drink buttermilk 
[lassi]. But have not asked from anyone, from these Baniyas or the Jats here. This has been a 
quality of Punjabis. They [Baniyas and Jats] have succeeded by copying us. There is a strange 
tale of a man in Merut. That had not even occurred to anyone here. What he would do? There 
was a shop there of a Muslim in Merut; he captured it. Who would refuse? They allotted it to 
his name. But the shop was not doing well. What did he do? He wrote, bhai, rate for rate sugar 
available. Do you understand rate for rate? 
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PK: Yes, he was selling it at the rate at which he had purchased it. 
R: What we have purchased in wholesale, that he was selling at that rate. The first day he sold 
one sack. The second day, two. His 40-40, 30-30 sacks would sell like that. There his 
competitors were astonished that bhai how is he eating on this? Someone asked him, Lala, 
what do you eat? The cost at which you buy, that cost… He replied, I sell at the cost at which 
I buy. And then when I dust out the sack, I get some sugar from that. I sell that. The sack that 
is left, I sell that. When I sell 10 sacks, that’s my roti done. 
[…] 
R: So he would get the worth of the sacks in his earnings. Now bhenchod58 when he has sold 
20-20 sacks, yes, yes? So how much money has he saved? Why? 
PK: He saved a little but his survival is met. 
R: He became very rich. People would come from all places, bhenchod, they would imitate 
him, he was selling so much. So Punjabis found ways to earn. Otherwise these people were 
committing daylight robbery. […] So alongside hard work, Punjabis developed schemes so that 
we would be self-supported.    
Here again, Rajaram invokes hard work and ‘self-sufficiency’ as the innate national character of 
Punjabi refugees. The idea that Punjabis never begged for money, or asked for support of any kind, 
was something Rajaram referred to often in his stories. In another conversation I had with him, he re-
emphasised the hard-working nature of Punjabis and went on to add that he and his father had also 
worked as daily wage construction labourers, during their initials days in Gurgaon.  
 R: Punjabis did not do any kind of begging. You must write this. 
 PK: They ate off their own labour 
R: Yes, they ate off their own labour. Stayed hungry. This is the main point. I told you na how 
he [the sugar-seller] did it. And the reply that he gave, ‘bhenchod, at least the sack will sell.’ 
You did not understand? 
[He assumes I did not understand and recounts the sugar-seller’s tale again] 
                                                            




R: Like this people rode rickshaws. This New Colony here, you’ve seen it right? New Colony. 
Here, we did mazdoori [construction labour]. Even my father did mazdoori. I also did 
mazdoori. We carried all those bricks. But I never did dishonesty.   
Rajaram once again returns to the story of the sugar-seller. Recapping it and sharing the story of his 
own physical labour, he emphasises the virtuous and honest nature of the work that Punjabis did. His 
repeated emphasis on how Punjabis never begged is similar to Mahendar’s comment about how his 
father never let their family eat the free food in refugee camps. In addition to justifying wealth and 
privilege (through karma and the predestination of national character) such stories assert their pride 
and agency. They present the Punjabi refugee as an exceptionally hard-working and resilient worker.  
Another theme that emerges strongly from these stories is the implicit definition of purusharth as 
specifically backbreaking, physical man-work. Stories of purusharth seldom comprise middle-class 
office jobs; this despite the fact that most of my informants including Bhanwarilal, Rajaram, Mahendar 
and Dilip worked in regular desk-based office jobs, for most of their lives. Stories of street-smartness 
add to the dramatic character of these stories of purusharth.  
The following story told by Bhanwarilal of the success of a button-seller combines all of these 
elements. Here, Bhanwarilal was telling me about the kind of purusharth he witnessed Punjabi 
refugees performing, just after the Partition. While Bhanwarilal was in Mianwali at the time that 
Partition riots broke out, his brother and mother were in Delhi. His brother was a civil servant and in 
1942, had purchased an apartment in the vicinity of the historic Roshanara Garden of Old Delhi. It was 
to this house that Bhanwarilal somehow returned in November 1947, after having spent numerous 
harrowing months on the refugee trail.  
‘When we came from there, so they [people] would bring a bundle of rice and sit downstairs 
in the vegetable market close to where we stayed. All day they would sell rice. They would 
make just one rupee extra. That one rupee was their earning. Household expenses would 
come from that, however they came. […] These people who are established today have 
established themselves on that and today they have even built their own houses. These 
people have worked so hard after coming here. Sat on the streets to sell. I have a friend, he 
sat on the street and sold buttons, in Sadar Bazar [Delhi]. These buttons for different button 
holes in coats. Today he has four-four houses. He says when he came from Pakistan, he would 
sit on the street with a box of buttons; every morning he would sit with buttons on the streets 
of Sadar Bazar.’ 
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Continuing with this story Bhanwarilal said that one day, his friend, Hansraj, was approached by a man 
who owned a button-making factory in Delhi. This man offered him a loan to set up a proper shop and 
offered to supply him regularly with buttons. Hansraj balked at the thought of paying off a hefty loan 
and refused initially. But the man waived off his concerns and insisted that he only had to pay him as 
and when he could spare some money from his earnings. Hansraj initially set up a shop in partnership 
with his brother-in-law. However, the two had a falling out. In disgust, Hansraj walked out of his own 
shop and returned to selling buttons on the streets. The same man found Hansraj again, and this time 
gave him a bigger loan to set up shop again. Hansraj accepted the loan and opened a new shop directly 
opposite his brother-in-law’s. Over time Hansraj’s shop emerged the more successful one of the two 
and he built back his wealth, little by little. ‘Today he has 4 houses, 3 in Mianwali Nagar alone,’ 
Bhanwarilal commented, concluding Hansraj’s story.  
Ultimately, these stories of purusharth provide karmic justifications for the current and former wealth 
and privilege of my informants. Disavowing the role of state-supports in their recovery, these stories 
assert the efficiency of their labour along with a sense of pride. We get a glimpse of this in both 
Mahendar and Rajaram’s stories where they repeatedly say that Punjabis only ate from what they 
earned and went hungry when they could not earn. Framed against the helplessness of displacement, 
the idea that Punjabis would go hungry rather than suffer the indignity of begging, expresses agency 
in their suffering. By emphasising the pride inherent in the Punjabi refugee, these stories reassure the 
listener that despite everything that happened to them, Punjabis never lost their honour and dignity.  
Whether it is Dilip’s story of selling toffees, or Mahendar’s story of riding a rickshaw, or Rajaram’s 
story of mazdoori, or Bhanwarilal’s story of the button-seller, all of these stories comprise dramatic 
tales of harsh, physical labour. Yet, they are all stories of men who did whatever it took to support 
their families. Suffering the indignity of selling whatever they could on the street in order to eke out a 
living, these men are valourised for having saved their families (and by extension the Punjabi 
community), from the dishonour of begging. Also implicit in these stories is the valourisation of street-
smartness as purusharth. Rather than have ‘their women’ suffer indignity, rather than beg or steal, 
rather than have their physical and social bodies polluted by the ‘other’, Punjabis chose ‘sacrifice’ and 
suffering over dishonour.  
Yet, this discourse hides as much as it reveals. After all, the wealth and real estate of my informants 
(and the friends they cite as examples) cannot be accounted for by manual labour or the sale of 
buttons or leftover gunny sacks. In its dramatic, redemptive retelling of the success of ‘man-work’, 
these stories obscure the role of the state in the resettlement of Partition refugees. In the following 
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section, I examine the political and moral statement this obscuration constitutes. I also explore the 
ways in which the discourse of purusharth is itself part of the politics of Hindu nationalism. 
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2.3. A Story Half Told: The Moral and Political Claims of Purusharth  
 
‘On the one hand are those [critics of demonetisation] who talk of what people at Harvard say, and on the 
other is a poor man’s son, who through his hard work, is trying to improve the economy. […] In fact, hard work 
is much more powerful than Harvard.’ 
Narendra Modi (The Hindu, 2017a) 
 
In the previous section, I presented a number of stories of purusharth narrated by my informants. In 
doing so, I also drew attention to how stories of purusharth seem to comprise dramatic tales of 
physical labour such as button-selling, construction labour or riding a rickshaw. Stories of purusharth 
did not include stories of everyday office work or any other kind of stable, long-term employment. In 
contrast to the former, stories of the latter were devoid of any details. Ravinder Kaur (2007: 141) 
observes this contrast in the stories of Partition refugees and writes that such stories, ‘were presumed 
too ordinary to mention, as it had little to do with the general theme of struggle successfully waged 
by the refugees.’ 
I am drawing attention to this here to argue that due to this recurring trope of the helpless refugee 
waging a dramatic struggle in pursuit of success, stories of purusharth place the individual at the 
centre of their narrative. In doing so, the framing of this narrative obscures the state’s active role in 
the rehabilitation of refugees. Yet a closer reading of the stories of my informants reveals the state 
lurking in the background.  
For example, Mahendar mentions that his family was allotted a house in Ambala, in compensation for 
the property they had lost in Pakistan. Needless to say, the compensation was paltry in comparison to 
their former wealth. However, it also meant that despite riding a rickshaw for a living, Mahendar’s 
family was never at the same economic level as those workers who could only ride a rickshaw for a 
living.  
Similarly, while Bhanwarilal extols the ‘sacrifices’ of Punjabi refugees and alleges the lack of adequate 
reparations, his stories are also laced with occasional descriptions of the compensation their family 
received. For example, in his passionate exposition on the sacrifices of Punjabi refugees at the 
beginning of this chapter, Bhanwarilal acknowledges that his family received agricultural land worth 
Rs 10,000. While this was significantly less than their former wealth, it nevertheless provided the 
family with an important source of capital. Moreover while reminiscing about the idyllic ‘Thandi Sadak’ 
boulevard (in Section 1.4) and while talking about Punjabi refugees selling vegetables in Delhi’s Ghanta 
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Ghar, Sabzi Mandi area (in the previous section), Bhanwarilal mentions a house his brother owned in 
Delhi at the time. Bhanwarilal’s brother was a civil servant and had purchased a flat in Delhi, near 
Roshanara Garden, in 1942. In 1947, following the Partition, this was the flat to which the rest of their 
family moved. Thus, while Bhanwarilal experienced chronic hunger and thirst during the four months 
he spent on the refugee trail, he and his family were never reduced to the abject poverty of daily-
wage labourers. There is even an implicit recognition of this in his stories. After all, he rarely speaks 
about his own purusharth. Rather, he recounts the purusharth and hardship of others; allegorising 
their experiences to that of the entire community. 
In his stories of the establishment of Faridabad’s New Industrial Township (NIT), Pooran Chand also 
alluded to some of the special concessions that the government made for the refugees. As stated 
previously in Section 1.4 Pooran Chand remembered Prime Minister Nehru’s decision to give the 
Frontier refugees a 1 rupee bonus on top of their daily wages. Pooran Chand also remembered that 
the government started a subsidised monthly instalment scheme towards housing refugees. In this 
way, 5000 housing plots of 235 square yards each were given to the Frontier refugees in lieu of a Rs 6 
monthly instalment paid over 25 years (Jain, 1998). Priced at Rs 1800 in the 1950s, these houses are 
estimated to be worth somewhere between 8 to 12 million rupees today.   
However, in restating these facts and figures, I do not mean to imply that Partition refugees did not 
face hardship in the effort to rebuild their lives. Rather, my argument is that middle-class and caste-
Hindu refugees such as my informants did not face quite as dramatic and hopeless a path towards 
rehabilitation as their stories of purusharth imply. In her examination of the rehabilitation claims filed 
by Punjabi refugees, Kaur (2007) found that by creating a compensation system that awarded land (up 
to Rs 10,000) on the basis of previously owned land, the Indian government created two classes of 
refugees: the landed and the landless.   
‘The most vital pre-requisite for compensation was that refugees should have owned some 
form of property. This pre-requisite straightaway barred the homeless and poor migrants from 
staking any claim in the new scheme of nation-building. They could continue to live on the 
margins just as before, while new territories were being carved out for the middle class 
refugees.’ 
(ibid.: 101) 
In doing so, the compensation system reproduced past social hierarchies. All of my informants, 
without exception, were middle class upper-caste zamindars. As a result, even though the 
compensation system did not restore their former wealth, it nevertheless preserved their status as a 
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propertied class. Moreover, all of my informants had the privilege of education. As wealthy land-
owning families, they had completed a basic level of education prior to their migration. As previously 
stated in Section 1.4, following the Partition, many could access higher education through 
government-run Camp Colleges (Datta, 1986). In the short-term, their education helped them 
navigate convoluted bureaucratic procedures in pursuit of their compensation claims, while, in the 
long-term, their education helped secure relatively stable employment. This was by no means a simple 
or easy process but, middle class, upper-caste refugees were helped along by their systemic privilege 
and the state’s welfare initiatives. 
In the compensation system’s reproduction of past hierarchies, Kaur (2007) locates a typically colonial 
impulse. As stated previously in the Introduction, the Indian state inherited the colonial regime’s 
position as the ‘moral protector’ of an ‘ancient’ civilisation (ibid.: 94); assuming the role of a neutral 
arbiter of ‘communal conflict’ (Ahmad, 2020; Pandey, 1990; van der Veer, 1944). The former 
influenced the state’s policy to actively salvage and preserve pre-Partition hierarchies through the 
rehabilitation process (Kaur, 2007). An example of this was the caste-based segregation of refugee 
camps (ibid.). Similarly the establishment of resettlement colonies along ethnic lines was also intended 
at preserving these social orders (ibid.).  
The Indian state’s inheritance of a colonial positionality is also visible in its representation of Partition 
violence. The Story of Rehabilitation – a 1967 document published by the Publications Division of the 
Government of India presents the violence of the Partition as an unimaginable, one-off event where 
religion ‘warped’ the minds of ‘men’ such that, ‘they forgot their humanity and turned upon one 
another with the ferocity of jungle beasts’ (ibid.: 87). Positioning itself as a ‘benevolent parent’ that 
hopes to restore the ‘lost dignity’ of refugees, the state effectively absolves itself of any responsibility 
for its inability to control or pre-empt the violence of the Partition (ibid.: 89). 
Yet, state-refugee relations on the ground were characterised by confrontation and suspicion (ibid.). 
In order to receive their compensation, refugees were forced to confront the unwieldy bureaucratic 
apparatus of the state (ibid.). Administrators, in turn, were supposed to carefully scrutinise 
compensation claims and treat them impartially (ibid.). To the refugees, this conveyed the state’s 
mistrust of their suffering (ibid.). The state’s mistrust of the refugees was mirrored by the refugees’ 
mistrust of the state; they felt the state did not treat their claims seriously (ibid.). This in turn gave the 
refugees incentive to exaggerate the story of their losses (ibid.). 
Kaur (ibid.: 123) argues that in the confrontations around the compensation system, both the refugees 
and the state were attempting to create, ‘the universe of moral obligation.’ That is, by establishing a 
system of compensation, the state expressed the moral obligation it felt towards Partition refugees 
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due to their suffering, while, by confronting the state with claims based on accounts of suffering, 
Partition refugees felt the state was morally obliged towards them. This element of moral obligation 
in visible in my informants’ quotes where they cite their suffering as a sacrifice that necessitates just 
compensation. There is, in this discourse, the articulation of compensation as a moral obligation.  
What Kaur describes as a ‘universe of moral obligation’, can also be understood as the attempt at the 
restoration of a fractured nomos: of a social order that would compensate suffering with justice. 
Recognising this impulse helps understand refugee-state contestations around compensation in terms 
of Weberian theodicy. I draw attention to these dynamics for the way in which they combine to 
establish the discursive structure of the stories of purusharth.  
Emphasising their loss and suffering (even exaggerating it at times), Partition survivors confront their 
listeners with their burning desire for justice; a justice that they feel is morally owed. Posing destitute 
and helpless before the state in pursuit of compensation is experienced by them as a communal 
shame. They recover their pride and agency through the retelling of these dramatic stories of 
purusharth; retrospectively constructing themselves as hard-workers. In the way that these stories 
frame the individual at the centre of a tough struggle for rehabilitation, these stories require the 
obfuscation of the role of the state. This discourse allows no space for the acknowledgement of any 
sort of reparations or compensation. After all, to accept, or rather, to admit to having accepted 
compensation would undermine their status as hard-workers.  
Visible in this obfuscation is also a refusal to acknowledge one’s caste and class privilege. After all, 
Kaur (ibid.) has also observed that Dalit and Scheduled Caste refugees acknowledged and appreciated 
the state’s rehabilitation measures far more than caste-Hindu and Sikh refugees. This, despite the 
state having spent significantly fewer resources on the former (ibid.; Sen 2012). In contrast to these 
subaltern Hindu refugees, my informants valourise their purusharth to provide a karmic justification 
of their present and former privilege. Edging the state into the background, they present themselves 
as the heroes of their own rehabilitation.  
However, this karmic justification of wealth and privilege as the fruit of one’s purusharth reifies a 
meritocratic view of society. As stated previously, the legitimation of one’s own wealth and good 
fortune is also simultaneously a moralising discourse that blames the poverty and misfortune of others 
on their present and past conduct (Weber, 1965, 2013). As a philosophy of the ruling class, this has 
much in common with the idea of the American Dream. It uses the moralising labels of ‘hard work’ or 
its absence as generalising and simplistic explanations of inequality. 
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In this way, my informants’ denunciation of refugees and the ‘charity’ of the welfare-state, is 
demonstrative of a trenchant neoliberalism. Denouncing the state’s responsibility towards 
‘dependent’ populations (such as refugees or minorities), they assert the individual’s responsibility in 
the making of one’s own ‘success’. Although this assertion is watered down by their demand for 
compensation from the state, this is seen by them not as dependence or weakness, but as a moral 
obligation. The state owes them compensation not because they believe in socialism or the welfare-
state, but because they see themselves as inhabiting a meaningful cosmos where suffering warrants 
reparations. That the state is seen to have failed in this – as not having served them – is taken as 
evidence that the state has in fact been captured by minorities and self-serving liberal elites.  
We can see here how warped stories of purusharth breed ressentiment and thereby feed into a 
pervasive ‘democracy fatigue’ (Appadurai, 2017). This is an idea I return to in the following chapter, in 




The Politics of Hard Work: Karma, Neoliberalism and the Meritocracy 
 
In Lessons From Hell, Christopher Pinney (2018) examines the culture of ‘karni bharni’ imagery in India. 
The term ‘karni bharni’ is derived from the words ‘karam’ (action) and ‘bharan’ (payment or reward). 
These images comprise the karmic cultural belief that the universe repays one’s actions with 
proportionate reward or punishment: that one reaps what one sows. These images are often called, 
‘karam ke phal’, or the fruits of one’s deeds (ibid.: 16). 
Mass-printed since the 1880s, these popular printed images provide graphic depictions of the 
punishments that await sinners in hell. The punishments they depict are often an iconic replication of 
the misdeeds they condemn. For example, the person who commits the allegedly sinful work of 
butchery is hacked to death by demons or the person who kills a bird is condemned to a divine-
ordained pecking by a flock of his former victims (ibid.: 20). More often, the images feature sinners 
tied to a pole while being inventively tortured by demons, as punishment for their alleged sins. In 
identifying a number of ‘sins’ and their ordained punishment, this culture of imagery details a 
comprehensive moral philosophy of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Consequently, Dalit rights activists such as 
Jyotirao Phule, B.R. Ambedkar and Kancha Ilaiah have critiqued the upper-caste morality that such 
images seek to reify (ibid.). 
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While Pinney engages in a visual ethnography of this culture of imagery, his analysis provides insights 
relevant to my discussion of theodicy and the politics of hard work. As a culture of imagery that 
punishes sin with an iconic replication of the sinful act, the larger philosophy of karni bharni provides 
a karmic justification for suffering and misfortune: a form of theodicy. Where the philosophy of 
purusharth conjures a meaningful order where virtuous hard work is rewarded with success, karni 
bharni, provides its complementary opposite, promising divine retribution to those who sin. Where 
purusharth – in Weberian terms – presents one’s good fortune as legitimate fortune or a sign of God’s 
favour, karni bharni images provide an explanation for misfortune and suffering. Under the philosophy 
of karni bharni, only those who have sinned suffer, and, if a sinner does not suffer in this world, then 
they are condemned to punishment in hell.  
Pinney notes the prevalence of the tropes of karni bharni within contemporary Indian politics, 
especially the politics of Anna Hazare and Narendra Modi. Pinney notes that Anna Hazare’s 2011 anti-
corruption Jan Lokpal (Public Ombudsman) campaign articulated the imagery of karni bharni. Hazare’s 
discourses on corruption in India – of shady deals being struck in ‘smoky black rooms’ – mobilised 
some of the tropes found in karni bharni images on ‘rishvat lene ka phal’ (the fruits of accepting a 
bribe) (ibid.: 128). Hazare has also frequently iterated his support for ‘hanging corrupt politicians’ and 
‘“cutting off the hands” of thieves’ (ibid.: 129).  
Hazare’s endorsement of a kind of justice that, like karni bharni imagery, awards a punishment that is 
the iconic replication of the crime, is a consistent pattern within his politics. As a self-proclaimed 
‘Gandhian activist’, Hazare’s history of ‘social reform’ in Ralegan Siddhi – his natal village – comprises 
a similar pattern of graphically retributive ‘justice’. Hazare celebrates as his ‘achievement’, the 
imposition of prohibition in his village. Shopkeepers in the village also claim to have not sold tobacco 
products in the last 13 years. However, the ‘success’ of Hazare’s campaign was largely predicated on, 
‘the public thrashing of alcoholics by Hazare himself (they are tied to a pole and he thrashes them with 
his army belt)’ (ibid.: 129). Hazare has been quoted as saying that alcoholics are taken to the temple 
and have to promise god against drinking in the future (ibid.: 129). But should this fail, Hazare promises 
to, ‘tie him up to the electric pole in front of the temple and then beat him up so that he gets scared’ 
(Anna Hazare quoted in ibid.: 129).  
The image of a sinner tied to a pole whilst being punished for their sin(s) is eerily reminiscent of karni 
bharni imagery. The similarity is heightened by Hazare’s treatment of the consumption of alcohol and 




Pinney notes that while Hazare disappeared from Indian politics soon after 2011, his legacy has 
endured. Hazare succeeded in reviving the karni bharni critique of corruption. In doing so, Hazare 
created an unusual political space that fused a traditional upper-caste Hindu cosmology with the 
politics of the modern nation-state. By 2014, this space had been inherited by Narendra Modi, who 
like Hazare, was seen to be un-corrupt, celibate and an austere vegetarian (ibid.). While Modi comes 
from an OBC-caste, through his celibacy and austere vegetarianism, he embodies the lifestyle of an 
upper-caste Hindu: a prime example of sanksritisation59 (Srinivas, 1966) within the Hindu-fold. 
Through careful management of the media, Modi has also been presented as a devoted son. 
Meanwhile, his abandonment of his wife at a young age, to join the RSS, is celebrated as evidence of 
his selfless nationalism. Therefore, Modi is seen as an elderly brahmachari: a celibate acetic (Pinney, 
2018).  
Interestingly, there were many similarities in the way that my informants described themselves as 
hard-workers and the way in which they would praise Modi’s qualities. Modi was seen by my 
informants as a selfless, hard-working politician who only has the interests of the nation at heart. 
During my fieldwork, I regularly encountered people who expressed their awe at Modi’s hard-working 
nature. Widely publicised claims that Modi only sleeps four hours a night and never takes vacations, 
were cited as evidence of his dedication. 
Another theme that emerged in this discourse of Modi as an honest purusharthi, was the allusion to 
his lack of family ties. Modi’s image as an elderly bachelor was contrasted with the nepotism and 
corruption of the Nehru-Gandhi family. Modi has himself furthered this contrast by positioning himself 
as a ‘kamdar’ (working man, or hard-worker) against the ‘namdar’ (dynast) Rahul Gandhi (Singh, 
2018). Here, Modi is helped by the Nehru-Gandhi family’s visibly dynastic hold over the Congress 
party60. In a larger sense, Modi’s discourses such as his famous comment that ‘hard work is much more 
powerful than Harvard’ (The Hindu, 2017a) comprise a denunciation of privilege while also reinscribing 
                                                            
59 As stated previously in the Introduction, Sanskritisation is a process whereby lower-caste Hindus, Dalits and 
Adivasis articulate the aspiration for mobility by imitating and imbibing the lifestyle and ritual practices of 
upper-caste Hindus (Srinivas, 1966). Sanskritisation may be seen to comprise a ‘subordinate discourse’ 
(Messick, 1987) for the way in which it seeks not to overthrow Brahmanical (or more generally upper-caste) 
supremacy as much as it seeks betterment within this established order and its dominant ideology. It aspires 
to mobility through imitation, assimilation and the appeasement of an established hegemonic order.  
 
60 Some political commentators have pointed out that nepotism and political dynasties are a larger fact of 
Indian politics. For example, some recent newspaper reports have shown that 11% of the BJP’s current MPs 
have dynastic linkages while some of the BJP’s current and former regional allies such as the Shiv Sena, the 
Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) and the Lok Janshakti Dal (LJD), are family-run dynastic parties (Arnimesh and 
Pandey, 2020). However, the top political leadership of the BJP, unlike that of the Congress is not controlled by 
a fifth-generation political dynasty. It is here that the Congress party’s nepotism appears infinitely more 
pervasive than that of any other major national political party in India.      
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the centrality of the US to global concepts of prestige. Thus, Modi as a former tea-seller is largely 
considered a self-made hard-working leader of the masses.  
There is an interesting observation to be made here regarding kinship. Readers will recall my argument 
that not only were my informants’ stories of purusharth justifications of wealth, but that these stories 
were also distinctly familial or communitarian in their values. After all, my informants saw their hard 
work not as a selfish act of individualism but as a service or a duty to their families (and through it the 
larger collectivity). In a similar vein, the purusharth of Modi the brahmachari is seen to serve the family 
that is the Hindu nation.  
During my stay in Dehradun, my informant Naagesh and I had a conversation that crystallised this 
perspective. We were evaluating Modi’s public image when Naagesh praised Modi as a nationalist 
leader who is selflessly devoted to the service of the nation. I countered that with a tongue-in-cheek 
remark at Modi’s failed marriage. I said, ‘A man who could not be faithful to his own wife, how could 
he ever serve his country?’ Through this, I hoped to draw attention to Modi’s hypocritical failure to 
live up to the traditional Hindu family values his politics claims to defend. But, Naagesh’s reply 
reframed Modi’s life as the purusharth of a Brahmachari. Naagesh replied, ‘He left his wife for his 
country.’ Naagesh’s reply implicitly frames Modi as an unacknowledged father of the nation61; as a 
man who left his own family to serve the family that is the Hindu nation.  
The way in which ‘real’ kinship is seen to be in conflict with national service reveals something about 
nationalism. Herzfeld (1992) observes that nationalism relies on the symbolism of kinship in its 
imagination of a united nation. Kinship forms, ‘the bridge between body and polity, the locus of that 
spectacular conversion which all successful nationalisms effect between “blood” and “culture.”’ (ibid.: 
76). The implicit imagination of the nation as family allows the hard work of my informants to serve 
as a contribution to both their real family and the nation-as-family. In the case of Modi, his 
abandonement of his ‘real’ family is seen as a denunciation of nepotism and corruption. After all, as 
                                                            
61 In fact, meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on September 24, 
2019, US President Donald Trump went so far as to christen Modi the father of the Indian nation (India Today, 
2019c). He said: 
‘I remember India before [before PM Modi rule], not intimately, but I remember India before, it was 
very torn, it was a lot fighting and he brought it all together. Like a father would bring it together. 
Maybe he is the father of India. We will call him the father of India. He brought things together, you 
don't hear that anymore.’ 
(Trump quoted in ibid.) 
While Indian opposition leaders and Twitter users mocked Trump’s ignorance by reminding him that India 
already had a ‘father’ of the nation – Mahatma Gandhi – Trump’s remarks were vociferously defended by 
Modi’s party (The Hindu, 2019c). Some such as Union Minister Jitendra Singh went so far as to say that, ‘This is 
the first time that an American President has used this kind of words of praise not for an Indian Prime Minister 
but for any other world leader, and if someone is not proud of this, then maybe he does not consider himself 
an Indian’ (ibid.).  
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Herzfeld (ibid.) writes, corruption and nepotism – the use of political power for personal and familial 
ends – scandalise the notions of bureaucratic rationality and rule of law that are seen to be enshrined 
in the state. A violation of these principles constitutes a violation of the nomos that is the nation-state. 
However, Herzfeld (ibid.: 77) also reminds us that the discourse of corruption is not an absolute 
discourse but is dependent on the positionality of the observer.  
Specifically, in the context of Hindu nationalism, Modi’s celibate purusharth as a service to the family 
of the Hindu nation is also a reiteration of the RSS’ imagination of the body of the Hindu nation in 
purely masculine terms (Bacchetta, 2019). As a ‘fraternity of men’ (McClintock, 1995) sustained by 
firm male, homosocial bonding, celibacy is a necessary mark of one’s dedication to the nation 
(Bacchetta, 2019).  
The hallowed status of ascetic celibacy also draws on aspects of Hindu religious discourse. The tension 
between ascetic celibacy and domesticity is visible in Hindu mythology and is even embodied by the 
high-gods Shiva and Vishnu, and the former’s avatars Ram and Krishna (van der Veer, 1994). In 
Vaishnavism, celibacy and physical strength (bal) combine to produce the Hindu idea of power (Shakti) 
(ibid.: 72). The retention of semen within the body is said to imbue supernatural power, such as in the 
legendary strength of the brahmachari ape-god Hanuman (ibid.).  
Historically, ascetic celibacy also formed a major feature of the moderate Hindu nationalism of 
Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi took a vow of celibacy at the age of thirty-six and believed that his political 
power (Shakti) was derived from disciplining his body (ibid.). For Gandhi, it was his ascetism and 
celibacy that fed into the political power of his ahimsa (non-violence). In fact, Gandhi’s infamous 
practice of testing his celibacy by sleeping beside young naked women was linked to this idea of the 
retention of semen as the source of power (ibid.). Following an increase in Hindu-Muslim violence in 
1946, Gandhi suspected that his ahimsa’s power was being choked by something (ibid.: 97). Building 
his Shakti through a test of celibacy, Gandhi sought to enhance the political power of his ahimsa (ibid.: 
97). Gandhi’s ideas are in turn drawn from a specifically gendered Tantrik, Hindu religious discourse 
(ibid.) that is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
It is therefore no coincidence that Modi is also seen as a strong leader; both in his resolve and his 
ability to perform violence. As a brahamachari he is seen, by his followers, to be above personal 
temptation and, thereby ‘corruption’. Furthermore, as a ‘tea-seller’ and common man who has risen 
to high-office from the lowest rungs of the RSS and BJP, he is seen as a self-made man; someone who 
reminds my informants of their own past struggles. Yet, this affective identification with Modi is not 
merely symbolic. Modi’s neoliberal market economics too find resonance within my informants’ 
discourses on hard work and self-reliance. The retreat of the state – whether through the privatisation 
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of public services or in the proposed downscaling of welfare and affirmative action policies – is largely 
seen as a step in the right direction. Here, the support for neoliberalism intersects with casteism62. For 
most urban middle-class Indians – including my informants – what is ultimately hoped for is a 
downscaling of the state’s caste-based reservations63. The abolition of reservations that is hoped for 
represent the liberation of the state from undeserving minorities (predominantly Dalits and Adivasis) 
– and the liberal elites supportive of them – who are seen to be feeding off the fat of the land. 
Therefore, for my informants, purusharthi brahmachari Modi holds the promise of a Hindu state based 
on those very principles.  
                                                            
62 Discrimination on the basis of caste. 
63 Positive discrimination or affirmative action policies in India. 
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2.4. Sacrifice and Hard Work: Martyrdom as Theodicy 
 
‘We are not sharanarthi that we have come into your refuge [sharan]. Arre64 we have sacrificed and 
come. You have not made any sacrifice.’ 
Bhanwarilal 
 
‘A lot of people call what happened to them during the Partition as “sacrifice” [Kurbaani], that we 
have sacrificed this for the nation. What do you think about this?’ I asked Lata and Kulbhushan. Lata 
and Kulbhushan were an elderly Partition survivor couple who lived with their eldest son in Pitampura, 
New Delhi. They had been married for more than 50 years. While Lata was 4 years old at the time of 
the Partition, Kulbhushan was 10. Although Lata was too young to remember the Partition, 
Kulbhushan vividly remembered the day his family was forced to flee their village in district Dera Ghazi 
Khan.  
‘So what else? If this is not sacrifice then what is it? So many lives were lost, what is this?’ Kulbhushan 
asked rhetorically in reply. ‘We brought nothing from Pakistan,’ Lata added in a firm but quiet voice.  
‘We had absolutely nothing. Some people had brought a little money or something. We had nothing. 
We were in deep trouble. [My] Father had died there, we were all small-small. My [eldest] brother, I 
had told you, you know that he had been finished [killed] there and he was very healthy,’ Kulbhushan 
said, reminding me of the stories he had shared with me during our last conversation. Kulbhushan’s 
father and brother had been lynched by a mob of Muslims. The mob had begun by burning their shop. 
When his father and eldest brother fled the scene and hid in a nearby farm, the mob followed them 
there. Cornering both father and son in the fields, they savagely hacked both of them with swords. 
While his father died on the spot, his brother succumbed to his injuries later.  
‘I remember you told me, he had been killed with swords,’ I acknowledged.  
‘Our homes everything was divided, everything… When he [brother] was in Dera Ghazi Khan hospital 
who knows how many wounds were there on him, on his neck, his eye, over here, here,’ Kulbhushan 
began to pat certain parts of his body as he said this, indicating the various places his brother had 
been wounded. ‘He had a finger that was cut off, this’, Kulbhushan held up the index finger of his left 
hand. ‘This was connected by just a small bit,’ Kulbhushan said, as he paused to indicate that his 
brother’s wrist had been cut so badly that it remained attached to the rest of his arm by only a small 
                                                            
64 A dramatic or forceful exclamation. 
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amount of skin and tendons. ‘Even later it did not heal, he could not close his hand, it stayed like this,’ 
Kulbhushan said, showing me his outstretched palm.  
‘He did not have full control of his hand…’ I said.  
‘Yes, yes. When the doctor put stitches on him, so even the doctors were left stunned. So strong that 
he would not even say, “Uff”. They [doctors] kept saying we have not seen a man like this,’ Kulbhushan 
continued, recounting his eldest brother’s final moments in the hospital ward.   
‘But I found the word “sacrifice” a bit weird because would you consider this sacrifice? Sacrifice is a 
kind of voluntary thing. Like how someone might sacrifice a goat [in a ritual].’ Realising my faux pas, I 
halted my somewhat opaque and potentially disrespectful analogy. Changing tack, I continued, ‘You 
were not like that. What happened to you all was murder, crimes, riots, it was not sacrifice. It was not 
like you wanted to give this sacrifice for the nation.’ 
‘Consider this in helplessness or whatever it is,’ Kulbhushan responded, unconvinced.  
‘Yes so that is why I feel the word “sacrifice” is not right here,’ I argued.  
Both Lata and Kulbhushan retreated into silence. Unconvinced by my argument, they reflected in 
silence for a few moments. For my part, I was hesitant to press my disagreement any further for fear 
of seeming dismissive of their loss and suffering. Finally, Lata broke the silence by comparing the 
rioters in Pakistan to the terrorists of today. Kulbhushan disagreed and clarified that they were not 
terrorists, just Pathans and people of other ethnicities who stoked the flames of hatred. Stewing in 
my reflection of the meaning of ‘sacrifice’, I watched the conversation drift away to other matters.  
During my fieldwork, I encountered many informants, like Lata and Kulbhushan who insisted that their 
suffering during the Partition constituted a 'sacrifice' to the nation. Like them many of my informants 
insisted that the deaths of their relatives (and coreligionists), the loss of their property and the sheer 
fact of their displacement could not be considered as anything but sacrifice. Often voiced in this 
rhetorical structure of, ‘what is this if not sacrifice?’ this idea of Partition suffering as a national 
sacrifice comprises a popularly held common sense understanding of the Partition. Here I use the term 
‘common sense’ not in its generally positive connotation of ‘good sound practical sense’, but in its 
Italian form of ‘senso commune’ – as elaborated by Antonio Gramsci – as beliefs, ideas and opinions 
uncritically held by a group of people (Crehan, 2011: 273-4).  
This common sense understanding of Partition suffering as sacrifice differs from my (and social 
scientific) understandings of the word ‘sacrifice’. This was essentially the crux of my discussion with 
Lata and Kulbhushan. To me, sacrifice implies a voluntary act of renunciation. It has implications of 
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‘choice’ and agency; a knowing and intended action on the part of its actor. To sacrifice something 
implies that they ‘chose’ to do so; that one had the power to commit the said sacrifice. Sacrifice implies 
an element of altruism; the giving up of something in pursuit of a greater good. It is in the context of 
the latter that nationalist discourses frame national sacrifice: a sacrifice to the nation (in material, 
bodily or symbolic terms) for its betterment and progress.  
In this section, I focus on exactly this conflict of meanings, drawing attention to the contradiction 
between the apparent involuntariness of their suffering and its retrospective (re-)imagination by 
them, as a sacrifice to the nation. It is precisely this process of rationalising the ‘uselessness’ out of 
their suffering by reference to the nationalist discourse of sacrifice that I refer to as a form of theodicy. 
By (re-)imagining their suffering as a sacrifice to the nation, my informants sanctify their suffering as 
an offering to the greater good; as their contribution to the nation. Through recourse to this theodicy, 
they make sense of death and suffering (as witnessed on a hitherto unparalleled scale), giving it 
meaning and significance. This is visible in Lata and Kulbhushan’s words above, where when 
confronted with the idea that all that death and suffering might have been for nothing, they 
defensively ask, ‘So what else? If this is not sacrifice then what is it? So many lives were lost, what is 
this?’ There is, after all, no suffering more traumatic, more fundamentally threatening to one’s sense 
of humanity, than a useless one.  
 
 
Remember Us As Martyrs; As Freedom Fighters 
 
One of my informants for whom this idea of suffering as sacrifice resonated deeply, was Bhanwarilal. 
Bhanwarilal – whom we have encountered numerous times in this chapter – hailed from the town of 
Mianwali in Pakistan. Born in 1931, he was 16 years old at the time of the Partition. A highly 
opinionated, outspoken and well-read man, Bhanwarilal was someone I spent a lot of time with during 
my fieldwork. Through the time we spent together, Bhanwarilal came to address me as his student 
and grandson. Whenever I visited him, Bhanwarilal and his wife Bhavna, would generously ply me with 
snacks and beverages and insist on making me stay for lunch. He would also often count on me for 
lifts to the nursing home and some of the meetings of the All India District Mianwali Association. The 
latter became my way of immersing myself further in the life of this community.  
Despite having worked in the Indian Railways all his life, Bhanwarilal was at his heart an academic. 
Over time, he had built a priceless collection of Urdu and Hindi books. These included anthologies of 
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poetry, editions of magazines that had long gone out of print, newspapers and fiction and non-fiction 
books. Many of them referenced the Partition and/or the history of Punjab: his two foremost 
fascinations. During our conversations, he would often recommend books to me and sometimes he 
would even read out chosen passages from them, for the benefit of my Dictaphone. Although he was 
87 years old when I first met him, he was still an active contributor to two monthly magazines. He 
served as a mentor and editor for an Urdu Smarika (magazine) and also contributed some writing to 
the All India District Mianwali Association’s monthly gazette.  
An organic intellectual, Bhanwarilal was the first among my informants to describe Partition suffering 
as a sacrifice. This was an idea that resonated with him deeply; one that he confidently restated on 
numerous subsequent occasions. However, our first conversation on this subject occurred on August 
18, 2017. August 15, 2017 had marked the 71st anniversary of India’s independence while the previous 
day, August 17 did so for the Partition of India. August 17, 2017 was made particularly significant by 
the fact that Captain Amarinder Singh (Congress leader and Chief Minister of Punjab), had inaugurated 
India’s first and only museum dedicated to the memorialisation of the Partition. This was a piece of 
news that had made it into most national dailies on August 18. While we talked, I noticed a copy of 
the Hindustan Times on his bed. Open at page 9, the headline, ‘Capt. Amarinder and his visit to 
Partition Museum takes him down memory lane,’ caught my eye. This article sat eerily beside an op-
ed piece headlined ‘India today like Nazi Germany’.  
I suspect that the historical significance of that week, along with the saturation of political 
commemorations and speeches had an indelible impact on Bhanwarilal’s words. That day, as we 
retreated into Bhanwarilal’s study with cups of tea, Bhanwarilal began to talk about the hollowness 
he perceived in political discourses on the Partition. Beginning with a recent Independence Day 
celebration he had attended in the local park close to his house, Bhanwarilal went on to talk about 
why he felt that Partition survivors were the ‘real losers’ of the Partition.  
B: So they had a function on 15 August- the people who come to that park. Now in that park 
they were talking about all this, that we got freedom, freedom led to this, freedom led to that. 
So I was sitting there so they took my name. I said, all those who were speaking before me, 
they were talking about the Partition, they have not seen the Partition. They were born here. 
What actually happened, they are not witness to that.  
PK: They would have told the things they had heard 
B: They were saying things they had heard. I have seen with my own eyes, what the situation 
was. People showed a lot of curiosity. So then I told them how I saw things on the way and I 
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came after this September or October. When August went by then 14 August was when 
Pakistan celebrated [independence] and on 15 August India did. So I came near about 
October, in the end of October or November. So I came 4-5 months after that [independence]. 
And the situation on the way, how they sent slaughtered trains, how they responded, the 
Indians, how we were stuck along the way we did not get food for two days, did not get water. 
They were astonished to hear. As they heard me many of them started tearing up. So I said it 
is alright whatever the Partition was, but after that at that time, we have stood up on our feet 
and they are enjoying the freedom. Whereas we are the losers. We lost everything and came 
here. Their parents must have lost and come here but they do not know this, the people who 
are speaking on stage at the moment. They do not know anything. That what actually… I am 
from that generation that has seen this with its own eyes. Those conditions I have told you 
before.  
PK: So in a way, do you find Independence Day celebrations - the way we celebrate freedom 
- a little hollow? That this might not be a day of celebration for you? 
B: I find them hollow because, son, the present generation or the present ruling [government] 
or the present persons who are happy or they remained ministers in UPA [previous coalition 
government] or in the NDA [current BJP-led ruling alliance], they have not seen the Partition. 
There is no strength in their sympathy. What all actually went on, that only our people who 
suffered in north Pakistan have suffered.  
PK: Maximum [violence] happened in that Punjab belt. 
B: The people who came from Punjab were the sufferers. Delhiites did not move. Delhiites are 
just sitting there. […] Those ahead of Delhi are also sitting there. What have they seen, they 
have seen nothing.  
PK: South India has not seen that much also. 
B: Today this belt of Rohtak65, that we call Haryana, in which Jat66 people live. They created 
trouble, look bhai the refugee have come. Sharanarthi have come. Actually we are not 
sharanarthi. […] We are not sharanarthi that we have come into your refuge [sharan]. Arre 
we have sacrificed and come. You have not made any sacrifice.  
                                                            
65 Rohtak is a major industrial city of the state of Haryana. During the Partition a number of Punjabi Partition 
refugees (including many from Mianwali) were resettled here.  
66 A largely pastoralist north Indian ethnic group. In the context of the displacement of the Partition, they may 
be regarded as the ‘indigenous’ residents of the land. 
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PK: So does that mean you also do not like these words such as refugee or sharanarthi? 
B: It is like this, I mean that all this that these people do, all of it seems hollow. They actually 
do not know about that suffering. Imagine if there was a father there, he saw that here the 
Muslims are attacking us. He has four daughters. He said where will I take these four 
daughters? On the way, these people will rape them. Using his own hands he took out a knife 
and cut the necks of those girls and threw them in a well. So that neither will they be with us, 
nor will they be raped. He cut them with his own hands and threw them. Look at their courage 
that the children they birthed, the children whom they nurtured and the children for whom 
they made offerings [to god], in the end what did those parents do? Rest of the life they are 
crying after their children. But their circumstances were like that. But in those circumstances 
they could not bring their children with them. The female children mainly, the male they 
brought however they came. And some reached here such that their parents had died there 
[in Pakistan]. When they came they would see where can we go, whom can we stay with, who 
will give us shelter?   
PK: What they did, to kill their daughters with their own hands, that is a kind of honour killing, 
is it not? 
B [hysterically]: What could we do? There was no alternative, there was no protection. If they 
migrated with them then would they have been protected? On the way there were such kind 
of things happening where they would grab the girls and marry them forcefully. A case came 
to me. […] Now these people were from Bannu. Among them in Dera Ismail Khan, some people 
in Bannu, some in Dera Ghazi Khan, stayed behind out of selfishness. Some converted their 
religion. They became Muslims, so that, ‘we will stay here so whatever is our land, the 
agricultural land of our caste, we will get the rest also, and our houses will stay with us.’ Now 
the thing there is that they [Muslims] are 500 people there, they [Hindus] are 5. 500 are the 
residents of that place, and 5 people are the ones who have converted. Or in those 5 people, 
3 are converts, 1 person says I will stay a Hindu. So that, they are pinpointed, these are the 5 
peoples, who have been left here after the Partition. They [Muslims] do not allow them into 
the mainstream. Every other day they attack them [Hindus/converts]. Every other day they 
dishonour67 them. They are second or third-grade citizens. They are lying there. Tolerating it 
they are lying there. Now in that suppose if a Hindu was left behind. So that Hindu has no 
                                                            
67 Could be a reference to sexual violence. Remains unclarified.  
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worth, neither does he have any means. He would have to bring and arrange stuff there, 
would have to buy their vegetables there, use them. 
Bhanwarilal’s narrative here is multi-layered and I unpack aspects of it sequentially. Responding to the 
deluge of discourses commemorating India’s Independence and Partition suffering, Bhanwarilal 
begins by expressing his displeasure towards them. He perceives these discourses and 
commemorations as ‘hollow’, since to him, these derive from people who ‘do not know’ about 
Partition suffering. However, the issue here is not that they do not know about Partition suffering, but 
that they have not suffered. Therefore, the crux of Bhanwarilal’s narrative here is his ressentiment for 
people who have not had to suffer the Partition’s excesses. ‘Arre we have suffered and come,’ he says 
at one point. ‘You have not made any sacrifice.’    
Bhanwarilal’s ressentiment also extends to the political class and their perspectives on the Partition. 
For Bhanwarilal, the Partition and India’s independence are indelibly linked. To him, commemorations 
of India’s independence seem ‘hollow’ as they seem to come from a class of people who remained 
unaffected with what he implicitly sees as the ‘cost’ of that freedom: the suffering of the Partition. 
Through this formulation, he frames his suffering and that of his community, as a ‘price’ that was paid 
for the fulfilment of freedom.  
This juxtaposition of the suffering of the Partition, with the fulfilment of independence was articulated 
by many of my other informants. For example, Jogesh and Kishore, two of the informants I met in 
Gurgaon recalled the suffering endured by people during the Partition, and demanded that Partition 
survivors should be recognised as freedom fighters. 
Kishore: We became nation-less, became homeless, came here. That is a different thing that 
we established ourselves. […] But we sacrificed a lot for azaadi [freedom], lakhs68 of people 
died. Our people, in front of parents, they saw daughters being raped. What did we get, what 
did they give us? […] Murders happened, fathers were killed. People ate poison and many died 
consuming poison, things like this they could not see there and they were buried alive there. 
What did we get? In fact we should get the status of freedom fighters. 
Jogesh: Did not get it. No asks about us, who does? Who has asked? 
Kishore: If they [people arrested during the freedom struggle] stayed in jail for 6 months so 
they are getting pension and those whose houses were destroyed, children were killed, and 
                                                            
68 One lakh signifies the number 100,000  
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all their sources [of livelihood] finished, became homeless and had to come here, for azaadi, 
nothing for them. [We] Should get the status of a freedom fighter.  
Jogesh: We should get the status. Pakistani, Pakistani, they would call us.  
Like Bhanwarilal, Kishore remembers the suffering of the Partition and wonders, ‘What did we get?’ 
His discourse too is evocative of the ressentiment that Bhanwarilal expresses. By demanding the status 
of a ‘freedom fighter’, they demand the recognition of their suffering.  
Other informants expressed this sentiment differently. Some, for example, took issue with the 
inherently undemocratic process of the Partition, pointing out that they were never once consulted 
about the borders that ultimately decided their future. Where the Partition constituted an act of 
supremely callous political high-handedness, political commemorations after the fact seem to add 
further insult to injury. Speaking about it in May 2015, my granduncle Om Prakash had said:   
‘Did you ask the population what is to be done, and what not? Democracy was not there at 
the time. We call it a democracy now. Now when something happens so then they ask, bhai, 
put it to the public. What do the people want? What was it then? Back then everyone was 
after their own seat [high-office]. Everyone only talks about the sacrifices of Pandit Nehru. 
Arre their sacrifices, are our sacrifices less that our entire property, our hard-earned ancestral 
property, that we left behind? And what did we get in compensation? Broken-broken houses. 
Where we had mansions… So it made a big difference, na.’  
Contrasting the loss of his ancestral property and privilege as zamindars with the valourisation of the 
lives of the prominent politicians of the Independence movement, Om Prakash expresses a deep-
seated ressentiment of what came to pass. His heartrending appeal for the recognition of the 
‘sacrifices’ of Partition survivors is also a call for the recognition of the suffering engendered by the 
Partition. In the process, Partition suffering is also implicitly juxtaposed with the realisation of India’s 
independence. While Om Prakash does this by asking, ‘what did we get in compensation?’, 
Bhanwarilal does so by telling his audience that they have benefitted from and ‘enjoyed’ freedom 
whereas he and his people, ‘are the losers’. Implicit in this juxtaposition is the idea that their suffering 
constitutes a debt to the nation; a contribution to the country’s freedom paid through their blood, 
sweat and tears.  
This is perhaps clearest in Jogesh and Kishore’s demand that Partition survivors be honoured as 
freedom fighters; juxtaposing their suffering against the apparent lack of any kind of compensation or 
reparations. By branding themselves the victims, or as Bhanwarilal says, ‘losers’ of this experience, by 
demanding what, if anything, they got in return, one can also see them struggling with the apparent 
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uselessness of their suffering. ‘Tell me what this was all for?’ they seem to wonder. Amidst the bleak 




Martyrdom: An Organic Grammar of Mourning 
 
On a deeper level, the juxtaposition of the Partition and the ‘unfulfilled promise of freedom’ – as it 
were – addresses a fundamental cleavage in Indian history. While Independence (along with the 
leaders and organisations that made it possible) is celebrated, commemorated and memorialised ad 
nauseam, the suffering of the Partition has been largely consigned to the margins as an unfortunate 
by-product. Gyanendra Pandey (2001) and Mira Debs (2013) argue that the reason for this is located 
in the complexity of the Partition itself (Kohli, 2015). As a period of reciprocal and retributive sectarian 
violence, the Partition does not lend itself easily to national commemorations and memorialisation 
(Debs, 2013; Kohli, 2015).   
Pandey (2001: 6) has also observed a tendency within Indian historiography to treat the Partition, and 
other episodes of ‘communal’ violence in India as, ‘someone else’s history- or even, not history at all’. 
Locating the source of this tension in the clinical separation between the oral historical and archival 
branches of Partition Studies, Pandey (ibid.: 6-7) remarks, ‘Nationalism and nationalist historiography 
[…] have made an all too facile separation between “Partition” and “violence”.’ Although the Partition 
is inseparably entangled with nationalist historiography, its violence has often been left 
unacknowledged and unaddressed.  
This separation itself springs from an aforementioned common-sense understanding of 
‘communalism’ (ethnonationalism) and its violence as not nationalism (Pandey, 1990; see also 
Introduction). Thus, to a certain ‘secular’ imagination, the Partition is not seen as an example of the 
violence of nationalism, but is instead seen as aberrational to the ‘secular’ character of the Indian 
nation-state. In this way, the violence of the Partition has been separated from nationalism and 
nationalist historiography. However, this neat separation between Partition violence and 
Independence (or nation-state formation) is absent from the discourses of its survivors; with 




Comparing and contrasting the Indian state’s mourning and memorialisation of the assassination of 
Mahatma Gandhi with that of the Partition, Mira Debs (2013) writes that the former was a 
fundamentally easier event to publicly mourn and memorialise than the latter (Kohli, 2015). This 
despite the fact that the Partition and the en masse displacement of Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan 
was cited by Nathuram Godse as his motive for assassinating Gandhi (Debs, 2013; Godse, 2015). Unlike 
the Partition’s entangled victimhood-perpetrator positions, Gandhi’s assassination presented a clear 
distinction between the perpetrator and victim; a distinction that also allowed for an instant 
outpouring of grief (Debs, 2013). Moreover, as the assassination of a ‘secular’ freedom fighter by a 
Hindu nationalist terrorist in pursuit of a sectarian (and fascist) agenda, the assassination and its 
subsequent memorialisation became an opportunity for the Congress to preach its brand of ‘secular 
nationalism’ whilst denouncing the Hindu Right’s ‘communalism’ (ibid.).  
Consequently, the Indian state has found itself memorialising and commemorating the Independence 
movement and Gandhi’s assassination to the neglect of the Partition. As a result, while commentaries 
on the Independence movement and Gandhi’s assassination follow a well-established grammar of 
sacrifice and martyrdom, faced with the sheer scale of ‘useless suffering’, commentaries on the 
Partition ultimately struggle with a mono-syllable expression of shock: ‘why?’     
Commenting on the politics of mourning in relation to the Partition, Veena Das (2007) invokes Nadia 
Seremetakis’ (1991) ethnographic work on mourning rituals in Inner Mani, Greece. A ‘good death’ is 
performed and embodied via the presence of mourners, with their screaming, vocal lamentations and 
the act of a community bearing witness to and actively participating in the mourning of the deceased 
(Seremetakis, 1991). A ‘bad death’, in contrast, is an ‘asocial’ death, with the silence of the mourners 
signifying the absence of witnessing (Das, 2007: 48; Seremetakis, 1991).  
The lack of state commemorations and memorialisation coupled with the violence of the Partition has 
condemned victims of the Partition to a ‘silent’, ‘asocial’ and by extension, ‘bad death’. With the 
passing of time, this has further problematized the task of mourning. Urvashi Butalia (2000) drew 
attention to an aspect of this when she observed that while museums and memorials dedicated to 
freedom fighters and the Independence movement abound, there were none dedicated to the 
Partition. This changed on August 17, 2017 with the inauguration of the Partition Museum in Amritsar. 
Yet despite the curiosity this generated among my informants, especially after my visit to Amritsar in 
March 2018, this memorialisation (or mourning?) of Partition suffering was undeniably too little too 
late. 
The absence of the mourning of the physical death of the victims of the Partition has given way to 
other symbolic acts of mourning. In the absence of a grammar of commemoration unique to their 
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suffering, Partition survivors have developed their own rituals, memorials and idioms for honouring 
and mourning their dead. Veena Das (2007: 49) mentions the use of ritualistic devices such as the 
breaking of a pot (symbolic of the deceased person whose corpse their kin cannot access) as a symbolic 
performance as part of a private funeral.  
Similarly, in Section 1.4, I have documented a memorial shrine that Faridabad’s Partition survivors 
have built in honour of the dead. Faridabad’s Gurudwara Shahidane Gujrat Train (whose name 
translates to ‘Gurudwara of the Gujrat Train Martyrs’) pays homage to those who were killed in the 
massacre of a train full of refugees fleeing the Frontier, at the Gujrat railway station in Pakistan. 
Although a Sikh place of worship, this gurudwara functions as something of a non-denominational 
shrine – drawing both Hindus and Sikhs – to the memory of the Partition’s ‘martyrs’.   
This gurudwara is especially interesting due to the fact that as an active place of worship, the discourse 
of sacrifice here invokes not only a form of secular theodicy but also religious theodicy. As such the 
impulse to build shrines in memory of the martyrs of one’s faith captures something of a universal 
impulse within most world religions. After all, religious discourse provides a well-established theodicy 
for the rationalisation of that which is denomising, along with a well-established grammar of 
mourning.  
It is in this vein that Levinas (1988) argues that the experience of death and suffering makes faith 
necessary. In such times, faith not only provides comfort –a ‘sacred canopy’ (Berger, 1967) – but also, 
suffering due to religious persecution (whether the Holocaust or the Partition), makes it all the more 
necessary to believe in that which is seen to define us: our faith (Levinas, 1988). Thus, Levinas (ibid.) 
concludes that the suffering of the Holocaust made it necessary for Jewish people to believe in their 
faith. In the face of persecution – especially genocide – faith emerges not only as a form of theodicical 
comfort but also becomes a revolutionary act of resistance69 (ibid.).  
We can observe something similar at play in the religiosity and religious nationalism of Partition 
survivors. Perhaps it is the necessity to believe in the faith for which one has seen others die that 
makes Hindu nationalism such an effective form of theodicy to this generation of Partition survivors. 
Religious idioms and discourses were invoked by many of my informants in their remembrance of the 
suffering of the Partition. Often these went no further than reflexive invocations of god(s) and karma 
                                                            
69 This is observable even in contemporary geopolitical contexts such as Israel-Palestine. Palestinian author 
and activist Dr Ghada Karmi (2015) has observed something similar in her memoir of her return to the 
besieged Gaza Strip. Karmi noted how the Palestinian people appeared to have responded to the Israeli state’s 
relentless siege and persecution through zealous assertions of an Islamic Palestinian identity. Here too, the 
existential threat posed by systematic persecution appeared to have made the assertion of one’s faith a 
revolutionary act of resistance.    
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such as, ‘May God never show anyone such days’, and, ‘God knows what we did to deserve this fate.’ 
At other times, the collective nature of the suffering of the Partition was invoked as a comforting fact 
such that, ‘Partition did not happen to us alone. This has happened with everyone.’ Yet, such 
invocations of God(s) and karma did not comprise sophisticated theodicical explanations for the 
suffering of the Partition.  
However, there were a couple of occasions on which religious discourse and the supernatural seemed 
to delineate the hand of god within the godless suffering of the Partition. The first of these occurred 
during my MPhil fieldwork, on June 1, 2015. While remembering his suspenseful train journey from 
Muzzafarnagar to Lahore (and ultimately Attari, India), my informant Sunder Lal said that he believed 
that it was the presence of an idol of Lord Krishna in their train that ensured their safety. He said: 
‘The train would move some twenty, thirty kilometres and then the Muslims would stop it. 
The Muslims were running the train, it did not belong to Hindus. Their driver, their staff, so 
thankfully no looting-killing happened in our train. But the ones that went before us, in them 
looting-killing happened, and in some they were cut [murdered] but in this nothing happened. 
One reason I believe is that Gopinath-ji’s [another name for Krishna] idol was there, God’s 
idol. There was a temple of Gopinath there [Dera Ghazi Khan, city]. That idol [of the temple] 
was in the last bogie [carriage] of our train. Just possible that because of the presence of his 
image, God ordained that, bhai, in this no looting-killing should happen. So we survived that.’ 
Here, Sunder Lal attributes his safe passage to the presence of an idol of Krishna. He indulges the 
possibility that Krishna might have been watching over them due to the presence of his idol in that 
train. In doing so, he attributes his train’s collective good fortune – the lack of violent suffering – to 
their collective faith in this deity. 
In contrast to Sunder Lal, whose invocation of the supernatural was fairly explicit, Bhanwarilal’s 
remembrance of the Partition often involved an implicit identification with religious discourse. For 
example, while recounting his experience of chronic thirst and starvation in a refugee camp 
somewhere near Attock (formerly Campbellpur) and Hasan Abdal, Bhanwarilal began to tell me a story 
of Guru Nanak’s (the first Sikh Guru) – experience with thirst. 
‘So Hasan Abdal station that is there, Sikh travellers go there. Panja Sahib is there. Panja Sahib 
is a pilgrimage destination. Even today people go to the gurudwara there. […] So when people 
go from here, the importance of Panja Sahib is that, once Guru Nanak Dev-ji was travelling 
through that area with his disciples [Bhai] Bala and [Bhai] Mardana, when they became thirsty. 
So when they got thirsty they noticed that above them was [the house] of a Muslim fakir 
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[ascetic]. So they sent a messenger and said we are thirsty. […] So they said, “Will we give 
water to a kafir [infidel]? Get lost!” So they said our Guru is with us and he is thirsty. But in 
reply, they threw a boulder at them from the top of the mountain, a big one; and he [Guru 
Nanak] stopped it with his hand. That boulder stopped there. And where his hand touched 
the boulder, there you can see the imprint of his hand. And from that imprint in the boulder, 
water is flowing. So that is why it is called Panja Sahib because the panja [hand] is imprinted 
on it and water flows from that; natural water.’  
Although Bhanwarilal began telling this story due to his refugee camp’s proximity to the famous Sikh 
shrine of Panja Sahib, the story is implicitly made relevant due to his own experience of thirst and 
starvation during the Partition. Spending months in those very same mountains, suffering from 
chronic thirst and hunger as a result of being persecuted for his faith, there is an uncanny parallel 
between the themes of Guru Nanak’s legend and Bhanwarilal’s experience of the Partition. In the way 
that he recounts the legend of Panja Sahib, one can sense his inchoate identification with the thirsty 
Guru Nanak who used his divine powers to prove the superiority of his faith to his Muslim detractors.  
This was merely the first of many times that Bhanwarilal invoked the Sikh Gurus while remembering 
the Partition. Another time, while discussing the narrative framing of my ethnography, Bhanwarilal 
told me that the Partition will only make sense to my readers if I frame it against a larger history. When 
I asked him what this might be, he responded with a spontaneous and detailed exposition of the 
history of Punjab. Bhanwarilal stressed that I must start my dissertation by giving a background of the 
history of Punjab. His conception of this history began in the fifteenth-century with the life of Guru 
Nanak and later, the arrival of Babur. He emphasised the egalitarian and spiritual teachings of Guru 
Nanak and then went on to detail the ‘anti-Hindu’ reign of Babur; the two men were contemporaries. 
He recounted the names of all of the Sikh Gurus and laid particular emphasis on the martyrdom of 
Guru Arjan Dev and Guru Tegh Bahadur. Guru Arjan Dev’s execution was ordered by the Mughal 
Emperor Jahangir in 1606 while Guru Tegh Bahadur was publicly beheaded in Delhi’s Chandni Chowk 
in 1675 on the orders of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb (Singh, 2004).  
Bhanwarilal then went on to recount the ‘Muslim’ invasions of India by Ahmad Shah Abdali, Mahmud 
of Ghazni (although he lived from 971-1030 CE) and Nadir Shah. He mentioned Abdali’s desecration 
of the Golden Temple; the holiest Sikh shrine. He then gave a brief overview of the British colonisation 
of India, including the brutal suppression of the First War of Indian Independence in 1857. Following 
this, he detailed a common-sense understanding of the Independence Movement and Partition high-
politics. As he moved from speaking of the secessionism and atrocities of the Muslim League, to his 
227 
 
own experience of the Partition, he paused to remind me that the Sikhs, throughout history, have 
been heavily oppressed by Muslims.  
Much of what Bhanwarilal says in relation to history would be familiar to my readers as a repetition 
of the Hindu nationalist conception of a historical victimhood. But Bhanwarilal also references 
religious discourse to access a larger discourse of sacrifice and martyrdom that foregrounds these 
concepts within the suffering of the Partition. Through his emphasis on the martyrdom of the Sikh 
Gurus, Guru Arjan Dev and Guru Tegh Bahadur, he accesses a specifically Sikh discourse of sacrifice 
and martyrdom.  
The discourse of sacrifice and martyrdom plays a key role in Sikh religious discourse (Dorn and 
Gucciardi, 2011; Fenech, 1997; McLeod, 1992). In Sikhism, salvation or mukti is intimately tied to the 
performance of seva or altruistic service (Singh, 2019). The first Sikh Guru, Guru Nanak is said to have 
laid the foundation for this discourse by teaching his disciples that the path to salvation lay in the 
liberation of the individual from self-centredness and the fear of oppression, insecurity, injustice and 
want (Dhillon, 2010: 36; Fenech, 1997). However, the Sikh discourse of seva is gendered such that for 
men the ultimate form of seva is altruistic sacrifice or martyrdom, in defence of the faith (Singh, 2019). 
By contrast, seva for women does not entail sacrifice, but rather service of the Sikh patriarchy through 
the performance of specifically gendered tasks (such as cooking) in religious settings (ibid.).  
Sikh phenomenology differs from that of Hinduism in that the dominant strands of Hinduism believe 
the physical world to be an illusion (Dhillon, 2010). The latter also feeds into the Hindu view of ascetic 
monasticism – the renunciation of the physical world and its material comforts – as one possible path 
to salvation (Wilson, 2002: 115). For Hindus then, salvation is attained once one’s soul has been 
released from the burden of reincarnation; the cycle of life and death (Albertson, 2009: 62). 
In Sikhism, salvation is found through an activist-like practice of one’s faith combined with a 
universalist love for all, especially the oppressed (Dhillon, 2010). Within this larger Sikh 
phenomenology of sacrifice and martyrdom as the path to salvation, the martyrdom of Guru Arjan 
Dev and Guru Tegh Bahadur functions as an important historical symbol (Dorn and Gucciardi, 2011; 
van der Veer, 1994). When considered along with the martyrdom of the last Sikh Guru, Guru Gobind 
Singh, one finds that three of the ten Sikh Gurus feature as martyrs (Dorn and Gucciardi, 2011). What 
emerges from this is a religious and cultural history of the Sikhs and Punjab whose essentialism frames 
sacrifice and martyrdom as the national character of its people (Fenech, 1997; van der Veer, 1994). 
Bhanwarilal taps into this sub-nationalist strain to extend his understanding of Sikhism and Punjab’s 
history of sacrifice and martyrdom, to encompass his own experience of the Partition. I am detailing 
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this connection to cultural history to show that my informants’ turn to the discourse of sacrifice builds 
on specific cultural crosscurrents that include historical and religious discourses. Additionally, 
Bhanwarilal’s affinity for Sikh religious discourse must not be seen as undermining his belief in Hindu 
nationalism. As I detail in Section 3.3, Bhanwarilal – in-line with the discourses of the RSS – believes 
that Sikhs are the ‘sons of Hindus’ and that the Sikh Gurus were also Hindus. Bhanwarilal’s reverence 
for the Sikh Gurus is not an example of ‘syncretism’ but is instead characterised by a chauvinistic 
hierarchisation of Sikhism as little more than a sect or sub-set of Hinduism.   
However, my larger point regarding my informants’ turn to cultural and religious idioms of sacrifice 
and theodicy is that the recent wave of Partition oral historical and ethnographic literature has not 
percolated down to the lives and discourses of everyday people. What has pervaded the everyday 
consciousness instead is a piercingly sectarian question: ‘If the Muslims got their Pakistan, why can 
we not have our Hindustan?’ This demand for a Hindu nation, voiced through the juxtaposition of 
‘secular India’ with ‘sectarian Pakistan’ is merely the logical progression of a discourse that seeks to 
understand what the Partition achieved. ‘What was the point of all this?’ they wonder. In this way, 
the sheer ‘uselessness’ of suffering, the futility of ‘bad’, ‘asocial’ death on an unimaginable scale, 
provokes the search for a form of theodicy. 
Using culturally-derived idioms of ‘sacrifice’ and ‘martyrdom’, the victims are elevated from the 
ignominy of ‘useless suffering’ and ‘bad death’ to the exalted status of national heroes; as ‘martyrs’ 
and ‘freedom fighters’. This theodicy – this rationalisation of loss through a specific performance of 
mourning – features prominently in Bhanwarilal’s narrative. Bhanwarilal’s idea of sacrifice includes a 
broad swath of events ranging from the loss of property, to the death of co-religionists and the 
purusharth of refugees in the immediate aftermath of the Partition. Bhanwarilal also refers to 
Partition-era honour killings as ‘sacrifice’. He extolls the ‘courage’ of fathers who slaughtered their 
own daughters; branding them heroes. In doing so, he frames their violence as ‘sacrifice’ and the 
women, as ‘martyrs’. And, while I specifically refer to Bhanwarilal’s words here, in the ethnographic 
evidence I have used so far in this chapter, we have observed the universality of these tropes.  
Previously, in the Introduction, I have referred to Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin’s (1998) work on the 
phenomenon of women who were murdered by their own family for honour. Menon and Bhasin (ibid.) 
found that the male relatives of these women remembered their murder as a kind of ‘voluntary 
sacrifice’. Remembering them as honourable and virtuous women who ‘chose’ to die rather than risk 
the ‘taint’ of rape or forced marriage to the ‘other’, the men disguised their murder as assisted suicide. 
Menon and Bhasin (ibid.: 59) identify this phenomenon as a direct consequence of the ‘shame-fear-
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dishonour syndrome’; a toxic circumstance where the ‘shame’ of rape was seen to bring ‘dishonour’ 
to the victim’s relatives and communities, such that death seemed like the only ‘honourable’ option.  
In identifying the ‘shame-fear-dishonour syndrome’, Menon and Bhasin show that this violence of 
‘sacrifice’ was itself sanctioned by a pre-existing cultural understanding of sacrifice and martyrdom 
(Misri, 2014). Specifically, in the context of women, this also included ritual practices of honour-based 
‘suicide’ such as sati (the ritual burning alive of a widow on her husband’s funeral pyre) and jauhar 
(the medieval Hindu practice of collective suicide to avoid ‘defilement’) (ibid.).  
In this context, culture not only sanctions violence but provides an interpretative framework for the 
description of violence as ‘sacrifice’; as not-violence (ibid.). Menon and Bhasin (1998) observed that 
the men remembered these traumatic memories by reference to political and historical narratives, 
thus, framing the murder of their women relatives as a ‘necessary’ and ‘unavoidable’ action. The men 
accessed the ‘protective shadow of a coherent narrative’ in how they understood these events (ibid.: 
55). Reference to discourses rooted in history, politics and the patriarchy allowed men the cushion of 
a comforting narrative to explain away suffering, death and even murder committed off their own 
hands.  
In contrast to the men, women survivors of the Partition remembered the violence differently, by 
retaining, ‘“the memory of loot, rape and plunder” in their bodies’ (ibid.: 55). Thus, women absorbed 
the experience of rape within existing impressions of how they visualised the relationship between 
their bodies and society; understanding their sexual assault as a continuing ‘fact’ of the gendered 
exploitation of their bodies (Das, 2007). This grim understanding of their body as a literal and symbolic 
receptacle of pain and violence in a patriarchal society was one of the ways in which women 
incorporated the extraordinariness of Partition violence within the ordinary (ibid.).  
What Menon and Bhasin (1998: 55) document here as the ‘protective shadow of a coherent narrative’ 
has been described by Benedict Anderson (1983) as nationalism’s capacity to turn the individual 
deaths of its citizens into a shared immortality. To Partition survivors, this articulation feels inherently 
empowering; even emancipatory. It lifts their death and suffering from the ambiguous stateless (and 
helpless) position of a death on-the-way-to-the-nation to a death for-the-nation. It comprises an act 
of redemption.  
Anderson’s (ibid.) theorisation of the shared immortality of the nation has come under some criticism, 
specifically from Herzfeld (2005). Herzfeld (ibid.) criticizes Anderson’s argument as a top-down 
formulation that fails to adequately theorise how and why individual citizens respond to the appeal of 
nationalism in the way that they do. Herzfeld (ibid.) argues that while the shared immortality of the 
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nation provides existential comfort to the citizen, it also raises the question of whether this symbolic 
immortality actually helps individuals transcend their own real deaths. Herzfeld (ibid.: 5) wonders, 
‘Why should people be willing to die for a formal abstraction?’ 
While Herzfeld (ibid.) raises important questions that warrant attention, his questions reflect an 
understanding of ‘sacrifice’ that is different from my informants’ usage of the term. In the discourse 
of sacrifice on the Partition, my informants do not profess the wish to die for the nation as much as 
they hallow the suffering in their past within the redemptive shared immortality of the nationalist 
imaginary. The description of ‘bad’ death and suffering as a sacrifice to the nation is not meant to 
transcend death but rather, to transcend the ‘uselessness’ of their own (past) suffering.  
The discourse of sacrifice here emerges from an existing cultural understanding of sacrifice and 
martyrdom. The shared immortality it alludes to feeds into and off of larger nationalist discourses, 
grounding national belonging in the fact of a shared victimhood. This idea of a shared immortality lies 
at the heart of the idea of a, ‘homogenous population that is unified and anchored in a common 
mythological past and identified with a particular place and territory to the present day’ (Schäuble, 
2014: 159). The theodicy that is the discourse of sacrifice transcends not only the ‘uselessness’ of 
suffering but also individual and group differences, producing a wounded sectarian nation out of a 
collectively victimised population. 
 
 
A ‘War of Fathers’: The Gendered Connotations of the Discourse of Sacrifice 
 
However, this discourse of sacrifice is also a masculine discourse in the way that it inters the ashes of 
the dead within the decorative urn of nationalism. I am intentionally drawing out this funerary analogy 
in order to draw attention to the gendered aspect of mourning visible here. Veena Das (2007: 48) 
observes that, ‘it is the task of men to ritually create a body for the dead person and to find a place in 
the cosmos for the dead.’ In the case of the Partition, men have done so by recourse to the discourse 
of suffering as sacrifice; disguising even their own violence using the pall of martyrdom. Thus, Das 
(ibid.: 56) remarks, ‘Just as women drank the pain so that life could continue, so men longed for 
martyrdom by which they could invite the evil back upon themselves and humanize the enormous 
looming images of nation and sexuality.’  
This process of ‘inviting the evil back upon themselves’ through the discourse of martyrdom can be 
observed in Bhanwarilal’s narrative. Bhanwarilal’s ascription of sacrifice and martyrdom to the act of 
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fathers murdering their daughters normalises the violence by implicit appeals to safeguard the honour 
and purity of the family, and by extension, the nation. ‘What could we do? There was no alternative, 
there was no protection,’ he insists, presenting these fathers as ‘helpless’; lacking any agency. He 
contrasts the sacrifices of these ‘heroes’ with the ‘selfish’ Hindus and Sikhs who chose to stay in 
Pakistan even after the Partition. Bhanwarilal describes their decision as an act of selfishness, born 
out of greed for wealth and ancestral property. He sees these people as hapless minorities surrounded 
by a hostile majoritarian Islam; innocent lambs awaiting the coming of the wolf. The latter also reflects 
local ambiguities of the word ‘refugee’ since in the context of the Partition, a ‘refugee’ did not 
designate an alien or stateless person but instead, ‘a member of a communal minority in need of a 
majoritarian sanctuary’ (Naqvi, 2012: 475).  
On the other hand, in presenting the hard work necessitated by the Partition, as sacrifice, this 
discourse helps the broken and scarred survivors of the Partition retrospectively reconstruct their 
agency. Through stories of blood, sweat and toil, my informants present these purusharthi refugees 
not as victims of history, but as martyrs and hard-workers of the nation. If these fathers murdered 
their own children, they did so for their family; and later if these fathers toiled on the streets to 
somehow eke out a living, they did so for their family. Everything these men did was in service to the 
family, and through it, the nation. That is, these ‘heroic’ fathers were the bedrocks of their community, 
and through it, the nation. 
The centrality of fathers in this discourse finds a mention in Das’ (2007) work. Das (ibid.: 34) argues 
that the systemic rape and abduction of women during the Partition is best understood as a ‘war of 
fathers’. State discourses (of the governments of both India and Pakistan) around the ‘recovery’ of 
abducted women visualised justice as the act of reuniting abducted women with their families (ibid.). 
Such simplistic discourses did not take into account societal complexities concerning the ‘dishonour’ 
and ‘shame’ of abduction and rape. Social workers on the ground were confronted with the paradox 
of abducted women who refused to cooperate with their repatriation for fear of being rejected by 
their kin (ibid.). Menon and Bhasin (1998) also argue that in circumstances where abducted women 
had found some measure of stability in domestic life with their abductors, forcibly repatriating them 
was akin to re-displacing them.  
Das (2007) notes that these actions and discourses were symptomatic of the state seeing abducted 
women as passive victims awaiting saving. By envisioning and enacting justice in this context solely as 
the act of ‘recovery’, the state attempted to recover its own ‘fertile female bodies’ even as it sought 
to restore ‘correct’ patriarchal authority. Thus, Das (ibid.: 34) writes, ‘The state’s commitment to the 
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recovery of women is the acknowledgment of the authority of the father as the necessary foundation 
for the authority of the state.’  
The Indian government’s implicit framing of the ‘recovery’ effort as one of the restoration of 
patriarchal authority involves a conflation of nationalism with kinship. The symbolic discourse of 
kinship not only imbues a moral content to politics (Chatterjee, 2004) but is also the foundation for 
the imagination of the nation (Anderson, 1983). Anderson (ibid.) argues that improvements in print 
technology which allowed for the spread of vernacular literature to the masses helped establish 
‘linguistic national imagined communities’ (see also Yuval-Davis, 2003: 15). Building on that, Anderson 
(1983: 143) argues that people view their membership within the nation as ‘natural’ and not chosen 
or happenstance. Simultaneously, it is this veneer of a ‘natural membership’ that draws on essential 
ties based on blood and kinship that, ‘the nation, like the family, can ask for sacrifices – including the 
ultimate sacrifice of killing and being killed’ (Yuval-Davis, 2003: 15). After all, as Katherine Verdery 
observes, nationalism is primarily a discourse of imagined kinship: 
‘Anthropological work on nationalism is revealing it to be quintessentially about kinship, 
something that is organized around ideas of youth and age, male and female, shared 
substance, blood and bone, and exclusion. […] Gendered images of kin – images of 
‘brotherhood’, ‘forefathers’, and ‘mother-’ or ‘fatherland’ – are at the very heart of nationalist 
imagery.’  
(Verdery 1996: 233) 
Nationalism’s use of the symbolism of kinship is evident in the way that the female body functions as 
a representation and delineation of the national homeland (Schäuble, 2014; Yuval-Davis, 2003). Thus, 
where father (and men in general) are seen as protectors of the nation, mothers (and women in 
general) come to symbolise national suffering. Michaela Schäuble elucidates this link, writing:   
‘As literal and symbolic reproducers of the nation, mothers and motherhood have become 
interchangeable with national suffering in the sense that the personal suffering of mothers in 
times of war is portrayed as a (voluntary) sacrifice for the nation. The suffering mother thus 
signifies the suffering of the homeland and the maternal body serves as a marker and maker 
of the nation and national territory.’ 
(Schäuble, 2014: 184-5)  
Through the well-establish trope of the suffering woman as a symbol for the suffering motherland, 
women are remembered not as ‘heroines of history’ but as its hallowed victims: as martyrs. Studying 
the nineteenth and twentieth-century’s politics of commemoration, John Gillis (1994: 12) observes 
233 
 
that the contributions of women are, ‘represented largely in terms of sacrifice, a traditional female 
role that only reinforced gender stereotypes.’  
In contrast to the men who are remembered as heroic soldiers, devoted sons, dutiful fathers and hard-
workers, women are remembered only as martyrs. They are remembered not as hard-workers but as 
mothers and daughters who had to be murdered – ‘sacrificed’ – to preserve the ‘honour’ of the Hindu 
nation. This is not to say that men are not remembered as martyrs; they are. The point however, is 
that women are only remembered as martyrs. In this way, the bodies of women – remembered only 
in sacrificial terms – become the, ‘surfaces on which their text of the nation is written’ (Das, 2007: 46).   
Raping, killing, sacrificing and abandoning women for the sake of its racial/ethnic purity – resting on 
the authority of self-sacrificing, purusharthi fathers – the discourse of sacrifice delineates the 
boundaries of the Hindu nation; a boundary that is literally drawn across the bodies of women.  
Ultimately, remembering hard work and suffering as sacrifice; remembering the victims of retributive 
ethnonational violence as ‘martyrs’, this discourse is an articulation of the Hindu nation. An inherently 
redemptive articulation, it shifts the death and suffering of kin and co-religionists from one on-the-
way-to-the-nation to a sacrifice for-the-nation. Elevating the ‘silent’, ignominious suffering of the 






2.5. The Purusharth of Women  
 
‘[T]heir women come here to collect scrap paper. Our women did not do any work.’ 
Rajaram 
‘I just have one last question, and I’ll leave after that,’ I told Rajaram as I prepared to wrap up our 
conversation. It was a warm August morning and we had been talking for nearly two hours. I could tell 
from Rajaram’s face that he was getting tired. ‘My last question is this, now keeping in mind some of 
the other refugee communities, such as Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, or Syrian refugees, does your 
experience of displacement, of living in camps and tents make you feel any sense of solidarity towards 
them: that they are like you?’ Rajaram had a lot to say in reply:  
 ‘Look, I’ll tell you, every man… Every community has its own philosophy. I do not know about 
theirs. But their women come here to collect scrap paper. Our women did not do any work. I 
have got to know there is a park here where they have 500 tents. From many years. That 
community, their Muslim societies might be helping them. I do not know. Why? That 
community, I understand, is still backward. They are weak. Understood? They have 500 tents. 
They live in tents. We did not stay in tents for 5 years. We took over whatever the Muslims 
left behind. Yes? Or, those who were the biggest [most prosperous] whose possessions had 
survived, they came and they started their businesses. I do not know what their livelihood is. 
Our people never took this long. Assamese Muslims are here. They do not even have 
experience of farming. Our people had experience of running a business. So everywhere they 
did business. Whatever they could. Just like the examples I told you, some people opened a 
barber’s shop. We have done work, have not asked [begged]. […] They are here from 5 to 4 
years, I have got to know. But they do not have any experience of business yet, I think. What 
do they do? I just see that they are poor.’ 
At this point Rajaram paused and asked his shop assistant for a saree.  
‘I do not remember theirs. They work hard, they do mazdoori, I have not seen them in 
business. I have not seen these Assamese doing any work besides this scrap paper. Now they 
have two wives, two children, two girls. You understand? I do not know what condition they 
are in. Why, because I have not seen much. But those who came from our Punjab they have 




A saree in hand, Rajaram paused again and pointed at his shop assistant. Rajaram said that his 
assistant had told him about a Muslim woman who lives in one of these tents and works as a rag-
picker. So, Rajaram had told him to procure some sarees for them and has been distributing them as 
a way of helping them out. ‘6 women have taken them so far,’ he said with a smile. Setting the saree 
aside, he continued:  
‘During the winter, some people had distributed jerseys in the refugee camps. The biggest 
people. And to those recovering in hospitals. So in the camps they did this because the 
prosperous people of this area, of Delhi, they got blankets from the factories in Panipat and 
distributed those in the camps. This has happened. But no one ever said, “Sir, my child is dying, 
give me two rupees so I can buy milk.” The government gave our ration for 2 years. Alright? 
But we did not depend on the ration. Alongside that we did physical labour. Now I do not 
know about these Assamese. I do not know what they do. I had said, we should distribute 
clothes for those children. So a man showed up, “whatever day you come, tell us and we’ll 
distribute for you.” That means they still need it na? For us it was not like this. After we came 
we hosted weddings also. Marriages also happened in the tents [refugee camps]. But, 
whatever we could do, or a relative gave something, or a maternal uncle gave something, a 
paternal uncle gave something, we accepted, but no one said like this that we have very little. 
Or no one said like, “Sir you are a rich person…” Nothing. Even during our girls’ weddings we 
did not ask for anything. What is their system, I do not know. I gave someone the responsibility 
to study them and if they are very poor, then please help them.’   
At this point, I interjected to point out that contrary to his assertion that ‘our women’ had not worked, 
Punjabi women had played an integral role in the post-Partition recovery of Punjabi families. I gave 
him examples of working women from my own family and from some of my informants. Aside from 
their labour within the home, some women had also worked in government jobs, while others had 
supplemented the family income through needlework; by running informal boutiques from within 
their own homes. This led to the following exchange: 
 R: Yes, but that work is not bad.  
 PK: Stitching, that is what I am saying that even the women did work, it is not like that. 
 R: Our girls have also done that. This work is not bad [demeaning]. 
 PK: No, no that is not what I am implying. 
 R: To work is not a bad thing. Asking is bad.  
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 PK: I see, I was just responding to what you said about how ‘our women’ did not work. 
 R: No that is not what I said. They did not do work like this [rag-picking] 
PK: I see, they did not do work like that and asking [begging] is bad, is that what you are trying 
to say? 
R: And they did not even do work like that. [Emphasising those final words] 
In many ways, the above exchange between Rajaram and me encapsulates the gendered and sectarian 
nuances of this discourse of suffering and purusharth as sacrifice. When asked about the solidarity he 
feels for other contemporary refugees – in light of his past experience as a refugee – Rajaram begins 
to talk about a slum settlement of Assamese Muslim migrants in the vicinity of Gurgaon. This implicit 
conflation of Bangladeshi refugees with Assamese and Bengali Indian migrants echoes the muddle of 
mainstream political discourse. In recent times, the BJP has often branded slum settlements of poor 
Assamese and Bengali Indian Muslims as ‘Bangladeshi’ in order to whip up hysteria about the scale of 
‘mass-infiltration’ (undocumented immigration) along India’s border with Bangladesh. This has been 
a key argument for the BJP in its attempts to construct the CAA along with a nation-wide NRC as 
exercises necessary to weed out the ‘termites’ and ‘intruders’ ‘corrupting’ India’s body politic70.  
Rajaram’s speech lacks the BJP’s vitriol, but retains its implicit racialization of Assamese and Bengali 
Muslims (especially the poor) as un-Indian. Rajaram begins by drawing attention to the fact that, ‘their 
women come here to collect scrap paper. Our women did not do any work.’ Later, when pressed on 
his comments about women, he returns to his observation that he has seen Assamese women working 
as rag-pickers. He clarifies that he did not mean to imply that Punjabi women did not do any work at 
all, merely, that in contrast, Punjabi women only did work befitting their dignity, such as needlework. 
Framing it in the sense of ‘Our women did not do any work, like this,’ transforms this into a classist 
and sectarian discourse of Hindu patriarchal pride. 
Drawing attention to how women often carry the ‘burden of representation’, Nira Yuval-Davis (2003: 
45) writes that women are, ‘constructed as the symbolic bearers of the collectivity’s identity and 
honour.’ Building on this, Yuval-Davis (2003: 45) observes that in the nationalist imaginary, men go to 
war (or work) for the sake of the ‘womenandchildren [sic]’. Women, in this sense, are firmly associated 
with the familial, within the imaginary of the collective (ibid.). Moreover, the ‘womenandchildren’ are 
seen as passive beneficiaries (dependents) of the actions of men (ibid.). 
                                                            
70 In this pathologization of immigrants as a disease, readers may be reminded of Susan Sontag’s (1978) 
brilliant work on the use of illness as a metaphor.  
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In Rajaram’s narrative, the destitution of Assamese Muslim women symbolises to him, the destitution 
of the entire community. Conversely, by drawing attention to the displacement of women from their 
familial (and domestic) realms, Rajaram implies a disruption of the ‘natural order’. So, by subtly 
questioning why ‘their women’ are reduced to such harsh and ‘degrading’ labour, Rajaram insinuates 
a fundamental deficiency within these communities. Remarking on how he has seen these women 
rag-picking, he moves on to an exposition on the ‘weakness’ and ‘backwardness’ of this community. 
He insists that unlike Punjabis, these people have overstayed their time in tents. Where Punjabi 
refugees are constructed as resourceful, determined and hard-working people, Rajaram constructs 
Assamese and Bengali migrants as passive victims dependent on the support and charity of others.  
It is revealing then that in the hard work of these Assamese Muslim women, Rajaram perceives not 
purusharth, but only their supposed destitution and desperation. That these women make a livelihood 
from rag-picking is not seen as an example of, ‘doing whatever it took to survive’, but as evidence of 
a deficiency – a symbolic impotency – of ‘their men’. He reminds us that Punjabi men were purusharthi 
and clever. He also reaffirms the success of Punjabi men by reminding us that ‘our women’ were not 
reduced to performing ‘this work’ on the streets. Rajaram’s differentiation of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ work 
draws on fundamentally casteist ideas of work. In drawing attention to the ‘bad’ work that the women 
of this community have been reduced to, caste and gender hierarchies intersect to articulate a deeply 
problematic, othering discourse.   
Where the labour of Assamese and Bengali women is used to malign their communities, the labour of 
Punjabi women is obscured to assuage the pride of purusharthi Punjabi men. Rajaram’s casteist and 
classist denigration of the labour of Bengali and Assamese women in comparison to ‘our women’, 
involves a degree of obfuscation of the labour of Punjabi women.  
In the stories of purusharth, as told by men, women are conspicuously absent from the scene. If they 
feature at all, they do so as beneficiaries of the man-work of refugees; as their dependants. This 
misogyny is reflected even in the Indian government’s rehabilitation efforts. In the state’s discourses, 
women were not seen as ‘useful workers’ but at best as secondary or tertiary earners for their 
households (Datta, 2019). Furthermore, the economic value of their domestic work was ignored 
altogether (ibid.). 
This was far from the reality of the role women played during this period. However, in this game of 
smoke and mirrors that obscures, disguises and undermines the hard work of women, women were 
not just passive victims. The women I encountered in my fieldwork, often played an active part in 
reproducing this discourse of man-work; supporting and reifying the discourses of men. As my 
grandaunt Anjali explained to me later, the fact that women did not want to highlight their 
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contributions did not surprise her in the least as this is what was expected of them as ‘good’ wives 
and daughters. That is, by retelling and reifying the stories of purusharth of their closest male relatives, 
these women were merely performing their traditional gender roles as ‘good women’.  
In the obfuscation of the hard work – or purusharth – of women, in this context, we observe how 
women absorbed their experience of the Partition within the everyday fabric of their lives. Just as 
Veena Das (2007) found that women’s experience of sexual violence was absorbed within the 
‘ordinary’, so too, I found that the memory of their hard work was absorbed within the ordinary 
rhythm of domestic life. The hard work of women – especially within the home – was seen as a given; 
a kind of universally constant denominator of ‘normal’ life. On the other hand, the labour of men was 
seen as a product of the disruption and displacement caused by the Partition. By emphasising the 
harsh physical and ‘menial’ nature of the labour of men, stories of purusharth contrast the life of 
zamindari privileges and luxury with the poverty that followed the Partition. Here, the labour 
performed by men is seen as unusual but necessary.  
Thus, the domestic work of women was seen as a continuation of the natural order; assumed and 
invisible. All of the work that women did during this period – cooking in communal tandoors, sewing, 
domestic chores, motherly responsibilities and providing care within the household – remained largely 
unacknowledged. It was subsumed within images of domesticity since, ‘this is what women are 
supposed to do anyway.’ Where women worked commercially, even seeking employment outside the 
household, their contribution was omitted for the sake of patriarchal pride.  
The erasure of the hard work of women is a well-established narrative trope that is visible even in the 
state’s museumizing imagination. This was starkly visible in the tropes deployed by the Partition 
Museum (Amritsar, Punjab) in its memorialisation of the experience of women during the Partition. In 
a sprawling hall whose props and exhibits seek to convey something of the Partition’s denomizing 
violence, the museum prominently displays a well. A banner detailing the statistics concerning 
‘abducted’ and ‘recovered’ women hangs above it. The well itself is meant to memorialise the ‘suicide’ 
of Hindu and Sikh women in the village of Thoa Khalsa. Over the years, the ‘jauhar’ (collective suicide 
of women) at Thoa Khalsa has become a symbol of the ‘sacrifice’ and ‘martyrdom’ of Hindu and Sikh 
women during the Partition (Butalia, 2000; Menon and Bhasin, 1998; Pandey, 2001). It has also been 
used generously by the Hindu and Sikh far-right for islamophobic propaganda (Butalia, 2000; Pandey, 
2001).  
At the very end of the museum’s chronological memorialisation of the Partition lay a room that was 
dubbed the ‘Gallery of Hope’. The last room in the museum, this gallery argued that, ‘What helps 
societies to overcome this trauma is memory, and hope.’ The gallery contained the biographies of 
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some Partition survivors who went on to become spectacularly successful in their respective fields. 
The illustrious names listed here included Milkha Singh (Olympian athlete), Dharampal Gulati (the 
founder of MDH spices), Brijmohan Lal Mujjar (founder of Hero Cycles and Hero MotorCorp) and 
Surinder Singh Gandhi (businessman). The gallery also included snippets of and references to some of 
the impactful literature on the Partition. This included the works of Gulzar, Bapsi Sidhwa, Khushwant 
Singh, Bhisham Sahni, Krishna Sobti, Joginder Paul, Intizar Hussain, Qurratulain Haider, Rajinder Singh 
Bedi and Nanak Singh. With the exception of a passing reference to Krishna Sobti and Qurratulain 
Haider, all of the individuals mentioned in this gallery were men. The omission of Amrita Pritam was 
particularly glaring given her fame and literary acclaim. Similarly glaring were the omissions of Ahmed 
Ali, Saadat Hassan Manto and Faiz Ahmed Faiz. Intizar Hussain’s inclusion – the only Pakistani 
individual in this gallery – appeared to be little more than a token gesture. 
The latter were evidence that the ‘Gallery of Hope’ appeared to have paradoxically accepted the post-
Partition borders of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Here, ‘hope’ was predicated on an uncritical 
acceptance of the Partition. ‘Hope’ in this gallery was to be found only in the ‘achievements’ of Hindu 
and Sikh Partition refugees; and not among the struggles of those who went across the border. In its 
omission of women and, of refugees who migrated to Pakistan and Bangladesh, the ‘hope’ 
museumized by this gallery was a fairly standard articulation of the narrative of purusharth.  
Thus, the ‘Gallery of Hope’ in fact museumizes the ethnic and gendered contours of the post-Partition 
nation. In this nation – as indeed in most nationalisms – the nation is composed of the hard work and 
achievements of men; and the ‘hope’ that is to be derived from them. Women are largely confined to 
sacrificial commemoration as ‘martyrs’; their wounds and suffering symbolising the suffering, 
wounded nation.  
In this section, I seek to interrupt this discourse by documenting the purusharth of women. The turn 
to specifically focus on the stories of women comes from a recognition of the way in which the 
discourse of sacrifice eulogises women while obscuring their actual lives. My argument here is a 
continuation of my exploration of the gendered dimensions of the discourse of sacrifice. As stated 
previously, this discourse draws on the gendered body of the nation to focus on the suffering of 
women as a symbol for the suffering nation. In the process, women are remembered in purely passive 
terms, as victims and martyrs. It is in this vein that John Gillis (1994: 10) observes that, ‘women and 
minorities often serve as symbols of a “lost” past, nostalgically perceived and romantically 
constructed, but their actual lives are most readily forgotten.’ While Gillis makes this observation in 
the context of the West’s politics of commemoration, his words articulate an important observation 
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about the discourse of sacrifice. That is, in this nostalgic and romantic construction of the self-
sacrificing woman martyr, the actual life of the woman comes to be overwritten.  
 
 
Of Sewing Machines and Needlework 
 
I became aware of the nuances of this discourse only after I encountered the meanings invested in 
sewing machines. In relation to the hard work of women, sewing machines functioned as a root 
metaphor. According to Sherry Ortner (1973: 1341), root metaphors function as a, ‘source of 
categories for conceptualizing social phenomena.’ Sewing machines were (and to a very large extent 
still remain) an integral part of most middle and lower-middle-class households in South Asia. The 
women of my grandparents and great-grandparents’ generation learnt needlework (including 
stitching, sewing, embroidery, tailoring and knitting) at a very early age, with sewing often being 
introduced to them as a form of play. The women of this generation often received a sewing machine 
of their own – as part of their dowry – as a symbolic marker of their passage into womanhood. 
Equipped with a sewing machine of their own, Punjabi women, especially, would often sew their 
clothes themselves, in addition to household linen such as pillow covers, runners, throws and other 
such miscellaneous items. Women would also knit prolifically, making their own shawls, pullovers, 
jackets, caps, gloves, scarves and mufflers. In the era that preceded the mass-consumption of ready-
made garments and linen, the needlework of women comprised a substantial economic contribution 
to the household.  
In the years that followed the Partition, sewing machines were used by the Indian government as part 
of its rehabilitation efforts. Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin (1998), for example, note that women living 
in institutions were provided with organised and self-employment through the setting up of tailoring 
centres and, the distribution of sewing machines respectively. Anjali Bhardwaj Datta (2019) observes 
that the kind of work and training that the government offered women refugees reflected clear biases 
and assumptions of the kinds of work considered ‘appropriate’ for women. Thus, women were offered 
training and employment primarily in the fields of embroidery, stitching, tailoring, and weaving (ibid.). 
This is yet another example of what Kaur (2007) has observed as the Indian government’s resolve to 
leave the social order of refugee communities undisturbed. 
During my fieldwork in Gurgaon, I found that a family friend of my grandaunt Anjali still owned the 
sewing machine that their mother had been provided by the Indian government (figure 2.01). Their 
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mother had received this Usha brand, Indian-make, sewing machine in 1948, while she and her family 
were still living in a refugee camp in north India. While no one in their family had any memory of the 
specifics of this story, they had held on to this sewing machine as a symbol of her memory. The latter, 
however, should not be misinterpreted to mean that the machine was seen purely as a relic of the 
past. As visible in the following picture, the machine was well-oiled, threaded and ready to use. 
 
Figure 2.01: The Usha-make sewing machine my grandaunt Anjali’s family friends still possessed.  
 
As other informants told me, a similar story had unfolded within the home, where women prohibited 
from seeking employment outside the home, began to run de-facto boutiques from within their 
homes. In this way, women were not just passive recipients of the purusharth of men, but were active 
workers in their own right. Their needlework constituted a substantial source of income while also 
contributing materially to their household in the form of home-made linen intended for domestic use.  
Thus, deeply embedded within this cultural context, sewing machines are a potent root metaphor 
imbued with, ‘great conceptual elaborating power’ (Ortner, 1973: 1340). Sewing machines symbolise 
a process of production, economic recovery, gender relations and memory to women survivors of the 
Partition of India. Closely intertwined with the traditional gender roles of femininity, speaking of 
sewing machines also evoked contestations of the hegemonic masculine discourse of purusharth as 
sacrifice, but also organic, everyday critiques of patriarchy. 
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This tension constitutes an important part of the stories of women. On the one hand, sewing machines 
and needlework in general, symbolise traditional gender norms. Women informants not only 
subscribed to these ideas but also played their part in reproducing discourses that devalued their own 
hard work. But, on the other hand, speaking of needlework also evoked organic critiques of such 
dominant ideologies. Thus, in the way that these subtle critiques coexist beside a dominant patriarchal 
ideology, they are best understood as ‘subordinate discourses’.  
Brinkley Messick (1987) defines subordinate discourses as discourses that while conversant in the 
grammar of the dominant ideology also comprise subtle subversions of the dominant discourse. They 
do not seek to overthrow but rather coexist, while establishing a degree of autonomy. In this, 
subordinate discourses share something of Michel de Certeau’s (1984) idea of tactics. After all tactics, 
like subordinate discourses, comprise small acts of appropriation rather than a full-blown revolution.  
Subordinate discourses are different from alternative or competing ideologies, since the latter involve 
an ‘oppositional conceptual order’ (Messick, 1987: 217). The subordinate status of such discourses is 
based on the social efficacy of the dominant ideology. The hegemony of dominant ideologies like the 
patriarchy, is explained by the fact that, ‘women subscribe to them, at least in a public sense, for there 
is no other "world" to live in’ (ibid.: 216). This is an important nuance since, even though the 
association of needlework with femininity represents the hegemony of patriarchy, needlework was 
not remembered by my informants as a site of oppression. Rather, some of my informants, such as 
Falguni, found a genuine measure of freedom in their lives through the commercial success of their 
needlework. The latter is consistent with Messick’s observation that: 
‘In communicative worlds jammed with patriarchal cultural constructs, a distinctively female 
perspective is to be found not so much in what women say as in what they do, located in the 
structure of such women's spaces as menstrual huts, and in such specialized women's 
activities as weaving.’ 
(ibid.: 217) 
Therefore, speaking of needlework with women informants helped create a discursive space where 
such subordinate discourses were remembered and articulated.  
I became specifically interested in the hard work of women shortly after my trip to the Partition 
Museum in March, 2018. The Partition Museum also has on display a number of random artefacts 
which date back to the Partition. These artefacts which included a sewing machine, a comb, a dagger 
and other such simple everyday trinkets, were among the few personal possessions that refugees 
managed to bring with them as they crossed the border. I had found these exhibits captivating since, 
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inspired by Aanchal Malhotra’s (2017) work on ‘material memory’, I had similarly been on the lookout 
for old personal artefacts that my informants might have still retained from their Partition journeys.  
My visit to the museum had provoked a significant degree of curiosity in my grandaunt. She had 
originally planned to accompany me to Amritsar but had been unable to due to other personal 
commitments. The morning after I returned from Amritsar, we talked about the museum and I told 
her about all the artefacts they had on display. When I mentioned the sewing machine, her eyes lit up 
and she said that she had an old sewing machine like that lying at home.  
A few days later, she had the storeroom cleaned and together, we dragged out the machine – along 
with its stand – to the centre of the room. Removing the dusty cloth that covered it, she pointed at 
the embossed panel on the machine. ‘Tolaram Ramdass and Co., Post Box No. 130, Karachi,’ it said; 
the address of the seller I assumed. ‘This machine was my mother’s,’ she said, ‘This is from her dowry. 
She got married in 1942 and they brought it with them from Pakistan.’ She beamed with pride as she 
said, ‘Back then there were only three types of sewing machine: Usha, Singer or the German-made 
Pfaff. This is Pfaff. Pfaff was the best.’ In awe, I ran my fingers over the panel, disbelieving what I had 
just discovered. This Pfaff branded, German-made sewing machine had been sitting here all along; 
here, in the very house that I been staying in for a significant portion of my fieldwork. 
 




Figure 2.03: The embossed panel on the machine that reads, ‘Tolaram Ramdass and Co., Post Box 
No. 130, Karachi.’ 
 
My grandaunt had no idea how this sewing machine had reached Delhi. She was born in India, in 1950, 
a good few years after the Partition. As a result, she neither had any first-hand memories of this event, 
nor did anyone else in our family remember how this had come to pass. However, she suspected that 
her father had been transferred to Delhi a few months before the Partition; allowing them the luxury 
of migrating with most of their possessions.  
For my grandaunt, this machine was not a symbol of the Partition or the history of our family’s 
displacement. In the hierarchy of meanings that my grandaunt implicitly associated with this machine, 
its connection to her memory of her mother stood foremost. ‘I will not give it to anyone. This is a token 
of my mother,’ my grandaunt declared as she told me about a housekeeper of hers who had once 
shown an interest in the machine. Her housekeeper wanted it so she could do some stitching at home. 
My grandaunt had refused her request saying, ‘So what if I do not use this machine. This is a token of 
my mother.’ And then, almost as an afterthought, she added, ‘I can no longer thread the needle…’  
As my grandaunt remembered her mother, she drew my attention to some of the objects with whom 
my great-grandaunt’s memory was attached. The little pink cover, on top of the machine (visible in 
the photograph), had been stitched by her. A beautiful chequered throw that covered the table on 
which I would rest my suitcase in her guest bedroom, had been made by her care-worker, in the 
terminal stages of her illness. The throw (which I now wish I had photographed) was made from 
discarded pillow covers. These had then been stitched together, front beside back, to form four red 
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and white checks. ‘In those days all women would stitch and we never let any cloth go to waste. If 
something got old we would just cut it up and make something new. Recycling,’ my grandaunt added 
with a hearty laugh.  
Having my attention drawn to the memories and cultural practices embedded in seemingly ordinary 
pieces of linen was eye-opening in itself. Even though my great-grandaunt and her care-worker no 
longer inhabited this home, their essence – embodied by the remnants of their stitching – lingered. 
But in order to see it, one had look closely. Like the cover and the throw, the stories of the hard work 
of women had hitherto inhabited the margins of my peripheral vision; subsumed within a normative 
idea of the ‘ordinary’. In order to make this visible, I had to turn my attention towards these very 
images of domesticity.  
As we continued this conversation over the course of the next week, my grandaunt also provided me 
with two leads on the subject. She told me that Dayaram’s wife, Basanti, had done stitching on a big 
scale. We had met Dayaram together in December 2017, in Dehradun; a story I have recounted 
previously in Section 1.5. ‘Government jobs did not pay that much. She worked a lot,’ my grandaunt 
revealed. According to her, Basanti had stitched, altered and sold clothes from within her home on a 
big scale. In this way, Basanti’s hard work – domestic and commercial – had been instrumental in the 
rehabilitation of her family. This fact about Basanti stood in stark contrast to the way she had excused 
herself from our conversation, when we had visited them. Basanti had simply said that she was only 
6 years old at the time of the Partition and as a result, did not have any significant memories of it. 
Happy to be left alone with Dayaram, I had not pressed any further, either.  
When asked why neither Basanti, nor Dayaram had mentioned this fact earlier, my grandaunt replied, 
‘In reality, women will never talk about this. They do not want to go against their husband. The thing 
is male ego can be very touchy, especially about money.’ My grandaunt explained that while many of 
the women of that generation worked and earned money, few would talk about it at length. Even 
though some of their husbands had passed away since, few would bring this up themselves, for fear 
that it might be seen as undermining their husband’s memory. My grandaunt’s critique of the fragility 
of masculinity, however, was ambiguously positioned beside her awareness and performance of 
traditional gender roles. It constituted a subordinate discourse; one that strives for survival under the 
shadow of a dominant ideology.  
Furthermore, my grandaunt’s remark also reminded me of my own positionality within this discourse. 
As a male researcher, women were always unlikely to bring up ‘womanly’ topics such as needlework, 
in conversation. In this way the hard work of women had remained additionally hidden from me 
because women informants (my grandaunt included) had presumed that I would not be interested in 
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these stories. The fact that these stories might also be seen as threatening to a fragile sense of 
masculinity had further encouraged women informants to presume my lack of interest.  
The second lead that my grandaunt provided me was that of Falguni. While I could not visit Basanti 
and Dayaram again (due to the distance involved), Falguni lived in Faridabad and, incidentally, had 
been among one of my first informants. I had first been introduced to her in June, 2015, while I was 
conducting fieldwork for my MPhil dissertation. Although I never used any of the material from that 
interview in my thesis, I had enjoyed listening to her stories.  
When I had returned to Delhi in July, 2017, I had gotten back in touch with her. Since she lived a mere 
10 minutes away from my maternal uncle Shailendra’s house (where I stayed for a major portion of 
my fieldwork), Falguni and I fell into a regular routine of tea-chats. Every few weeks, whenever I came 
over to stay with my maternal uncle, I would make sure to meet Falguni for a cup of tea at her place. 
And yet, despite the frequency of our meetings, this was the first time that anyone (including Falguni 
herself) had ever mentioned sewing. My grandaunt told me that Falguni was an expert at sewing and 
knitting. Apparently, she had done sewing on a massive scale, substantially contributing to the 
household income. However, 82 years old now and bed-ridden since a particularly severe bout of 
Chikungunya Fever in 2015, Falguni had not done any sewing in years. Confined entirely to her bed, 
the only journeys she embarked on now were figurative in nature. Listening to her stories of faraway 
places and times as I sat by her bedside became part of my fieldwork routine. And she had many, 





Falguni was 12 years old at the time of the Partition. While her family originally hailed from Karor Lal 
Essan (a village mid-way between Layyah and Bhakkar), they had been living in Karachi at the time of 
the Partition. Her father had owned and run a massive departmental store in Karachi; the biggest in 
the city, according to Falguni. Her family migrated to India in September 1947. By then, Karachi had 
been engulfed by what seemed like endemic violence. Although, in her experience, the situation in 
Karachi had not been as bad as in other places, the non-Muslim minorities of Karachi no longer felt 
safe in the city. Travelling by train through Hyderabad and Mirpur (in Sindh, Pakistan), they reached 
Ambala. Later, their family moved to Delhi as they were allotted a house in the up and coming refugee 
colony of Lajpat Nagar.  
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Falguni began learning needlework at an early age. In fact, while living in Karor sewing was a form of 
play. One of her older cousins had a tailoring shop there and at the end of every day, he would send 
home a sack of waste cuttings. Falguni and her cousin would scavenge through the sack looking for 
the bigger cuttings and use them to make something new. ‘In the evening, my father would come 
home, what did you do, today we made this,’ she laughed heartily, reminiscing.  
While they were staying in Ambala, Falguni received some formal instruction in sewing, at her school. 
Studying in 5th grade, Falguni remembered that her all-girls school had had a class dedicated to 
teaching them cooking and sewing. Falguni earned a name for herself on the very first day when she 
re-stitched a salwar that her teacher had cut up, to test her. ‘That salwar of mine was shown to the 
whole school. All the lines were straight, there were only straight lines. […] So she started saying your 
work is very neat. I said I even stitch my own clothes at home,’ Falguni remembered.  
At the age of 15 – while they were living in Lajpat Nagar – Falguni took a course on sewing. One of 
their neighbours had started a sewing school for girls, within her house. She sent word to other 
families in the neighbourhood, requesting them to enrol their daughters. The woman organising the 
course was a Partition refugee herself, and thus, was supporting her family by teaching sewing to the 
children of other refugees. ‘Back then the fees was just 3 rupees. Money had value then. So I went. I 
knew everything before that as it is,’ Falguni said. Falguni was at such an advanced level that she ended 
up finishing that 6-month course in just three months. Over the course of those three months, she 
also became friends with her instructor. ‘She told me your work is very neat, you should start your 
own work [shop]. I said that comes later. I said after marriage who knows where my husband will go, 
won’t go, will he support me, will they let me work.’  
However, contrary to her doubts about the prospects for sewing commercially, events seemed to 
transpire in her favour. One day, a neighbour of hers requested her to alter one of her blouses. Her 
neighbour had heard from someone that Falguni was extremely good with sewing. For her part Falguni 
quickly finished the work and had sent it back to her house. When she received it, she was overjoyed 
and came over to Falguni to tell her that this was the first time she had gotten her blouse sewn from 
a lady. This comment provoked a critique of the latent misogyny of the sewing industry, from Falguni. 
Falguni retorted, ‘I do not do the work of a woman, I do the work men do. The work I do is of a tailor. 
Not that of women.’ Falguni explained that the sewing of women is seen as a hobby whereas a man 
doing the same is considered a darzi (professional tailor).  
‘The difference is that women do not get paid as much. “Yes, they’ll just do it like that, they do not 
know.” So even if men are not skilled, they are still men. So that is why,’ Falguni said. I in turn cited 
the culinary industry as a similar example of an industry where men are handsomely rewarded for 
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commercialising typically ‘domestic’ skills71. Falguni exasperatedly remarked, ‘Yes! But… that… That is 
what men do,’ making both of us laugh. 
In this way, speaking of needlework consistently brought up memories of the subordinate discourses 
of her past. This is visible in the above example where Falguni says that she does not do the work of a 
woman, but rather that of a male-tailor. This is a subordinate discourse because Falguni perceives the 
ascription of femininity to her work as an affront that undermines its value. Instead, by equating her 
work to that of a man’s she establishes a higher value. She appropriates the hallowed status of the 
darzi’s masculinity to score a point for herself, while leaving the supremacy of masculinity itself 
unchallenged. She does not defend the tailoring of women as a whole, but instead distinguishes her 
work from that of other women.  
At other times, the subordinate discourse at play was more subtle, observable in her memories of 
money and the impact it had on her life. As word of Falguni’s skills spread through her network of 
family and friends, she began to receive a steady stream of work. The money she thus earned gave 
her a degree of autonomy over her own life. Falguni remembered that through her sewing she was 
able to pay for her own wedding dresses. Even after marriage, Falguni kept her savings private. ‘I 
would not give my money to anyone. I would save it for myself. […] Now, whenever I would visit [family 
in] Delhi, then I would not ask him [husband]. All my Delhi expenses also I made from that,’ Falguni 
said.  
Over the years, Falguni’s savings comprised a consistent and substantial contribution to the overall 
wealth of their household. When she and her late husband were constructing the house she currently 
lives in, she paid for all the doors. ‘These doors that you see these were built by my money. […] All of 
them. We would not have money. It would run out,’ Falguni said, beaming with pride as she drew my 
attention to the doors in her home.  
Keeping her savings private brought Falguni autonomy within her family. Sometimes this also meant 
having the power to assert her own stance unhindered by familial and patriarchal moral codes. For 
example, Falguni remembered the time she helped her visually impaired cousin elope with his 
girlfriend. Her cousin, known affectionately as Tej-ji (pseudonym), was a Professor of Philosophy with 
a Hindi Sahitya Ratan and a PhD in Philosophy. He fell in love with a woman whom he would often 
meet at the bus-stop, on his way to work. However, while the young couple were keen to get married, 
her family did not approve of Tej-ji due to his disability. Falguni intervened in favour of her cousin’s 
                                                            
71 My remark was inspired by Ortner’s (1972: 20) observation that, ‘when a culture (eg., France or China) 
develops a tradition of haute cuisine –“real” cooking as opposed to trivial ordinary domestic cooking – the high 
chefs are almost always men.’ 
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marriage, standing up to both her own family and that of her sister-in-law’s. Using her savings, Falguni 
helped the young couple elope and accompanied them to the registrar’s office to register their 
marriage. Later Falguni also accompanied Tej-ji to his in-laws’ home, so that they might try and soothe 
their anger. In this way, Falguni’s financial freedom was a major part of this subordinate discourse, 
enabling her everyday acts of subversion.  
An interesting aspect of Falguni’s stories was that they did not comprise fable-like tales of purusharth. 
This is not to say that Falguni, and other women refugees, did not value or valourise hard work. 
However, the terms of the discourse did not allow for the celebration of their own work as purusharth. 
The exuberance and extraordinariness of the stories of purusharth told by men was contrasted by the 
sparseness of details in Falguni’s descriptions of her work. This difference was also evocative of 
femininity’s normative association with needlework. For Falguni, her performance of needlework was 
not a disruption of the ‘natural order’. Needlework, like the domestic work of women, was considered 
work that women were supposed to do. This normativeness meant that there was nothing special or 
redemptive about her performance of it. By contrast the dramatic stories of blood, sweat and toil told 
by men were implicit admissions of how unnatural physical labour felt to them. 
For Falguni, the only ‘unusual’ aspect of her needlework was the way in which its commercialisation 
granted her access to the market economy. It is for this reason that her subordinate discourse is closely 
linked to money. She places great emphasis (and pride) on the fact that she kept her savings private. 
She used her savings to tactically subvert her husband’s influence on the things that were important 
to her: her visits to her parents, shopping and indulging her children and grandchildren. In this way, 
while her savings indirectly contributed to the household finances, she used them to establish her 
independence. Her money gave her the means to resist some of the influences of patriarchal authority 
on her everyday life. While the story of her cousin’s elopement provides a particularly dramatic 
example of this, the quotidian impact of this was far more subtle.  
Falguni did not always succeed in her subversion of patriarchal authority. One of her biggest regrets 
was that her family had not supported her ambition for a career outside the home. After all, Falguni 
was highly educated. Like her cousin Tej-ji, Falguni also held a Sahitya Ratan – the equivalent of an MA 
– in Hindi. Following that, she and a friend of hers Manjeet, had completed a teacher training course 
together. However, Falguni’s family refused to support her in pursuing this any further. Falguni’s 
brothers opposed this vehemently. Part of the reason for this was that her eldest brother needed 
Falguni to take care of his infant son. While her needlework (including its commercialisation) was seen 
as a natural extension of her domestic responsibilities, a career outside the home was considered a 
step too far. She recounted this incident with great regret.    
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F: There was a Manager [in Eastern Post] whom we knew. He was a relative. He came home, 
said your daughter has passed with excellent scores. Show me the mark-sheet. I showed the 
mark-sheet so he said come I’ll see to it that you get a job. So my brother started saying, “No, 
among us, women do not do jobs. They will say can her brother not feed her?” Seriously if I 
had got that job, today I would have retired at such a good position. [Pause] He [husband] 
would always say, your family are completely koop-mandook. [Laughs] 
PK: What does koop-mandook mean? 
F: A frog that lives in a well. [Laughs] They are called koop-mandook.  
PK: As in they can’t see the world beyond their well. [Smiling]  
F: Yes, they don’t want to see. Anyway he said there are seats in English [for teachers] do you 
want them? I said I’ll go home and tell you. I came home and there was a storm in my house. 
He [brother] is crying. Those two brothers, one after the other are pacing the room. [Both 
laugh] They said, no need for this. […] So then my teacher training went to waste. Feel very 
sad about it. That Manjeet got her placement, she did it. I said Manjeet you did well out of 
this, my whole boat only sank. [Laughs, seems forced] After marriage men should offer 
support. Both these brothers could not do that. They could not take care of a small child. He 
[her nephew] must have been one and a half to two years.  
Recounting this bitter argument, Falguni uses humour to criticise her brothers. Interestingly, Falguni 
recounted this conversation twice. In her first iteration of this story (above) she remembers her 
husband being similarly critical of her brothers. In this version, it is her husband who mocks her 
brothers calling them koop-mandook (frogs in a well). Her husband’s sarcasm implies that he would 
have been supportive of Falguni’s teaching job.  
This, however, changed when she retold this story in June 2018. This time she remembered this 
conversation as relatively more vitriolic. She put all of the blame on her elder brother and his 
disinterest in parenting his own son. She remembered how her brother had influenced her father, 
arguing that letting Falguni work would ‘dishonour’ them all. ‘What will people say? Now will we eat 
rotis earned by our sister?’ her brother had declared. Far from her usual cheery, sarcastic tone, she 
seemed (understandably) bitter and remorseful as she recounted this.  
In this retelling, she also implicitly connected her brother’s misogyny to her husband. Speaking in a 
low voice, almost as if she was sharing a secret, Falguni said that her husband had also been quite 
traditional in his ways. She remembered that when they were getting married, he had liked her 
especially because she did not have a job. He wanted a housewife and had even said that, ‘I do not 
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want to earn money. I want to establish a home.’ Explaining this, Falguni said that this was unusual at 
the time as most men and families preferred working women. According to her, the Punjabi 
community especially preferred to marry working women since back in those days, one person’s salary 
was not enough to support a household. As someone who earned her money by working within the 
home, Falguni combined the best of both worlds. The invisibility of her earnings assuaged patriarchal 
pride while also satisfying urgent material needs. This was as close as Falguni ever came to critiquing 
her husband in my presence.  
However, Falguni’s critique of these traditional, patriarchal values was perplexingly followed by a 
somewhat chiding aside about her daughter-in-law’s lack of domesticity. Falguni’s daughter-in-law 
was a working professional and had been working even before her marriage. Rather than channel her 
own unfulfilled career ambitions into expressing solidarity for her daughter-in-law’s career, Falguni 
lamented that she had had to manage the household of their joint-family almost till the day she 
became bed-ridden. Falguni told me that despite always having had domestic help, she had been doing 
most of the cooking and overseeing all of the housework. When I tried to defend her daughter-in-law, 
Falguni disagreed saying, ‘She did not have those feelings [domesticity] from the beginning.’ The 
implication was one of neglect and indifference to her ‘domestic responsibilities’.  
With a great sense of irony, I observed how, in this scenario, one woman’s right to work meant 
another’s domestic prison (in addition to their paid domestic help). Her daughter-in-law had made her 
contribution to the processes that had kept Falguni anchored to her kitchen. Yet to see Falguni’s words 
as resentful of her daughter-in-law would also be a disservice to their relationship. Despite all the talk, 
to the best of my knowledge – as gleamed even in conversations with common relatives – no one in 
that household, including Falguni, had ever stood in the way of her daughter-in-law’s career. The frogs 
were no longer trapped in their well. Perhaps there was some unspoken solidarity there, after all.  
One day when I went to visit Falguni, I found her sitting up in bed, reading her cousin Tej-ji’s 
autobiography. She showed it to me with pride and then said that she had not read it in a while and 
so felt like reading it again. Later that day, with a tinge of sadness in her voice, she told me that she 
and Tej-ji had always had very similar interests, whether that was the MA (Sahitya Ratan) in Hindi or 
creative writing. Falguni told me that in her youth she had written a number of short stories but unlike 
her cousin, had never had the courage to publish them. ‘My talent has been completely wasted,’ she 
lamented.  
Seeing my interest in the subject, Falguni briefly narrated one of her short stories from memory. The 
story was called ‘Namaste-ji’ and was based on a real life incident where she and a friend of hers were 
once catcalled by a persistent group of young men. The men stalked them for a good distance, 
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continuously calling out to them with cries of, ‘Namastey-ji, namastey-ji”. When she crossed the 
bridge that marked the halfway mark to her house, she turned around and very politely said, ‘Since 
you have come till here, why don’t you come home with us so we can welcome you properly.’ 
Confronted by Falguni, the men apologised and crept away in silence. When I asked her why they ran 
away like that, Falguni explained that it was because by inviting them home, she had implied that she 
was going to get her family together and have them beaten up. Falguni said that she could have had 
them beaten up in the market itself, had she called for help. But she had chosen not to. At this point 
she looked into my eyes and in a firm and sincere voice said, ‘I was not afraid of anyone then.’ In that 
moment, as our eyes met, there was no doubt about the truth of what she spoke.  
Like her mocking description of her family as koop-mandook, her short story too comprises a 
subordinate discourse. In the story, her act of turning around to challenge her stalkers constitutes a 
deliberate interruption of the male gaze. Additionally, her final comment to me about her lack of fear, 
drives home her rejection of the notion of male saviours; a theme evident in many of the other stories 
from her youth. Yet, interestingly, while threatening her stalkers, Falguni falls back on the symbolic 
protection of her male relatives. This is not a full-blown critique of the patriarchy as much as it is an 
act of everyday resistance within it. It constitutes survival more than revolution but, a survival on her 
own terms, nevertheless. This theme of an underlying subordinate discourse symbolises the role that 
sewing played in the lives of women. As much as sewing upheld a certain domestic order, the money 





Discovering this hidden side of Falguni – an informant I had known for a considerable period of time 
– made me to return to other women informants with similar questions about needlework and other 
domestic work. It was in this way that I ended up talking to Bhagwanti about sewing. Like Falguni, 
Bhagwanti was someone I had first met during my MPhil fieldwork in May 2015. In fact, Bhagwanti’s 
nostalgia for the Sundays she had spent frolicking in Dera Ghazi Khan’s canal had featured prominently 
in my MPhil thesis (Kohli, 2015).  
Aged 19 years at the time of the Partition, Bhagwanti was one of my most elderly informants. She had 
a wealth of stories to tell about Pakistan (especially Dera Ghazi Khan and Karachi), the Partition, as 
well as life in post-Independence Delhi. As one of the longest continuing residents of the national 
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capital, she had seen the city change and grow right before her eyes. Bhagwanti lived just a short drive 
from my grandaunt’s house in Rajourie Garden, and, so by default, she became someone I frequently 
visited during my fieldwork. I would often drive over to her house around 11am and spend a couple 
of hours with her chatting over tea and snacks. 
Yet, in all the time that I had known her, she had never once mentioned sewing. Instead, she had 
spoken numerous times about her father and her late husband’s occupations. Her father had run a 
transport business in Dera Ghazi Khan; owning a fleet of buses and trucks. Her husband had worked 
in a privately owned business corporation in Delhi. Overshadowed by their stories, she had never really 
spoken about her own hard work (or perhaps I had neither asked nor really listened). This was an 
interesting omission considering that the story of Bhagwanti’s engagement with sewing was tied 
intimately to her experience of the Partition.  
Bhagwanti had married her late husband in 1945 at the age of 17. She then moved to Karachi, from 
Dera Ghazi Khan, to live with her husband and in-laws. This meant that in 1947, when South Asia was 
Partitioned, Bhagwanti was in Karachi with her in-laws. As violence in the city escalated, her husband 
put her and her mother-in-law on a flight to Delhi. He reached Delhi himself several months later, after 
the Partition had made it impossible for him to stay on in Karachi. However, during those initial months 
that Bhagwanti and her mother-in-law spent in Delhi following the Partition, they were on their own. 
Through Ram Singh72, a family friend of her in-laws, they had found lodging in Tibbia College. In my 
MPhil thesis I had also drawn attention to the murky history of Tibbia College as the site of a massacre. 
I had written:  
‘Tibbia College was not a government designated refugee camp but was instead an Ayurvedic 
and Unani medical college that was forcibly occupied by incoming refugees (Sharma, 2011). 
The college’s property was ransacked and its boarding house was occupied (ibid.).’ 
(Kohli, 2015: 41) 
Bhagwanti remembered the rooms of Tibbia College being littered with dead bodies and 
dismembered body parts, when she first visited the college. Ram Singh arranged for the college to be 
cleaned. Rooms were then occupied de facto, with 2-3 families often sharing one large room. With 
their male relatives back in Pakistan and the violence of the Partition still raging across Delhi, 
Bhagwanti and her mother-in-law were completely on their own. They had neither savings to fall back 
on, nor any other source of financial support. It was then that they took to knitting as a way of 
                                                            
72 Ram Singh was also apparently a relatively well-known local politician at the time 
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supporting themselves. As Bhagwanti explained, she and her mother-in-law would receive wool from 
a nearby shop and get 5 aanas for stitching it into a sweater:     
‘It was like this, when we came, we did not have money. He [husband] was there. So, we used 
to get wool from the shops. So for making a sweater they would give what, 5 aanas73. Back 
then they would use aanas. Yes? They would give. Quickly we would bring that thick-thick 
wool, then there only, I would make sweaters. Sitting through the night till 12-12 o clock, by 
the next day the sweater was finished. […] It was a plain sweater. The wool was thick so we 
had to make it thick, it was not fine. If it is fine then it takes time. This wool was thick-thick, 
they would give thick-thick wool so that sweater is also made thick-thick. So it would not take 
time to make.’ 
In this way, Bhagwanti and her mother-in-law spent most of their time in Tibbia College knitting 
sweaters so that they could make enough money to support themselves.  
‘Tell me what am I doing in the morning? After breakfast, what do we do, daughter and 
mother-in-law? So then I would set myself to work. We would do that till 12 in the night, to 
finish it completely. In the morning my mother-in-law would go and give it to the shopkeeper. 
And bring more [wool]. That’s it, I kept doing this work, yes, I kept doing the sweaters. Till the 
time he [husband] did not come, we managed, so you do manage somehow something or 
other happens or comes. So I would do this work.’ 
In addition to knitting, Bhagwanti also did sewing and stitching. With the passage of weeks, they had 
succeeded in making contact with more relatives; as an increasing number of their family crossed the 
border and sought each other out. This allowed her access to the money her father had given her in-
laws as part of her dowry so she could buy herself a sewing machine. Again, working for orders and 
using the cloth and measurements supplied by the local shopkeeper, she now began to stitch 
underwear, kurtas and pyjamas.  
‘Then they would give us that, underwear. To make underwear, for stitching, on the machine. 
I did not have a machine. They had given me money for a machine in my dowry. My father 
had given, that bhai, Singer machine is available for 500. Then my mother-in-law’s brother, he 
found out that here machines are available, in Delhi, so it is for 500. There was a tailor 
somewhere he did not want it so they said take it. We bought the machine. Bought the 
machine, after that the shopkeeper would sometimes give us kurtas and sometimes pyjamas. 
                                                            




Why, because I had learnt sewing from Dera Ghazi Khan only. I did not sit like that, I completed 
my education in the house, inside. When I did not go further in that I learnt sewing. After 
learning sewing I learnt everything. Then after that we would get clothes from there, some 
underwear, some pyjamas, for sewing. Sewed and returned. Sewed and then I gave it back to 
them. They would not give that much money but still we would manage to survive. It was a 
survival. […] After that our food or whatever else this would go towards that, however.’   
Bhagwanti would earn about 4-5 aanas per finished piece, whether that was a sweater, a pyjama or a 
kurta. While it took her longer to knit a sweater, she would do between 3-4 units of kurtas, pyjamas 
and underwear, in total. In this way, sewing and knitting between 5-6 pieces every day, Bhagwanti 
would earn a little over 1 rupee for her labour; just enough for their survival.  
Here, it is relevant to draw attention to Bhagwanti’s closing comments that, ‘They would not give that 
much money but still we would manage to survive.’ Although Bhagwanti invokes the word ‘survival’ 
here, she does not do so in the didactic, moralising terms of the men’s stories of purusharth. While 
Bhagwanti and her mother-in-law did whatever it took to survive, their hard work is not remembered 
in the redemptive tones of man-work. As stated previously, the reason for this lies in the very nature 
of the work they did. Where the physical work performed by zamindar patriarchs implied a disruption 
of the ‘natural order’, the knitting and stitching done by women was seen as relatively normal.  
There is an additional layer of specificity here in that while needlework was normatively associated 
with femininity, its commercialisation under these circumstances was anything but normal. The fact 
that women had to also earn for their survival is experienced as a sign of hardship; of shame and 
suffering. In this context, the hard work of the women is not seen to be redeeming but is instead 
perceived as a failure of masculinity. As I have stated throughout this section, the latter fuels the need 
for the omission of these stories.  
Life in the refugee camps was especially difficult for women. Recreating the most basic domestic 
comforts in these cramped and austere settings rested solely on the constant hard work of women. 
Yet, in remembering those days, Bhagwanti implicitly absorbed this hard work within the ordinary 
fabric of everyday life. To her, the domestic work she had to do in the camp (including caring for her 
mother-in-law) was merely a continuation of her normative responsibilities as a dutiful daughter-in-
law.  
However, what she was more inclined to remember was the bonding that developed between the 
women in the camp, as they pooled in their resources to ease the burden of domestic chores. As 
families (often complete strangers) living in cramped conditions, it made sense to share whatever they 
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had. Through a strange twist of fate, Bhagwanti and her mother-in-law found themselves living beside 
my grandfather and their family, in Tibbia College. This was a nugget of personal history that we 
serendipitously discovered while talking about life in refugee camps. Bhagwanti fondly remembered 
my great-grandfather Chaman Lal and his eldest daughter, my late grandaunt Pushpa.  
Living and working in such close quarters, Bhagwanti and Pushpa become close friends. Out of all of 
my grandfather’s siblings, Bhagwanti remembered only Pushpa clearly. ‘Back then Pushpa was, 
meaning, she was elder to them. Among the sisters. This was the thing. She was older. Would talk 
some,’ Bhagwanti remembered. At night, when the residents of Tibbia College would set up their 
mattresses on the roof, to sleep out in the open, Bhagwanti remembered always setting hers up beside 
Pushpa. It is in simple acts like these that one can sense the meaningfulness of the bond between 
them. Bhagwanti and Pushpa would also perform numerous chores together, including cooking at the 
communal tandoor and filling water at the communal tap. The conversations shared during these 
times created a strong bond between the two women; a bond whose memory has endured in 
Bhagwanti even though she lost contact with Pushpa after they moved out of Tibbia College. 
The bonding of women in such refugee camps was also furthered by the omnipresent threat of sexual 
violence. Without identifying the fear as such, Bhagwanti also spoke about how women in Tibbia 
College would take trips to the toilet together as it was some distance away from their rooms.      
‘Everything, together. The bathrooms and all were far away. So we went together, let’s go, if 
we needed to in the morning, let’s go, like that it was a good distance like this Bhawan [local 
landmark] is from here, it was that much. We were right in the back. So then like 2-4 together, 
as we came out [of the room], yes, let’s go.’  
These group trips further strengthened these bonds as they were more opportunities for 
conversation. As Bhagwanti remembered, ‘It provided some company, then only meaning we would 
talk also or something.’ In these recollections, it is particularly interesting to note that the bonding of 
women occurred while they were working. With the sheer quantum of work needed to be performed 
in order to maintain a functional household, the women often only had time to talk while they were 
working. This makes the absence of the stories of women from the discourse of purusharth as sacrifice, 
even more glaring.  
Bhagwanti and her mother-in-law stayed in Tibbia College for a couple of months. Once her husband 
reached the city, they occupied an ‘abandoned’ house while they waited for their claim for 
compensation to be approved. Bhagwanti kept sewing and knitting all through this period. However, 
once their claim had been processed and her husband had found himself a job, she gave it up. ‘Then 
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staying up late at night, for just one odd [rupee], what was the need. Had to manage the house also, 
that also fully. So then I gave it up,’ Bhagwanti said. Staying up late nights and constantly balancing 
multiple jobs through the day had also taken a toll on her health. ‘Then your health also becomes like 
that, if food is not right or something so then I had become like this, completely like this,’ Bhagwanti 
said as she held up her slender index finger to indicate how weak she had become. ‘Whenever my 
father met me after that he would say, she has come, our bangle-seller, the bangle-seller,’ Bhagwanti 
smiled sadly before adding, ‘that is how thin I had become. I looked like a poor bangle-seller.’ 
Where the sweat and toil of men was borne as a battle-scar – a redemptive wound – Bhagwanti’s 
weight loss became an object of humour. While her father’s joke is undoubtedly affectionate, it is 
revealing that he compares her to a ‘bangle-seller’. The implication here is one of the lowering of her 
status; of her weight loss as something that is unbecoming of her status as the daughter of a zamindar 
businessman. Ultimately, the effects of Bhagwanti’s hard work on her body are not seen as redeeming; 
they are demeaning. Her father’s joke implicitly articulates a sentiment similar to Rajaram’s casteist 
and classist take on the work of women, at the beginning of his section. And, it is because the hard 
work of women is seen as a symbolic failure of masculinity – as the lowering of the status of the family 
and the woman herself – that the masculine discourse of sacrifice demands its obfuscation.    
 
 
A Final Note: Hard Work and Caregiving 
 
In this section, I have sought to move past sacrificial tropes of martyrdom to document something of 
the hard work and lived experience of women. This is itself part of my larger discussion about the 
masculine nature of this discourse of sacrifice and of purusharth as sacrifice. In this final sub-section, 
I want to briefly highlight the stories of other such women – including some of my informants – whose 
hard work and care-work (not that the two were mutually exclusive) has gone unacknowledged.  
Here I am reminded of Kusum, my granduncle Om Prakash’s wife. I never met Kusum because she 
succumbed to breast cancer when I was just a toddler. However, I had grown up hearing stories about 
her. My mother was particularly fond of her. As a working woman with a successful career, Kusum 
was a feminist icon for my mother. One of her favourite stories about Kusum was of the time she 
included my mother and her daughter Poonam in a school-children’s photo-op with the then Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi. 
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Kusum had worked as a producer in Doordarshan, India’s national broadcaster. Kusum rose high 
within Doordarshan’s hierarchy, consistently outpacing her husband’s salary as a Deputy Postmaster. 
Moreover, the government accommodation she was entitled to was far more comfortable than that 
guaranteed by her husband’s post. As a result, they always lived in the accommodation provided by 
Doordarshan. Interestingly, while Om Prakash acknowledged all of this while talking about his life after 
the Partition, he never framed his wife’s employment as a story of purusharth. Her meteoric rise within 
Doordarshan’s hierarchy was not given the redemptive gloss of the economic miracle of Punjabi 
refugees. Instead, she was remembered as a loving and dutiful wife who is still sorely missed by her 
family and community.   
 
Figure 2.04: My mother’s photograph with the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Like in her 
politics, my mother can be seen kneeling (wearing a polka dot shirt) in the left-most edge of the 
photograph. Her cousin Poonam, Kusum’s daughter, is just behind her. For me, this photograph has 
come to symbolise the purusharth of a woman Partition survivor.  
  
Similarly, during my fieldwork, I met Aadarsh and Chandini. They had both witnessed the Partition at 
the ages of 10 and 5 respectively and, had been married for over 50 years. Like my grandaunt Kusum, 
Chandini had held a far better paying job than her husband. Chandini had worked in the Reserve Bank 
of India (RBI) for over three decades, until her retirement. Her husband Aadarsh on the other hand 
had worked as a car mechanic. Despite the fact that their household had been run predominantly 
through Chandini’s job and its supplementary benefits (including pension and healthcare), there was 
no recognition of Chandini’s labour as purusharth in Aadarsh’s narrative. In fact, while sharing his 
memories of the Partition and their life immediately after it, Aadarsh had barely mentioned Chandini 
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and her job. It was actually through my grandaunt Anjali that I learnt of Chandini’s work within the 
RBI. The couple of times that we met, Chandini herself was hesitant to speak at length about her job 
and never really went beyond the bare detail of her employment. Unlike other male informants, she 
never extolled the virtues of her work as ‘sacrifice’ using the moralising narrative of purusharth. 
Another informant that I encountered in the field, Lakshmi, had spent her life working as a government 
school teacher. Lakshmi was a Shastri by qualification; a degree awarded to students after seven years 
of higher education in the Sanskrit language. Lakshmi was a scholar of both the Sanskrit language and 
the Vedas. As a school teacher, she had taught Hindi and Sanskrit to students of all ages. Even at the 
age of 85 (when I met her in 2017), Lakshmi was quite active within her local Arya Samaj circle. 
Lakshmi’s stories about her work lacked the redemptive gloss of the stories of men. She was proud of 
herself and what she had achieved, but her pride and hard work were never analogised to that of the 
Punjabi community.  
In addition to the hard work of women there is another aspect of work that remains largely 
unacknowledged in this discourse: caregiving. Iain Wilkinson and Arthur Kleinman (2016: 15-16) write 
that, ‘Social suffering requires a response of care and caregiving practices’. While an ethnography of 
caregiving in the context of the Partition is beyond my scope (and perhaps even the scope of 
temporality), I nevertheless want to draw attention to its implicit presence in the stories and 
memories of women in this section. Besides holding down a job and fulfilling their domestic 
responsibilities as ‘good women’, women refugees also provided an unquantifiable amount of care 
within the household. This is implicit in Falguni’s story, where despite being denied the opportunity 
to pursue a career in teaching, she continued to play the role of a ‘good’ sister and helped raise her 
nephew. 
Another good example of the implicit presence of caregiving is visible in Bhagwanti’s story. During the 
time that Bhagwanti and her mother-in-law lived in Tibbia College, they had had no news of her 
husband. Meanwhile, Bhagwanti’s own family had crossed the border with great difficulty. 
Bhagwanti’s mother had contracted cholera somewhere along the refugee trail. She was also 
breastfeeding her one year old son at the time. She continued breastfeeding him all through the 
difficult journey; even after she came down with cholera. Caring for her son despite her illness and in 
the absence of proper food, water and medicines ultimately took an insurmountable toll on her health. 
Bhagwanti’s mother died a week after their family reached Rohtak, Haryana. Her death was so sudden, 
and their family so scattered, that Bhagwanti’s father never made it to his wife’s funeral. And, while 
Bhagwanti did attend the funeral, she was forced to hurry back to Tibbia College to care for her 
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mother-in-law. Additionally, the complete radio silence from her husband had adversely affected her 
mother-in-law’s mental health. As Bhagwanti recalled,  
‘My mother-in-law would keep saying, my child is also gone in Pakistan and my money is also 
gone. Yes? Home, what did she say, I don’t know she used to use a particular word. So I would 
say why do you say that? They will come. After all everyone is coming, it is not a big thing. 
Then my father, meaning, he had someone coming from Pakistan to meet him so then he 
passed on the message through them that bhai, you try to send my son-in-law quickly, 
somehow put him on a train.’ 
Consoling her mother-in-law while she worked herself ragged and mourned the death of her own 
mother, signifies the unquantifiable emotional burden that Bhagwanti shouldered during the 
Partition. Similarly, the other women whom I have written about in this dissertation, all provided care 



















2.6. Conclusion: Martyrdom and Victimhood 
 
In this chapter, I have deconstructed the discourse of sacrifice. I have argued that the description of 
Partition suffering and the hard work that followed, as a ‘sacrifice’, by my informants’, is a 
retrospective imposition that aims to rationalise the ‘uselessness’ out of their suffering. That is, the 
narrative of struggle and suffering as sacrifice is a form of theodicy that – on the one hand – attempts 
to make sense of death and suffering, while – on the other – elevates the ‘bad’, ‘asocial’ death of their 
coreligionists, kith and kin to the glorious and redemptive status of martyrdom. Within this larger 
theodicy, my informants’ stories of hard work or purusharth serve a central role. These stories serve 
as karmic justifications of wealth and privilege (in their past and present) – as a rationalisation of the 
inequality of suffering and hardship – presenting ‘good fortune’ as ‘legitimate fortune’ (Weber, 2013).  
My discussion of theodicy in this context is supplemented by a rigorous interrogation of the gendered 
aspects of this discourse of sacrifice. In this chapter, I have shown that the discourse of sacrifice is a 
specifically masculine discourse. This is observable clearly in the way that my informants present their 
stories of purusharth as a sacrifice to the nation. As stories told by men about the back-breaking 
physical work performed by men, these are essentially stories of man-work. In doing so, these stories 
remember male refugees (especially fathers) as hard-workers who upheld the pride of their 
collectivity by doing whatever it took to survive. As we are reminded constantly by my informants, 
these men are not refugees but hard-workers: self-reliant and productive workers of the (Hindu) 
nation. By contrast, women are remembered in the purely passive, sacrificial terms of a martyr. The 
remembrance of women solely as martyrs is itself evocative of the twentieth-century’s politics of 
commemoration where women are eulogised for their ‘sacrifices’ even as their actual lives are 
forgotten (Gillis, 1994). Within nationalist discourses, the image of the suffering, sacrificing woman 
comes to symbolise the suffering nation (Schäuble, 2014).  
In drawing attention to this, I have argued that the theodicy that is the discourse of sacrifice replicates 
some of the discursive patterns of funerary rituals. I have drawn on Veena Das’ (2007: 48) observation 
that in the gendered division of labour in this context, it falls upon men to, ‘find a place in the cosmos 
for the dead.’ This insight brings my argument back to its starting point regarding the discourse of 
sacrifice as a form of theodicy – but a specifically gendered theodicy – that uses ‘sacrifice’ and 
‘martyrdom’ to rationalise the uselessness out of suffering. Das (ibid.) also observes that while men 
use the discourse of sacrifice to disguise even the honour killings of women kin and coreligionists, 
women absorbed the memory of this violence into the ‘ordinary’. Women incorporated their 
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experience of the violence of the Partition into the everyday experience of being a woman in a 
patriarchal society.  
Having drawn attention to the masculine character of the discourse of sacrifice and its erasure of the 
lives of women, I then interrupt this discourse by documenting the quotidian life and hard work of 
women during this period, using the humble sewing machine as a key symbol of South Asian 
domesticity. The stories of women embody a ‘subordinate discourse’ (Messick, 1987) that often voices 
clever critiques of the patriarchy. These stories are also interesting for the way in which they show 
that although women value hard work the terms of the discourse disallow the description and 
valourisation of their own hard work as purusharth.  
In concluding this chapter, I want to connect my discussion of the discourse of sacrifice in this chapter, 
to victimhood; the principle theme of the following chapter. Interestingly, the trope of Partition 
migration as sacrifice is extremely pervasive in how the Partition is remembered across the border 
(Naqvi, 2012). In Pakistan, Partition refugees are known as ‘muhajirs’ (ibid.; Zamindar, 2007). 
Canonically, the term originates from Prophet Muhammad’s migration from Mecca to Medina in 622 
CE (Naqvi, 2012). The classification of Partition refugees as ‘muhajirs’ imputes religiosity to their 
(forced) migration, reimagining displacement as pilgrimage (Naqvi, 2012). In doing so, the 
construction of Pakistani citizenship deliberately draws on the cultural meanings of migration within 
a wider Islamic tradition. As Tahir Naqvi (ibid.: 478) elaborates, ‘Within the Islamic tradition, migration 
is viewed as a form of religious and political action whose goal is to separate the believer in both moral 
and physical terms from sources of evil and ignorance.’ Naqvi (ibid.: 479) traces the genealogy of this 
trope of sacrifice to Mohammad Ali Jinnah. In a speech to the general assembly of the All India Muslim 
League in July 1947, Jinnah acknowledged the ‘unparalled sacrifices’ made by Muslims in Hindu-
majority states in support of the Pakistan Movement. Here, ‘sacrifice’ not only prefigures 
displacement as pilgrimage but also establishes a relationship between sacrifice and citizenship 
(Zamindar, 2007). In doing so, it articulates the contours of a nation through reference to a common 
sacrifice. 
While the genealogy of the imagination of ‘sacrifice’ follows a different contour, in the Indian context, 
it has the same effects. Here, a certain discourse of sacrifice is folded within Hindu and Sikh religious 
discourse and history. At times it reaches into history to make inchoate identifications with the 
sacrifices of the Sikh Gurus and, Punjab, in general. This discourse sanctifies ambiguous, ignominious 
suffering and even the murder of female relatives, through the redemptive discourse of sacrifice. 
Transcending time as well as individual and group difference, this theodicy articulates the contours of 
a sectarian nation by reference to a shared victimhood. This victimhood binds the Hindus of the Hindu 
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nation together, uniting them through the shared, collective experience of suffering throughout 
history.  
In the following chapter, as I analyse the idea of healing though remembrance, we find an unresolved 
sense of victimhood underlying remembrance of the Partition. This victimhood, and the ressentiment 











On June 22, 2017, Junaid Khan, a 16 year old74 resident of Ballabgarh district was lynched aboard a 
local train (NDTV, 2017a). That day, Junaid along with his brother and some friends had gone to Delhi 
to buy clothes for the upcoming Eid festivities (Lakhani, 2017). While returning on a Mathura-bound 
train, the boys became embroiled in a dispute over seats (ibid.; NDTV, 2017a). In their testimony, 
Junaid’s brother and friends alleged that the dispute took a communal turn and escalated quickly 
(Lakhani, 2017). Soon, a violent mob of Hindu men gathered to face them. The men taunted them by 
calling them ‘beef eaters’ and ‘anti nationals' (ibid.; Razdan, 2017). They also pulled their beards and 
flung the boys’ skullcaps to the ground (Nair, 2017; Razdan, 2017). The altercation turned violent as 
the men pulled out knives and tried to pin the boys down (Nair, 2017; NDTV, 2017a). At some point 
during this scuffle, one of the men stabbed Junaid multiple times as others held him in place (ibid.). 
None of the onlookers in that crowded train compartment intervened (ibid.). The men then threw 
Junaid, his brother and his friends out of the train and onto the Asaoti Railway Station where Junaid 
bled to death in his brother’s arms (ibid.).    
Junaid’s lynching caused nationwide outrage. It dominated the news headlines at the time and led to 
the ‘#NotInMyName’ protests which were attended by thousands of people across the country (Nair, 
2017; Wilkes and Srivastava, 2017). Junaid had been lynched in broad daylight, in a crowded train 
compartment, within the geographical limits of India’s National Capital Region. Yet, in the days that 
immediately followed the news of the lynching, no eye-witnesses came forward (NDTV, 2017b). The 
public outrage ensured that arrests were made, but, the police investigation into the incident, sought 
to deliberately water down the islamophobic nature of the crime. In its statement to the media, the 
police presented Junaid’s lynching as a case of aggravated assault over seats (Ahsan, 2018). The police 
insisted that while ‘caste abuses,’ had been used, it claimed that its interrogation of Naresh Kumar – 
the self-confessed killer – had revealed no ‘communal angle’ or relation to beef (ibid.; The Hindu, 
2017b).  
                                                            
74 There seems to be some ambiguity around Junaid’s age. In the media reports I have cited here, The Indian 
Express (Lakhani, 2017; Ahsan, 2018) and The Wire (Apoorvanand, 2018) report that Junaid was 15 years old, 
NDTV (2017a; 2017b) and Hindustan Times (Razdan, 2017) claim he was 16 and The Hindu (2017b) reports that 
he was 17.  
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This disappointingly tepid police investigation is itself part of a larger pattern whereby such beef-
related lynchings have been normalised in Modi’s India. The search for justice for the victims of 
lynching has been characterised by glacial investigations, unending judicial proceedings and threats to 
the families of victims, often with the counter-charge of cow slaughter (Apoorvanand, 2018). The lack 
of strong condemnation from political leaders and large sections of civil society has further consigned 
the victims of lynchings to the forgotten margins of society (ibid.).  
While the victims of lynchings (and their next of kin) have been made to feel like criminals, the BJP has 
taken to routinely mobilising in defence of the perpetrators. In July 2018, BJP leader and Union 
Minister of State for Civil Aviation Jayant Sinha courted controversy when he honoured and garlanded 
eight men convicted for the lynching of Alimuddin Ansari in Ramgarh in June 2017, in an act of alleged 
cow vigilantism (The Times of India, 2018b). The 11 men had been found guilty of the crime by a fast-
track court and sentenced to life imprisonment in March 2018 (ibid.). The eight men in question were 
out on bail when they visited Jayant Sinha’s residence (ibid.). The minister greeted them with sweets 
and garlands (ibid.). It later emerged that Jayant Sinha along with other members of the BJP had also 
paid the legal fees of six of the convicts (News18, 2019).  
Yet, this was not an isolated incident either. In February 2018, members of the BJP marched alongside 
the right-wing Hindu Ekta Manch (Hindu Unity Platform) in a protest march in Jammu’s Kathua district 
(Ahmad, M, 2018a). The protest was held to demand the release of Deepak Khajuria- a Special Police 
Officer (SPO) who had been arrested for his involvement in the rape and murder of Asifa (ibid.). Asifa 
was an eight year old Muslim Bakkarwal girl who was kidnapped, drugged and then raped repeatedly 
in a Hindu temple in Kathua with the specific intention of teaching the local Bakkarwals ‘a lesson’ 
(Fareed, 2018; Scroll.in, 2019). The protest rally marched under the Indian flag and was attended by 
several prominent BJP members, including the then BJP state secretary Vijay Sharma (Ahmad, M, 
2018a). BJP members and spokespersons at the time had alleged a conspiracy to defame Hindus 
(ibid.). Deepak Khajuria and five others were ultimately found guilty of the crime (Ohri, 2019; Scroll.in, 
2019).  
Junaid’s lynching was simply one among a series of beef-related lynchings that have since come to 
define Modi’s ‘New India’. Lynchings by themselves, are not new to India. In the past, lynchings have 
played a key role in disciplining lower-castes and indigenous communities (Nair, 2017). However, since 
the BJP’s rise to power in 2014, cow-vigilantism fuelled by a Hindu religious revivalism has gained 
traction (ibid.). Between 2010 and 2017, 63 attacks involving cow-related violence were recorded in 
India (ibid.). Almost all of these 63 attacks occurred after Modi came to power, in 2014 (Wilkes and 
Srivastava, 2017). The lynchings themselves are often video-taped by perpetrators and shared widely 
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in the WhatsApp groups of the Hindu Right ecosystem (Nair, 2017; Banaji, 2018). Apporvanand (2018) 
dubs the lynchings a veritable epidemic and an unmistakable symbol of Modi’s ‘New India’. Thus, the 
spectacle of lynching Muslims and Dalits has emerged as a distinctly modern way of imposing upper-
caste Hindu supremacy.  
Mukul Kesavan (2019) has observed that the most terrifying aspect of this ‘New India’ is the 
normalisation of this violence in law as well as by those in high office. From Kathua to Unnao to 
Hathras, the BJP has used the party machinery (including its famed IT Cell), institutions of the state 
(especially the police) and the media to openly and tacitly defend the rapists and murderers involved 
(Kumar, R, 2020). While in Unnao the accused was a BJP MLA, in Hathras, the four men accused of the 
rape and murder of a 19-year old Dalit woman belonged to the Thakur-caste; the caste of BJP leader 
and UP Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath (ibid.). In this way, not only have criminals become lawmakers, 
but those in government draw their power from criminality (Appadurai, 2019). From the 2019 
Citizenship (Amendment) Act (that deliberately excludes Muslims) to the way the ongoing 
investigation into the February 2020 Delhi pogroms has been used to clamp down on dissent, ‘New 
India’ has emerged as a Hindu fascist state where violence and criminality is enshrined in law and high 
office. In this land, horrific acts of wanton violence no longer warrant political accountability. As stated 
previously, Appadurai (ibid.) describes this condition as one of ‘aspirational hatred’; a violent culture 
of impunity where hatred functions as a legitimate mode of upward mobility.  
Junaid’s lynching was a dystopian introduction to my field site. While I had not been in Delhi at the 
time of his murder, Junaid’s death did not feel like a distant event. I began my fieldwork in the first 
week of July that year, all too aware of my proximity to the time and site of the lynching. The protests 
ignited by Junaid’s lynching were still raging in Delhi when I began my fieldwork. Furthermore, Junaid’s 
family lived in a village in Ballabgarh district, a mere 10 kilometres from my uncle’s home in Faridabad. 
Later on in my fieldwork, I even made a few trips to Ballabgarh, where I interviewed Sohan Chand.  
My perceived proximity to Junaid’s lynching affected the way I approached the memories of the 
Partition. I found myself increasingly disinterested in the sense of Hindu victimhood that my 
informants sought to convey to me. The Hindu is ‘peaceful’, ‘tolerant’ and ‘timid’, they insisted. Yet, 
all around me, I saw a resurgent, militant Hindu nationalism at work. Writing for The Atlantic, Supriya 
Nair (2017), locates the violence of cow vigilantes (known locally as Gau Rakshaks, or cow protectors) 
within a historical sense of victimhood. Nair writes that, among other things, Hindu nationalism: 
‘Normalizes a certain cultural-nationalist worldview which recasts the historic, 300-year rule 
of the Mughals (whose empire at one point stretched from Burma to Afghanistan and 
267 
 
produced, among other things, the Taj Mahal and the Urdu language) as a form of Muslim 
settler-colonialism that oppressed Hindus.’ 
(ibid.) 
During his 2014 Prime Ministerial campaign, Narendra Modi raised the spectre of India’s so-called 
‘Pink Revolution’ (ibid.). Modi and the BJP alleged that under Manmohan Singh’s Congress 
government, Indian cows and livestock had been slaughtered with wild abandon and even been stolen 
and smuggled to Bangladesh (ibid.). This fear-mongering was based on a convenient distortion of the 
fact that under Manmohan Singh, India had seen a rise in its meat (especially beef) exports (ibid.).  
What followed, was a gradual rise in beef-related lynchings across India as ‘cow security squads’ or 
Gau Raksha Dals emerged across India, and began operating with impunity (ibid.).  
Observing and living through this period of de facto state-sanctioned lynching, made me question the 
relevance of my own work. Why was I, living in this India, recording the victimhood of a people who 
were no longer oppressed? What relevance did these memories of a Hindu victimhood have at a time 
when violent Hindu mobs were openly lynching Muslims? 
It was in September 2017 that I first began to articulate this inchoate tension that I had been 
experiencing all along; the tension between the present I was living and the past I was recording. This 
tension was brought to the fore during my visit to an exhibition organised by The 1947 Partition 
Archive. The exhibition had been organised in an effort to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the 
Partition. Featuring a small collection of personal artefacts (that Partition survivors had migrated 
with), snippets of oral history interviews, archived news reports, photographs and documents, the 
exhibition was a rare attempt at the commemoration of the Partition.  
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Figure 3.01: The 1947 Partition Archive’s exhibition in Delhi’s Kamladevi Complex, September 2017. 
 
There were two things in this exhibition that caught my attention. In a corner, the organisers had 
installed a TV which played a montage of oral history interviews on loop. Among this montage was an 
interview of Sarah Kirby, a Citizen Historian of The 1947 Partition Archive. While reflecting on her 
experience of interviewing Partition survivors, Kirby remarked that she felt that the process of 
remembering the Partition is part of the, ‘process of healing’.  
 




Elsewhere in the exhibition, I encountered a snippet of an oral history interview. In it Promod Mehra, 
a Partition survivor, ‘remembered’ life in Lahore during the Partition.  
 
Figure 3.03: A brief excerpt of Promod Mehra’s oral testimony on display at the exhibition. 
 
Mehra’s story caught my eye because of the way it told the story of the riots by juxtaposing the 
membership numbers of the RSS and the Muslim League. Mehra’s reference to the RSS’ swelled 
numbers followed immediately by a story he had heard about the abduction and rape of 1000 Hindu 
women, reminded me that for the RSS talking about the Partition references a golden era of their 
service. For the RSS, the Partition represents a time when they protected Hindus in the streets and 
fed the refugees coming into India; a time when they beat back the Muslim ‘other’ in service of the 
Hindu nation. After all, as I have stated previously, the Hindu-fold is not innate, but is rather performed 
through such acts of violence and solidarity. 
As I perused the snippets of oral history interviews in the exhibition, I wondered for whom these 
memories might be considered healing? In the months that had followed Modi’s ascension to the 
Prime Minister’s Office, the RSS’ shakhas (branches) and ranks had expanded visibly. Furthermore, 
with their spokespersons being invited to most primetime news debates, the RSS had shifted 
dramatically from a fringe organisation to a visibly important force in Indian politics. The so-called 
fringe-elements of the Hindu Right could no longer be considered fringe. By 2018, Mohan Bhagwat 
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(the leader of the RSS) could be seen publicly boasting about his ability to prepare an army in three 
days, for the ‘defence’ of the nation (The Times of India, 2018a). Against whom, one might wonder…  
With the consistent mainstreaming of fringe Hindu Right organisations and their violence, the display 
of Promod Mehra’s story struck me as particularly tone-deaf. Would these memories of the 
enthusiastic recruitment of the RSS bring healing to the family of Junaid Khan, I wondered. It was in 
this juxtaposition of Sarah Kirby and Promod Mehra’s words that I began to articulate the question at 
the heart of this dissertation, particularly this chapter. What does it mean to remember the Partition 
in the time of fascism?  
However, before I proceed any further, it is important to outline the broad contours of the critique of 
oral history within which I pose this question. The 1947 Partition Archive’s exhibition highlighted 
certain problematic trends within the recording of Partition oral history. Chief among these is the way 
in which oral history reifies rumours. This is clearly visible in Promod Mehra’s story. According to the 
Archive’s plaque, Mehra was born in 1944. Yet despite having been a mere 3 years old at the time of 
the Partition, Mehra claims to ‘remember’ the events of Lahore. He also claims to ‘remember’ having 
heard of the abduction of 1000 Hindu women, at the time. One wonders how a 3 year old child could 
vividly ‘remember’ such specific details.   
Far from a first-hand testimony of the Partition, Promod Mehra’s story itself relies on hearsay and 
dubious secondary sources. More importantly, the precise round-numbered statistics that Mehra 
provides in his story bears – what Gyanendra Pandey (2001: 91) has labelled – ‘the stamp of rumour’. 
Pandey (ibid.: 70) writes that, ‘rounded-off figures are one indication of the persistence of rumour, 
precise and yet extravagant – suggestive of so much more than the numbers themselves.’ Observing 
the use of such precise, round-numbered statistics in primary, secondary and tertiary sources, Pandey 
(ibid.) argues that in their usage, these numbers are akin to figures of speech. They are not precise 
death tolls based on verifiable research but instead hope to convey to their audience the scale of the 
violence. In Mehra’s story precise, round-numbered statistics of 4000 people, 1000 women, 10,000 
Muslim Leaguers and 30,000 RSS workers are used to convey the scale of violence and victimhood. In 
their tendency to use concrete numbers to convey abstract emotions, Pandey notes the proximity of 
these narratives to rumour: 
‘As such, it is even more overpowering than a verifiable statistic; for it shares the power 
contained in rumour, which worked to produce the new beliefs and emotions of the day, with 




In his discussion of the ‘stamp of rumour’, on historical discourses, Pandey also observes the self-
referential quality of rumours and rumoured statistics. Pandey argues that most Partition related 
statistics can be traced back to dubious oral reports such as FIRs, memoirs and the testimonies of 
bureaucrats and social workers. Extending his scepticism over statistics to the larger field of historical 
discourses, Pandey (ibid.: 91) wonders whether, ‘the most “likely”, “consensual”, “estimates” are thus 
accepted as true and recycled – because they have been heard, or heard repeatedly, in various forms 
and contexts.’  
Pandey draws attention to inconsistencies within estimations of the Partition’s death toll. Pandey 
(ibid.: 89) observes how the figures of 200,000 to 2 million, cited by Urvashi Butalia (2000) vary 
considerably from the figures of 500,000 to 1 million used by Menon and Bhasin (1998). Others whose 
works touch on the Partition seem to quote similarly varying figures such as Mohammed Waseem 
(who chooses, ‘about half a million’), Stanley Wolpert (‘approximately one million’), Phillip Ziegler (‘a 
million dead’), Chandulal Trivedi (225,000), Penderel Moon (200,000), Ian Stephens (‘about 500,000’) 
and Richard Symonds (half a million dead and twelve million homeless as the ‘lowest estimate’) 
(Pandey, 2001: 89-90).  
There are similar discrepancies in the estimates of ‘abducted women’ with some speculating the 
number to be about 75,000 while others insist that it might well be as high as 200,000 (ibid.). 
Elsewhere in this dissertation, I have used Paul Brass’ (2003) estimate of between 200,000 and 2 
million dead with 10 to 17 million people displaced and Khwaja et al’s (2009) estimate that 3.4 million 
migrants went missing.  
Questioning the evidence for some of these estimates, Pandey (2001: 90) concludes that, ‘nothing in 
the surviving records, in the calculations made at the time, or in the contentious debates that have 
gone on since then, gives us anything like a persuasive basis for such an inference.’ Instead, Pandey 
(ibid.) observes that despite the uncertain nature of these statistics, the figure of 500,000 dead seems 
to function as a sort of ‘median’. Pandey wonders why this number in particular has acquired the 
status of a de facto average, asking: 
‘Is it rather a question of what one can live with? Yet it is not entirely clear why it is easier to 
live with 500,000 dead than with a larger or smaller figure. Is this the ‘median’ that allows one 
to emphasise the enormity of Partition and point to our surviving humanity at the same time? 




Pandey (ibid.: 91) goes on to ask whether most of the general discourse on the Partition continues to 
function as, ‘something like a gigantic rumour, albeit a rumour commonly presented as “testimony” 
(or “history”)?’ 
Pandey’s discussion is thought-provoking in that it questions the authority accorded to the statistics 
used to quantify suffering. My objective in questioning the validity of Promod Mehra’s testimony is 
not to insist on some kind of positivistic, retrospective distinction between ‘truth’ and ‘rumour’, but 
to draw attention to The 1947 Partition Archive’s problematic use of oral historical narratives. It is The 
1947 Partition Archive’s lack of attention to the complexity of rumour, memory and history that is 
particularly concerning. In presenting snippets of oral history narratives as part of an ‘archive’ of 
memory, The 1947 Partition Archive implicitly presents memory as an absolute fact. Memory in this 
context is perceived as ‘truth’, its validity reified by the moral force of lived experience.  
Yet, as I have stated previously in the Introduction, memory is anything but an absolute truth. Memory 
is a social construction (Connerton, 1989; Halbwachs, 1992). The process of remembering, of narrating 
events from the past, is also fundamentally a process of making sense of the past (Kohli, 2015; Tuncel, 
2014). Memory is neither an absolute truth nor a faithful reconstruction of lived experience. Memory 
is the body of the past reanimated with the spirit of the present. The staccato process of remembering 
itself is something that needs to be kept in mind when dealing with memories of genocidal violence. 
This is because such memories of violence are themselves marked by their silences and 
fragmentariness. As Pandey writes:   
‘Genocidal violence leaves but a broken historical trace. The surviving records of Partition are 
marked by their fragmentariness. They move, in fits and starts, through jerks and breaks and 
silences – incoherent, stuttering, even incomprehensible – between the poles of testimony 
and rumour.’ 
(Pandey, 2001: 67) 
The object of my critique is not to insist on a sifting of ‘fact’ from ‘fiction’ (although this is necessary 
to some degree), but rather to show that The 1947 Partition Archive seems oblivious of these 
academic discourses. By using the narratives of survivors as a ‘document’ of the past and by not 
engaging with the idea of memory as a constructed narrative, the Archive seems to readily absorb, 
amplify and thereby reify rumour and hearsay.  
However, it would also be unfair of me to allege that in its reproduction of oral history narratives, the 
Archive refrains from editing altogether. It is in this context that another aspect of oral history needs 
to be highlighted: the editing-out of hate speech. One finds that this is a fairly regular practice in oral 
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historical work on the Partition. The bitterness and hatred for the ‘other’, that one finds flowing freely 
in the reflections of Partition survivors is almost entirely absent from the literature on them. My 
attention was drawn to this at The 1947 Partition Archive’s exhibition when I serendipitously came 
across a snippet of an interview that was attributed to one of my own informants.  
 
Figure 3.04: An excerpt of Thakar Daas Batheja’s oral testimony at The 1947 Partition Archive’s 
exhibition.  
 
I had met Thakar Daas through Pooran Chand. Thakar Daas was one of his oldest friends. The two of 
them would meet in the Rose Garden almost every day. After I spotted this plaque at the Archive’s 
exhibition, I went back to Thakar Daas to confirm whether that really was him. Thakar Daas told me 
that some time back, a researcher from the Archive had approached him for an interview. But until 
that day, he had no idea what they did with his interview. I showed Thakar Daas the picture of his 
interview excerpt and read out a rough translation of it.   
The excerpt of Thakar Daas’ interview brings up several issues. Firstly, the plaque states that his date 
of birth is ‘unknown’. I found that that simply was not the case. Pooran Chand went to school with 
Thakar Das in Faridabad and insisted that Thakar Daas was just 6 months older than him. Both Pooran 
Chand and Thakar Daas were between 13 to 14 years of age at the time of the Partition (thus born 
around 1933-34). The failure to accurately state Thakar Daas’ date of birth to me exposes the 
superficiality of this attempt at oral history. It also shows that the Archive’s single-minded obsession 
with ‘memory’ translates into a lack of engagement with the community that Partition survivors 
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inhabit, as well as the context in which these memories are remembered. ‘Memory’ in this context 
seems to be understood in purely positivistic terms, as an anecdote or a nugget of lived experience. 
What is neglected is the way memories are evoked, localised, experienced, interpreted and retold in 
reference to one’s community and the present. As Halbwachs (1992) and Connerton (1989) argue, 
memory is always a socially constructed collective narrative.  
More importantly, I found it astonishing that the Archive’s representation of Thakar Daas’ story 
glosses over his islamophobia. During my fieldwork, I found that Thakar Daas was one of my most 
vocally islamophobic informants. For example, Thakar Daas believed that Nehru and Jinnah were half-
brothers75 and that the Congress party was a ‘Muslim’ party. When I challenged him on this topic and 
asked him to name his source, he named ‘Facebook’ and insisted that because he had read it there, it 
had to be true. In other conversations, he also revealed his disdain for Mahatma Gandhi, especially 
what he perceived to be Gandhi’s role in allegedly exacerbating Partition violence. Thakar Daas 
believed that by campaigning for peace in north India, Gandhi had advocated for Muslims while ‘our 
Hindu brothers’ were being killed in Pakistan. Thakar Daas extolled the example of Sardar Patel, 
praising his decision to allegedly order the slaughter of two trains of Muslims in response to every 
train of dead Hindus and Sikhs that came from across the border.     
However, Thakar Daas’ islamophobia was not restricted to his views on the Partition alone. I realised 
this when one time, while hanging out with Thakar Daas in Faridabad’s Rose Garden, he introduced 
me to some of his other friends in the park. His friends were not Partition survivors but belonged to 
the generation that was born immediately after Independence. Thakar Daas’ conversations with his 
friends were islamophobic on a level I have rarely ever witnessed first-hand. We entered the 
conversation at a point when one of his friends was arguing that communal riots only occur in those 
districts where the population of Muslims is over 10%. ‘Even at 15-20% these people [Muslims] do 
riots, they don’t have any other work,’ he said. All of the others in that little circle nodded their 
agreement while another man chimed in that the Muslims of Faridabad seemed poised to organise 
riots. He urged the others to procure a skullcap (as camouflage), just in case riots did occur.  
They moved on from that to alleging that mosques and madrassas were brainwashing Muslims into 
terrorism. ‘The Quran-sharif is not sharif [noble/innocent], it is badmaash [crooked],’ quipped Thakar 
Daas to the raucous laughter of his friends. Emboldened one of his friends began to mimic the words 
of the namaz and asked the others why it sounded like that. When he did not get the answer he was 
looking for he said, ‘Gas [flatulence]’. He then bent forward in his chair and began mimicking someone 
                                                            
75 This is the same conspiracy theory articulated by Jaideep in the introduction of Chapter 2. Gangaram, a key 
informant whose story I tell in Section 3.4 also believed in this conspiracy theory.  
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doing the namaz while making fart noises. ‘This is how they release gas,’ he said, as all of them broke 
out in laughter. Unrelated, someone quipped, ‘Who are these Congress [leaders] anyway? They are 
all descendants of Muslims.’  
This marked a change in the conversation as they now began to talk about how Islam was antithetical 
to nationalism and national progress. Someone raised the issue of how mosques glorify the Mughal 
rulers of old while another built on this to remind the others how a number of Delhi’s streets are still 
named after Mughal rulers such as Akbar, Humayun and Aurangzeb. Predictably, the mention of 
Aurangzeb evoked even more anger76.  
‘Tell me one thing what will you do? Five times in a day you read the namaz, when will you work for 
your country or family or home? Where will you get your roti from, tell me?’ another quipped 
rhetorically. One of Thakar Daas’ friends now told the others how the government building Shastri 
Bhawan had been planned in a way that would avoid demolishing the mosque beside it. Other such 
examples of roads and architecture literally ‘making way’ for mosques followed. These examples of 
the alleged reorganisation of urban architecture around mosques and shrines seemed to confirm the 
‘fact’ of the Indian state’s literal and symbolic appeasement of its proximate enemy.  
The conversation shifted to politics when someone mentioned that Muslims cannot take a joke and 
would kill anyone who dares to insult their god. Speaking of the supposed tribalism of Muslims brought 
up the ongoing protests in Kashmir. They alleged a grand conspiracy by Kashmir’s Muslim political 
leaders (with the JKNC leader Farooq Abdullah chief among them) to foment separatism and 
encourage stone-pelters. Repeating the popular Hindu Right claim at the time, they alleged that stone-
pelters could be purchased for 50-200 rupees.  
There was nothing particularly new or shocking in this conversation. I had heard variations of these 
discourses in different contexts before. But, what did surprise me was the way in which Thakar Daas 
and his friends felt unafraid to air these views in public, at the top of their lungs. This was no shy 
sharing of extremist views. Rather, their demeanour suggested not only their unflinching faith in these 
discourses but also the awareness that their views were now part of the mainstream.  
In addition to this, Thakar Das struck me as an incredibly orthodox man (even by the standards of his 
own peers). Once when talking about Bangalore, he told me the story of his own visit to the city. He 
had gone to Bangalore in the 1980s on a holiday with his wife. While exploring the city, the couple had 
somehow accidentally found their way into a ‘Muslim’ restaurant. Thakar Daas said that as soon as he 
                                                            




realised that this was a ‘Muslim’ establishment, he apologised to the staff and asked them to guide 
him to the nearest ‘Hindu hotel’. His refusal to eat in a ‘Muslim’ restaurant was a continuation of the 
age-old Hindu upper-caste practice of untouchability against Muslims (Kohli, 2015; Talbot, 2006).  
In general, Thakar Daas showed a high propensity for bigotry, rumour and conspiracy theory. My point 
in highlighting this side of Thakar Daas is to show that his islamophobia was inherently linked to his 
experience of the Partition. That is, not only did his sense of historical victimhood fuel his 
islamophobia, but that Thakar Daas’ islamophobia was so deeply embedded that it was also the lens 
through which he remembered the Partition.  
The editing-out of hate speech is not a phenomenon restricted to The 1947 Partition Archive alone. It 
can also be seen in books on the Partition, such as Urvashi Butalia’s (2000) The Other Side of Silence. 
During my fieldwork, I had the pleasure of meeting Urvashi Butalia in Delhi. She admitted that while 
she and her colleague Sudesh Vaid had also similarly witnessed the bigotry and islamophobia of their 
informants, she had made a conscious editorial decision to omit these in her book. Urvashi Butalia’s 
decision to do so was also partly shaped by the anti-Sikh pogroms of 1984. It was the way in which the 
violence of 1984 seemed to provoke memories of the Partition that had inspired her foray into oral 
history. Therefore, by recording these memories, Butalia wanted to contribute to the unsilencing of 
these memories of violence; to reach the other side of silence.   
Similarly, Aanchal Malhotra’s (2017) Remnants of Separation indulges in a careful omission of the 
hate-speech and bigotry of the Partition survivors whose stories the book retells. Malhotra’s (ibid.) 
work is among the first explorations of material culture in the context of the Partition of India and 
Pakistan. Using oral historical methods, Malhotra (ibid.) compiles 19 life history narratives that explore 
how personal artefacts and family heirlooms act as a stimulus for memory. Tracing the migrations and 
family histories of Partition survivors, Malhotra focuses exclusively on their feelings of nostalgia and 
displacement. Her stories of Partition survivors who revisited their homelands are especially poignant. 
Malhotra’s book steers clear of ‘communal’ rants and competing ethnonational claims. Generic 
references to ‘rioting’ and violence against women are as far as she allows herself to wander off this 
script. Instead, Malhotra (ibid.) focuses on the nostalgia of her informants for the ‘good old’ pre-
Partition days, for their ancestral homes, for the cities of their youth – their yearning for simpler times.  
However, Malhotra (ibid.) packages this nostalgia as a trenchant belief in secularism; as somehow 
evidence that those who remember the Partition do not believe in the excesses of the time. Such a 
simplistic conflation of the two also neglects a critical examination of the demography of her 
informants. The personal artefacts whose stories Malhotra (ibid.) records include the pearls of Azra 
Haq (gifted to her by the then Maharaja of Bikaner) and a massive stone plaque from Mian Faiz 
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Rabbani’s pre-Partition mansion. These stories speak volumes of the wealth and privilege that these 
people lived in; conditions that were far removed from those of the majority of the people at the time. 
The wealth and privilege of informants forms an important part of their experience of the Partition, 
determining, for example, whether the individuals in question crossed the border on foot in crowded 
caravans or in the relative safety and comfort of trains and flights. Although beautifully written, 
Malhotra’s (ibid.) book is ultimately a compilation of stories that memorialise the wealth of upper-
caste, upper-class individuals. Such wealth and privilege also problematises nostalgia in this context, 
as nostalgia for the pre-Partition days also constitutes nostalgia for one’s former wealth and status. 
Yet one finds no critical reflection on the meanings of nostalgia.  
Mara Ahmed’s documentary on the Partition, A Thin Wall (2015), relies on a similar narrative. The film 
focuses purely on Partition survivors’ nostalgia for pre-Partition South Asia. In a narrative trope similar 
to Malhotra’s, A Thin Wall romanticises the alleged peace and harmony of the pre-Partition past in an 
effort to express a hope for a peaceful future. Both the film and Malhotra’s (2017) book remember 
the Partition through such well-intentioned informants, implying that if there had been more such 
individuals around, then the Partition might never have happened.  
Yet, as I have written elsewhere, nostalgia, like memory, is not an absolute but a social construction 
(Kohli, 2015). Nostalgia involves an idealisation of the past, a process whereby individuals make 
‘perfect memories of imperfect worlds’ (Finlay, 2004: 150; Damousi, 2001). Not only do these works 
naively believe the nostalgic recollections of their informants, they also mistake this nostalgia for lack 
of bigotry.  
In my experience of fieldwork, I found that all of the Partition survivors I spoke to (who lived mainly in 
and around Delhi), were prone to islamophobic discourses; an islamophobia that was explicitly derived 
from a trenchant belief in Hindu nationalism. Sweet nostalgic recollections of the perfect homes they 
had left behind in Pakistan were often followed by islamophobic rants. They might remember Muslim 
friends and neighbours from their childhood quite fondly but they would also brand all Muslims as 
inherently treacherous and untrustworthy. They would recall their lives being saved by Muslim 
strangers but they would also simultaneously blame the Partition on Muslims and stress that Muslims 
had ‘committed more violence’ than the Hindus and Sikhs. This apparent tension between nostalgia 
and islamophobia needs careful attention. 
My discussion of the memories of the Partition, in this chapter, mark a dramatic break from most of 
the preceding oral historical work. Where the majority of past work on the Partition has chosen to 
edit-out hate speech, I pivot towards the opposite direction. I argue that turning a blind eye to the 
reality of the political context in which the Partition is remembered by its survivors, accomplishes 
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nothing. If anything, I suspect that it only furthers the feeling of repression and oppression that haunts 
the survivors. This is an important critique considering that the scholarly urge to remember the 
Partition is motivated by the impulse to ‘unsilence’ the memory of the Partition. 
By analysing the bitterness and islamophobia in the memories of Partition survivors, by briefly drawing 
attention to the Hindu Right’s sustained co-optation of these narratives, I want to problematize such 
simplistic notions of ‘speaking out’ as healing. In this chapter, I wonder whether it is really ‘healing’ to 
remember the Partition when everyone from the survivors themselves to the political leaders they 
idolise seem to support a fresh cycle of violence in retribution for the past; to finish the unfinished 
work of the Partition, as it were. Is this, or can these acts of public remembrance in this political 
atmosphere, provide the ‘healing’ we all desire?  
In my discussion of the problematics of oral history, I argue that this idea of ‘speaking out’ as ‘healing’ 
is a form of theodicy – a prayer for salvation from a fractured nomos – that falls prey to its own claims 
of redemption; imagining healing where there is none to be found. Combining relevant literature on 
trauma, silence, violence and theodicy with some ethnographic evidence of my own, I show that for 
those who survived the Partition, for a subcontinent searching for the end to this unfinished history, 
‘healing’ is a far more complicated process.   
In Section 3.2, I critique Partition oral history’s therapeutic mission. Such oral histories insist that to 
remember is to heal. They present the mere act of remembering the Partition as a successful reckoning 
with the past. In presenting its project of remembrance as one of ‘healing’, such oral histories embody 
an implicit pathology of silence and what it means to remember. Yet, by pathologising silence as 
trauma, such (oral) history also unwittingly others the violence of the Partition. Rejecting such 
simplistic and self-aggrandizing notions about the significance of remembering, I show how these oral 
histories implicitly ‘other’ the violence of the Partition. 
In Section 3.3, I continue this line of critique by examining the representation of Partition violence. 
Employing a hermeneutics of suspicion (Ricoeur, 1970) in relation to the narratives of my informants, 
I explore the silence and guilt that haunts remembrance of the Partition. Here, my discussion is guided 
by the idea that violence – the act as well as its remembrance – as a narrativizing lens (Feldman, 1997) 
constitutes the formation and performance of national community (Pandey, 2001). Ultimately, 
through this discussion I seek to interrupt narratives of violence that contribute to the retrospective 
imagination of a homogenous Hindu-fold. Together, these two sections attempt to trouble the flat 
generalisations of trauma and victimhood in this context.  
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In Section 3.4, I present the stories of two of my key informants. These are stories from my fieldwork 
that brought me up against the question of healing. Exploring the nostalgia of my informants and their 
love for Pakistani people and culture besides the seemingly conflicting presence of islamophobia in 
their narratives, I question what healing means in this context.  
In Section 3.5, I address the theme of victimhood. Building on my discussion of silence, trauma and 
violence, I discuss how my informants’ perceived victimhood imbues their islamophobia with the 
moralistic aura of justice. I explore this feeling of ressentiment that lies at the heart of their perceived 
victimhood. The realisation that one’s sense of victimhood imbues one’s hatred with putative 
righteousness has important ramifications for our understanding of Hindu nationalism. It allows us to 
understand how, to its followers, Hindutva bears the guise of a political revolution. Finally, in 
discussing the victimhood and ressentiment of my informants, I ultimately draw the reader’s attention 
to the terrifying thought that far from the warm, reconciliatory healing imagined by scholars, revenge 
is the only healing sought by Partition survivors.  
Can the act of ‘speaking out’ be considered healing even when these discourses validate majoritarian 
impulses? Who are these narratives really healing for? Moreover, what does it mean to have “healed” 
and “moved on” when ethnonationalist animosities of the past control my informants’ imaginations 
of the future? What even is the post-conflict stage for an open, bleeding rupture such as the Partition? 




3.2. The Fractured Nomos: Remembrance and Healing 
 
I want to briefly return to the question Gyanendra Pandey posed while observing the variations in the 
estimation of the Partition’s death toll. Pandey (2001: 90) had asked whether the figure of 500,000 
dead is, ‘the “median” that allows one to emphasise the enormity of Partition and point to our 
surviving humanity at the same time?’  
The crux of the question Pandey poses here, about how the death and suffering unleashed by the 
Partition – as embodied in the weight of a number – endangers our sense of humanity, is a deeply 
anthropological one. This ‘sense of humanity’ that Pandey refers to comprises a veritable nomos. This 
nomos is fractured by the violence of the Partition. This history, where enormous numbers of people 
organised themselves to enslave, rape, murder and loot millions of others, threatens to destroy one’s 
faith in god and its secular equivalents (Indian society and humanity). It is in this context that a death 
toll – as a statistical expression of suffering – becomes morally troubling.  
However, Pandey’s subsequent discussion on how the enduring self-referential quality of rumour 
contaminates the historian’s evidence reduces this question to a fleeting rhetorical aside. My interest 
in this discussion stems from how oral historical and ethnographic work on the Partition – by 
documenting the fact of human suffering on an unimaginable scale – carries a fundamentally 
denomizing quality. It is against this backdrop that the oral historical obsession with the therapeutic 
quality of remembrance becomes relevant. In this section, I argue that it is because hearing/reading 
stories of the Partition fractures our nomos – making us question our faith in India, humanity and/or 
god – that faith in the therapeutic qualities of remembrance itself becomes necessary. Thus, it is 
because stories of the Partition fracture our nomos that belief in oral history’s ability to heal, becomes 
necessary.   
In Charred Lullabies Valentine Daniel (1996) writes about anthroposemiosis. Semiosis describes the 
activity of dabbling in signs, whether giving, receiving, disseminating or transforming signs (ibid.). 
Anthroposemiosis then is semiosis that involves, ‘human beings’ knowledge or awareness of the 
relation of signification’ (ibid.: 121). What sets anthroposemiosis apart from other semiotic exchanges 
in nature is that humans are conscious of these semiotic processes while participating in them (ibid.). 
As Zygmunt Bauman (1992: 12) writes, ‘Unlike other animals, we not only know, we know that we 
know.’ Daniel (1996) writes that anthroposemiosis defines what it means to be human. Conversely, 
silence, especially silence that disrupts or resists this process is seen as threatening to our sense of 
humanity (ibid.). It is in this vein that the stunned silence of victims of violence seems particularly 
disconcerting. The concept of trauma is closely related to this (Fassin and Rechtman, 2009). Similarly, 
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the silence of the authorities or a general lack of public outrage on perceived injustices provokes 
introspection into whether we have lost our sense of humanity. On the other hand, the ability to 
render a potentially traumatic lived experience and the myriad emotions associated with it into words, 
seems to restore a sense of normality.   
This is an idea that’s quite prominent in the philosophy of counselling and therapy. A counsellor or a 
therapist encourages you to dwell on your experience and helps you process it by extracting meaning 
from it. This conscious turn to the meaning-making processes of narrative memory through the 
resuscitation of anthroposemiosis is seen as ‘healing’. It is in this way that speaking about one’s 
trauma is seen as ‘healing’ (ibid.).    
One finds this idea of the therapeutic qualities of remembrance underlying much of the oral historical 
work on the Partition of India. Oral historians often mention the ‘healing’ their work brings to these 
troubled histories. They present the act of remembering the Partition as a healing experience for its 
survivors. Meanwhile, the use of phrases such as ‘reckoning with history’ and ‘confronting the past’ 
express a similar hope for healing in the larger context of the past that is remembered. Here, 
remembrance is constructed as somehow healing for the society that enables it; thus interrupting 
society’s ‘traumatised silence’.  
Sometimes, as in the case of the simplistic narratives of The 1947 Partition Archive these discourses 
seem almost self-congratulatory. The 1947 Partition Archive sees itself as a community of ‘concerned 
global citizens’ and describes the impact of its work using the following words: 
‘Turning the tide on public acceptance: The sharing of lived memories over social media, 
millions of times has helped create a "critical mass" acknowledgement of the human suffering 
that resulted from Partition. As a result, we are watching a change in tide of public 
consciousness. We are watching as memories of Partition are becoming accepted in the 
mainstream and drawing attention from popular film makers, media makers, news 
organizations and educators. An honest look at our past, with scrutiny will help us move 
toward a more just future.’      [Emphasis Original] 
(The 1947 Partition Archive, 2011) 
The 1947 Partition Archive, and other oral history projects like it, valorise the act of remembrance as 
a therapeutic action. The recording of memories is framed as an act of healing; one that helps the 
individual as well as their society somehow transcend the past through the mere act of remembering 
it. Such simplistic narratives seem more concerned with shoring up the morale of their legion of unpaid 
volunteers (‘citizen historians’ and ‘story scholars’) along with online contributors and donors. Building 
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morale rather than confronting the difficulties of remembering the Partition – especially in this time 
– appears to be the objective. As I argue in this chapter, it is India’s current proto-fascist period that 
needs as much a reckoning as the unfinished past it seeks to complete.  
This idea of remembrance as healing derives from the antimimetic theory of trauma. In her genealogy 
of approaches to trauma, Ruth Leys (2000) identifies a binary classification for academic approaches 
to the study of trauma: mimetic and antimimetic theory. According to Leys, although the act of 
‘imitation’ is central to both theories, they both understand imitation differently. The mimetic theory 
holds that due to being unable to recall the traumatic incident, the traumatised subject is doomed to 
act out its content or imitate it in other ways (hypnotically). As Leys (ibid.: 298) writes, ‘The idea is that 
the traumatic experience in its sheer extremity, its affront to common norms and expectations, 
shatters or disables the victim's cognitive and perceptual capacities so that the experience never 
becomes part of the ordinary memory system.’ Due to the fact that the traumatic incident is assumed 
to have never become part of the victim’s memory, the mimetic theory disputes the authenticity of 
the victim’s testimony (ibid.). 
The antimimetic theory, on the other hand, holds that the victim can represent the traumatic event 
to others and themselves but fundamentally remains aloof from it (ibid.). As Leys explains:  
‘The antimimetic theory is compatible with, and often gives way to, the idea that trauma is a 
purely external event that befalls a fully constituted subject; whatever the damage to the 
latter's psychical autonomy and integrity, there is in principle no problem of eventually 
remembering or otherwise recovering the event, though in practice the process of bringing 
this about may be long and tortuous.’ 
(ibid.: 299) 
Furthermore, the antimimetic theory of trauma rejects the mimetic theory’s claim that the victim 
experiences an inchoate identification with their aggressor; an identification represented in the 
impulse towards ‘hypnotic imitation’ of the traumatic episode (ibid.: 298-299). The antimimetic theory 
understands violence as an external action on the victim and rejects the mimetic theory’s impulse to 
consider the victim as somehow complicitous in the act of violence directed at them (ibid.). Because 
the antimimetic theory considers the victim aloof from their trauma and yet simultaneously capable 
of recalling it, it advocates the ‘speaking cure’. The conscious turn to narrative memory in this context 
is meant to ‘heal’ the alienation of this experience in the victim’s memory system.  
It is important to clarify here that the issue with Partition oral history’s self-prescription of the 
‘speaking cure’ is not that it privileges one trauma approach over another. Indeed, as Leys (ibid.) 
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clarifies such an endeavour is ultimately futile due to the fact that the two approaches have been 
inseparably intertwined in the historical development of the concept of trauma. Rather, the object of 
my critique here is to show that the representation of remembrance as healing is predicated on a 
number of problematic assumptions, chief among them the pathologization of silence and the erasure 
of the distinction between victim, perpetrator and witness.  
This is due to the fact that in contemporary discourse, trauma has emerged as, ‘the universal language 
of a new politics of the intolerable’ (Fassin and Rechtman, 2009: 93). Didier Fassin and Richard 
Rechtman (ibid.) note that the trauma concept began as a medical category that sought to avoid any 
moral prescription between victim or perpetrator or witness. By medically establishing the idea of a 
psychological wound – akin to a bodily injury – the idea of trauma focused solely on, ‘the mark left by 
the event’ (ibid.: 284). However, this has evolved over time such that, ‘rather than a clinical reality, 
trauma today is a moral judgement’ (ibid.: 284). The validity accorded to the trauma of the victims of 
a genocide (such as the Holocaust or the Partition), ‘is not the validity of a clinical category but rather 
of a judgement- the judgement of history’ (ibid.: 284). As a category of moral judgement that defines 
legitimate victims and the reparations they are due, the concept of trauma articulates a larger 
philosophy of what it means to be human77 (ibid.). 
I am emphasising this aspect of the trauma concept in order to connect it back to my starting point: 
anthroposemiosis. In the public act of remembering the Partition, silence is framed as something to 
be overcome; as something to be fixed or ‘healed’. Silence, in this context is visualised as an abrupt 
event horizon that allegedly delineates the boundary between semiosis (speech) and its absence 
(silence). Implicit here is the conflation of silence (as the ‘interruption’ of anthroposemiosis) with 
trauma; an illness to be overcome. 
Imagining oral history as a therapeutic project that seeks to heal victims by provoking the speech of 
victims, informants become patients. Focusing its gaze onto these victims of history, the oral historian 
as therapist provokes them to speech, moving their narratives from the obscurity of forgetting to the 
public consciousness-raising act of remembrance. In this act of ‘excavation’, it restores semiosis, 
allegedly healing its self-diagnosed afflictions. This transition from darkness to light, from silence to 
speech, from forgetting to remembrance is framed within the very title of Urvashi Butalia’s (2000) 
pioneering ethnographic oral history of the Partition. After all, as Butalia (ibid.) frames it, to remember 
the Partition is to access, The Other Side of Silence.  
                                                            
77 Previously, in the Introduction, I have compared this to a form of secular theodicy. 
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What emerges in the process is a pathology of silence that relies heavily on the assumption that silence 
exists in dialogical opposition to the act of speech. This interpretation of silence neglects the myriad 
ways in which silence is folded within semiosis. That this assumption is made in the context of Partition 
oral history seems like a gross oversight considering the well-established place of silence within 
mourning: a situation where silence denotes respect, sobriety and grief.  
In a hugely influential article titled, ‘To Give Up on Words’, Keith Basso (1970) observes the various 
meanings that silence holds for the Western Apache. Basso documents a number of situations where 
the Western Apache choose to keep silent. These include situations where one is spending time with 
someone who is either sad or angry, where one is courting a new lover and when meeting someone 
new. Basso (ibid.: 225) argues that ‘status ambiguity’ signifies the common denominator in all of these 
instances. Basso (ibid.: 225) defines ‘status ambiguity’ as a situation when, ‘participants perceive their 
relationships vis-à-vis one another to be ambiguous and/or unpredictable.’ Therefore, the Western 
Apache, use silence as a response to uncertainty and unpredictability in their social relations.  
While the specific situations that constitute ‘status ambiguity’ are culturally specific to the Western 
Apache, Basso’s work reminds us that contrary to unreflective truisms, silence – like speech – is a 
mode of communication, not its opposite. He shows how silence is folded within semiotic practices 
and constitutes a deeply meaningful response in the way that individuals navigate social relations. 
Basso’s work disproves the assumption that silence is dialogically opposed to speech.  
A second, but related assumption that follows from the assumption that silence signifies the absence 
of semiosis is that silence in the narratives of Partition survivors is seen as subordinate to the act of 
speech, or remembrance. By characterising silence as subordinate to speech, the silence of survivors 
is often understood in one of two ways:  
‘The first is the idea that communities have been subordinated to such an extent that their 
histories and memories have not been spoken or heard [oppression] and the second is that 
the stories about past events have been so traumatic as to be rendered literally ‘unsayable’ 
[repression].’ 
(Greenwood, 2019: 750) 
Greenwood (ibid.) identifies this as a core philosophy of Truth and Reconciliation Committees (and 
oral histories). However, the oppression-repression binary fails to recognise that there is also agency 
in silence (ibid.). That is, people make a conscious choice about when to speak and when to stay silent 
and in doing so, silence constitutes an important part of everyday semiosis and social relations. In this 
way, silence is not always evocative of trauma, just as trauma is not purely embodied by silence.  
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In a similar vein, Fassin and Rechtman (2009) argue that it is necessary to recognise the tactical 
dimension of trauma (and silence). This includes the way that individuals might themselves mobilise 
the concept of trauma in practice of the politics of reparation, the politics of testimony and/or the 
politics of proof. Fassin and Rechtman (ibid.) clarify that the recognition of this is not cynical but rather 
a pressing ethical imperative. They write that, ‘in asserting the tactical dimension of trauma we are 
recognising the social intelligence of the actors involved’ (ibid.: 11). In this recognition of the tactical 
use of trauma by intelligent social actors, Fassin and Rechtman (ibid.) are guided by de Certeau’s 
(1984) understanding of ‘tactics’. 
In Charred Lullabies, Valentine Daniel (1996: 150) reflects on a ‘drone of silence’ that persists over his 
conversations with victims of violence. Reflecting on his experience of interviewing victims of torture, 
Daniel (ibid.) pushes past the oppression-repression binary as he observes a silence that evades such 
easy characterisation. Daniel (ibid.: 150) writes that, ‘what persists in this and many other interviews 
such as this is the drone of silence – a silence that does not settle for the anthropologist whether it is 
a silence of a not-being-able-to-speak or of an ought-not-to-speak.’  
During my fieldwork, numerous times, I too observed this silence that, ‘does not settle for the 
anthropologist’. This feeling was most palpable while interviewing Ambunath. Ambunath was an 82 
year old Partition survivor who lived in Gurgaon. Out of all the people I interviewed, Ambunath had 
had perhaps the most intimate experience of death and violence. Most of Ambunath’s family had 
perished during the Partition. Before the Partition, Ambunath’s family had lived in Choti, not far from 
Rajaram’s village. In August 1947, when the violence first began in that region, four of Ambunath’s 
uncles were killed in the violence. As the violence escalated and showed no signs of abating, their 
family moved to the city of Dera Ghazi Khan for safety. After spending four months in a makeshift 
refugee camp in Dera Ghazi Khan, the military evacuated them to Multan from where they boarded a 
train to Lahore. At the Lahore railway station, as their train awaited clearance from the signalman, 
they were attacked by a mob of Muslims. As the mob swarmed their compartment, Ambunath and 
his mother hid under a bleeding corpse. Ambunath remembered: 
‘After reaching Lahore around 3 o clock, they attacked us, Muslims. My mother was with me. 
You know how inside the train they have these planks [berths], there someone was already 
lying [dead], and he was bleeding. My mother had kept me hidden. She put a dupatta78 over 
me. That blood was dripping over me, was flowing. So they [mob] came, saw, thought we 
were dead and moved on. That they are dead, bleeding, so they left me thinking I was dead. 
                                                            
78 A shawl-like scarf that is traditionally worn by women in South Asia.  
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But they kept killing as they went ahead. A lot of damage happened. After that at 5 o clock 
the train started moving and then Attari [India].’  
Such vivid descriptions of the scenes of the Partition were relatively rare for Ambunath. He was, for 
the most part a quiet and reserved man. Where other informants would barely need a prompt to 
narrate their life histories, Ambunath spoke predominantly in one-word answers. The conversations 
that I had with him were generously punctuated by silence. He disavowed any interest in politics and 
political discussions. The couple of times that I tried to steer our conversations towards politics, he 
precluded my attempts with dismissive (but polite) comments emphasising his quotidian material 
concerns over lofty discussions of high-politics. He claimed he had no hatred for Muslims despite the 
suffering in his past.  
Even among his community he was known for his quietness. Jogesh, his neighbour and also a Partition 
survivor, remarked that while Ambunath came out to the park every evening, he never spoke to or sat 
beside anyone; preferring instead to sit by himself in the comfort of his own silence. Jogesh’s son 
Mrinal confided in me that Ambunath’s wife had died relatively early while his son had also died 
young. His son, Mrinal told me, had died of the ‘fruit of his own deeds’ (‘karmon ka phall’). When I 
responded to that comment with a confused expression, Mrinal lowered his voice to a conspiratorial 
whisper and told me he had died of AIDS. The moralisation of his death79 and the sheer lack of grief in 
its remembrance stayed with me for long after that conversation.  
My awareness of the death and suffering in Ambunath’s life had the paradoxical effect of pushing our 
subsequent conversations further into silence. Even though I visited him with the objective of 
recording his memories, I often felt hesitant to disturb the silence. What was the point of 
remembering relatives who had died long ago, I wondered. What might be gained by talking about his 
son; a death the local community had clearly moralised. Nothing I might have said or written had the 
power to heal these ruptures. In the face of his suffering, my attempts at speech for the sake of 
ethnography felt like a deliberate scratching of barely concealed wounds.  
In the face of this suffering that he clearly wanted to keep private, ethnography felt a deeply invasive 
and disrespectful task. Thus, in Ambunath’s presence, the task of ethnography became meaningful 
through silence. To some degree, I had come to understand his silence. Rather than unearth his 
                                                            
79 Mary Douglas (1994: 92) provides an insightful account of the moralisation of diseases and the 
discrimination that ensues from this, through the idea of ‘libel’. Douglas (ibid.: 92-3) writes, ‘The simple food 
libel (foreigners eat disgusting foods), and the sex libel (the demeaned category is promiscuous, effeminate, 
incestuous), escalate to violence and perversion, and if the determination to exclude is fixed, it resorts to the 
blood libel (the enemy is murderous, and even murders children). The culminating infamy that incites ethnic 
persecution combines blood, sex, food, and religion. […] Imputing filth to the victims enables them to be 
rejected without a qualm.’  
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wounds in pursuit of speech for the sake of speech – of some simplistic notion of healing – I instead 
chose to respect the agency of his silence. In this way, the silence that we shared became one of 
solidarity. For me, these moments of silence became an opportunity for reflection on the problem of 
theodicy; something I grappled with extensively in my everyday thoughts during this final phase of my 
fieldwork. I do not know whether he had similar thoughts. But, I do know that the silence we shared 
was somewhat cathartic.  
To many, the idea of a silence that is ethnographically meaningful might scrape against the very nature 
of the task. Words are after all the anthropologist’s most valuable currency. The fact that silence might 
be valuable to ethnography appears prima facie to run counter to this idea. But, perhaps that is what 
is at issue here: a troubling urge to produce speech for the sake of words. Although I do not claim to 
propose an alternative, I return to this difficulty of remembering the Partition, in the conclusion of this 
chapter. 
In concluding this section, I want to return to my earlier point about the pathologisation of silence as 
trauma. The pathologisation of silence is a problematic that directly springs from oral history’s 
adoption of a therapeutic mission. After all, in advocating remembrance of the Partition as a form of 
healing oral history moves from being just oral history. However, the conflation of ‘remembering’ with 
‘healing’ also implies that the oral historian assumes the role of a therapist just as their informant 
becomes their patient. Oral history seems not only unfit to this task but also an inappropriate venue. 
In therapeutic settings, such as counselling or Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, the objective of 
evoking autobiographical memory is not to arrive at a ‘true’ life history but to establish reminiscence 
as a healing process (Climo and Cattell, 2002). In these settings, the ‘truth’ that individuals are 
encouraged to explore is not the historian’s truth but a ‘truth’ that helps the individual make sense of 
their past (ibid.).  
However, where the ‘truths’ of therapy and support groups are kept confidential, the ‘truths’ of oral 
history are reified as public, historical documents preserved in ‘archives’. As I argue in the following 







3.3. The Trauma Concept and the Representation of Violence 
 
So far in this chapter I have critiqued oral history’s therapeutic mission. I have shown how the idea of 
‘speaking out’ as ‘healing’ relies on the assumption that silence purely signifies trauma. On the one 
hand, this constructs one’s informants as patients, while on the other hand, it neglects reflection on 
the myriad meanings of silence, including the way that silence is itself a part of how the Partition is 
remembered.  
In this section, I focus on oral history’s representation of Partition violence. I argue that the uncritical 
and generous ascription of trauma as a category of moral judgement conjures a landscape where all 
those who remember the Partition, do so as ‘traumatised victims’. Evading engagement with the 
violence of the Partition due to its alleged ‘complexity’, this discourse problematically obscures the 
distinctions between victims, perpetrators and witnesses. It also fails to consider how these categories 
collapse into each other due to the retributive nature of Partition violence. In response, I use 
ethnographic evidence to show how violence and its memory is part of the delineation of the 
boundaries of community. That is, violence as a narrativizing frame – both in the act itself and its 
memory (Feldman, 1997) – comprises a richly political discourse that needs careful attention. 
Yasmin Khan (2017b) notes that despite the recent surge in oral historical work on the Partition, it 
ultimately remains, ‘a history layered with absence and silences.’ Khan (ibid.) observes that while most 
Punjabi families can tell a Partition-era story of loss and displacement, either of their family or of 
someone they know, ‘far fewer are willing to discuss the role of their own locality in contributing to 
the violence.’ As a result, while oral histories of ‘victims’ abound, ‘guilt and silences stalk the archive’ 
(ibid.).  
This total absence of perpetrator testimonies characterises my work too. During my fieldwork, I did 
not encounter a single informant who admitted either their own or their locality’s role in violence. The 
closest I ever came to a perpetrator testimony was when one of my informants80 admitted to having 
been trained for ‘self-defence’. Aged 16 and living in Dera Ghazi Khan at the time of the Partition, 
Dipankar became an RSS swayamsevak (volunteer), at a young age. He subsequently rose through the 
ranks to become a naik and then a gatanaik (group leader).  
In 1947, as ethnonational tensions simmered, his RSS shakha (branch) organised its members into 
teams to carry out training exercises. Donning the typical RSS attire of a white shirt, khaki shorts and 
                                                            
80 I have deliberately omitted any further biographical details about this informant in order to preserve his 
anonymity.   
289 
 
a lathi81, they would set off early in the morning to patrol ‘their’ (Hindu) neighbourhoods. Since the 
RSS was a banned organisation at the time, most of their activities took place in secret. Dipankar 
admitted that sometimes, senior members of the shakha would also organise elaborate drills to test 
their alertness and combat readiness.   
‘So what we did, no one would get to know. Suppose 50-something men have come to the 
shakha. So there the shakha would be set up beside a gaushala [cow shelter], early in the 
morning. So then suddenly they would say, bhai, Muslims are coming from there, they are 10-
12, we have to beat them up, we have to catch them, and they are coming to attack us. They 
have knives in their hands, they have daggers in their hands, and a lathi. So you 2-2, 3-3 men 
go do them. But afterwards when they [Muslims] would come we would use a lathi – now we 
knew how to fight with a lathi, we knew how to do gatka82, we had also learnt to use swords. 
So we would run after them. Later we would learn that these are Hindus. They are just people 
from our shakha who are just conducting an exercise – bhai, if the need ever arises.’ 
Dipankar was always very careful about packaging his riot drills and weapons training as an exercise 
in self-defence. He admitted that his gatanaik at the time – a 20-something young man who was the 
son of a local mid-ranking police officer – would organise regular arms training for them.  
‘So there were brick kilns there, he would call us there at 4, alright? There he would teach us 
everything. And we would hide from the government. Now, when we would return from 
there, like we are wearing our [khaki] shorts, we would wear a tehmat over it, a dhoti. So that 
no one would know this is a man from the [RSS] shakha.’  
Though their training had included firearms too, Dipankar said he was unable to learn to use a gun 
properly. Dipankar also denied any involvement in riots or any actual attack on Muslims or their 
property. Although, listening to his stories made me wonder how far I was willing to trust his words. 
Could I seriously believe that someone who had trained for violence all through their youth had never 
actually participated in a pogrom or attack of some sort?  
Dipankar’s story sheds some light on the more shadowy aspects of Partition history. It is evocative of 
Yasmin Khan’s (2017a) observation that even today India and Pakistan remain in denial about the 
nature of Partition violence. This question of, ‘who were the killers?’ has been described by Khan 
(2017b) as the ‘mystery at the dark heart’ of the Partition and by Joya Chatterji (2014: 311) as the, 
‘gaping void at the heart of the subject.’ Within the larger field of South Asian Partition Studies, this is 
                                                            
81 A long wooden stick, similar to a staff 
82 A form of martial art (often associated with Sikhs), that practises a style of stick fighting. In battle, sticks may 
often be substituted with swords.  
290 
 
not so much an actual mystery as it is the weasel-worded invocation of ‘complexity’ towards the denial 
of an obvious reality. At other times, this question has been avoided through the articulation of the 
dubious claim that the violence of the Partition was an uncontrollable, spontaneous aberration83. 
Yasmin Khan (2017a, 2017b) is among the few scholars who boldly identifies the killers as the young 
men of organised militias such as the RSS and the Muslim League. The crux of Khan’s (2017a) argument 
is that far from a chaotic spectacle of blood-letting, there was a fundamentally organised character to 
the violence of the Partition. The violent mobs that survivors refer to in their stories were made up of 
real people who came from specific backgrounds and were often very skilled in the violence that they 
perpetrated (ibid.). Khan’s (ibid.) analysis is supported by Ian Talbot (2006), Talbot and Singh (2009), 
Gyanendra Pandey (2001) and Vazira Zamindar (2007) who have similarly revealed the role of partisan 
policemen, political parties, pseudo-military gangs and even Partition refugees in the violence that 
unfolded across North India. Thus, far from a spontaneous, aberrational episode of blood-letting, the 
retributive violence of the Partition was the result of careful planning and disciplined execution.      
Yet, the therapeutic mission of oral history with its bland, oversimplifying gloss of trauma, effaces 
these mobs and killers from our midst. Survivors of the Partition lay inordinate stress on the ‘fact’ that 
the violent mobs they witnessed came from ‘outside’. Meanwhile, fleeting allusions to their own 
violence are presented as desperate acts of self-defence. Where the historiographical inquiries of the 
Partition partly focus on apportioning blame (Pandey, 2001) – i.e. who fired the first bullet and why – 
the oral histories present the bullets that were fired as acts of self-defence; a reaction to the other’s 
action. In their uncritical reliance on survivors’ descriptions of Partition violence as purely stories of 
self-defence, oral history reifies sectarian narratives of ‘communal’ violence.   
The rationalisation of violence as self-defence is a well-established trope of the Hindu Right; one that 
is not purely restricted to the Partition. In this sense, oral history’s implicit enabling of this discourse 
has implications that go beyond just the way in which Partition violence is understood. In 2002, 
following the Gujarat pogroms that left more than a 1000 Muslims dead, Narendra Modi had drawn 
on this discourse to rationalise the violence. Modi had said, ‘every action has an equal and opposite 
reaction’84 (The Times of India, 2002).  
                                                            
83 As stated in Section 2.3, this dubious claim has also been amplified by the Indian government in its official 
account of the resettlement of Partition refugees (Kaur, 2007). The Story of Rehabilitation presents the 
violence of the Partition as an unimaginable, one-off event where religion ‘warped’ the minds of ‘men’ (ibid.: 
87). 
84 Despite being widely quoted in 2002, in recent times, Modi and the BJP have tried to deny having ever made 
this statement. They allege that the statement is a misquote that is part of a deliberate, malicious campaign in 
order to malign Modi and his standing as a national leader (The Economic Times, 2014). However, various 
news outlets reporting the Gujarat pogroms in 2002 clearly attribute the quote to Modi (Times of India, 2002). 
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The ‘action’ that Modi was referring to was a fire onboard the Sabarmati Express train that left 59 
Hindu pilgrims dead (BBC, 2011). This incident was used by Hindu nationalist organisations such as the 
Bajrang Dal, VHP, BJP and RSS as a trigger for the violence (Sarkar, 2002; Ghassem-Fachandi, 2010). 
Hindu nationalists continue to claim that the fire was an act of sabotage by Muslims; that the death 
of the Hindu pilgrims was not an accident but deliberate ethnocide (BBC, 2011; Sarkar, 2002). These 
explosive allegations were supplemented by a section of the Gujarati press that invented the rape, 
murder and mutilation of 80 Hindu women on the Sabarmati Express (Sarkar, 2002). In descriptions 
that echo memories of the Partition, the Gujarati press falsely insinuated that Muslim men had also 
cut off the breasts of Hindu women (ibid.: 2875; Ghassem-Fachandi, 2010). What followed was a 
‘carnivalesque’ orgy of ‘revenge’; with mobs of armed Hindu men marching on the streets shouting, 
‘we will avenge one death with a hundred’ (Sarkar, 2002: 2874-2875).  
Although a local court in Gujarat held 31 Muslim men guilty for the burning of the train (the judgement 
was also upheld by the Gujarat High Court), the exact cause of the fire remains unknown (BBC, 2011; 
Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006: 299; Ghassem-Fachandi, 2010). Many others, including the retired 
Supreme Court judge Umesh Chandra Banerjee (who was part of an Inquiry Commission constituted 
to examine the incident) have argued that the fire was caused due to an accident and was not a 
deliberate Muslim conspiracy to firebomb the train. (BBC, 2011).    
In this way, details real and invented were deliberately circulated to stir up ‘communal’ sentiments. 
The accident was used to justify the deliberate murder of thousands of Muslims, thus, rationalising 
the violence while simultaneously distancing Hindus from all moral and political culpability for it. At 
the time, Tanika Sarkar (2002: 2874) had dubbed this, ‘Modi’s action-reaction thesis’ and situated this 
discourse within what she identified as a broad Hindu fascist, ‘semiotics of terror’.  
In recent times, violence against Muslims has been justified as ‘revenge’ for cow slaughter; as justice 
for the desecration of this sacred Hindu symbol of motherhood (Banaji, 2018). More generally, 
memories of Partition, and of the so-called injustices of the Mughal-era are used to establish the 
victimhood of Hindus; a centuries-old victimhood that is presented as the static condition of the 
‘weak’, ‘peace-loving’ Hindu in the face of Islamic ‘barbarism’. I discuss victimhood in greater detail in 
                                                            
This report by The Times of India (2002) further states that Modi used the ‘action-reaction’ line to also justify 
the lynching of Congress MP Ehsan Jafri. Jafri was dismembered – hacked limb by limb – shot and then burnt 
by the mob, while his wife was raped numerous times, in what later came to be known as the Gulbarg Society 
Massacre (BBC, 2012). The Times of India (2002) claims that when Modi was asked why the police did not 
respond to Ehsan Jafri’s numerous frantic calls for help regarding the violent mob that had gathered outside 
his house, Modi claimed that Jafri had, ‘fired the first bullet.’ This claim along with the narrative of Jafri’s 
‘provocation’ was repeated in the Supreme Court, in a report filed by the Special Investigation Team (SIT) 
probing the incident (BBC, 2012).    
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Section 3.5. However, I intend to highlight a different strain of theory here: that of the way in which 
violence delineates the boundaries of community. 
 
 
Violence and Community 
 
In the consistent presentation of violence as self-defence, in this concerted disavowal of violence from 
our midst, lies a deeper impulse. Gyanendra Pandey (2001) identifies this discourse as something 
intrinsic to nationalism and the re-constitution of community in the aftermath of violent events that 
are perceived to produce a rupturing of community itself. The ruptured community that Pandey refers 
to might be seen as the rupturing of a nomos; a certain idea of a syncretic, secular India, an idea of 
‘us’ – of modernity itself. However, this rupture is also a constitutive force. 
In the previous chapter, as part of my discussion of the way in which the twin events of Partition and 
Independence have been treated in state commemorations, I had cited Pandey’s (ibid.: 6) critique of 
Indian historiography’s tendency to treat Partition violence and other episodes of 
communal/sectarian violence as ‘someone else’s history.’ Pandey’s critique of historiography is part 
of a larger discussion of the ‘othering’ of sectarian violence from the realm of the Indian nation. 
Building off Michael Billig’s (1995) work on Banal Nationalism, Pandey (2001: 176-177) attributes this 
tendency to the intolerance that is fundamentally built into nationalism: a call to conformity that is 
the unnoticed common political denominator of nations. Pandey (ibid.) argues that nations deal with 
violence in their past and present by drawing a boundary around themselves; presenting the violence 
as either caused by the other or necessitated due to an act by the other (the narrative of ‘self-
defence’). In this act of boundary-marking through the categorisation of violence as ‘out there’, 
Pandey (ibid.) observes the constitution of community. Pandey writes:  
‘Violence happens – and can only happen – at the boundaries of community. It marks those 
boundaries. It is the denial of any violence “in our midst”, the attribution of harmony within 
and the consignment of violence to the outside, that establishes “community”.’ 
(ibid.: 188) 
Pandey’s observations spring from his own ethnographic fieldwork on the Partition in the Sikh village 
of Dhamot. Various informants told Pandey (ibid.: 181) about an incident where forty to fifty Muslim 
women were brought to the village, following a ‘raid’ on a neighbouring village. The women were kept 
in the village gurudwara for a night and then killed in the temple compound the following day. In his 
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interviews, Pandey (ibid.: 181) noted that his informants were always careful to point out that the 
murders had occurred ‘outside’ the village. Pandey writes:  
‘The location of the site of violence “outside” the village – even the precincts of the gurdwara, 
which appears to have been the shared property of several villages, might technically be 
considered “outside” –  seems to be a matter of some importance to the informants.’ 
(ibid.: 181) 
Pandey’s informants insisted that not a single Muslim had been harmed ‘inside’ their village; although 
they admitted to having forced their Muslim neighbours to eat pork, ‘for their own safety’ (ibid.: 181). 
Pandey connects these statements to the othering of Partition violence, observing that by establishing 
the site of this violence as ‘outside’ the geographical bounds of their village, his informants sought to 
figuratively distance themselves from it.   
In this way, the violence of the Partition involved the constitution of a national community; a 
collectivity whose boundaries had to be sketched in blood. The community is shaped as much by the 
actual physical use of violence – the ethnic cleansing of those who do not belong – as much as its 
representation after the fact. This is revealed strikingly by Pandey’s fieldwork, where his informants 
construct their community as analogous to an island around which the rivers of blood flowed. Where, 
in actuality, the metaphorical island is constructed by violence – the coagulated mass of severed limbs, 
guts, blood and gore – in its remembrance after the fact, the island is essentialised as eternal fact. In 
this retelling, violence does not happen within the community so much as it happens to or around, or, 
better yet, ‘outside’ the community (ibid.).  
Yet, these seemingly natural boundaries are also inherently fluid and unstable (ibid.). This fact is 
evident in Pandey’s (ibid.) fieldwork in the way that his informants find it necessary to continuously 
and obsessively establish the location of violence as ‘outside’ their village. This reflexive narrative urge 
betrays an anxiety around these boundaries; an urge that demands constant maintenance of the 
boundary in narrative. Pandey (ibid.: 177) notes that, ‘Face-to-face local communities have to live with 
disturbing memories of this kind more uncertainly, and continuously, than nations and states.’ In 
everyday life, these boundaries are reinforced through the performance of identities; by acting like a 
Hindu. Everyday acts of structural violence, of discrimination and casual misdemeanour, not only 
uphold the physical fact of these boundaries but are also reflective of the nature of violence as a 
‘narrativizing frame’ (Feldman, 1997). Here, violence performs the seemingly self-evident character of 
these boundaries.   
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We may connect Pandey’s discussion of violence as a performative delineation of the boundaries of 
community to Herzfeld’s (1992) idea of nationalism as a form of theodicy that transcends local 
differences and also, to Marilyn Strathern’s (1992) idea that the Euro-American concept of ‘society’ 
(or ‘group’ or ‘nation’ or ‘collectivity’) is imagined as homogenous and internally undifferentiated; as 
analogous to the ‘individual’ person. The larger argument this related body of work articulates is that 
the community or collectivity (or nation) is fundamentally based on the imagination of homogeneity 
and absolute conformity. As Strathern (ibid.: 26) writes, ‘Generalisation implies that collectivities are 
made up of units which can be enumerated. Society can thus be imagined as a plurality of particulars, 
as “a society of individuals”.’  
Key to this imagination is the performance of homogeneity through violence. Here, it is relevant to 
remember Allen Feldman’s (1997: 36) theorisation of violence as ‘second representation’; that is, of 
the act of violence itself as a lens or ‘narrativizing frame’. Violence then perceives, constructs, 
imagines, narrativizes and performs the homogeneity that characterises conceptions of (national) 
community (ibid.). In this way, violence both performs and imagines community. Furthermore, as 
Deepti Misri (2014) argues, representations of violence also comprise interpretations of violence. 
Thus, the violence of the Partition – both in its performance at the time and in its representation after 
the fact – comprises one long process of the delineation of national community (Pandey, 2001).   
In the rest of this section, I explore this idea by paying attention to two themes within the narratives 
of the violence of the Partition. Firstly, in the following sub-section I use some of my own ethnographic 
evidence to discuss my informants’ othering of the violence of the Partition by attributing it to Sikhs. 
This representation of violence, I argue, is evidence of the continuous process of the construction and 
reconstitution of the Hindu-fold. Secondly, in the sub-section following that, I draw attention to the 
local and intimate histories of conflict that can be glimpsed through the cracks of my informants’ 
stories of the Partition. I argue that these local and intimate acts of violence prove the lie of the 
imagination of homogeneity on which the idea of national community rests. That is, not all violence 
during the Partition was motivated by religious and ethnic identity. Some of it was motivated by a 







Memories of ‘Violent’ Sikhs: Imagining and Re-imagining the Hindu-fold Through Time 
 
During my fieldwork, I observed that the othering of violence (not just of the Partition) always 
conformed to the shifting boundaries of the Hindu-fold. One of the ways in which my informants 
othered the violence of the Partition was by attributing it to Sikhs. This was an imprint of the events 
of the 1980s; of the way in which the violent contestations between the Indian state and the Sikh 
nationalist movement for an independent Khalistan problematised the position of Sikhs within the 
Hindu-fold. In this dissertation, I have alluded numerous times to the fact that the Hindu-fold is an 
imagined community that loosely pulls together a variety of antagonistic castes and distinct religions 
(specifically Sikhs and Jains). But, as van der Veer (1994) and others have shown, the Hindu-fold is little 
more than an illusion whose boundaries are fluid through time.   
The ghost of 1984 – along with its problematisation of the Hindu-fold – is far from extinct. I found this 
performance of community active in the way that the events of 1947 and 1984 were remembered. 
More often than not, whenever I confronted my informants with questions that asked them to reflect 
on the violence perpetrated by Hindus (often in response to their islamophobic descriptions of 
violence), my informants responded by attributing the worst Partition violence against Muslims to 
Sikhs. My granduncle Om Prakash, for example, described the September 1947 violence of Delhi as 
the work of organised mobs of Sikhs, not Hindus. ‘The Sikhs did a lot [of violence]’, and, ‘The Sikhs had 
a greater conflict [with Muslims]’, were refrains I commonly encountered. In this way, the aberrational 
character of the violence of 1947 was attributed to the allegedly innately violent nature of Sikh 
masculinity. My informants routinely described Sikh men as aggressive, violent and fanatical. My 
granduncle even admitted to being ‘afraid’ of Sikhs, till today. ‘One can never trust when they [Sikhs] 
might start killing,’ he said while talking about the Partition as a living memory. These stereotypes 
were contrasted with the inherently ‘peaceful’ and ‘tolerant’ character of Hindus. ‘The Hindu still stays 
low85 [or subjugated]’, was a common refrain in this regard.  
These stereotypes were not restricted to descriptions of communal violence alone. In July 2018, when 
my grandaunt Anjali began to look for new tenants for her other Rajouri Garden flat, her eldest brother 
told her to steer clear of Sikh tenants. The fear was that if a Sikh tenant decided to start squatting  on 
their property, then there would be no way to evict them; especially not in the Sikh-Punjabi dominated 
Rajouri Garden. To them, the Sikhs represented a singularly aggressive, homogenous mass of people. 
Muslim tenants were so far out of the question that they did not even warrant a discussion.  
                                                            
85 A translation of, ‘Hindu phir bhi dab ke rehta hai’. 
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These discourses mirrored and reflected the discourses of Sikh militant leaders from the 1980s. Veena 
Das (2007) has observed that between 1981 and 1984, Sikh leaders began to articulate new images of 
the Sikh self in relation to the Hindu self. The Sikh ‘self’ was constructed as pure and righteous while 
the Hindu ‘other’ was seen as ‘weak’, ‘effeminate’ and ‘cunning’ (ibid.: 112). The weakness of the 
Hindus was emphasised by reference to a history where they were seen to have depended on the 
Sikhs for protection (ibid.). This was also related to a larger historical narrative of Sikh sacrifice and 
martyrdom that I have mentioned previously in Section 2.4. In this way, a new Sikh national identity 
took shape; one that was juxtaposed against the Hindu other.  
Metaphors of male relatedness were an important part of this racialisation. Religious ties between 
Sikhism and Hinduism were disavowed as a Hindu ‘insult’ to the Sikhs (ibid.). Sikh leaders saw their 
community as the ‘true sons’ of Guru Gobind Singh (the last Sikh Guru and the founder of the Khalsa 
tradition), rather than the ‘sons’ of ‘weak’, ‘effeminate’, Hindu men (ibid.). Sikh masculinity was 
presented as one based on strength, virility and dignity. This understanding of Sikh masculinity was 
itself an internalisation of the British colonial (orientalist) categorisation of Sikhs as a ‘martial race’ 
(ibid.).  
The claim to ‘pure ancestry’ – voiced through anxieties around one’s ‘true father’ – are also 
demonstrative of the fact that the Sikh and Hindu nations thus imagined, are quintessentially 
masculine nations (ibid.). Belonging – within both nations – is conditional on ‘correct’ patrilineal 
genealogy (ibid.). For the Sikhs, acceptance of the Hindu nation construed a symbolic betrayal of their 
‘true father’. While, for Hindus, Sikhs could not belong within the Hindu nation until they 
acknowledged Hinduism as the ‘parent’ religion; a symbolic acceptance of Hindu hegemony (ibid.).   
These racial boundaries were reinforced through the re-imagination of violence in the past and the 
simultaneous performance of and interpretation of violence in the present (the 1980s). Just as my 
caste-Hindu informants attributed Partition violence to the Sikhs, Sikh leaders re-imagined the history 
of communal conflict as a specifically ‘Hindu history’. Notably, the ‘Sikh memory’ of communal 
violence in Punjab in the 1920s and in 1947 reframed ‘communal’ violence as a purely Hindu-Muslim 
contestation (ibid.: 115-116). This narrative connected medieval violence and ‘communal’ violence in 
Punjab’s recent past (in the 1920s and 1947) to the violence of the 1980s (ibid.). In the process, the 
‘Hindu majority community’ was presented as the source of all violence, while the (Hindu) Indian state 
and its institutions were presented as an imposition on the Sikh people (ibid.).  
Recording Partition oral history in the 1980s and 90s, Butalia (2000) noted how the anti-Sikh pogroms 
of 1984 and the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 had reopened the wounds of the Partition. 
Butalia noted that, ‘“We didn’t think it would happen to us in our own country” was a feeling 
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expressed by Sikhs and Muslims in 1984 and 1992’ (ibid.: 276). For the Sikh community, the events of 
1984 were doubly traumatising for they were seen to be a betrayal of the Partition (ibid.). This was 
mirrored on the other side in the ‘Hindu’ view that Sikh separatism similarly constituted a grave and 
treasonous betrayal of the state, as well as what they saw to be a shared religious heritage. After all, 
Sikhs had, for the most part, been an intimate part of the Hindu-fold; with shared places of worship86 
and familial ties. This is not to say that Sikhs and Hindus represented a homogenous Hindu-fold, but 
that the imagination of the Hindu-fold largely rested on the assumed assimilation of the Sikh 
community within it. 
But the events of the 1980s, came to necessitate a careful maintenance of these boundaries. As a 
result, there were strong similarities in the way that Sikhs and Muslims were racialised by my 
informants. This is evident in the following conversation I had with Bhanwarilal and his friend, 
Gangaram. This discussion began when Bhanwarilal shared that day’s major news story with 
Gangaram. That morning (February 27, 2018), the newspapers had broken the story that in secret 
talks with the Indian government, Sikh separatist groups had made an offer for reconciliation (Laskar, 
2018). They had offered to give up the demand for Khalistan in return for 1) an apology from the Prime 
Minister in an international forum for the Indian Army’s 1984 desecration of the Golden Temple, 2) 
special status for the Golden Temple akin to that of the Vatican City and 3) unconditionally open talks 
on justice for extrajudicial killings of Sikhs and the 1984 anti-Sikh pogroms (ibid.). Our discussion went 
as follows:   
Bhanwarilal: If you [Indian government] do all this, then we have a compromise. Meaning, 
those are the discussions that are on. But, one cannot trust them [Sikhs]. There is no trusting 
them that way.  
Gangaram: [in agreement] No, no. 
PK: So uncle, you do not trust them? You do not trust these Sikh organisations? As in you do 
not believe they will honour their end of this bargain? 
B: They can still demand Khalistan.  
G: They are still demanding this. These Sikhs, they are very sectarian. Very sectarian. 
B: They are like Muslims. Just like how Muslims talk to you and then betray you. 
G: They always say, ‘Sikh first’. Just like how Muslims say, ‘Islam first’. Sikhs-Muslims. After 
that anyone else. These Sikhs also, they do not go to Hindu temples. Hindus go to gurudwaras, 
                                                            
86 Rajaram mentions this too in his memories of Choti, in Section 1.6. 
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in 100, 80 men are Hindu. 20 are Sikh. But in temples 95 out of that 100 men are Hindu, 5 will 
be Sikh. [To Banwarilal] What do you say, isn’t it right? 
B: Yes. 
G: Hindus go to gurudwaras, Sikhs don’t go to temples.  
B: We go to gurudwaras and pray with complete faith, but those people [Sikhs] will not come 
here, will not come to temples. 
G: Sikhs do not come. They will never come.  
B: And they, they especially have this feeling. Today Sikhism is only 550 years old. Meaning… 
G: No no, in reality it is only 300 years.  
[Some back and forth over whether Sikhism began in the fifteenth-century, with the preaching 
of Guru Nanak, or more recently, after the establishment of the Khalsa by the last Sikh Guru, 
Guru Gobind Singh.] 
G: [On the subject of Sikh Gurus] They were all Hindus.  
[Argument over age of Sikhism continues.] 
B: It has been 300 years. Now in 300 years they say we are a separate community. We have 
no connection to Hindus.  
G: They have a lot of hatred.  
B: They are not relatives of Hindus. Meaning, they do not even believe that they are sons of 
Hindus. So that is why you cannot trust them, because, they have come from the main [Hindu-
fold] and separated. We are still walking with them, still believe in them: the Gurus. The faith 
those people [Sikhs] have in them [Gurus] is less than what all of our people do. They [Sikhs] 
may become whatever they want but they only do bad things [in the name of the Gurus].     
In the exchange above, Bhanwarilal and Gangaram, both racialise Sikhs and Muslims as inherently 
fanatical (or sectarian) and untrustworthy. Bhanwarilal also goes a step further and remarks – 
exemplifying Veena Das’ observations regarding the anxieties of ‘true’ patrilineal descent – that Sikhs 
neither acknowledge their connections to the Hindu fold, nor that they are ‘sons of Hindus’. Their 
insistence on the similarity of Hindus and Sikhs seems paradoxical considering their recognition of the 
deep differences that allegedly divide the two.  
299 
 
At this point in the conversation, I decided to play the devil’s advocate. Repeating Butalia’s (2000) 
observations about the Sikh feeling of anomie and betrayal, I wondered aloud whether the entrenched 
separatism they allegedly observed was a response to the events of 1984. Bhanwarilal responded 
rather angrily:  
Bhanwarilal: That 1984 is another event. Look the event of ’84 is what they did to the Prime 
Minister, her guardians who were Sardars [Sikhs]. People had said remove them, Indira 
Gandhi said no, no they are alright. And they only killed her.  
PK: But that was also said to have a reason, that the army was sent into the Akal Takth [Golden 
Temple]. 
B [shouting]: Arre, it is a humanly reaction son. There will be a human reaction. That if you do 
one thing for one minute – a wrong thing – so that will have some or the other reaction na? 
She is the Prime Minister of the country. And that Prime Minister who had been given the 
status of Durga [Hindu demon-slaying warrior goddess]. When Bangladesh was attacked, they 
conquered Bangladesh, won, cut it off from Pakistan, so then they [‘people’] had said that she 
is Durga to us, she is an avatar of Durga.  
Gangaram: They had given that [title] to her.  
B: So see that is the difference. So what if those ‘84 riots happened? Why, are they now not 
even part of their own country? This has happened to them [Sikhs] because what happened 
that was a reaction to a reaction. That happens everywhere.  
Seeing Bhanwarilal get worked up, I deescalated the conversation by clarifying that I was merely 
thinking out loud as a philosophical exercise. In reply, Bhanwarilal sardonically quipped that my 
subject was the Partition and not 1984, and that I would do well to focus on that. Thus, 1947 and 1984 
were thoroughly unrelated in his mind.  
Bhanwarilal’s comments in these exchanges demonstrate many of the patterns of thinking about 
violence that I have discussed previously in this section. He describes the anti-Sikh pogroms of 1984 
as, ‘a reaction to a reaction’, thereby justifying the violence of the ‘peaceful’ and ‘tolerant’ Hindu as 
an act of self-defence. As a reaction to an action, the pogroms are rationalised as an act necessary for 
the disciplining of an allegedly errant Sikh community.  
This justification of pogroms as a disciplining tool extends the parental metaphor to the much darker 
realm of the management of entire populations. Although the parental metaphor implicitly identifies 
common ancestry – an extension of the discourse of nationalism as kinship – the act of disciplining by 
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definition is an act of boundary-marking. It delineates the parent from the child, the ruler from its 
subjects; the hegemonic majority from its minority. It demarcates ethnic boundaries whilst 
establishing power and hierarchy. 
The 1984 pogroms also marked the boundary between the Sikhs and the Hindu-fold at the lowest 
levels as some Hindu Chamars (an ‘untouchable’ and oppressed caste) participated in the violence 
against Sikhs. Das’ (2007) work maps the violence in north-west Delhi (Sultanpuri and Prem Nagar) 
down to the street and block level and documents how local politicians and police officers were 
complicit in the pogroms. Her work explains why some streets and blocks saw more violence than 
others. Specifically, Das (ibid.) focuses on the horrific violence that unfolded between blocks A2 and 
A4 of Sultanpuri.  
This example is relevant to our current discussion given that it shows not only the remaking of the 
boundaries of national community, but also that this ethnocidal violence was itself foregrounded by a 
prior history of antagonisms. Das (ibid.: 144) reminds us that the Sikhs were not a homogenous group 
but instead differed considerably on the basis of, ‘caste, sectarian allegiance, and place of origin’. This 
diversity could be observed in the spatial organisation of the blocks that made up these 
neighbourhoods. Block A4 was inhabited by the Sikh Siglikar community while A2 belonged to the 
Hindu Chamar caste. Since 1982, the two groups had violently clashed over local issues concerning the 
use of shared land. Additionally, the Pradhan (leader) of the Chamar community saw the region as his 
fiefdom. There was also a growing economic inequality between the Siglikars and the Chamars as 
some Siglikar men had succeeded in finding employment in the Middle East. Their aspirational status 
was resented by their poorer Chamar neighbours.  
On October 31, 1984, the assassination of Indira Gandhi became the flashpoint of a verbal exchange 
that quickly spiralled out of control. The Pradhan of the Chamars shouted at the Siglikars that the Sikhs 
must apologise for the assassination of ‘their mother’ (ibid.: 154). But the Pradhan of A4 responded 
to this with casteist slurs. The confrontation escalated quickly and a few hours later the Pradhan of A2 
returned with the local SHO and some police constables at the head of a violent mob. The mob pulled 
the Siglikar Pradhan out of his house and, after torturing him and his sons, burnt them alive. The mob 
then proceeded to systematically pull all of the Sikh men of A4 out of their homes and burnt them 
alive. The Siglikar homes were then looted and the ‘foreign-made’ clothes of Siglikar women acquired 
a trophy-like status for the Chamar families.    
Das (ibid.: 159) focuses her analysis on the insults traded between the Pradhans of A2 and A4, in 
particular a comment by the Pradhan of A2 where he requested an apology from the Sikhs because 
they had killed ‘our mother’. By referring to Indira Gandhi as their ‘mother’ and whose death had to 
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be avenged, Das (ibid.: 159) notes that the Chamars had constructed themselves as, ‘the true sons of 
the nation.’ In this way, the Chamars, despite being one of the poorest and most oppressed castes 
within the (Hindu) nation, expressed solidarity with the most privileged echelons of society (ibid.). Das 
(ibid.) understands this as a moment of ‘brokered subjectivity’. Identifying Indira Gandhi as their 
‘mother’, the Hindu Chamars of A2 expressed their belonging within the Hindu-fold; in opposition to 
the ‘Sikh other’. This verbal confrontation and the ethnocidal violence that followed served as a final 
event of the delineation of the new boundaries of the national community.  
Das’ observation of the participation of this oppressed Hindu caste in the violence against the Sikhs – 
a violence meant to discipline an ‘unruly’ minority – is part of a larger phenomenon in Indian politics. 
While the participation of some Hindu Chamars in the violence of 1984 was a moment of ‘brokered 
subjectivity’ – of a violence in solidarity with and on behalf of upper-caste Hindu ruling elites – in 
recent times, the participation of lower-caste Hindus in pogroms and communal violence is part of a 
larger, deliberate consolidation of the Hindu-fold.  
Parvis Ghassem-Fachandi (2010) has observed a similar consolidation of the Hindu-fold in Gujarat’s 
2002 anti-Muslim pogroms. The violence in Gujarat was unusual for the way in which it involved the 
participation of lower and upper caste Hindus, and Adivasis in the ethnic cleansing of Muslims (ibid.). 
Ghassem-Fachandi writes: 
‘In opposing the Muslim minority, there was a complementary division of labour at work 
between upper castes (savarna) and classes, and lower classes, including many members of 
scheduled castes and Adivasi (tribal), the avarna and bekwad (backward) groups. According 
to some scholars, the larger participation by subaltern and other marginal groups 
distinguishes the 2002 violence from previous rounds. In a spatial division of work, looting and 
burning shops was accomplished on the west side of the city, while beyond the Sabarmati 
River, and outside of the historical city, looting and burning was accompanied by massacres.’ 
 (ibid.: 164) 
As I have detailed previously in the Introduction of this dissertation, the consolidation of the Hindu-
fold through the assimilation of Adivasis and Jains (Banaji, 2018) is a deliberate strategy pursued by 
the various Hindu nationalist organisations that make up the Sangh Parivar. Its success has been driven 
by effective grassroots mobilisation and ‘cultural awakening’ (Ghassem-Fachandi, 2010), as well as by 
Sanskritisation (Srinivas, 1966) and aspirational hatred (Appadurai, 2019). In this way spectacular acts 
of street violence play a pivotal role in the performance and imagination of the Hindu-fold; a ‘fold’ 
that is always mobilised in opposition to a racial and religious ‘other’. Consequently, Appadurai (1998) 
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would also argue that it is the anxiety of inhabiting large-scale identities in the unstable and fluid arena 
of globalisation that transforms vivisectionist ethnocidal violence into a richly semiotic technology 
towards the establishment of ethnic certainty through ‘dead certainty’.  
However, I am drawing attention to this to argue that violence – as a narrativizing lens (Feldman, 1997) 
– delineates the boundaries of community; both in the act itself and its representation and 
interpretation (Misri, 2014). The ‘dead certainty’ established through violence provides the illusion of 
stability – by locating difference in the body of the ‘other’ – to what are in fact infinitely fluid ethnic 
imaginations (Appadurai, 1998). As I have shown in this sub-section, the events of the 1980s have 
come to retrospectively alter the memory of the Partition. Where the Sikh nationalist discourse re-
imagines ‘communal violence’ as a purely Hindu-Muslim issue (Das, 2007), the Hindu nationalist 
discourse has attributed the worst anti-Muslim violence to ‘fanatical’, ‘aggressive’ Sikh men. Here, 
narratives of violence delineate the boundaries of national community establishing the victimhood or 
innocence of the ‘self’ whilst blaming the ‘other’. After all, as Pandey (2001) writes, violence can never 
happen ‘inside’ the community but instead happens to it or outside it. Thus, narratives of violence in 
fact follow and reify the contours of these boundaries.  
In the following sub-section, I continue this argument regarding violence and its narrativization in 
pursuit of an imagined homogeneity, by examining some local histories of conflict. 
 
 
Problematizing Community: Local Histories of Violence 
 
Thus far in this section, and this dissertation, I have steadfastly held to my rejection of the idea that 
national communities are homogenous. In the previous sub-section, this took the form of a discussion 
of violence as a narrativizing lens that delineates the boundaries of national community. In this sub-
section, I continue this discussion by focusing on the local histories of violence. These stories of 
antagonisms that predate the Partition can be glimpsed through a closer reading of the literature on 
the Partition and the stories of my informants. My discussion in this sub-section is partially inspired 
by Veena Das’ (2007) aforementioned ethnographic work mapping the spatial distribution of the 
violence in Sultanpuri during the 1984 anti-Sikh pogroms. Just as her work reveals a history of conflict 
between Blocks A2 and A4 that predated the events of 1984, so too, I hope to explore the specificities 
of the violence of the Partition.  
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Here, I want to return to the claims of Pandey’s (2001) informants – which I quoted in the beginning 
of the previous sub-section – that no violence was done to ‘our’ Muslim neighbours in ‘our’ village. 
This claim evokes a particularly enduring fantasy regarding the violence of the Partition (especially in 
Punjab). I am referring here to the fantasy that even as Punjab descended into violence, that 
neighbour did not turn on neighbour. Rather, it was mobs of ‘outsiders’ who were responsible for the 
violence.  
One encounters this fantasy routinely in survivor narratives as well as in literature. We find this 
expressed, for example, in J Nanda’s (1948) account of Partition violence. Nanda’s (ibid.) Punjab 
Uprooted straddles the thin line between memoir and contemporaneous history as it documents 
Partition violence as it unfolded in Punjab, starting from the March riots of 1947. Struggling to 
reconcile the brutality of violence with the famed idea of punjabiyat87, Nanda writes:  
‘Inevitably, old personal scores were paid off in a few cases, but as a rule, the raid on the 
minority of a village was not made by the majority community of the same village, but of a 
different village. This is a very important point: the communal riots did not suddenly destroy 
the bonds of neighbourliness between immediate neighbours who could never commit such 
bestialities on each other as were perpetrated by outsiders. It was not an individual Muslim 
warring against an individual Sikh, but an individual Muslim at war with the Sikh community.’ 
[Emphasis added] 
(ibid.: 18)  
While Nanda (ibid.) admits that some of the Partition violence was motivated by local antagonisms 
that predate the event, he goes on to provide an elaborate model that blames ‘outsiders’ for the 
violence that unfolded on the ground. Despite its neatness and the alluring romanticism of a society 
where neighbour would not turn on neighbour even amid the collapse of a moral universe, Nanda’s 
model remains nothing but a fantasy. Nanda provides no evidence in support of his claim and there is 
nothing in the historical record that indicates the truth of this claim. Furthermore, Nanda’s idea of an 
individual ‘Muslim’ or ‘Sikh’ at war with the collectivity of the ‘other’ expresses an inchoate neoliberal 
understanding of the individual’s place within society. Nanda conceives of individuals and their hatred 
as somehow located ‘outside’ of society. 
Khushwant Singh’s (2009) descriptions of the simmering ethnonational tensions in the fictional 
Punjabi border-village of Mano Majra, in Train to Pakistan, give us another version of this fantasy. In 
                                                            
87 Punjabiyat translates to Punjabiness and expresses a certain idea of the warmth, hospitality, comradery and 
passion that is said to be intrinsic to relationships by and with Punjabi people.  
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Singh’s (ibid.) novel, it is a group of militant Hindu and Sikh men from a neighbouring village (read 
‘outside’) who fan the flames of communal tension in Mano Majra. It is these men from ‘outside’ who 
convince the Hindus and Sikhs of Mano Majra to attack the train on which their Muslim neighbours 
intend to flee to Pakistan. In doing so, Singh attributes the genocidal impulses of the villagers of Mano 
Majra to ‘outsiders’; implicitly ‘othering’ the bloodlust that subsequently grips a section of Mano 
Majra.  
Versions of this fantasy routinely crowd the oral history archives as scores of survivors stress that their 
homes and neighbourhoods were burnt by violent mobs of ‘outsiders’. In my fieldwork, I found that a 
number of my informants expressed similar views. When asked to describe the violent mobs they had 
witnessed during the Partition, my informants were often quick to specify that the mobs had come 
from ‘outside’. Yet, such statements that sought to ‘other’ the violence from their midst were often 
contradicted by statements that acknowledged some familiarity with individuals that made up these 
mobs. For example, when recounting the day that the mob attacked his ancestral home in the village 
of Choti, my informant Sanchit, agitatedly recalled how his father’s driver had set fire to their home. 
Similarly, when Pooran Chand recalled the attack on the evacuation convoy carrying his family from 
their village of Lakki Merwat to Bannu, he also remembered that his aunt had been abducted by a 
local Pathan who was known to their family. This man had previously approached their family to ask 
for her hand in marriage, but Pooran Chand’s grandparents had refused. 
Earlier in this dissertation, in Section 1.6, I have retold Rajaram’s story. When ethnonational tensions 
flared during the Partition, Rajaram was attacked by Ghulam Haider (someone he knew locally) even 
as Matto (his Muslim girlfriend) risked her life to save his. I am also reminded of the story of Kishori 
Raj, an informant I interviewed for my MPhil thesis (Kohli, 2015: 25-26). While talking about communal 
violence, Kishori Raj too had insisted that the violent mobs that had terrorised Dera Ghazi Khan had 
come from outside. Yet, he also recalled an incident when he ran into a violent mob and was saved 
only by the timely intervention of his student. 
‘I was a teacher in Choti town. I would go there every Friday and Saturday and there, there 
was a person called Bhagwandas Ram from whom I had just claimed my dues. Later I realised 
that I had forgotten my wallet at his place. When I went to recover my wallet, I ran into the 
mob. […] But one of my students was part of the mob. […] So he told them that this is my 
teacher, don’t do anything to him. Then they told me to go to Kot Chutta, a nearby village, 
because riots had broken out here. But for a moment they had raised their axe [to strike]. But 
my student said “Hey! This is my teacher! Don’t do anything to him” so it isn’t that there 
weren’t good people there. There were good people. It is because of him that I survived.’ 
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(Kishori Raj quoted in Kohli, 2015: 25) 
I have recounted these stories here because of the specificity of the violence that they depict. That is, 
the violence of the Partition was both strange and familiar, at the same time. That people’s friends 
came to their rescue and helped them in whatever way they could even as others turned on them. In 
contrast to the seemingly random chaos of this specificity, the fantasy of Partition violence as the 
action of ‘outsiders’ seeks purely to other the violence. It implies that the violence and those who 
caused it somehow belonged outside society itself. There is no reckoning with the violence of our past 
to be found here; just its avoidance.  
There is a theodicical quality to this narrative of violence as purely an action of ‘outsiders’. It hopes to 
preserve a sense of punjabiyat (Punjabiness) or Indianness; of insaniyat (humanity). Thus, this reminds 
us that even as the nomos of plural-Punjab (and with it India) collapsed, it nevertheless endured 
briefly; among the ashes. But, perhaps what this narrative – or fantasy – actually conceals is a sense 
of guilt; an implicit acknowledgement of the un-neighbourliness of some relations. Perhaps, this image 
of ‘perfect’ neighbours actually conceals the imperfection of these relationships.   
After all, the othering of violence in this manner results in the annihilation of local histories of conflict. 
The fact that Kishori Raj’s student stopped a mob from lynching him cannot merely be explained away 
as the conscionable act of a ‘good’ person; this student was after all part of a violent mob. Rather, this 
story might be read as the evocation of a local history. It references the socio-cultural context of South 
Asia where traditionally, one’s teachers were revered like one’s ancestors. Therefore, what Kishori 
Raj’s story evokes is a local history of interpersonal relations. We see this even in Pooran Chand’s 
story, where the ‘abduction’ of his aunt was not just a random act of violence. Rather, it was the 
tactical use of ethnonational violence for the fulfilment of unrequited desire. Similarly, I suspect, 
Ghulam Haider’s attack on Rajaram and Sanchit’s driver’s arson attack might be indicative of silenced 
local histories of class conflict.  
I suspect the latter not on the basis of mere conjecture, but based on my past research on the 
Partition. In my MPhil thesis, I had drawn attention to the Hindu practice of untouchability against 
Muslims (Kohli, 2015). Although my thesis had focused on the memories of survivors of Dera Ghazi 
Khan, the Hindu practice of untouchability against Muslims was widely prevalent in much of South 
Asia, at the time (ibid.). I had used memories of untouchability to argue that in this region, 
ethnonationalism predated the Partition (ibid.). That is, the Partition did not result in the spontaneous 
outburst of newly discovered nationalist passions, but was the result of long-simmering antagonisms 
(ibid.). However, my allusion to long-simmering antagonisms should not be misinterpreted as support 
for the ancient hatreds or clash of civilisations style of discourse. The antagonisms that I am referring 
306 
 
to here, specifically concern the intersections of class, religion and caste. And while these intersections 
predate the Partition, they were made antagonistic by the quasi-feudal zamindari system that the 
British colonial policy of indirect rule upheld (ibid.). What made these previous conflicts different from 
the Partition was the latter’s pursuit of racial and ethnic homogeneity. 
Contrary to nostalgic recollections of the pre-Partition period as one of unrivalled sectarian harmony, 
the reality was far more complex. While pre-Partition South Asia did embody a far more plural culture 
than it does today, it was also an oppressively hierarchical quasi-feudal society. As my informants were 
always quick to remind me, in Punjab, the majority of zamindars were Hindu. Bhanwarilal, one of my 
key informants, described this social dynamic as follows: 
‘Hindus were in minority. Muslims had the majority. If we could stay there and dominate, we 
did it only because we were financially strong. From the agricultural point of view we were 
strong. [sic] Because we owned the land. They would work for us. If they needed money, they 
would come and take it from us. They would take it on interest. We would give them money 
on interest. So that is why we were dominant.’  
In this way, Hindu zamindars possessed a significant amount of power and privilege in relation to most 
Muslims. Far from a paradise of syncretism, the pre-Partition period was also one where Hindu 
zamindars dominated much of the countryside through their ancestral capital: land, money and debt. 
My argument, in focusing on this, is that these rigid hierarchical relations comprise a local history 
whose antagonisms were accelerated and brought to fruition by the Partition. That is, not all of 
Partition violence can be explained away as the result of ethnonationalist passions. The class conflict 
created due to the practice of untouchability, the indebtedness of Muslim peasants and workers, and, 
years of servitude also had their part to play in the specific incidents of violence that some informants 
remember. I evoke this history of the structural violence perpetrated by Hindus to further 
problematize the binary classification of victim and perpetrator.  
Therefore, what is necessary in histories of the Partition is greater attention to such local histories 
that, in the writing of history, have been overshadowed by the Partition. Here, Nonica Datta’s (2009) 
work on the Partition proves instructional. In Violence, Martyrdom and Partition, Datta (ibid.) records 
the oral testimony of Subhashini (1914-2003). As mentioned previously in the Introduction, Subhashini 
was a prominent woman in the Haryana circle of Arya Samaj and served as the head of the Kanya 
Gurukul in Khanpur, Haryana: a well-known institution devoted to the education of rural women. This 
is an astonishing testimony because Subhashini remembers 1942 (the year of her father’s murder by 
Muslim Rangars), and not 1947, as a rupture. Subhashini’s father, Phool Singh (later known as Bhagat 
Phool Singh) was a prominent Jat leader and Arya Samaj activist in his lifetime (ibid.).  
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Subhashini simultaneously mourns and celebrates 1947. She celebrates it as the year when her Jat 
community avenged her father’s death. In 1947, the Jats of Haryana carried out a carefully planned 
programme of ethnic cleansing (ibid.). By the time the dust had settled most Muslims had either been 
killed, forced to flee to Pakistan or been forcibly converted to Hinduism. Nonica Datta (ibid.: 5) 
observes that in Subhashini’s memory, ‘Partition was preordained to avenge her father.’ But, 
simultaneously, in scattered recollections of the piles of dead bodies of Muslims she saw in 1947, she 
also quietly mourns the death and destruction unleashed by the Partition.   
However, in her introduction to Subhashini’s testimony, Datta (ibid.) shows that the Jat’s ethnic 
cleansing of Muslims was unconnected to the Partition. Datta documents a history of conflict between 
the pastoral nomadic communities of Muslims and settled Hindu Jat peasants. But, this conflict was a 
recent invention. Going back in history, the Jats and pastoralists had worked together to resist British 
rule in 1809 and again, in 1824 (ibid.). She traces the beginning of the conflict to British colonial policies 
that took away the political, cultural and grazing rights of the Muslim pastoralists, thus bringing them 
into conflict with Jat peasants. Datta’s (ibid.) illuminating discussion of a local history within the broad 
contours of national events adds much needed specificity to the documentation of Partition violence. 
Moreover, the broad contours of a conflict between settled peasants and pastoral nomads that is 
exacerbated by colonial policies of land use and thereby leads to genocidal violence has echoes with 
other global contexts; most notably, the ethnic conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda 
(Mamdani, 2012).  
Similarly, in addition to adding specificity to the spatial distribution of violence in Sultanpuri during 
the 1984 pogroms, Das (2007) also observes how some of the violence on the ground unfolded due to 
motivations entirely different from those implied by the reductive lens of religious conflict. For 
example, Das (ibid.: 158) recounts the story of a woman whose husband took advantage of the 1984 
pogroms to murder the Sikh man she had been having an affair with. The woman had approached Das 
for advice because she suspected that her husband was neither dead nor missing, but in hiding to 
avoid being held accountable for the crime. The woman was unable to report the murder to the police 
since this would deny the Sikh man’s family compensation from the government (as he would no 
longer legally be considered a victim of the pogroms) while also poisoning her relations with her in-
laws. She suspected they would ‘finish her off’ (ibid.: 158). 
Paying attention to the specificity of violence as it unfolds on the ground problematizes essentialist 
understandings of the Partition and other episodes of ethnocidal violence. Recognising the tactical use 
of violence in these contexts follows the prescription of Herzfeld’s (2005) critique of Anderson (1983) 
and Gellner’s (1983) ‘top-down’ theorisations of nationalism. Herzfeld (2005: 6) argues that by not 
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grounding their account of nationalism within the everyday life of the average citizen, Anderson and 
Gellner assume that, ‘ordinary people have no impact on the form of their local nationalism: they are 
only followers.’ Instead, locating the agency of the individual within a larger account of 
ethnonationalist violence, one acknowledges them as thinking social actors while also recognising a 
deadly but ‘tactical’ (de Certeau, 1984) quotidian appropriation of nationalism and its violence.  
The essentialist understanding of Partition violence as little more than a violent convulsion of 
conflicting religious nationalisms also erases subaltern Hindus – Dalits and Scheduled Castes – from 
the scene. After all, the Hindu-fold is merely an illusion that struggles to hold a number of antagonistic 
castes and religious communities together (van der Veer, 1994). The Dalit experience of the Partition 
has remained one of Partition literature’s more glaring oversights. Urvashi Butalia was among the first 
to point to this absence and famously observed that: 
‘In its almost exclusive focus on Hindus and Sikhs and Muslims, Partition history has worked 
to render many other invisible. One such history is that of scheduled castes, or untouchables. 
Harijans, Dalits, untouchables, by whatever name you call the protagonists of this history, 
have remained, in a sense, virtually untouchable even in the writing of this history.’  
(Butalia, 2000: 235)  
Butalia (ibid.) extends the metaphor of ‘untouchability’ to imply immunity from the violence of the 
Partition. Through the testimony of her sole Dalit informant Maya Rani, Butalia (ibid.: 234) posits that 
as ‘untouchables’ Dalits found themselves positioned ambiguously in relation to the violence of the 
Partition; they were neither anyone’s allies, nor enemies. 
However, Gyanendra Pandey (2009) wonders how Dalits might be considered to have enjoyed a 
‘bizarre immunity’ when they also became refugees as a result of the Partition. Pandey (ibid.) points 
to the displacement and exile of Dalits as an example that Dalits were far from ‘untouched’. Similarly, 
Ravinder Kaur (2007) has documented the discrimination faced by Dalit and Scheduled Caste groups 
in the rehabilitation process. Kaur’s work argues against the common-sense idea that traumatic 
experiences lead to the disintegration of social hierarchies (Sen, 2012). Rather, Kaur (2007) observes 
how these hierarchies were preserved and reproduced by the Indian state through the rehabilitation 
process. This was done not just through the establishment of separate camps for caste-Hindu and 
Sikh, and Dalit refugees but also in the difference of capital expended on their rehabilitation (ibid.). 
Dalits received very little per capita in comparison to caste-Hindus and Sikh refugees88 (ibid.).  
                                                            
88 For anyone interested in the Dalit experience of the Partition beyond my brief discussion here, Sen (2012) is 





In this section, I have attempted to move past simplistic notions of silence and trauma to examine the 
violence of the Partition. Rather than evading engagement with the specificity of Partition violence, I 
have sought to make this violence intelligible. I have done this by questioning the common sense 
description of all Partition violence as ‘self-defence’. Peering behind this mask, I have used the work 
of Gyanendra Pandey (2001), Michael Herzfeld (1992, 2005), Veena Das (2007), Allen Feldman (1997) 
and Marilyn Strathern (1992) to examine how violence as a narrativizing frame involves the 
delineation of the boundaries of national community. Here, I have examined the idea of violence as a 
performance of national community – through the sanctioned killing of the ‘other’ – as well as the way 
in which the memory of violence conforms to the boundaries of national community. Violence is 
always remembered as having occurred ‘outside’ the community (Pandey, 2001); thus, involving the 
implicit view of the community as a pre-existing homogenous whole.  
Yet, this homogeneity – like the imagination of the Hindu-fold as an internally undifferentiated mass 
of Hindus – is a mask that conceals internal contestations. It is in reference to the latter that I have 
detailed some examples of the local histories of conflict, as well as the Dalit experience of the Partition. 
These are stories of violence and displacement that question the homogeneity assumed by the post-
partition national community.  
This discussion is tangentially related to my earlier discussion of the problematics of oral history’s 
simplistic perspectives on trauma and silence. I have critiqued the use of the trauma label not because 
I believe that the Partition was not a traumatic experience. Rather, my argument is that ‘trauma’ as a 
moral statement on suffering (Fassin and Rechtman, 2009) implies an automatic ascription of 
victimhood. I have used ethnographic examples from my own fieldwork and those of others to argue 
that the ascription of victimhood requires careful attention to the specificity of a particular context. 
Victimhood in the context of the Partition is a particularly vexing issue given the structural privilege of 
upper-caste Hindus as well as the retributive aspect of the violence itself.  
In concluding this section, I want to briefly draw attention to the nuanced discussion of violence and 
victimhood in Urvashi Butalia (2000), Menon and Bhasin (1998), Gyanendra Pandey (2001) and Veena 
Das’ (2007) ethnographic work on the plight women during the Partition. Menon and Bhasin (1998) 
and Butalia (2000) were the pioneers in this field. Their turn to the experience of women during the 
Partition was driven by the desire to seek stories of the Partition that went beyond the Hindu-Muslim-
                                                            
However, Sen’s review of literature covers other sites that I have left untouched such as the United Provinces, 
Bengal and Sindh.     
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Sikh narrative. Although considered oral history, their work is best described as ethnography for the 
way in which they combine the voices of individual women with a detailed examination of the political 
and cultural contexts within which these stories are situated.    
Menon and Bhasin (1998) and Butalia (2000) were among the first to document the experience of 
women during the Partition as one of being caught in the crossfire of competing communal 
patriarchies. As discussed in the previous chapter, this body of work disputes the authenticity of male-
centred narratives that present the deaths of their women relatives as a voluntary sacrifice. Through 
a polyphonous retelling of the Thoa Khalsa incident (among others), they show that these women did 
not die these deaths voluntarily, but were instead often coerced and shamed into accepting murder 
by their male relatives as ‘martyrdom’. Additionally, they also draw attention to the unreliable aspect 
of memory by documenting how their informant Bir Bahadur Singh (a survivor of Thoa Khalsa) insists 
on remembering his very-much-still-alive mother as a ‘martyr’ (Menon and Bhasin, 1998; Pandey, 
2001).  
Das (2007: 34) subsequently built on this foundation to describe the Partition as a ‘war of fathers’. In 
doing so, these ethnographers produce a significantly nuanced account of victimhood and violence in 
this context. That is, while these caste-Hindu (a caveat necessitated by the unique experience of Dalits) 
and Sikh men might be considered ‘victims’ of communal violence (as a minority religious community 
facing genocidal violence in their neighbourhoods), they were also simultaneously perpetrators of 
gendered violence within their communities. 
One would think that as a body of work devoted to studying the experiences of individuals, Partition 
oral history would be ideally positioned to explore these diverse subject positions. That through an 
archive’s worth of polyphonous narratives, oral history would emerge as the pioneer of this field, 
observing the shockwaves of this violent rupture in the communities that people construct after the 
fact. Drawing a wealth of stories from people from diverse backgrounds, such archives and oral history 
projects should ideally be offering the discipline a wealth of local histories, including a broader 
examination of the Dalit experience of the Partition.    
Yet, for the most part, Partition oral history appears to have restricted itself to a largely formulaic 
remembrance of the Partition. Content in its assumption that to remember is to heal, Partition oral 
history has unfortunately restricted itself to a mere back-handed voicing of problematic and common 
sense understandings of violence, trauma and community. The result, as I have shown, is a narrative 
that implicitly others the violence from our past. Ultimately, for an academic endeavour that hopes to 
reckon with the violence of our past, Partition oral history needs to do more to make this violence 
intelligible within our past.  
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3.4. Remembering Partition in the Time of Fascism  
 
So far in this chapter, I have engaged in an extended critique of some of the oral historical work on 
the Partition. I have critiqued oral history’s practice of editing-out hate speech alongside its 
celebration of the act of remembering the Partition as a form of healing. I have also examined the 
difficult question of Partition violence and its representation.  
In this section, I explore the idea of ‘healing’ further. Using some of my ethnographic evidence, I return 
to the starting point of my critique of oral history: the juxtaposition of nostalgia and hate speech. The 
two stories that I present here involve a complex juxtaposition of seemingly contradictory 
perspectives. Gangaram and Pooran Chand, the two informants whose stories I examine here, had 
both revisited Pakistan following the Partition and had a number of close friends and acquaintances 
there. On the surface, their stories seemed to be exemplars of peace and reconciliation. Yet, even as 
they expressed a deep attachment with the place of their birth, they swore vengeance on Muslims. 
Although they fondly remembered the bonhomie of their recent visits across the border, they 
articulated a firm belief in the ideology of Hindu nationalism.  
In this section, I use these stories to reflect on the imprint of Hindu nationalism on these narratives 
and wonder how we might evaluate ‘healing’ in this context; if such a thing is even possible. Ultimately, 





I met Gangaram for the first time in February 2018, through Bhanwarilal. They had known each other 
for quite some time through their involvement in the All India Mianwali District Association. 
Gangaram, like Bhanwarilal, also hailed from Mianwali. Gangaram was born in March 1935 and was 
12 years old at the time of the Partition. His family had owned a vast amount of agricultural land and 
a clothes shop in Mianwali. His family moved to Jalandhar in March 1947, in response to Punjab’s 
March riots. By early August, when the situation appeared deceptively calm, his family left him in 
Jalandhar (as a precaution) and moved back to Mianwali to resume their business. However, by the 
end of the month the violence had escalated significantly leaving them no choice but to move to 
Jalandhar for good. Eventually his family decided to settle in Delhi and started a business selling 
carpets and matting. When I met Gangaram, he was living in the Shakti Nagar area of Delhi. As the 
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oldest son of his father, he had taken over the family business and now owned three shops in different 
parts of the city.  
Gangaram walked into my project like a breath of fresh air. By February 2018 I had begun to feel 
varying levels of disinterest and disgust towards some of my informants. Until I met Gangaram, all of 
the informants I had met were fairly islamophobic. But back when I met him, Gangaram seemed 
different. His story was like a fairy-tale of hope and reconciliation. For example, he had visited Pakistan 
twenty-two times since 1992. Between 1992 and 2018 he had made a trip to Pakistan almost every 
year and had cultivated a vast network of friends across the border. I also learned that the people who 
had occupied his ancestral home following the Partition, had later allowed him to build a small two-
bedroom unit for himself, on the same plot. As a result, whenever he visited Pakistan he stayed in an 
apartment of his own, on his ancestral land. While he clarified that his ownership of the apartment 
was largely symbolic, it was nevertheless a powerful symbol of reconciliation (and healing).  
Consequently, he also received a regular flow of guests from Pakistan. Anytime someone from 
Mianwali visited India for Urs89 or for medical reasons, Gangaram would host them and offer them 
every bit of help that they needed. I witnessed this first-hand when in May, one of his friends from 
Mianwali came to Delhi for a major surgery. Gangaram sponsored their visa, hosted the family in his 
own house and drove them to and from the hospital. I barely got a glimpse of Gangaram during this 
period as he devoted his entire time to helping his friends in their hour of need.  
Gangaram’s hospitality and solidarity were well-known across the border. He showed me clippings 
from Pakistani newspapers that had published brief features on him. The articles documented 
Gangaram’s attachment to his birthplace and his frequent visits to Mianwali. One clipping also made 
note of the fact that Gangaram had monetarily sponsored the construction of a classroom in an all-
girls school in Mianwali. Among the people of Mianwali, Gangaram was a celebrated ‘son of the soil’. 
Mitti Ke Farzan (Sons of the Soil) – an Urdu book authored by Prof Ziah Khan – included a brief 
biography of Gangaram. As the title suggests, the book is Prof Khan’s attempt to chronicle the lives of 
some of the noteworthy ‘sons’ of Mianwali. It is laid out as an anthology of biographical vignettes. 
Gangaram’s vignette is written in a deeply personal tone; like an affectionate letter from a close friend. 
It addresses him as Lala – the endearing yet respectful title used by the people of Mianwali – and 
                                                            
89 Every year, India grants a certain number of visas to Pakistani nationals so that they might visit India’s 
prominent Sufi dargahs for the religious celebrations. The Urs of Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti (in Dargah Sharif, 
Ajmer), Nizamuddin Auliya (in Nizamuddin Dargah, Delhi) and that of Amir Khusro (also Nizamuddin Dargah, 
Delhi) are among the most prominent Urs. These Urs attract crowds in excess of 100,000 people and are a 
potent symbol of interfaith unity.  
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constantly switches between addressing him in the first and third person; a sign of familiarity in 
Hindi/Urdu. Below is a brief excerpt from the book:  
‘You left sitting on top of your belongings on the roof of a truck. But Lala’s soul got left behind 
in Mianwali. This is why he remained incomplete even after reaching Hindustan. And now he 
looks for excuses to return to Pakistan. […]  
Even today he wears a white salwar-kameez and a boski90 salwar-kameez. He wears the 
traditional Mianwali sandals. He speaks the Saraiki of Mianwali with his family in India. He has 
kept a thick-thick moustache. Half the Mianwali biradari [brotherhood or community] is as 
close as siblings to him. Even today he comes to Mianwali. Even today he only brings 2-3 
clothes for himself and the rest of his luggage – which is substantial – is filled with precious 
gifts for his friends. In Mianwali he distributes gifts like sweets. 
The respect that the people of Mianwali have for him in their hearts is no less than that one 
might have for a famous personality. When you come from Delhi you bring laughter and a 
liveliness spreads. Somewhere someone is arranging for your food and drinks. Elsewhere big 
musicians like Tahir Saqi are called to a local stage to perform in your honour. Every individual 
wishes that you will become their guest.’ 
[Excerpt from Mitti ke Farzan (Sons of the Soil) read aloud by Gangaram; translation mine]  
Mitti Ke Farzan’s reference to Gangaram’s ethnic attire is noteworthy. In my fieldwork I found that 
Gangaram was the only one of his generation (that I encountered) who still dressed in the full Mianwali 
ethnic attire. Whenever I met him, Gangaram was always turned out in a salwar-kameez and a 
turban91. His attire along with his thick handlebar moustache evoked the image of a zamindar 
patriarch of a by-gone age. Gangaram had adopted the attire in 2002, during his nephew’s wedding.  
That was also shortly after his father’s passing. Appearing at the wedding in full-ethnic attire – as the 
oldest male relative on the groom’s father’s side of the family – Gangaram had symbolically assumed 
the role of his family’s reigning patriarch.     
Gangaram had also received some attention in the Indian press. He showed me the photocopy of an 
article in a Hindi newspaper that was headlined, ‘The scent of the soil of his motherland beckons him 
to Pakistan.’ Gangaram also remembered being interviewed for television by an NDTV reporter in 
Lahore in 2006. The Indian cricket team’s 2006 tour of Pakistan had led to a brief thaw in relations, 
                                                            
90 A kind of silk that is spun using the traditional Chinese method of silk-weaving. Due to the fact that it was 
incredibly rare to find boski silk in Mianwali before Partition, the fabric is prized by the people of that 
generation. Its rarity and price meant that the fabric was also a symbol of wealth and success.  
91 The Mianwali turban is different from a Sikh turban. 
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inspiring hope for peace between the rival South Asian nuclear powers. Like a number of other Indian 
travellers, Gangaram had used the cricket series as a pretext to visit Pakistan with his family. It was 
during that visit that Gangaram had met Imran Khan (known at the time primarily as a legendary 
cricketer) and taken a photograph with him.       
That February when we first met, Gangaram had been planning yet another month-long trip to 
Pakistan. He had just received his visa and begun collecting gifts for his friends. The confirmation of 
his visa had produced a wave of enthusiasm among his friends in Pakistan. One of them had even 
published the itinerary of his trip in an Urdu newspaper in Pakistan. Gangaram proudly showed me a 
photograph of the newspaper clipping on his phone. Other friends of his, whom he introduced to me 
over the phone, told me that they had planned a grand welcome for him. Abdulsattar Khan, a Lahore-
based senior advocate, said he planned to greet him at the railway station with a small motorcycle 
cavalcade. Others had begun planning feasts and parties in his honour. Gangaram also had a list of 
weddings to attend. Each year he received a number of wedding invitations – some that even listed 
him as an RSVP contact (a symbolic honour more than anything else) – and he regarded attending 
these an important duty as an elder of this community.   
During our initial meetings, Gangaram and I had several heart-warming conversations about hatred 
and belonging. When I cautiously shared with Gangaram my observations about the latent 
islamophobia of Partition survivors, he said that he found this hatred irrelevant in his own life. He said 
that the Partition was something that had happened in the past and, while his family had been 
displaced because of it, no one had died. He contrasted his family’s experience with those of other 
families who had suffered much more and reasoned that those who had lost close friends and kin feel 
more passionately about the Partition.   
Spending time with Gangaram at his shop and his home, I learnt that his family strongly disapproved 
of his links with Pakistan. Gangaram and his wife Meghana often argued about his frequent trips to 
Pakistan. Although, based on my experience of my parents’ divorce, I suspected the friction between 
them ran much deeper. To me, Pakistan appeared to be just one among many possible triggers in a 
generally fractious marriage. Gangaram’s enthusiasm for Pakistan never failed to annoy Meghana. She 
would often punctuate Gangaram’s experiences of travelling around Pakistan with islamophobic jibes. 
She said she found the full-bearded appearance of Muslim men terrifying and that she felt physically 
repulsed by the burqa. She claimed that Muslims were dirty and had no concept of hygiene. In these 
moments, Gangaram always disagreed with Meghana, countering her arguments with a wealth of 
personal experiences. He would always emphasise the love and respect that people had for him across 
the border.  
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Whenever I visited Gangaram’s house, I found myself caught in the crossfire of such arguments. My 
interest in his forthcoming trip and the tacit support that that implied, provoked vociferous 
denunciations from Meghana, Aditya (his son) and Bhanwarilal. They all saw Gangaram’s love for 
Mianwali as an irrational obsession. Yet implicit in these arguments was the age-old question of 
belonging and community: the afterlife of the Partition. One such exchange went as follows: 
Bhanwarilal [loudly, with sarcasm]: Delhi is so big, tell me which person is getting a fit to see 
Gangaram? Tell me this? Gangaram is the only one who has the wish to see [Pakistan].  
Gangaram [quietly]: No there are many… 
B: Tell me this, which person of Mianwali has gone there? You show me. 
Meghana: It is an obsession without any reason.  
B: Arre, I have asked in the Mianwali biradari, now you are quiet but I know how many people 
of the Mianwali biradari have gone there, till today. 
G: Two-four some… 
B: Aside from Gangaram no one has gone. Gangaram has gone. Gangaram’s family has gone. 
M: Went forcefully. 
B [sarcastically, to Gangaram’s son]: Come rajkumar [prince], honour the man! 
G [turning away from them to talk to me]: Last holi [festival], people had specially come from 
Multan for holi. Sent them visa, as a sponsor, they celebrated holi right here.  
M [bitterly]: They only need a place to stay, this is why they keep praising you.  
G: But that everywhere, [speaking louder and faster] they have only one place to stay, I have 
a hundred.  
M: Who else have they got but you? 
G [shouting]: I have a hundred places to stay. 
While Gangaram’s words and actions indicated that to him there was no difference between his Indian 
and Pakistani relationships, his family clearly did not agree. The heart of these arguments was the way 
in which Gangaram imagined his national belonging; his watan. In Hindi/Urdu, the word watan is 
synonymous with ‘nation’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘country’, and ‘birthplace’, all at once. I use the word watan 
here because of the way that it more accurately captures the ambiguity between these words; an 
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ambiguity that is fundamental to the post-Partition identity of survivors. For Gangaram, his Indian 
citizenship went beside his view that Mianwali was his watan.  
This was something I explored in a conversation with his son, Aditya. During one of these arguments 
about whether Gangaram should proceed with his trip to Pakistan, Aditya rhetorically asked me why 
Gangaram felt the need to keep going back when he had already been there so many times. When I 
mentioned Gangaram’s love for his watan and his friends, Aditya mentioned Gangaram’s advancing 
age. ‘Love, but he has reached an age as well. 20 times he has… We say go somewhere else, for 
sightseeing,’ Aditya replied.  
‘Look now, what can be a better place to go to than your own watan, you tell me,’ I replied poetically.  
‘But this is the watan now,’ Aditya observed in a genteel tone. 
‘But if you ask him this, he will probably say that Mianwali is his watan too,’ I replied impulsively. At 
this point, we turned to him and retold the conversation we had just had to Gangaram. He loudly 
exclaimed, ‘That’s it’, smiled at me and gave me a high-five.  
Numerous times during our interactions, Gangaram told me that even today he still considers Pakistan 
his watan and the people of Mianwali his watani (co-nationals). He told me that the first time he 
visited Mianwali, he made his friends stop their car at the district’s border so he could bow his head 
to the soil, to pay homage. ‘When the border of Mianwali zilla came, so Mianwali starts there, there I 
stopped to do pranam92. I bowed my head to the soil, bhai now we have reached our zilla93.’  
He said that going across the border is always easier than coming back. When returning from Pakistan, 
it all comes back to him, the fact of his displacement, the border, the Partition. Gangaram said that 
while saying goodbye, they do not greet each other. Their farewells are peppered with the silence of 
stifled tears. He said: 
‘Now when we go, we meet with happy hearts. On the way back… […] Always harder than 
going. Very difficult. Although we have no blood relation there, there is no Hindu there, but it 
is our culture, our land, our own place where we played, the place of our father-grandfather-
great-grandfather, the place of their ancestors. Although there [Mianwali] all the young blood 
is there but whenever… a sadness takes over. [Pause] Mianwali zilla is very big, very big… […] 
It reminds me of the full scene of the fighting and killing, how people were becoming refugees 
and leaving. Like we also left like that… The heart does ache.’   
                                                            
92 A gesture of reverential or religious salutation. 
93 The Hindi word for district that is often also colloquially used as a synonym for ‘area’ or ‘region’.  
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Gangaram’s words display a deep attachment to the land of his birth along with a rare recognition of 
the syncretic culture that predated the Partition. He describes this attachment by continuously 
invoking the ‘soil’ or the ‘land’ as a sacred symbol. The symbol of the soil recurs even in a bucket list 
wish that he confided in me. Gangaram said that he hoped to die in Mianwali. He said that even the 
people of Mianwali had told him that they prayed that whenever death came for him – ten-twenty 
years hence, in the due course of life – that, it would find him in Pakistan so that they could bury him 
in his ancestral city. They had told him that they would build him a memorial-like gravesite and light a 
candle on it every Thursday night. He confided that this is what he wanted for himself too, so that his 
body could be returned to the soil of his birth.  
When Meghana and Aditya overheard him say this, they were horrified. Meghana insinuated that this 
meant that ‘the Muslims’ wanted to kill him while his son scoffed and remarked, ‘they won’t build 
anything.’ Aditya even threatened to steal and hide Gangaram’s passport, to prevent him from ever 
travelling again. Later that day when we were bidding our goodbyes, Gangaram pulled me aside and 
gave me a peek into the breast pocket of his Nehru jacket. ‘I keep my passport with me all the time so 
they can’t do anything,’ he explained. He winked mischievously and gave me a quick peek at the freshly 
stamped Pakistani visa before returning it to his pocket. 
During those initial weeks of our acquaintance, Gangaram and I bonded over our shared appreciation 
for our Pakistani heritage. Noticing our shared ‘obsession’ with Pakistan, on more than one occasion, 
Meghana compared me to her husband, calling us a bunch of ‘wandering souls,’ in jest. There was a 
mischievousness to my friendship with Gangaram. As someone who had similarly faced the scorn of 
my extended family for my ‘ill-advised’ closeness to my Pakistani friends in Dublin, I could instinctively 
relate to the antagonistic dynamics of Gangaram’s family. I have mentioned Gangaram’s friction with 
his family in some detail because it also struck me as proof of the genuineness of his affection for 
Pakistan.   
Yet, upon spending more time with him, I saw that these thoughts coexisted with his passion for Hindu 
nationalism. After we had exchanged phone numbers on WhatsApp, Gangaram began to forward me 
Hindu Right propaganda. One of the texts he forwarded warned of the demographic threat that 




      
Figure 3.05: Screenshots of Hindu Right propaganda texts forwarded by Gangaram. 
 
This text message begins with an ominous warning telling Hindus that they must celebrate their 
festivals now as these will no longer be celebrated in the future. The text alleges that, ‘the Institute of 
World Demographics Research has released religious demographic data for India from 1948 to 2017 
and have estimated the population for 2041.’ Displaying a biopolitical obsession with population 
figures, the message consistently fabricates and overestimates the population of Muslims until the 
year 2017. The message thereafter projects an incremental increase of India’s Muslim populations. It 
warns that with India’s Muslim population at 38.1%, India will elect its first Muslim Prime Minister in 
the year 2030. The text predicts 2040 as the year when India’s Muslims will outnumber its Hindus and 
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labels this dubious landmark as the completion of the ‘Ghazwa-e-Hind mission’ or the total conquest 
of India. The text ends with another ominous warning:  
‘There is still time. If you will still not show unity then get ready to be wiped out? [sic] If your 
soul says so then forward this massage [sic] to at least 10 people and contribute to nation 
building. Forget sharing, some people will not even read it.. [sic] This is the truth.. [sic]’   
This text message evokes a Hindu nationalist version of the Great Replacement conspiracy theory. It 
alleges a Muslim conspiracy to capture India’s democracy by somehow outbreeding Hindus. It 
implicitly constructs Hindus as a disunited and weak community that is being led like lambs into a 
dystopian demographic trap.   
Another text message that Gangaram forwarded alleged that Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Jawaharlal Nehru 
and Sheikh Abdullah were in fact half-brothers and that they were the illegitimate sons of Motilal 
Nehru. I have mentioned this conspiracy theory at various times in my dissertation. In the Hindu Right 
ecosystem, this conspiracy theory is dubiously credited to MO Mathai. Mathai was Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
Private Secretary during the latter’s term as Prime Minister. Mathai is also believed to have had an 
affair with Indira Gandhi; a rumour often used to paint the Nehru-Gandhi family as a nest of decadence 
and corruption. The text message Gangaram forwarded attempts to provide a citation for its details 
by including the link to a Google search on MO Mathai. Below are the screenshots of this mammoth 









Figure 3.06: Screenshots of a forwarded text message from Gangaram. The text details a popular 
Hindu Right conspiracy theory about the ‘true’ genealogy of Nehru and Jinnah. 
 
Our communication over WhatsApp marked a dramatic change in our conversations. As I began to 
increasingly engage him in political conversations, I realised that Gangaram truly believed in these 
discourses. Gangaram was an enthusiastic supporter of Modi and the BJP, and a firm believer in the 
ideology of Hindu nationalism. Before any major state legislative election, Gangaram would send me 
messages asking me to pray for the BJP, vote for them (if I could) and imploring me to pass on the 
message to ‘all my friends’. Whenever the BJP won an election, Gangaram would send me messages 
congratulating ‘the nation’ on the victory and optimistically celebrating the forthcoming period of 
‘development’ and ‘progress’.   
322 
 
Gangaram also believed that the Congress was a party for Muslims that had historically held India back 
through a combination of ‘minority appeasement’, corruption, ineptitude and sabotage. He was 
particularly vitriolic towards Jawaharlal Nehru. But his discourses on Nehru were often self-
contradictory. Gangaram held Nehru’s unwillingness to share power as the primary reason for the 
Partition. Yet, he also believed that Motilal Nehru had conjured the Partition in order to split South 
Asia into independent fiefdoms for his three alleged illegitimate sons. Both these discourses sought 
to understand the Partition through the rhetoric of blame; blame that was always squarely placed on 
the Nehru family and by extension, the Congress party. In the same vein, Gangaram lamented the 
Partition and wondered why Hindus and Muslims could have not been allowed to live in peace; the 
way they had been living for centuries previously.  
However, Gangaram also often contradicted himself by expressing his support for the RSS and the 
Two-Nation Theory. Responding to my accusations of the role of RSS ideologue VD Savarkar in opining 
the Two-Nation Theory, Gangaram described the RSS as a necessary force. ‘Of course we believe in 
the Two-Nation Theory,’ he stated vociferously. Gangaram spoke at length about the ‘humanitarian 
work’ that the RSS did during the Partition, such as running soup kitchens for refugees at railway 
stations and ‘protecting’ Hindus during riots.  
Gangaram did not perceive the dissonance in his own rhetoric on the Partition. Gangaram’s belief in 
the Two-Nation Theory was a direct contradiction of his earlier insistence on the Partition as an 
unnecessary evil and a failure of Nehru’s politics. His faith in the RSS and the Two-Nation Theory was 
couched in the familiar discourses of Hindu nationalism. Like many of my other informants, he too 
recounted a history of Hindu victimhood; a history comprised of 800 years of oppression and atrocities 
at the hands of Muslims. ‘What else is their history?’ he asked rhetorically, implying that the history 
of Muslims is nothing but a history of violence. ‘Ghori came 18 times,’ he said, in a reference to 
Mahmud of Ghori’s raids into Punjab and north India. ‘How many times they looted Somanatha 
Temple! What else did they even do, this Ghazni, Aurangzeb, Khilji, whatever?’ In imputing the 
violence of a few medieval rulers onto the Muslims of today, Gangaram was merely regurgitating the 
rhetoric of the BJP.    
My counter-argument that the sacking of temples was not confined to Muslim rulers alone but was 
instead a regular part of all medieval warfare in South Asia (Eaton, 2000), was roundly dismissed by 
Gangaram. ‘Only you don’t believe this history. Are the rest of us idiots? Are the television people 
idiots? Everyone believes this history,’ he taunted me. Clearly, belief was of paramount importance to 
the epistemology of history. When I kept quiet in response to this, Gangaram went on to link this 
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‘history’ of Muslim oppression to another familiar discourse of Hindu nationalism: the lust of Muslim 
masculinity.  
Returning to the Partition, he spoke about how roughly 5-600 Hindu women had been kidnapped 
during Pakistan’s attack on Srinagar in 1947. ‘What atrocities did they not do on them…’ he mourned. 
‘In our Mianwali there is a village called Harnoli. There they did so many atrocities. There was a family 
there, they came to Gurgaon later. They threw 18 women of their own family into a well, themselves, 
with their own hands.’ Gangaram was practically shouting at me at this point. Gangaram had 
mentioned this family before, back when I had first asked him how he is able to maintain such good 
relations across the border despite the pain and suffering of the Partition. Back then, he had 
contrasted his family’s relative lack of suffering with this family’s.  
‘Eighteen!’ he repeated, ‘You ask us why our heart burns, ask them how much their heart burns.’ An 
awkward silence hung between us for a time. I did not know how to respond to his last comment. I 
felt a complex mixture of emotions that ranged from disgust at his opinions to shame and guilt for 
having disrespected his suffering. Gangaram, for his part, had a lot more to say and resumed the 
conversation. He insisted that all Muslims should be made to leave India. ‘Kill them, drive them out of 
here,’ he declared. He argued that they should all be sent to Pakistan because they may live here but 
their hearts are always with other Muslims. In doing so, he repeated a line that is spoken all too often 
across India, that Muslims may live in India but their sympathies will always lie with Pakistan. 
In an exasperated tone, I asked him, ‘So what is your solution for all this? Do you want a Pakistan for 
Hindus, I mean a country like Pakistan only for Hindus?’ My usage of Pakistan here was meant to 
critique Hindu nationalism’s dream of an ethnically pure nation by comparing it to its own 
understanding of its bitter enemy. But, instead, Gangaram let the penny drop.  
‘We in fact want this to be a Hindu Rashtra [nation]. We want to remove this nonsense of secularism 
from the constitution. We want Article 370 [Jammu and Kashmir’s Special Provisions] to be removed 
so Hindus can build houses there.’ Gangaram went on to add that he wanted the BJP to return to 
power (which they did) in 2019 with a 2/3rds majority in Parliament and in 3/4th of all the state 
legislatures so that they may have the numbers to rewrite the constitution. ‘We do not believe in this 
constitution,’ he declared firmly.  
Getting progressively worked up, he continued, ‘Hindustan anyway belongs to Hindus only. Why have 
so many of them [Muslims] been left behind?’ In the same vein he mentioned that as a consequence 
of the Partition, no Hindus had been left in Pakistan. ‘No Hindu families are left in Mianwali today but 
there are so many Muslims left in India,’ he lamented. ‘When they do not have any love for Hindustan, 
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no love for Hindus so why have they been left here? This is the most treacherous community. You 
cannot trust them. They only betray you.’  
Utterly disillusioned and disappointed with him, I said, ‘You are saying such horrible things. I never 
expected this from you. You have so many friends in Pakistan, you have been there so many times. If 
you hate them so much why do you even go there?’ He shrugged and replied, ‘Among Muslims, the 
5% that are literate are fine. The rest 95% are useless fanatics. I only go to Pakistan to meet my friends. 
The friends I have from that time, with whom I have maintained relations, I only go to meet them. I 
do not have any love for Pakistan.’ 
In this way, Gangaram was one of the most complicated informants I encountered during my 
fieldwork. His relationship with Mianwali (a relationship that was undoubtedly one of love and 
warmth) sat dissonantly beside his ressentiment for Muslims and ‘secularism’. On the one hand, his 
attachment with Mianwali was so deep that he routinely fought with his family to maintain his links 
with Pakistan. The latter came to a head in April 2018, when Meghana’s knee replacement surgery 
forced Gangaram to indefinitely postpone his trip to Pakistan. While Gangaram chose to stay beside 
his wife and take care of her, he did so reluctantly, almost begrudgingly. In turn, he was subjected to 
taunts by Meghana and Aditya.  
Sometimes his attachment with Mianwali made him express views that might even be considered 
‘anti-national’ by the BJP’s own yardstick of patriotism. In August 2018, when we last met, Gangaram 
was once again contemplating a trip to Pakistan. He was elated by Imran Khan’s victory in Pakistan’s 
2018 general elections. The reason, he explained, was that Imran Khan too was from Mianwali. By 
going over there at this time, he wanted to celebrate the victory of this successful watani (co-national).  
Another time, while discussing India’s 1971 war with Pakistan, he remarked that the Pakistani General 
A. A. K. Niazi who had surrendered to the Indian Army in Dhaka was also from Mianwali. This led to an 
interesting, almost treasonous exchange about honour and respect:  
Gangaram: He is from the proper city. That Bangladesh fellow [lowers voice] is from our 
Mianwali. There was a book on our Mianwali. In that there was a chapter on General A. K. 
Niazi, he wrote… Harish Chander Lakdha wrote that on the one hand we are delighted that 
we have conquered Bangladesh, but on the other hand there is a thing in our heart that a 
General from our Mianwali who is a Pathan had to surrender. [Own opinion] Instead of 
surrendering had he shot himself he would have been considered a big martyr. Now he lost 
all respect in Mianwali. Had he shot himself so then killed in battle…   
PK: Have you ever met? 
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G: Not him but his son-in-law, yes. His son-in-law lives in South Africa. Johannesburg. He lives 
there.  
PK: So his honour was completely destroyed after the surrender? 
G: This is the thing… The 93,000 prisoners that were taken… The loss of honour was bound to 
happen. If he had not surrendered then, then many would have died. On the one hand he did 
well, saved the lives of so many people, but on the other hand the name of Mianwali city got 
tarnished. Bhai, look he surrendered despite being a Pathan. It would have been better had 
he shot himself, who would have known in the fighting, who shot him. This line I remember 
he had written on this. [Quoting] Although we were delighted with our victory, 93000… 
[Breaks off] 
PK: But we are also sad… 
G: That a man from our city had to surrender. And being a Pathan he dishonoured Mianwali.   
The complexity of such an exchange where he laments the alleged dishonouring of Mianwali even as 
he celebrates India’s victory in a war captures the way Gangaram’s discourses routinely fell outside 
the neatly homogenising discourses of Hindu nationalism. Yet, despite inhabiting this space of 
ambiguity, Gangaram was fully committed to the ideology of Hindu nationalism. He was completely 
enamoured by Modi and the BJP. I had seen the BJP’s campaign material (a BJP-printed scarf and flag) 
at his house and also been on the receiving end of his habitual forwarding of Hindu Right propaganda 
on WhatsApp. That part of him was genuine too.  
How might we then understand this complexity? How might we make sense of this apparent 
ideological schizophrenia? How might we remember the Partition through this seemingly dissonant 
haze? It is helpful, at this point, to turn to Pooran Chand’s story for its similarity to Gangaram’s.   
 
 
Pooran Chand’s Story 
 
Pooran Chand is by now a familiar figure in this dissertation. Pooran Chand was one of my key 
informants. I have written about him at length in Section 1.4 and mentioned the story of his aunt’s 
abduction earlier in this chapter, in Section 3.3. During my fieldwork in Faridabad, Pooran Chand and 
I came to develop a grandparent-like relationship. He was an incredibly thoughtful and articulate man. 
Incidentally, among his community – the other elderly men with whom he shared walks and chats in 
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Rose Garden – he was known for being quiet and circumspect. Pooran Chand and I had happened to 
bond over our shared experience of having been immigrants.  
In the 1980s, at the height of the Iran-Iraq war, Pooran Chand had spent 5 years working in Libya and 
Iraq. Throughout his life, Pooran Chand had worked in the Indian Road Construction Corporation; a 
public sector corporation. But in his final years of service before retirement, he had been offered the 
opportunity to work in Libya and had seized it. His one and a half year long stint in Libya was followed 
by a three and a half year long deputation to Iraq. He described his time in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as 
the ‘golden years’ of his life. We’d often sit together in the Rose Garden and trade stories of our travels 
abroad, discussing the food, culture and politics of the faraway places we had lived in. I loved spending 
time with Pooran Chand and I would try to arrange my time such that I could meet him almost every 
week. Over the course of the time we spent together, Pooran Chand and I developed an honesty of 
rapport that went far beyond what I had with the average informant.  
Pooran Chand’s experience of the Partition was rife with violence. His family had been a wealthy 
zamindar family in the North West Frontier Province village of Lakki Marwat. Following the 
announcement of the NWFP’s inclusion in Pakistan, tensions rose to a fever pitch. As sporadic 
incidents of violence broke out across the countryside, the army began to evacuate Hindus and Sikhs 
to the big cities of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, from where they could ultimately be put on buses and 
trains to India. It was in September 1947 that their village was evacuated. Pooran Chand’s family had 
sent him to Bannu a week before their planned evacuation.  
However, the army convoy that the rest of his family was travelling in, was attacked just outside Lakki 
Marwat. Unfortunately, part of Pooran Chand’s family happened to be in that part of the convoy that 
bore the brunt of the offensive. Pooran Chand explained that the first 4 buses were attacked. His 
mother and her side of the family were fortunately in the latter half. The rest of his family was not so 
lucky. Pooran Chand’s paternal grandmother received a bullet wound just above her eye (she lost her 
eyesight in one eye as a result) while his aunt (father’s sister) was abducted. The attack forced the 
army convoy to retreat to Lakki Marwat.  
When Pooran Chand’s family finally reached Bannu, he learned that his father and grandmother were 
not among them. They had decided to stay behind to look for his aunt. ‘My dadi was all bandaged up, 
but she is a mother. So she tried a lot,’ Pooran Chand said. His grandmother and father pleaded with 
the local SP (Superintendent of Police). Pooran Chand remembered that though the SP was a Muslim, 
he gave their case fair treatment. The SP gathered intelligence on the whereabouts of Pooran Chand’s 
aunt. As I have written earlier in this chapter, his aunt was abducted by a man who was known to their 
family. The SP then organised a meeting of the local Pathans and pleaded with them to return the 
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woman to her family. The Pathans did not agree to this. Pooran Chand said that they too were 
zamindars and presented a united front. Negotiations ensued and a compromise was reached. It was 
agreed that a public hearing would be held in the presence of the DC, SP and Pooran Chand’s 
grandmother and father. It was here that his aunt would be given an opportunity to choose whom she 
wanted to stay with. A day before the hearing, the DC and SP seized the Pathans’ guns and organised 
a brief private meeting between Pooran Chand’s aunt and grandmother. Pooran Chand said that this 
meeting was particularly important as his family was afraid that his aunt’s abductors might intimidate 
or deceive her into choosing them. On the day of her hearing, Pooran Chand’s aunt publicly renounced 
her abductors and chose to go to India with her family. The DC and SP acted swiftly and whisked the 
family away to the relative safety of Bannu. From there, they arranged for Pooran Chand’s aunt and 
grandmother to fly to Ambala; all before the abductors could plot any sort of revenge.  
All of this took a number of months and Pooran Chand was reunited with them only in January 1948. 
Meanwhile Pooran Chand himself had to endure an agonisingly long wait for evacuation from Bannu. 
In Bannu, their entire extended family cramped into the home of a relative. The first evacuation train 
from Bannu was scheduled to run on December 14, 1947. While Pooran Chand’s aunt and uncle were 
allotted a place on that train, Pooran Chand himself along with the majority of his family was 
scheduled to travel on December 16. On the 14th, when Pooran Chand accompanied his aunt and uncle 
to the railway station, to bid them farewell, the policeman overseeing the boarding informed them 
that the train only had space left for one more person. His aunt and uncle, pushed him ahead and put 
him on the train. Pooran Chand choked up as he remembered the moment. ‘It was not my number. 
But what of that, everyone wants that their child should go [safely].’ The train from Bannu terminated 
at Maddi Indus. From there he changed another train until he finally reached Kurukshetra, a full two 
days ahead of the rest of his family.  
Despite the violence and desperation that characterised his final memories of the Frontier, Pooran 
Chand still experienced a deep attachment with the land. This was visible in his fondness for movies 
and literature that featured the Frontier and Afghanistan. His nostalgia along with my interest in the 
Frontier meant that between us, we managed to somehow connect even the most inconsequential 
small-talk to Bannu. One afternoon, while we were enjoying the faint December sunshine in Rose 
Garden, Pooran Chand began to talk about the health benefits of sun-bathing and Vitamin D. He then 
told me the story of an Afghani Hindu refugee who had settled in Faridabad. This man had developed 
a troublesome skin condition and his doctor had advised regular, moderated sun-bathing as a cure. 
When I showed an interest in the man’s Afghani heritage, Pooran Chand spoke at length about these 
subsequent migrations. Some Hindu families had used their familial links to migrate to Faridabad in 
the 1960s, while other Hindus and Sikhs from Afghanistan had migrated to India in the 80s and 90s, 
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as a consequence of the Soviet invasion and subsequent Taliban regime. Using family visas and refugee 
status, many of them had ultimately acquired Indian citizenship through naturalisation. Later, Pooran 
Chand even introduced me to some of them.   
However, talking about subsequent migrations from the Frontier, led to further recollections about 
Bannu. Pooran Chand spoke at length about Bannu’s military importance to British domination over 
the nearby Pashto tribes and Afghanistan. He revealed that the British would use regular aerial 
bombardment and raids to project their power over these rebellious hill tribes.  
In this vein, he unexpectedly began to recount an essay by Rabindranath Tagore (2002), called 
‘Civilization and Progress’. In it, Pooran Chand recalled that Tagore had contested common-sense 
ideas of progress and civilization through two brief vignettes. One vignette recounted a true incident 
where a British bomber pilot’s plane malfunctioned forcing him to crash-land in the very same Frontier 
tribal areas that he had just been bombing. Although the pilot was captured by a Pashto tribe, he was 
treated as an honoured guest and later safely escorted to a nearby British cantonment. The second 
vignette recounted a story from Tagore’s own life. Tagore had once found himself driving through the 
Bengali countryside in a car whose engine was prone to overheating and needed to be frequently 
cooled with water. Tagore found that although water was scarce in the countryside, the villagers he 
encountered were always generous in sharing it. However, once he reached the suburbs of Calcutta 
(where piped water was relatively abundant), he noticed that people began to charge him money for 
the water he needed. Through these vignettes, Tagore sought to contrast the exploitativeness and 
brutality inherent in modernity (as signified by the British army and the city of Calcutta) with the 
warmth and hospitality of the countryside94. Pooran Chand considered this essay one of the most 
memorable pieces of writing he had ever read.  
By the New Year, I had traced this essay of Tagore’s (2002) to his book, ‘Talks in China’ and procured 
a copy of it. One January afternoon, I showed up to the Rose Garden with this book and presented it 
to Pooran Chand. He choked up with emotion as he took the book from me and started leafing through 
it. ‘If I had my glasses with me I would read it,’ he said. When I told him the book was intended as a 
                                                            
94 Tagore occupies an interesting place in anti-colonial and nationalist thought. Poulomi Saha (2013: 1) writes 
that, ‘Tagore models in his speeches and writing a locally rooted globalism, committed to a universal 
humanism and an avowed love of country, and it takes a form that is explicitly neither nationalist nor 
cosmopolitan.’ In many of his writings, such as his 1916 novel Home and the World (Ghare-Baire) his 
philosophy is best described as one seeking to negotiate local attachment with global engagement (ibid.). In 
this way, Tagore’s nostalgia for country sat beside his refusal to endorse Bengali anti-colonial nationalism 
(ibid.). Tagore’s politics involved a steadfast repudiation of all nationalisms. Tagore saw nationalism as, ‘one of 
the most powerful anaesthetics that man has invented’ (Tagore quoted in ibid.: 4). Saha (ibid.: 14) thus 
concludes that, ‘While Tagore was anti-nationalist, he neither identified as cosmopolitan nor did he imagine 
such an outlook to be the answer to the quandary of factionalism and Empire.’   
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gift for him, he declined and told me to keep it for myself. I opened the book to ‘Civilization and 
Progress’ and showed him the essay. He held the page close to his eyes and squinted at it until he 
could finally read the title. He asked me whether I’d read it and I replied that I had and complimented 
him on the sharpness of his memory. He said that he remembered this essay vividly. He had first come 
across it while studying for his Faculty of Arts (FA) degree. ‘Some words are such that they remain in 
your heart,’ he remarked nostalgically. 
This simple gesture began a conversation that continued over the course of the next few months. Over 
the course of several meetings he told me the story of how he had tried his best to keep in touch with 
the Frontier in the 1950s. Pooran Chand said that between 1953 and 1955, while he was pursuing his 
FA in Delhi, he would go to the Delhi Public Library. In those days, one could apparently find Pakistani 
newspapers in the public library, including the English daily Pakistan Times. ‘I used to go there to read 
Pakistan Times, because we were from there, so just to get an idea of what is happening there these 
days, what is the news, like that,’ Pooran Chand recalled. One day, while reading the newspaper, he 
came across the advertisement of an Urdu newspaper printed in Bannu called Halal-e-Noh (New Life). 
Pooran Chand does not remember how he did it (whether it was mentioned in the advertisement 
itself), but somehow, he managed to get the address of the editor of Halal-e-Noh and sent him a letter.  
‘I am quite deft with letters. So I wrote to him that this is how it is, I am from Bannu and now 
I am studying in Delhi and it was nice to see a mention of Bannu and your paper. In his reply, 
the editor started regularly sending me copies of Halal-e-Noh. So now that paper started 
coming to my house. And I kept reading it till the time it kept coming. Then something 
happened and the government banned the import and export of newspapers. Back when 
Halal-e-Noh used to come, so one time I even sent in an article. So just like how I had to write 
essays for my FA-BA, so like that I wrote an essay in Urdu: “Science vs Progress”. Meaning, the 
benefits of science, like technology and all, that I broadly wrote and the drawbacks of science 
like bombs and all that, the loss of lives, that, like that. In that I had used a reference of Tagore 
also. So I wrote the essay and sent it to them and it got published also. Back then, at that time, 
I did not have the awareness so I did not save a copy. And now I do not even know if I can get 
that copy from somewhere or not. But this I wanted to tell that I had written an Urdu essay 
that was published in Bannu which had a reference to Tagore’s Civilization and Progress.’    
In addition to his beautifully serendipitous correspondence with Halal-e-Noh, Pooran Chand had also 
made contact with the Pakistan High Commission and expressed an interest in receiving governmental 
literature. ‘Back then embassies of all countries would send material for free. Interest was rare so if 
someone wrote them a postcard saying they want to know more about Pakistan, or Bannu, or Soviets, 
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they would start sending material for free,’ Pooran Chand explained. As a result he would also receive 
reading material in Pashto (his mother tongue) and Urdu. This was his way of keeping in touch with 
his watan.  
Just as a random conversation about Vitamin D had started a whole conversation on Pooran Chand’s 
attempts at keeping in touch with his homeland, discussing the works of Tagore revealed a powerful 
cultural symbol in Pooran Chand’s life. Tagore’s (2005) short story Kabuliwala (The Man from Kabul) 
– first published in 1892 – was one of Pooran Chand’s favourite stories. He had first read the story 
when he was in college and had felt drawn to it ever since. When its Hindi movie adaptation released 
in 1961 (also titled Kabuliwala), he saw it twice in Delhi’s famous Delite Cinema.  
Tagore’s Kabuliwala is a beautifully bitter-sweet story of filial love. In it, Rehman (the titular 
Kabuliwala) strikes up an unlikely friendship with Mini (pronounced min-knee), the 5 year old 
daughter of a middle-class aristocratic writer (a character based on Tagore himself). Rehman is a 
Hazara man from Afghanistan. He leaves behind a 5 year old daughter of his own to earn a living as a 
travelling fruit vendor. Living alone in Calcutta, hawking his wares in the often-times hostile 
neighbourhoods of upper-caste Bengalis, Rehman encounters Mini, a girl who reminds him of his own 
daughter back home. Rehman befriends her by offering her fruits and pistachios. Mini and Rehman 
come to share a beautifully filial bond. But, when Rehman receives news of his own daughter’s illness, 
he prepares to return home. However, while collecting his debts from the neighbourhood, Rehman 
has an altercation that ends in him stabbing the other man. Rehman is arrested and spends the next 
8 years in jail. When he returns to the author’s household following his release, he meets a much older 
Mini, getting dressed for her wedding. And though the author recognises Rehman, Mini seems to have 
no recollection of him. Heart-broken, realising that even his own daughter might not recognise him, 
the Kabuliwala bids them farewell, returning to Afghanistan95.  
Pooran Chand described the story to me in great detail and told me to watch the movie. He recounted 
how the Pathans of the Frontier were colloquially referred to as Kabuliwalas in passing. He said that 
when he saw the movie he had liked it so much that he had started calling his niece Mini. And, when 
                                                            
95 This famous short-story of Tagore has been the subject of much critique and reflection. On the one hand, 
Tagore’s representation of the simple-minded, honest but passionate Pathan through the character of Rehman 
is reflective of the racist stereotypes of Afghan and Pathan people. Seen in this light, Rehman often resembles 
a racist caricature. However, the story’s lingering appeal lies in its universal themes, its focus on filial love 
being the foremost. Professor of History at James Madison University, Shah Mahmoud Hanifi argues that 
Tagore’s Kabuliwala presents a snapshot of South Asian history that raises, ‘good questions about the cultural 
place of the Kabuliwala, the location of Afghan identity in relation to the Indian identity, or identities, and how 
these communities take shape through various migratory and mobility-based practices over the longue duree’ 
(Prof Hanifi quoted in Finnigan, 2018). In this sense, Rehman’s selling of dry-fruit documents economic and 
migratory ties between Afghanistan and India; ties that are themselves folded within a larger South Asian 
history of migration, trade and cultural exchange (ibid.).       
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her sister was born, he had taken to calling her Tini (pronounced tin-knee). Pooran Chand said that 
the thing he loved the most about the movie was Manna Dey’s famous song, Aye Mere Pyaare Watan 
(O my beloved nation). As he said this, he spontaneously broke into song, singing the well-known 
couplet, ‘Ae mere pyaare watan, aye mere bichhde chaman, tujhpe dill kurbaan’ (O my beloved nation, 
O my parted land I dedicate my heart to you). Pooran Chand’s voice fluttered and wavered as he tried 
to hold the tune despite the obvious lump in his throat. ‘Manna Dey did not make too many good 
songs after that,’ he remarked as he continued humming the tune.   
In the movie, Rehman’s Afghan friends sing the song in a bout of nostalgia. The movie’s music video 
constantly switches back and forth between close-ups of Rehman’s (played by Balraj Sahni) nostalgic 
face and wide-angle shots of the Afghan-Frontier landscape. The song – which was specifically written 
for the movie – refers to Rehman’s abandoned watan (Afghanistan or the Frontier) and not to the 
India in which the movie released. However, this song has lingered in the zeitgeist besides other 
similarly themed popular pieces of nationalistic music. But, in Pooran Chand’s emotional rendition of 
it, I could glimpse the Kabuliwala pining for his abandoned homeland.  
Like Gangaram, Pooran Chand too had maintained relations across the border. In 2007, Pooran Chand 
and a friend of his (now deceased) had made a trip to Pakistan together. Crossing the border via the 
Samjhauta Express train (‘Reconciliation Express’), they had first reached Lahore and then continued 
onward to Bannu and Lakki Marwat. While revisiting Lakki Marwat, Pooran Chand had run into Sadiq, 
the grandson of his maths teacher. ‘I did not recognise him, but he recognised me,’ Pooran Chand 
said. Despite the fact that the two were practically strangers to each other, a warm friendship 
developed between them. Sadiq took them to his home and hosted them for the rest of their time in 
Pakistan.  
While in Lakki Marwat, Pooran Chand had even revisited his ancestral house. He said that his house 
was now occupied by another family. When I asked him if he had gone inside, he said, ‘No. Although 
the people who were with me said if you say we’ll talk to the people inside and get it open, but I said 
no.’ When I asked him why, he did not reply. An awkward silence weighed upon us then; the weight 
of 70 years of unfinished history.  
Following Pooran Chand’s trip, Sadiq had also visited India a couple of times. Sadiq had used the Urs 
of Ajmer Sharif to spend time with Pooran Chand and his family here. The two still kept in regular 
touch. In fact, on more than one occasion, Pooran Chand received a phone call from Sadiq while we 
were hanging out in Rose Garden.   
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During his visit to Pakistan, Pooran Chand had also helped reunite Chetan with his long lost uncle. I 
had written about Chetan in Section 1.4 while recounting the history of Faridabad’s New Industrial 
Township (NIT). Chetan’s uncle (mother’s brother) had chosen to convert to Islam and stayed behind 
in Bannu. He owned a vast amount of agricultural land there. However, since their migration to India, 
the rest of Chetan’s family had lost touch with his uncle. When Chetan had heard of Pooran Chand’s 
plans to go to Pakistan, he had written his uncle a letter and handed the sealed envelope to Pooran 
Chand. There was no address on it, just the man’s old Hindu name. Yet, against all odds, in Bannu, 
Pooran Chand ran into an elderly gentleman who recognised the old Hindu name. Pooran Chand 
translated Chetan’s letter into Urdu, enclosed Chetan’s Indian address and phone number and sent it 
along. A few days after Pooran Chand returned from Pakistan, Chetan received a call from his uncle. 
And then, after more than 60 years of separation, Chetan’s mother finally spoke to her long lost 
brother.   
Yet, the sweetness of these stories and memories lived beside Pooran Chand’s belief in Hindu 
nationalism. In one of the first discussions we ever had about politics, Pooran Chand told me that he 
believed that Article 370 should be removed from the Indian Constitution. He believed that Article 370 
– the constitutional article which until August 2019 granted the state of Jammu and Kashmir special 
status within the Indian Union – was the only roadblock to peace in the valley. He felt that the Article 
should be removed so that Hindus, especially retired Hindu army officers, could buy land in Kashmir 
and settle there.  
The abolition of Article 370 along with Article 35A (that empowers the state of Jammu and Kashmir to 
define its permanent residents and restrict the ownership of private property to residents) is a cause 
that the BJP and the Sangh Parivar have long championed; one that they ultimately achieved in August 
2019. The Hindu Right visualise the abolition of these constitutional provisions as necessary steps to 
enable large-scale demographic changes in the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley. Thus, in supporting 
the abolition of Article 370 and linking it to large-scale Hindu migration into the valley, Pooran Chand 
was vocally supportive of Hindu settler-colonialism in Kashmir.  
Similarly, Pooran Chand believed in the Hindu Right’s version of Indian history as a series of ‘Muslim’ 
invasions and occupations. In this vein, he hoped that the Supreme Court would award the disputed 
site of the erstwhile Babri Masjid to Hindus and that in time, a grand Ram Temple would be built there.   
However, even as he supported some of the BJP’s core Hindu nationalist agendas, he also felt ashamed 
of the beef lynchings that had become routine by 2018. He even admitted that these acts of ‘cow 
vigilantism’ were impossible without the tacit support of the government of the day. On this subject, 
his views were similar to those of Rajaram (refer Section 1.6) who similarly acknowledged that Modi 
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was indirectly responsible for the beef lynchings and condemned the so-called ‘gau rakshaks’ (cow 
protectors) as ‘murderers’. Pooran Chand also acknowledged that the consumption of beef was not 
restricted to Muslims alone and that Hindus too consumed beef regularly.  
Similarly, by virtue of the time he had spent in the Middle-East, Pooran Chand had a more nuanced 
view of the post-9/11 world order. Unlike many of my other informants he did not believe that 
Muslims were inherently prone to terrorism or that countries with a Muslim majority were 
condemned to chaos. Instead, he had a grudging admiration for the ‘efficiency’ and ‘social freedoms’ 
of Saddam’s Iraq, especially the lack of street-crime and the high prevalence of women in the work-
force at the time. On numerous occasions he lamented that the US had ruined Iraq and Libya through 
its military interventions.    
Yet, despite breaking ranks with the Hindu Right on some of these subjects, Pooran Chand also 
espoused faith in a de-facto majoritarianism. In a conversation where I critiqued the Modi 
government’s sectarian impulses, Pooran Chand countered by reminding me that the government of 
the day enjoys the majority and support of the people. The opposition cannot expect the government 
to function by their values, he said. When I reminded him that secularism is not only a constitutional 
principle but also a humanitarian value, he dismissed me by saying that, ‘These values have been 
created by those who are against this government. The opposition cannot be in opposition and still 
dictate terms.’ Democracy is rule by the majority and the majority has elected Modi and this 
government to do the job, he reminded me.   
In defence of this majoritarian doctrine, he turned his attention to the Middle East and said that he 
had observed that in ‘Muslim countries’, the head is always Muslim. ‘Show me one Muslim country 
whose head is from the minority. Iraq has 15% Christians but still their President has always been 
Muslim,’ he argued. Everywhere it is the majority that rules, he observed, ‘and now Hindus have also 
awoken to this realisation.’ This idea that by embracing the BJP’s naked majoritarianism, the Hindu 
has ‘awoken’, is part of how India’s turn to Hindu nationalism is experienced by its supporters as a 
veritable revolution.    
Pooran Chand was also extremely critical of the Congress’ embrasure of soft-Hindutva. In Rahul 
Gandhi’s frequent temple visits during the Gujarat state legislature elections of 2018, he implicitly saw 
a vindication of Hindu nationalism. Pooran Chand rhetorically asked, ‘And why should Hindus not vote 
for BJP? Who knows what Rahul Gandhi is? Is he a Christian, is he Muslim, is he Hindu, what is he? Till 
today he has never been to a temple but now that elections are on, he is touring temples. His mother! 
Who knows what [religion] she is?’ Pooran Chand saw the Congress’ soft-Hindutva as nothing but an 
opportunistic, electoral facade. If anything, Rahul Gandhi’s temple-hopping campaign appeared to 
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reify the hegemony of Hindu nationalism, firmly establishing the primacy of religion discourse within 
politics.   
‘The majority of this country accepts this. In democracy it is the will of the majority that prevails,’ 
Pooran Chand continued. Responding to recent political commentary, he said that it was not right of 
the opposition parties to allege that the majority is stupid. They know what they want and they have 
voted for this government, he reminded me. And then, he prophetically observed that, ‘This 
government is not going to go away so soon. They will stay a while.’ 
Pooran Chand also denied the violence inherent in Hindu nationalism. As he saw it, ‘Violence is not in 
the nature of Hindus. In fact it is not in our blood. Those are just one or two incidents, like Babri Masjid 
[demolition], or Mumbai riots and blast. It is some anti-social elements. These are one or two, they 
are not the norm. All this is not in the blood of Hindus.’ When I disagreed and argued that at the 
moment, Hindus seem very aggressive and fanatical, he justified this as a response to a history of the 
oppression of Hindus. 
‘This is because they [Hindus] have been oppressed. First by Mughals, then by Congress. 
Hindus have been oppressed and now they have risen up. Hindus are 88% in this country, but 
Congress has done nothing for Hindus. Earlier it was a government of the 12%.  
[Pause]  
During Partition, RSS had a major role. During Partition, RSS helped our people a lot. Saved us 
from attacks, fought back, gave food, found houses. These Congressi only talk. Now that 
Pranab Mukherjee [Former Indian President and influential Congress leader] has accepted the 
invitation of the RSS so they have made a ruckus over that. Arre bhai, at least listen to him, 
what he wants to say. They are not capable of giving sacrifices. When the 1962 war happened 
in the mountains [Himalayas], there our soldiers’ corpses were lying in the cold. Government 
could not retrieve their dead bodies. Even Indira Gandhi had refused96. Then 500 volunteers 
of RSS had gone and retrieved them. In fact it is not in their blood to give sacrifices. Only us, 
Hindus, can give sacrifices for the nation.’ 
It is unclear whom he specifically means when he says, ‘they are not capable of giving sacrifices.’ 
Coming right after his critique of the Congress, one would assume that the ‘they’ refers to the 
Congress. However, in his final sentence, he contrasts this ‘they’ with all Hindus, implying that the 
                                                            
96 This is a vexing reference (possibly even a slip of tongue) since Indira Gandhi only became Prime Minister in 
1966. It was her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, who was in power at the time of India’s 1962 war with China. 
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‘they’ includes not just the Congress but the ‘12%’ religious minorities (a reference to Muslims) whom 
he believes the Congress is representative of.  
However, despite his faith in the ‘activism’ of the RSS during the Partition, Pooran Chand’s view of the 
organisation as a whole was far more complex. In August 2018, towards the very end of my fieldwork, 
Pooran Chand gave me a copy of the RSS weekly magazine Panchjanya. This particular edition of the 
magazine contained some Partition survivor narratives, as it commemorated the 71st anniversary of 
India’s Partition and independence. ‘This has something about Partition. I thought this might help you. 
You can write about these in your study,’ he said as he handed me the magazine. He flipped through 
it, showing me some of the stories. He said that some of these were interesting but he hadn’t read 
them completely. And then, his voice dropped to a whisper as he added, ‘There is a man who comes 
here. He’s an RSS pracharak [member]. He gave it to me. This magazine is of the RSS. So it will have 
some of the RSS ideas but you can ignore them. Today’s RSS is not that organisation.’ 
When I asked him what he meant by that, he said that during the Partition, volunteers of the RSS had 
done real social service. ‘They gave Hindus batons! Before that Hindu homes did not have weapons.’ 
He clarified that in the Frontier some families had owned licensed arms for protection from tribal 
raiders but that largely people had no weapons. Pooran Chand stressed that back then, there was a 
need for the RSS. ‘[Back] Then Hindus needed protection. Muslims were committing many atrocities. 
This is a different time now. These days Muslims are not doing anything,’ he admitted.  He contrasted 
the RSS volunteers of old with their contemporaries. According to him the old volunteers were 
freedom fighters who were prepared to take blows on their body; were prepared to die for their 
country and community. By contrast, he saw the volunteers of today as fanatics and blamed them for 
indoctrinating Hindus and spreading hatred. ‘Now they only talk about Hindu-Muslim. Only spread 
hatred. They are turning Hindus into fanatics,’ he said.  
Critiques of the current dispensation were also voiced in other ways. For example, while discussing 
the death of celebrated left-wing journalist Kuldip Nayar in August 2018, Pooran Chand and some of 
his other friends in Rose Garden lamented the decline in the quality of Indian journalism. Despite being 
largely supportive of Modi and BJP, many of them joined in the chorus exclaiming, ‘These days all of 
them [journalists] are bought and sold.’ This critique was somewhat surprising considering that vast 
sections of the Indian media are quite visibly in bed with the BJP government. Pooran Chand 
contrasted the ‘friendly’ journalists of today with Kuldip Nayar’s courageous reportage during the 
Emergency of 1975-77. They remembered him as someone who was known for voicing the 
inconvenient truth.  
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However, my most enduring memory of Pooran Chand is of a conversation we had in February 2018. 
We were taking a half-round of the Rose Garden together when he unexpectedly remarked, ‘My life, 
to tell you the truth, there is a sadness. All this that happened, I had become a sadist [sic] then.’ 
Although he used the word sadist what he actually meant to say was sad or depressed. He explained 
that in the years immediately following the Partition, looking at how life was like here, he had become 
depressed. ‘I was just sad, never really laughed fully,’ he said. When I asked him whether it was the 
Partition that had caused this, he nodded and said, ‘One does get affected. Once that leaves an imprint 
it becomes difficult. After that I became a secluded, separatist [sic], silent-type, even now I don’t talk 
much. Even today I don’t speak a lot. So all these things, just gloomy type…’ He let those words hang 
momentarily. When I encouraged him to speak further, he added, ‘When someone’s smile is not 
natural, and you see that it is not natural, mine was just like that. I would see others and do the same 
but it was not the same. My mind got affected na.’ I had noticed his sombre disposition; I had seen his 
weak smiles and heard his half-hearted laughter. And even though he had bared his heart to me, none 
of that had fixed this sadness that he observed in himself. I do not think anything could. Some ruptures 
are beyond healing.   
My field notes tell me that the last time I met Pooran Chand was on August 25, 2018. Feeling a lump 
in my throat, I’d said something silly like, ‘You’re going to remember me a lot.’ I remember his voice 
cracking as he just told me to call him once in a while. I promised I would, but in the two years since, 




3.5. Healing, Victimhood and Revenge 
 
The ethnographic vignettes I have detailed above contain a number of nuances that problematize the 
core assumptions of the oral historical work I have critiqued previously in this chapter. As I have stated 
previously, some of the more recent oral historical work on the Partition appears to conflate Partition 
survivors’ nostalgia for their homeland with a refutation of islamophobia and bigotry. In the vignettes 
of both Gangaram and Pooran Chand, we see that their nostalgia for their birthplace sits beside their 
islamophobia and faith in majoritarian doctrines. This is most visible in Gangaram, whose frequent 
visits to Pakistan and warm relations with people in Mianwali sharply contrast his vitriolic outbursts in 
subsequent conversations. How might we then make sense of these narratives?  
One possible explanation for this might be found in James Scott’s (1990) idea of hidden transcripts. 
Scott understands all human behaviour as a series of carefully crafted performances; as a compilation 
of public and hidden transcripts. According to Scott, both those in power and their subordinates, 
perform public and hidden transcripts. In Scotts’ (ibid.: 2) reckoning, a public transcript is an, ‘open 
interaction between subordinates and those who dominate’. For the dominated, Scott sees hidden 
transcripts as an everyday form of resistance and an essential part of revolutions and insurrections. 
Hidden transcripts are not just ‘speech acts’ but also, ‘a whole range of practices’ (ibid.: 14). Scott 
(ibid.: 14) sees the border between the public and the hidden transcript as a ‘zone of struggle between 
dominant and subordinate,’ rather than a solid wall frozen in space and time. In that sense, the hidden 
transcript is not ‘secret’ per say, but is one that is performed among a ‘restricted public’; a carefully 
selected audience (ibid.: 14).    
There is some relevance of hidden transcripts to Gangaram’s story. After all, Gangaram’s contrasting 
perspectives could be seen as the oscillation from a public to a hidden transcript. We might regard his 
secular and reconciliatory posturing among his Pakistani friends as a public transcript that he enacts 
in contrast to the hidden transcript he revealed to me after we had become more familiar with each 
other. Thus, Gangaram’s islamophobic outbursts and text messages might be seen as a hidden 
transcript revealed to a ‘restricted public’ (ibid.: 14). This would partly explain why it took me some 
time to access that side of Gangaram.  
However, the application of hidden transcripts to this context is also problematic for a number of 
reasons. While Scott’s theory defines public and hidden transcripts as the result of unequal power 
relations, Gangaram’s relations with his friends in Pakistan cannot be understood through the 
reductively binary categories of ‘dominant’ and ‘subordinate’. By contrast, the examples Scott uses 
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for hidden transcripts in his work are defined by sharp power differentials; a clear distinction between 
those in power and their subordinates.  
Susan Gal (1995: 409) critiques Scott’s discussion of power by arguing that the categories he uses – 
that of ‘dominant’ and ‘subordinate’ – are broad generalisations. Moving from analyses of the 
narratives of slave masters and slaves in the US to British colonialists and their subjects in Burma, 
among others, Scott traverses the globe through space and time at a breakneck speed. The result is a 
detemporalised and decontextualised understanding of power. Scott does not pay sufficient attention 
to the particular contexts of the historical and ethnographic evidence he references (ibid.). After all, 
despite some fundamental similarities the power relations that organised slavery in the US were quite 
different from those that structured the administration of the British Empire. As Gal (ibid.: 409) argues, 
Scott’s description of power does not pay any attention to the, ‘important cultural differences 
between forms of power’. 
Furthermore, Gal critiques Scott’s description of public transcripts. The issue is two-fold. Firstly, Scott 
does not sufficiently define the term ‘public’. In reducing the idea of public to a question of one’s 
audience and thereby of a specific model of first-hand witnessing, Scott articulates a Western 
ideological construct that relies on the, ‘separation of language from a face-to-face situation’ (ibid.: 
417). Gal locates this ideological construct within the decontextualization of language through print. 
Scott’s uncritical use of ‘public’ evades any discussion of alternative publics. Gal argues that:  
‘Within the Western tradition, the broad notion of a public is a form of political legitimation 
in which the decontextualization and depersonalization of language produces the image of a 
social group uniquely fitted to govern because it is no-one-in-particular and thus can 
supposedly stand for everyone.’  
(ibid.: 418) 
Simultaneously, Gal (ibid.: 417) observes that if ‘public’ pertains only to the fact of having an audience, 
then hidden transcripts too must have their publics and with it, power imbalances and struggles within 
the ‘restricted publics’ of these subordinate groups. Scott pays no attention to this either, instead 
presenting dominant and subordinate groups as neatly juxtaposed megaliths.  
Secondly, and more importantly, Scott describes public transcripts as performances. As Gal argues, 
the view that one’s public transcript is a ‘performance’ implies that it is by definition unauthentic. She 
notes that in seeing acting as something that is ‘imposed’ on the weak – as a fact of their subordination 
– Scott implies belief in the idea of an ‘authentic self’ (ibid.: 411). This is problematic because it implies 
that this ‘authentic self’ is ‘betrayed’ (or shall we concealed) by performance (ibid.: 411).  
339 
 
By virtue of this, the dichotomy between hidden and public transcripts also involves an implicit 
heirarchisation of narratives. The hidden transcript is by definition considered the ‘truer’ transcript 
due to the very fact that it must be hidden. By contrast, the public transcripts (of both the 
subordinated and dominant) conceal their respective ‘authentic selves’ by acting out a script imposed 
on them by the fact of the inequality of their power relation. Therefore, if I were to argue that 
Gangaram and Pooran Chand’s islamophobia somehow comprises a hidden transcript, then, I would 
also be implying that their hatred for Muslims was a more ‘authentic’ emotion than their nostalgia for 
their birthplace.  
However, the ethnographic vignettes suggest that the truth is far more complex. Stories of the 
correspondence both men have maintained with their birthplace suggest that their yearning for their 
birthplace (their nostalgia) is as authentic an emotion as their islamophobia. In Gangaram’s case this 
is further complicated by the fact that he routinely defied his family and close friends in order to 
maintain this correspondence. Gal captures some of this complexity when she writes:   
‘More generally, the expression of contradictory opinions by a single speaker, in different 
contexts, is not necessarily evidence of dissembling or inauthenticity. […] But these 
contrasting stances cannot be classified as posed versus genuine; they are evidence of the 
coexistence of deeply felt yet contested discourses.’ 
(ibid.: 412-413) 
While Gal’s argument leaves the question of hypocrisy unanswered97, her larger argument, that the 
charge of inauthenticity against one or the other set of discourses involves a denial of specificity, still 
holds. The real challenge of ethnography here then is to understand how nostalgia and hatred coexist 
                                                            
97 Gal avoids any engagement with the possibility of contradicting discourses being a product of hypocrisy. This 
appears to be a glaring blind-spot in her critique. Here, Scott offers some clarity as his idea of hidden 
transcripts already accounts for hypocrisy as a product of power relations. Hypocrisy might be seen as a 
consequence of the acting that is ‘imposed’ on the weak, as a fact of their domination. For the powerful, 
hypocrisy is an inevitable consequence of the masks they must wear in public in the performance of their 
hegemony.  
Scott’s understanding of hypocrisy seems to be prevalent in the zeitgeist on all sides of the ideological 
spectrum. For example, in critiquing ‘liberal political correctness’ as hypocrisy, right-wing commentators 
(especially in the US and Europe) seem to implicitly articulate Scott’s ideas. Political correctness as hypocrisy 
presents it as an ‘inauthentic’ pandering to certain demographics and also a moral imposition on a majority 
seen to be held hostage by a so-called hegemonic minority. In India, the Hindu Right uses a similar argument to 
present ‘secularism’ as a hypocritical liberal ideology in pursuit of ‘minority appeasement’.    
Yet, despite Scott’s implicit presence in the zeitgeist, his work fails to explain hypocrisy in instances where 
power is not an obvious factor such as hypocritical speech or actions between friends. Here, perhaps de 
Certeau’s (1984) idea of ‘tactics’ might be more appropriate. Although de Certeau does not specifically 
theorise hypocrisy, a de Certeau-ian understanding of hypocrisy might see it as a tactical appropriation of 
discourse in pursuit of one’s self-interest.    
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in the lives of Partition survivors. These are not contradictory discourses as much as they are 
articulations of the struggle for the reconciliation of the past with the present; the search for healing. 
As I have argued in this chapter, Partition oral history presents ‘speaking out’ – that is, remembering 
the Partition – as a singularly healing act. However, for survivors of the Partition, the act of 
remembrance does not serve as an end in itself. For its survivors, remembering the Partition is part of 
the articulation for their demand for justice; for revenge. Ultimately, to engage with the full 
complexity of Partition survivor narratives is to confront the terrifying possibility that revenge might 
be the only ‘healing’ they desire.  
We see this expressed in similar shades in the narratives of Gangaram and Pooran Chand. For example, 
Gangaram laments the Partition and its violence, celebrates his links with the people of Mianwali but 
still expresses frustration at the fact that a number of Muslims were ‘left behind’ in India. The latter 
also complicates his feelings about the Partition, making him simultaneously express faith in the 
biopolitical logic of Partition and the Two Nation Theory. As a result, Gangaram opposes the Partition 
when talking about his friends in Pakistan but supports it while talking about Muslims in India. We see 
a similar struggle play out in Pooran Chand’s testimony when he details the efforts he made to keep 
in touch with Bannu, through literature. Although he recognises the deep psychological imprint that 
the violence of the Partition has left on him, he is still cynically supportive of the current majoritarian 
dispensation. While he acknowledges the violence of Hindu nationalism (beef lynchings, the 
demolition of the Babri Masjid and radicalisation of Hindus by the RSS) in spades, he nevertheless sees 
Modi’s rise to power as an ‘awakening’. He recognises Modi’s government as an enabler of sectarian 
violence, yet he feels that history necessitates this majoritarian mobilisation. So what is it that they 
ultimately yearn for?  
During her fieldwork on the Partition, Nonica Datta (2017) noted a similar contrast in the discourses 
of the celebrated Punjabi poet Amrita Pritam. As stated in the Introduction, Amrita Pritam too was a 
survivor of the Partition. The horrific sectarian violence that engulfed Lahore forced her to relocate to 
Faridabad in 1947. Datta’s work records Pritam’s memories of isolation and helplessness as she 
struggled to find her feet in the newly independent nation, amid the rubble of the Partition. Datta is 
particularly drawn to the way Pritam describes India’s independence as a tragedy:   
‘For Amrita, “this takseem (division) happened on very maslui (weak) foundation”. As she says 
repeatedly that when she heard of Partition, she thought it was a temporary madness. She 
did not think that it would continue. It was a storm of hatred, which was not properly 
managed, she said. “It too shall pass. It cannot last for long. We will return. Later, all hell broke 
loose”. The questioning of freedom in 1947 continues: “What kind of azadi [freedom] and at 
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what cost are we gaining?” The dilemma remains, “If Partition had happened on religious 
grounds, then why did so many people remain in Hindustan […]? More than half the Muslims 
are here. On what basis was it done?” She also points out that “ironically, Hindus could not 
stay there [Pakistan], and here [India] Muslims could remain. There is democracy here. It was 
very difficult”.’ 
(ibid.: 75) 
What is striking here is that Amrita Pritam – a secular, feminist writer – also wonders why India was 
left with a large population of Muslims while Hindus and Sikhs were almost entirely ethnically cleansed 
from Pakistan. Yet, she also laments her own displacement from Lahore and is similarly mournful of 
the relationships the Partition interrupted. Pritam’s discourses are similar to Gangaram’s and Pooran 
Chand’s who, in their respective vignettes, similarly wonder why so many Muslims were ‘left behind’ 
after the Partition.  
This discourse constructs India’s Muslim population as some kind of ‘human excess’ left behind by the 
Partition. All three speakers, in different ways identify ‘democracy’ and ‘secularism’ as the reasons for 
this. This is brought out starkly in Amrita Pritam’s quote above when she says that, ‘Hindus could not 
stay there [Pakistan], and here [India] Muslims could remain. There is democracy here. It was very 
difficult’ (ibid.: 75). The lamentation here is against a perceived inequality of suffering; that ‘we’ 
suffered more than ‘them’. In having retained some of its Muslim population, India – because of its 
‘democracy’ – is seen as the loser of the Partition. The presence of this ‘proximate enemy’ also 
symbolises the Partition’s unfinished nature. In other contexts, this inequality of suffering is also often 
cited as proof of the ‘peace-loving’ and ‘weak’ nature of Hindus. To its speakers, the issue here is not 
violence per se, but the inequality of death, suffering and misfortune.  
Such discourses grapple with the unfairness of the distribution of misfortune as much as they struggle 
with the left-over debris of nation-building. This unresolved history demands resolution not merely 
through a form of theodicy but also through ‘justice’; reparations and revenge. That is, opposing the 
Partition while speaking of the intimate but simultaneously espousing the logic of the Partition when 
confronted with the larger themes of politics and history, they show a yearning for reconciliation and 
healing. This is one interpretation I offer. That is, this discourse is a conflicted articulation but an 
authentic yearning for reconciliation nevertheless. I use the word reconciliation here to refer to the 
hope for an end to an unfinished history, a resolution; whatever that end might be.  
It is this that makes Gangaram’s call for the complete ethnic cleansing of Muslims from India seem like 
the completion of a process. He aspires to genocide because to him it appears like the resolution to 
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an unfinished history. This is not to argue that the aspiration to resolution makes this any less of a 
genocide, but that to him and my other informants, the complete ethnic cleansing of Muslims did not 
appear to be an act of unprovoked mass-murder. It was rather the necessary resolution of an 
unfinished history; and the turn to Hindu fascism, the very first step of the ‘awakening’. Genocide is 
not purely murder here, it is justice.   
There is, however, a second interpretation I offer, in this regard. In the way that my informants’ 
nostalgia for their abandoned homeland goes beside their desire for revenge (their ressentiment), 
there is also the confluence of two different strains of nostalgia: restorative nostalgia and reflective 
nostalgia. Here, their reflective nostalgia – one that prompts reflection on feelings of loss (Boym, 2001: 
41) – meets the internalised restorative nostalgia of Hindu nationalism. Where the former is evocative 
of the wounds of the past, the latter posits the ‘restoration’ of the ancient glory of Hinduism – as 
enshrined in the idea of the Hindu Rashtra (nation-state) – as just reparations for this loss. In 
diagnosing the reflective nostalgia of Partition survivors as evidence of the lack of hatred, Partition 
oral history misses the forest for the trees. That is, this nostalgia for the intimate is itself folded within 
a larger nationalist, restorative nostalgia that posits genocide and fascism as the remedy to a 
historically conceived victimhood. 
Genocide and fascism as justice – as the revenge of the non-violent Hindu – also follows the logic of 
karma. It lists a laundry list of historical injustices by Muslims – of which the Partition is merely the 
latest – to establish their guilt. Having established guilt, it articulates the logic of like begets like, of 
what goes around comes around to vow to do to them what was allegedly previously done to Hindus. 
This formulation mobilises a karmic theodicy of violence. This ‘action-reaction’ thesis – albeit one that 
casts a long eye over history – weaponises the theodicy of karma to sanction violence against the 
Other. Ultimately, mobilising memories of the violence of Muslims during the Partition, this discourse 
justifies the violent Hindu nationalism of today; a violence whose victims are seen as having deserved 
their fate. 
This theodicy of violence is rendered meaningful by the articulation of a historically conceived 
victimhood. Remembrance, in this context, is not purely an act of ‘healing’ as imagined by the 
practitioners of Partition oral history. Rather, history is remembered strategically. The history of the 
Partition (and beyond) is remembered to establish their own status (and that of all Hindus) as the 
eternal victims of history. It is against this victimhood – this feeling of having been wronged – that 
they articulate the demand for justice through the discourses of Hindu nationalism. The justice they 
seek is that of revenge; an eye for an eye. Healing, as it is implicitly aspired to in this context, is not 
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the kind of reconciliatory forgiveness that is imagined by Partition oral history. Rather, the healing 
aspired to by Partition survivors is an expression of the primal desire for blood in exchange for blood.  
Victimhood forms an important part of this discourse and it is therefore important to deconstruct it 
in some detail. Previously in this chapter I have stated that the uncritical use of the word trauma 
flattens the field of victimhood. By treating all survivors of the Partition as innocent traumatised 
victims, it thereby perpetuates an implicit denial of the violence of one’s own collective. I return to a 
discussion of victimhood here to elucidate its larger moral and political claims.  
Building on the work of Nietzsche, Robert Horwitz (2018) argues that the claim to group victimhood is 
located in the feeling of ressentiment. As I argued in the Introduction and in Section 2.1, ressentiment 
refers to thinly veiled feelings of unsatisfiable jealousy and hatred. Nietzsche theorised ressentiment 
as the way in which a ‘sufferer’ searches for a cause for their suffering (Olick, 2007). This basic idea is 
expressed through Weber’s (1965: 110) understanding of ressentiment as a form of ‘theodicy of the 
disprivileged’ (also see Olick, 2007: 157). Ressentiment is therefore hatred with a moral content, 
triggered by jealousy and anger at the fact of one’s own dispossession. However, ressentiment is not 
just empty anger. It is a hatred that is specifically directed at the thing (person, process, organisation, 
etc) that is held responsible for one’s misfortune/failing.   
In Section 2.4, I have previously mentioned the ressentiment visible in my informants’ discourses on 
Independence. This was starkly visible in the way that my informants’ asked what, if anything, they 
had received from India in lieu of the ‘sacrifices’ they had made during the Partition. While some, like 
Bhanwarilal and my granduncle Om Prakash, visualised reparations in material terms, for others like 
Jogesh and Kishore, reparations involved, at the very least, being granted the symbolic status of 
‘freedom fighters’. Yet, all of these demands for reparations were articulated alongside a deeply felt 
jealousy of those whom the Partition did not displace: north India’s Hindus and Muslims. We see a 
similar expression of ressentiment in Amrita Pritam, Gangaram and Pooran Chand’s discourses above 
as their remarks on India’s Muslims are partly located in feelings of jealousy. Their anger at the 
perceived inequality of suffering is also a jealousy of the latter’s perceived lack of suffering.  
Robert Horwitz (2018: 554) notes that, ‘victimised groups stand not simply for their own wounds and 
innocence, but for something larger […] the mission to secure fundamental justice, or some other 
grand calling.’ In his discussion of victimhood, Horwitz draws a distinction between the kind of group 
victimhood that characterises the American far-right and a state-centred or national victimhood like 
that of Nazi Germany in the inter-war period. He argues that most nineteenth and twentieth-century 
victimhood centred around the nation-state draws on the sacrifice of soldiers. Soldiers are seen as 
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victims on behalf of the nation, and their sacrifices are considered redemptive both for themselves 
and for the nation. 
I find this distinction between group and state victimhood irrelevant in the Indian context as the group 
victimhood of my informants collapses into a national victimhood by virtue of the fact that to them, 
their group is the nation. The additional fact of the Hindu nationalist capture of the Indian government 
furthers erases the distinction between the Indian state and the Hindu collective. Victimhood, in this 
context, springs from the soldiers and freedom fighters who died in service of the nation, as well as 
co-religionists who have been killed in acts of ‘Muslim aggression’ during the Partition, and beyond. 
Victimhood, therefore, springs from anyone who is seen to have died in defence of or due to their 
membership of the Hindu nation.  
We see a clear example of this in Pooran Chand’s comment in Section 3.4 where he moves from calling 
Mughals and the Congress party oppressors of Hindus, to extolling the RSS’ ‘sacrifices’ during the 
Partition, to the Congress’ alleged inability to retrieve the dead bodies of Indian soldiers who died in 
the 1962 war with China. Pooran Chand finishes this by saying that, ‘In fact it is not in their 
[Muslims/Congress] blood to give sacrifices. Only us, Hindus, can give sacrifices for the nation.’ In 
doing so, Pooran Chand establishes a clear genealogy of sacrifice stretching from medieval times to 
the Partition (including the ‘sacrifices’ of the RSS volunteers), to the dead soldiers of 1962; all the while 
presenting the ‘minority-appeasing’, liberal elite of the Congress as traitors to the Hindu nation. Here 
it is also relevant to recall my discussion in Chapter 2, of the sacrifice and martyrdom bestowed on the 
dead of the Partition as a form of theodicy in service of the Hindu nation. Memories (real and 
imagined) of the ‘sacrifices’ of kith, kin and co-religionists during the Partition motivate this feeling of 
Hindu victimhood, demanding revenge as justice. Thus, hatred and the aspiration for genocide are 
presented as a mission in pursuit of a fundamental justice.  
Horwitz identifies suffering and the ressentiment that springs from it, as central to the way hatred is 
presented as an appeal for justice and a claim to moral goodness. He writes:  
‘Suffering became constitutive of self-understanding and produced a moral code validating 
hatred of the evil enemies who caused the suffering. […] The resentful are no longer actors 
per se; rather they are defined passively by their victimhood. They become active only in their 
hatred of their purported oppressors. Their hatred is the mark of their moral goodness. […] 




Ressentiment also manifests itself in the feeling of having been oppressed and marginalised, in the 
everyday affairs of the nation-state. It is articulated in the view that ‘unworthy others’ might be 
‘unjustly favoured’ over the ‘deserving’ members of one’s community (ibid.: 555). The latter along 
with the trenchant individualism of neoliberalism also motivates a critique of affirmative action and 
similar policies of positive discrimination aimed at addressing systemic inequality. Affirmative action, 
in this context, is understood as a, ‘cynical use of government’ by the ‘other’; as a, ‘triumph of 
illegitimate clientelist politics’ (ibid.: 564). It is seen as the product of a self-serving alliance between 
minorities and liberal elites or ‘minority-appeasement’. As Horwitz elaborates:   
‘Policies designed to address systemic privilege are perceived as engaging in unwarranted 
entitlement that violates the traditional presumed ethic of individual merit, hard work and 
color-blindness. The critique of victimhood shifts the debate from the structures of power that 
inscribe inequality to the question of personal character.’  
(ibid.: 565) 
Here, it is relevant to recall my discussion of my informants’ discourses around hard work in the 
immediate aftermath of the Partition, in Chapter 2. My informants were always careful to emphasise 
that they were ‘hard-workers’ rather than ‘refugees’. While my informants sanctified their hard work 
as a national sacrifice, this discourse was also a karmic justification of their middle-class, upper-caste 
Hindu privilege.  
Using stories of hard work while underplaying the role of the state’s welfare schemes in the 
rehabilitation of Partition refugees, my informants would profess the supposedly uniquely resilient 
character of the Punjabi community. In the process, they also sought to legitimise the fortune of their 
privilege. Such narratives would be interspersed with claims of the inherent backwardness of lower-
caste Hindu communities (such as Dalits, OBC and SC) and Muslims. Such discussions would move the 
debate from the structural inequalities perpetuated by the caste system to a victim-blaming discourse 
that would attribute the generational poverty of these communities to their lack of street-smartness 
and hard work: purusharth. We observed a clear example of this in Rajaram’s sexist and classist 
observations in Section 2.5. Rajaram alleged an inherent ‘backwardness’ in a community of slum-
dwelling Assamese/Bangladeshi Muslims by pointing to the fact that ‘their women’ collected and 
traded scrap paper for a living.    
In the electoral realm, this feeling of ressentiment is articulated through the perception that the 
Congress party is a party of the Muslims. As stated previously in the Introduction, the feeling that the 
post-Independent Indian state has been captured by minorities and ‘minority-appeasing’ liberal elites 
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and, is wielded against the ‘meek’ Hindu majority, forms a major part of Hindu nationalist discourses 
(van der Veer, 1994). During my fieldwork, remarks that the last 60 years of Congress-led rule was the 
‘Raj of Muslims’ were routine. This political victimhood that ressentiment perpetuates then presents 
Hindu fascism as a necessary ‘awakening’. Therefore, when framed against a sense of historical 
victimhood, Hindu nationalism acquires an emancipatory façade; promising liberation from liberal 
elites and treacherous minorities. To its supporters, the goal of an ethnically pure Hindu nation seems 
like a project of justice.  
What I have identified as ressentiment here has been partially described by Arjun Appadurai (2017) as 
‘democracy fatigue’. Appadurai theorises democracy fatigue as a syndrome where democracy itself is 
seen as holding the nation back; as antithetical to national progress. A classic example of this discourse 
was on display recently in the words of the NITI Aayog CEO Amitabh Kant. On December 8, Speaking 
at an event hosted by the right-wing publication Swarajya magazine, the government think-tank CEO 
declared, ‘Tough reforms are very difficult in the Indian context, we have too much of democracy... 
You needed political will to carry out these reforms (mining, coal, labour, agriculture) and many more 
reforms still need to be done’ (The Hindu, 2020). Contemporaneous with the escalating farmer 
protests across the country – organised in response to neoliberal agricultural ‘reforms’ – Amitabh 
Kant’s comments seemed particularly tone-deaf. However, his words express the ethos of democracy 
fatigue in a refreshingly honest manner.  
As previously stated, in the context of the memories of the Partition, democracy fatigue manifests 
itself in the sentiment that India’s unfinished Partition – due to the presence of Muslims – is a failure 
caused by democracy. Consequently, Hindu nationalism’s aspiration for an ‘end’ to this ‘unfinished’ 
Partition necessitates the elimination of minorities and the ‘democracy’ that is seen to protect them. 
In this way, the ‘fascism of the streets’ and of high-office (Appadurai, 2019) combine to fulfil the desire 
for justice: for genocide and fascism. Thus, by removing all physical and material trace of its proximate 







Krishna Sobti once famously said that, ‘Partition was difficult to forget but dangerous to remember’ 
(Sobti quoted in Butalia, 2000: 283). To paraphrase Shakespeare, the dilemma at hand is that of: to 
remember or not to remember. In this chapter, I too have grappled with this dilemma. While on the 
one hand, the suffering of the Partition makes it necessary to remember, the ressentiment of Partition 
survivors and religious nationalism makes it dangerous to do so. As I have shown repeatedly in this 
dissertation, memories of the Partition feed into Hindu nationalist discourses inspiring the turn to 
retributive genocide and Hindu fascism as ‘justice’ for the injustices of the past. Urvashi Butalia (ibid.) 
too grapples with this dilemma in her work. In reference to Krishna Sobti’s aforementioned comment, 
Butalia writes: 
‘But does this mean then that we must not remember it? Over the years, despite many 
uncertainties, I have become increasingly convinced that while it may be dangerous to 
remember, it is also essential to do so – not only so that we can come to terms with it, but 
also because unlocking memory and remembering is an essential part of beginning the 
process of resolving, perhaps even of forgetting.’ 
(ibid.: 283) 
I agree with Butalia on the need to remember. However, the larger question this raises is how we 
might go about remembering the Partition. On the one hand Butalia thoughtfully acknowledges the 
fact that to the Hindu nationalist gaze, memories of the Partition serve as ‘proof’ of the allegedly 
inherent brutality of Muslims. Butalia notes that the RSS took up the issue of ‘Hindu honour’ with 
gusto even in the 1940s. For example, in the December 29, 1949 issue of its magazine, The Organiser, 
the RSS compared the rape and abduction of Hindu and Sikh women during the Partition to Alauddin 
Khilji’s thirteenth-century sacking of Chittor. The article entitled, ‘Pakistan the Sinner: 25,000 
Abducted, Thousands Sold,’ ran as follows:  
‘For the honour of Sita, Sri Ram warred against and destroyed Ravana, when filthy Khilji 
besieged Chitoor [sic] its thousands of women headed by Rani Padmini all clad in gerua 
[saffron] saris, mounted the funeral pyre smiling ere the mleccha [impure] could pollute a 
drop of the noble Hindu blood. Today, when tens of hundreds of Hindu women are spending 
sorrowful days and nights in Pakistan, the first free government of the Union of Indian 
Sovereign Democratic Republic has nothing but a whimper.’ 
(The Organiser quoted in ibid.: 145) 
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Butalia (ibid.: 145) notes that such commentary on the rape and abduction of Hindu and Sikh women 
by Muslim men was part of The Organiser’s regular reportage and, formed the backdrop against which 
accusations that Pakistan was a ‘barbaric’, ‘uncivilised’ and ‘lustful’ nation were raised. Furthermore, 
the violence of the Partition is seen as a continuation of Khilji’s ‘Muslim invasion’. As stated previously, 
accessing such historical and cultural narratives of victimhood and sacrifice forms an important part 
of the discourse of sacrifice as a form of theodicy.  
Panchajanya, the RSS mouthpiece that Pooran Chand brought to my attention towards the end of my 
fieldwork, continued this discourse. The magazine’s August 19, 2018 edition built on this discourse of 
Hindu victimhood to remember stories of the Partition as the RSS’ finest hour. The headlines of the 
oral historical vignettes in this edition ranged from ‘Had the Sangh [RSS] not been there, we would 
not have crossed the border’ (Bhargava, 2018), ‘The swayamsevaks [RSS volunteers/cadre] were filled 
with endless courage’ (Mishra, 2018a), ‘The swayamsevaks stood their ground in every situation’ 
(Mishra, 2018b), ‘We are indebted to the Sangh that the people of our village survived’ (Kumar, 
2018a), ‘We found stability in our lives due to the help of the swayamsevaks’ (Kumar, 2018b), ‘Muslims 
crossed all limits of barbarity’ (Mishra, 2018c), ‘Hindus would not have survived without the Sangh’ 
(Mishra, 2018d) and, ‘The swayamsevaks supported the army’ (Mishra, 2018e). These headlines and 
stories clearly present the Partition as the RSS’ golden hour of service to the (Hindu) nation. 
For Butalia, the solution to this dilemma lay in editing out the hate speech of her informants whilst 
acknowledging the violence and bigotry of the Indian state and ethnonationalist organisations. In the 
late 1990s, this seemed a workable comprise. It allowed survivors the space to remember, mourn and 
even vent, whilst drawing attention to some of the ways in which the violence of the Partition was 
embedded within political and cultural crosscurrents. Other oral history projects, including the The 
1947 Partition Archive, have followed Butalia’s lead in this.  
But, much has changed since the 1990s. A generation since Butalia (2000) and Menon and Bhasin’s 
(1998) pioneering work, the spectre of Hindu fascism dominates India’s politics and institutions in a 
way it never has at any other point in Indian history. This radical transformation of the very character 
of the Indian republic necessitates a radical rethinking of the task of (oral) history-writing.  
Editing out hate speech – no matter how vitriolic and problematic – in the current context risks 
remembering the Partition purely through the rose-tinted glasses of nostalgia. Such heavily 
editorialised narratives fail to tell the ‘true’ stories of the survivors they quote. I suspect that the latter 
furthers the (res-)sentiment among many survivors that their history has remained untold; that the 
‘true story’ of the Partition still remains unheard and unspoken. That is, that the Partition remains a 
‘suppressed’ and ‘repressed’ history. This is also politically problematic for it distracts attention from 
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the Partition’s silent, enabling presence in the mass support enjoyed by the BJP. In this time of Hindu 
fascism, remembering the Partition must entail confronting the Hindu nationalism of Partition 
survivors.  
There is a strange entangling of temporality in Hindu nationalism’s use of the Partition. While I have 
drawn attention to the polytemporality within Hindu nationalism’s discourse on history previously in 
Section 1.3, I wish to illuminate a slightly different strand here. Hindu nationalism’s aspiration for a 
violent ‘end’ to the ‘unfinished’ business of 1947, weirdly imagines a future that is the past. 
Consequently, the suffering of the past, the Partition, ominously looms over us portending our future 
– of the suffering that awaits our society should the Hindu nationalist project run its course. In this 
strange liminal present where the future that is aspired to is the past, and the past an ominous 
foretelling of our future, it becomes imperative to expose those cultural and political processes – the 
discourse of individuals as well as organisations and institutions – that threaten to take us both 
forwards and backwards to 1947. Therefore, to reiterate, the looming spectre of fascism makes it an 
ethical imperative to expose the violence and fascism in our midst – in our homes and social circles – 
and to see these in concert with the ‘fascism of the streets’ (Appadurai, 2019) and of high-office.    
Under the Modi regime, the Hindu nationalist reading of the history of the Partition has been 
acknowledged through subtle winks and nods, in Parliamentary proceedings. In July 2018, while 
defending his ruling coalition against a No-Confidence Motion pushed by the Congress party, Prime 
Minister Modi made a vexing reference to the Partition of India (Hindustan Times, 2018). He countered 
the Congress’ allegations against the misrule of his own government by pointing to the Congress’ 
history of misrule (ibid.). Modi equated the Congress’ 2014 decision to bifurcate the state of Andhra 
Pradesh to the Partition of India. Modi said:  
‘This is not the new for you. You divided India-Pakistan during independence. Today also we 
are facing problems. You have divided Andhra Pradesh also like this. If you had taken them 
into confidence, these problems would not have happened. But you thought nothing about 
this.’ 
(Narendra Modi quoted in ibid.) 
Meanwhile, the BJP has sought to present its unconstitutional actions in Jammu and Kashmir as the 
‘unshackling’ of the state from ‘vested interest groups’ (The Hindu, 2019a). In Parliament, BJP leaders 
Amit Shah, Jitendra Singh (Minister of State) and Jugal Kishore Sharma (MP representing the 
constituency of Jammu) blamed the de facto 1948 Partition of Jammu and Kashmir on Nehru (Vincent, 
2019). Invoking the bogeys of ‘corruption’, ‘nepotism’ and ‘Partition’, the BJP has presented its Hindu 
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nationalist project in the Valley as one of ‘development’ and ‘liberation’. The discourse was set by 
Prime Minister Modi who in a series of tweets, celebrated the passage of Jammu and Kashmir 
Reorganisation Act 2019, along with constitutional amendments to Articles 370 and 35A98, as a 
‘momentous occasion’ that promised a ‘new dawn’ and a ‘better tomorrow’ as the people of the state 
had been finally freed from the ‘shackles’ of ‘vested interest groups’ (The Hindu, 2019a). 
Meanwhile, on July 11, 2019, the RSS and BJP organised a rally on the subject of ‘overpopulation’ 
which was attended by the Union Minister Giriraj Singh (ThePrint, 2019). Speakers at the rally warned 
of the ‘overpopulation’ of Muslims and talked about how this was part of a conspiracy to ‘capture’ 
and ‘Islamise’ India (Matra, 2019a, 2019b). They also warned that as the population of Muslims rises, 
they will demand a ‘second Partition’ of India (ThePrint, 2019).  
Therefore, all through their six years in government, the BJP has consistently used the power of high 
office to acknowledge the Hindu Right’s understanding of the Partition. My point in recounting these 
Parliamentary proceedings and supplementary discourses, is to show how the history and memory of 
the Partition has been consistently co-opted in pursuit of a fascist agenda. Irrespective of Partition 
oral history’s censorship of hate speech in its archives, memories of the Partition continue to inspire 
a fresh cycle of (‘retributive’) genocidal violence. All that oral history’s censorship accomplishes is an 
ignorance of how these memories inspire contemporary majoritarian mobilisations.   
All through my fieldwork, I was constantly nagged by the thought that I might in fact be aiding and 
abetting the ideological grassroots work of Hindu nationalism. Through this discussion, I do not mean 
to imply that we must stop studying violence, or that as academics, we should stop studying histories 
that the far-right targets with its disinformation campaigns. However, a possible answer might lie in 
paying more attention to the kinds of people whose stories we choose to tell. The Partition survivors 
that I interviewed, and that most oral historians seem to interview, are mainly upper-caste, middle-
class Hindus. If the telling of their narratives seems to reify a regime of truth, then that has a lot to do 
with who they are. As upper-caste, middle-class Hindus, these Partition survivors are part of the state’s 
ideal citizenry and so it should be no surprise that their narratives pose little challenge to the prevailing 
regime. Perhaps this is our cue to pay more attention to the Partition narratives of those who are not 
as privileged, such as the working-class, Dalits or Adivasis, for example.  
                                                            
98 The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019 bifurcates the state of Jammu and Kashmir into the twin 
Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh (India Today, 2019a). Meanwhile the constitutional 




While, at the age of 27, this realisation comes fairly early to me, it nevertheless comes too late for the 
study of the Partition. With the passage of time, Partition oral history will become an impossibility. 
The last generation of Partition survivors is dying and by the middle of this decade, almost all of them 
will have passed on. The imprint of death is already visible on recent oral histories of the Partition, 
such as Aanchal Malhotra’s (2017) work on ‘material memory’. As the memory of survivors is 
consumed by the mists of time, we begin to interrogate inanimate objects for the stories they might 
tell. Yet, even in this one finds the imprint of caste and class. What stories shall we tell of those whose 
life was their sole material possession, in this journey?  
As I have stated previously, Partition oral history’s hitherto lack of attention to all this reveals an 
inherent methodological weakness. Due to the fact that most oral history is based on one-off life-
history interviews, oral historians are not embedded long enough in the lives of their informants to be 
able to observe many of these specific entanglements between politics and memory. My experience 
with my informants – especially Bhagwanti, Bhanwarilal, Falguni, Gangaram, Pooran Chand and 
Rajaram – underscores the need for participant observation in this context. My patient, persistent 
presence in their everyday lives allowed me an insight into the specificity of their memories of the 
Partition. One-off interviews simply cannot achieve this. What is needed therefore is less oral history 
and more ethnography; but specifically, ethnography that draws on participant observation and is 
reflexively critical of the epistemology of memory. 
What does it mean then to remember the Partition in a time of fascism? It means that we remember 
the Partition as a portent or warning of the future that awaits us. It means understanding nationalism’s 
rationalisation of violence through its call to absolute conformity and homogeneity. It means 
observing the role of a fascist ideology as a form of theodicy of death and suffering. It means 
interrupting these established theodicical understandings of ‘sacrifice’ and ‘martyrdom’. It means 
deconstructing ideas of national community implicit in narratives of violence. But most of all, 
remembering the Partition in the time of fascism means recognising that what my ancestors suffered 
in the past is what religious, caste and class minorities are suffering in India today. Rather than ignore 
the fascism that thrives on the victimhood of the Partition, we must use these memories to express 
solidarity towards those being similarly oppressed today.  
Perhaps in drawing this lesson from the Partition we might finally move closer to forgetting it. By 
forgetting, I do not mean forgetting the Partition itself but perhaps, moving past the impassioned 
ethnonationalism it feeds. However, this appears highly unlikely at the moment. But, if we must 
continue to remember the Partition in the 2020s, let us do so as part of an actively anti-fascist politics; 
one that expresses solidarity towards all such victims of genocidal and structural violence. 
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Conclusion: Field Notes on Global Authoritarianism 
 
Victimhood, Ressentiment and the Crisis of Meaning 
In this dissertation I have compiled an ethnography of the memory of the 1947 Partition of India. 
Spending large amounts of time with the last generation of Partition survivors, I have sought to 
document the interpretive frameworks they use to make sense of the suffering of the Partition. I have 
argued that my informants use Hindu nationalism as a form of theodicy to rationalise the Partition’s 
death and suffering. For my informants, the suffering of the Partition was made meaningful through 
recourse to a historically conceived narrative of victimhood and martyrdom. This narrative imagines 
the Partition as the continuation of a thousand-year long history of ‘Muslim aggression’ on ‘passive’, 
‘tolerant’ and ‘peaceful’ (Hindu) India.  
The progression of this narrative is intimately connected to the idea of transcendence. Hindu 
nationalism as a form of theodicy provides transcendence in multiple ways. Like most nationalist 
ideologies, Hindu nationalism transcends individual and group differences whilst infusing the 
quotidian life and concerns of the nation with the predestination-like ‘truths’ of national identity and 
national character (Herzfeld, 1992). Hindu nationalism’s historically conceived victimhood – along 
with its internalised orientalist conception of the ‘Aryan origins’ of Indian civilisation (Goodrick-Clarke, 
2000; Thapar, 1996; van der Veer, 1994) – provide the racial, cultural and historical mould within 
which the Hindu nation is conceived. The Hindus as a ‘natural’, ‘eternal’ nation take shape in the 
victimised shadow of an imagined endless cycle of ‘Muslim invasions’ and (British) colonialism. 
Consequently, in the context of the Partition, Hindu nationalism additionally provides transcendence 
by consecrating the death and suffering of the Partition as a ‘sacrifice’ to the Hindu nation (see Chapter 
2). Interpreting the death and suffering of kith, kin and co-religionists as ‘martyrdom’ and a ‘sacrifice’ 
to the nation, Hindu nationalism transcends the ‘uselessness’ of their suffering. As a form of theodicy, 
Hindu nationalism reimagines such ‘useless’ suffering (Levinas, 1988) and ‘bad’ death (Seremetakis, 
1991) as suffering for the nation, rather than as ambiguous futile suffering on the way to the nation.  
Hindu nationalism’s conception of a historical victimhood also evokes ressentiment. The feeling of 
ressentiment refers to a self-righteous outrage that springs from feelings of jealousy, resentment and 
anger (see Introduction, Section 2.1 and Section 3.5). Ressentiment has been described variously as 
hatred with a moral content (Horwitz, 2018) and as a form of ‘theodicy of the disprivileged’ (Weber, 
1965: 110). Building on a perceived historical victimhood – one that is both constitutive and 
characteristic of the Hindu nation, Hindu nationalist discourses on the Partition articulate the demand 
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for material (see Chapter 2) and symbolic reparations (see Chapter 3). Ressentiment, in this context, 
disguises the violence of Hindu nationalism as ‘self-defence’, ‘retribution’ and, ultimately ‘justice’. 
In remembering the Partition through the voices of its first-hand survivors, I have paid particular 
attention to the politics of memory. It is this recognition of the role of my informants’ ressentiment in 
legitimising the past and present violence of Hindu nationalism that I have attempted to problematize 
the purported therapeutic qualities of ‘speaking out’ or remembrance (see Chapter 3). Moving away 
from narcissistic celebrations of Partition oral history as ‘healing’, I have drawn on the work of 
Feldman (1997), Misri (2014), Pandey (2001) and Das, (2007) to elucidate how violence – through its 
performance and memory – creates and maintains the boundaries of national community. Analysing 
the memory of my informants as a malleable, mediated construct (Connerton, 1989; Halbwachs, 
1992), I have shown how specific memories of the Partition and its violence delineate the boundaries 
of national community (Pandey, 2001).  
This is visible, for example, in my informants’ retrospective imagination of Sikhs and Muslims as the 
main combatants and provocateurs of violence as well as in the description of the violence of their 
own collectivity purely as acts of ‘self-defence’ (see Chapter 3). The remembrance of the honour 
killings of women relatives and co-religionists as not violence but as ‘sacrifice’ and ‘martyrdom’ 
(Butalia, 2000, Menon and Bhasin, 1998; Misri, 2014), similarly demarcates the boundaries of national 
community. As Pandey (2001: 188) has argued, ‘Violence happens – and can only happen – at the 
boundaries of community. It marks those boundaries.’ Memories of violence thus embody implicit 
understandings of community in the way that they characterise as ‘violence’ those events that appear 
to happen to or are located outside an assumed essentialised conception of one’s ‘natural’ community 
(ibid.).  
Thus, remembering the Partition involves a persistent dialogue with the racial and ethnic borders of 
the post-Partition nation-state. It is this that I have drawn attention to by asking what it means to 
remember the Partition in the time of fascism. This question not only observes the centrality of the 
Partition’s memory within the politics of Hindu nationalism, but also the reimagination of the past in 
India’s Hindu fascist present. It expresses the specificity of the entanglement of a past that is 
reinterpreted and made politically relevant by the present and, a present regime that is legitimised by 
a victimhood and ressentiment drawn from the past (Connerton, 1989). Ultimately in this ethnography 
of the Partition, I have used hermeneutic political anthropology to contextualise politics within the 
cultural crosscurrents from which they originate and that gives them meaning to the public. 
In concluding this dissertation I want to return to my discussion of victimhood and ressentiment to 
delineate its relevance to the global rise of authoritarianism. Underlying the emergence of the latter 
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is a persistent crisis of meaning that is characteristic of what has become known as ‘the Post-Truth 
era’ (Mair, 2017). Understanding this necessitates a brief detour through nineteenth and twentieth-
century German political theory.  
Examining the works of Frederick Nietzsche, Max Weber, Max Scheler and Hannah Arendt, Jeffrey 
Olick (2007) observes that the idea of ressentiment – that past suffering necessitates reparations – 
can be said to underlie modern understandings of trauma and the humanitarian idea. Nietzsche (1989: 
127) understood ressentiment as a consequence of the fact that, ‘every sufferer instinctively seeks a 
cause for his suffering’ (also see Olick, 2007: 156). Elsewhere in this dissertation, I have described this 
as a ‘rhetoric of blame’; one that seeks to apportion blame and to subject the guilty party to a self-
righteous outrage. Nietzsche’s theorisation was a precursor to and inversion of Weber’s 
understanding of theodicy as the justification of ‘good fortune’ as ‘legitimate fortune’ (ibid.; see also 
Section 2.1). Nietzsche branded ressentiment the ‘fullest realization of slave morality’ (ibid.: 156). Olick 
explains that: 
‘Nietzsche points out, there is a close connection in German between the words for guilt 
(Schuld) and for debt (Schulden). The sense of guilt that slave morality foists on the world 
(“bad conscience”) developed in relation to the idea that every injury has its equivalent and 
that it can, in some way, be paid back, an idea rooted in the contractual, material relationship 
between creditor and debtor.’ 
(ibid.: 156) 
For Nietzsche, this ‘memory of injury’ (trauma?) is inhibitive to progress particularly for the victim who 
is held hostage by their past and its psychic wounds (ibid.: 156). An individual suffering from 
ressentiment becomes an, ‘angry spectator of all that is past’, and, ‘cannot break time’s covetousness’ 
(Nietzsche quoted in ibid.: 156). Ressentiment also simultaneously burdens the perpetrator by making 
them subject to ‘illegitimate’ moral claims (ibid.). Nietzsche was unequivocal in his denunciation of 
claims for reparations, redress and regret – products of ressentiment – as thoroughly illegitimate 
(ibid.). According to him, such a politics, ‘seek[s] a compensation that will never be adequate’, whilst 
making itself a ‘slave’ to an unchangeable past (ibid.: 156). The illegitimacy of ressentiment, for 
Nietzsche, lies in its deceit; in the way that it disguises revenge, anger and jealousy as ‘justice’ (ibid.). 
For Nietzsche, actual anger and hatred are infinitely more moral due to the honesty of their expression 
(ibid.). 
Today, Nietzsche’s extreme moralisation of the politics of reparation and humanitarianism would be 
regarded as a form of ‘virtue signalling’. Virtue signalling refers to a narcissistic, self-righteous and 
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moralising discourse that denigrates another’s politics while establishing a dubious moral high-ground 
for the speaker and their politics. While I do not agree with Nietzsche’s virtue signalling, I do agree 
with his recognition of the inadequacy of reparations as redressal for human suffering. After all, when 
dealing with death and suffering on the scale of something like the Holocaust or the Partition of India, 
how does one put a price on adequate reparations? How might we ever hope to compensate these 
survivors for the death of their kith and kin, for the pain of displacement; for the interruption of a 
social world?  
But, in the case of the Partition, survivors do articulate a price. They demand the restoration of their 
former wealth and privilege; they demand the status of ‘freedom fighters’ and ‘martyrs’ to the 
independent nation-state and, they demand the genocide of their ‘racial enemy’ as retribution for 
past suffering. An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. However, having engaged with the suffering 
and trauma of Partition survivors, we can also understand their ressentiment.   
For example, when Bhanwarilal mourns the suffering of the Partition and demands reparations, we 
can empathise with his pain and recognise its ‘humanity’. Our empathy with his ressentiment in this 
context is located in our acknowledgment of the humanitarian ideal underlying it – a connection 
between ressentiment and humanitarianism that Nietzsche and Max Scheler too have observed 
before us (ibid.). In demanding adequate compensation for their suffering and displacement, my 
informants articulate the familiar discourse of human rights.  
Yet, at the same time, given that Bhanwarilal and my other informants legitimise retributive genocide 
and Hindu fascism as reparations for the Partition, this very same empathy with their suffering is 
experienced as a troubling dissonance. Genocide and fascism – anti-humanitarian to their core – here 
seem to draw on the very same politics of reparations that underlies the international human rights 
regime. Where I, and other left-leaning academics, would generally be in favour of reparations for 
slavery and colonialism, here, the very same discourse appals us. The victimhood of Partition survivors 
implores us to take cognizance of their ressentiment even as their support for retributive violence 
unsettles and disgusts us.  
This conflicting emotional response along with the deliberate disinformation and reflexive revisionism 
by Hindu nationalist organisations and their supporters in this context, comprises the crisis of meaning 
in this context. Ultimately, as we deconstruct narratives of violence and memories of the pre-Partition 
period, we find ourselves wondering who is a victim and who the aggressor.  
The relevance that this question acquires has much to do with how we treat suffering and victimhood 
in society. Kleinman et al (1997) remind us of the social dimension of suffering. Not only is suffering 
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fundamentally a ‘social experience’, but that suffering also has, ‘social use’ (ibid.: ix-xi). In this way, 
suffering – as experience, memory, representation and politics – is not only intimately connected to 
existing cultural idioms of interpretation and expression (see Section 2.4), but also has political uses. 
As Kleinman et al write: 
‘Cultural responses to the traumatic effects of political violence often transform the local 
idioms of victims into universal professional languages of complaint and restitution – and 
thereby remake representations and experiences of suffering.  
[…] 
Historical memories of suffering – e.g., slavery, the destruction of aboriginal communities, 
wars, genocide, imperialistic and post-imperialistic oppression – have present uses, for 
example, to authorize nationalism or class and ethnic resistance. Collective suffering is also a 
core component of the global political economy. There is a market for suffering: victimhood 
is commodified.’ 
(ibid.: x-xi) 
The commodification of collective suffering and the victimhood derived from it feeds into the efficacy 
of a larger politics of victimhood. One of the most prominent qualities of a politics built on victimhood 
is that it somewhat paradoxically claims an apolitical space for itself (Jeffery, 2006). As Laura Jeffery 
and Mattei Candea (2006: 289) write, ‘Victimhood can be a prime way of suspending or attempting to 
suspend the political through an appeal to something non-agentive and “beyond” or “before” politics, 
such as poverty or suffering.’ Victimhood attempts to secure a political space that is paradoxically 
based on the negation of the political; posturing as a neutral position allegedly based on a higher moral 
claim (ibid.).  
Given victimhood’s implicit posturing as apolitical, Laura Jeffery (2006) has described victimhood as 
an ‘anti-politics machine’. Here, Jeffery (ibid.) builds on James Ferguson’s (1994) argument that the 
international development industry and its discourses constitute an ‘anti-politics machine’ that 
deliberately depoliticizes deeply political questions around accountability and resource allocation. By 
focusing on the depoliticizing nature of the politics of development, Ferguson (ibid.) argued that the 
act of and claims to depoliticization are in fact deeply political in themselves (see also Jeffery, 2006 
and, Jeffery and Candea, 2006). 
Victimhood – furthered by ressentiment – as an ‘anti-politics machine’ (Jeffery, 2006) compounds the 
crisis of meaning, in this context. On a basic level, the victimhood of Partition survivors leads 
practitioners of Partition oral history to frame their informants as passive, innocent witnesses of a 
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horrific past, rather than as active and intelligent political subjects who ‘tactically’ (de Certeau, 1984) 
marshal discourses of trauma, victimhood and violence to articulate a deeply political memory of the 
Partition. On a secondary level, this larger discourse of Hindu victimhood significantly depoliticizes the 
violent politics of Hindu nationalism, packaging its call for ‘revenge’ as an apolitical demand for justice; 
as even ‘national interest’. Framed against the victimhood of the Partition, a Hindu fascist state (with 
the ethnic cleansing it implies) does not appear an act of violence or oppression but as the logical, 
reasonable completion of the Partition; the deliverance of the promised nation.  
This clever appropriation of the discourses of victimhood by powerful groups and states is one of the 
defining features of the ongoing Post-truth era. Combined with carefully organised disinformation 
campaigns, they muddy the waters sowing confusion such that sifting ‘fact’ from ‘fiction’ becomes a 
difficult task in itself. As discourses based on appeals to emotions and beliefs – of rhetoric that ‘tells it 
like it is’ – resonate deeply with the general populace, we appear to transcend ‘truths’ and ‘facts’; the 
allegedly stable foundations of ‘modern’, ‘scientific’ society.  
Yet that is only one level on which the crisis of meaning operates. The cleverness of discourse results 
in a deep mismatch between the rhetoric that one hears and the actions one observes (Trend, 1995). 
Not only do ‘facts’ appear irrelevant to debates, but words themselves do not seem to mean what 
they should (ibid.). Speaking in an interview with The Hindu’s Social Affairs editor G. Sampath, social 
activist and Magsaysay Award winner Aruna Roy eloquently summarised this crisis of meaning in the 
Indian context. Roy said: 
‘But today, the “emergency” is with doublespeak: the rhetoric talks about what you like to 
hear but the substance goes against everything you value. In this kind of nebulousness, it is 
always more difficult to get people together because many hear only the rhetoric.’ 
(Aruna Roy quoted in Sampath, 2018) 
Roy’s mention of the Emergency is a reference to the Indira Gandhi-era. From 1975-77 Indira Gandhi 
invoked the ‘Emergency’ provisions of the Indian constitution, suspended the legislature and the 
fundamental rights of citizens, and, continued to rule by fiat (Guha, 2017). Gandhi’s actions were a 
desperate bid to cling to power following the Allahabad High Court’s 1975 verdict disqualifying her 
election to the Lok Sabha (lower house of the Indian Parliament) on the grounds of minor election 
malpractice (ibid.). This was followed by a Supreme Court order forbidding Gandhi from voting in 
Parliament until her appeal of the aforementioned verdict had been resolved. During this period, 
Gandhi also found herself besieged by the rising popularity of nation-wide protests led by opposition 
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leader Jayprakash Narayan with the support of a united opposition front which prominently included 
the Hindu Right (ibid.).  
In comparison to the ‘transparency’ of Indira Gandhi’s declaration of authoritarianism, Modi’s 
authoritarian regime has been characterised by an undeclared ‘emergency’. Under the last six years 
of Modi’s rule the space for dissent and resistance has shrunk even as Modi and some of the top 
leaders of the BJP have paid lip-service to the ideals of democracy and liberty. A nationwide spate of 
bovine-related lynchings has normalized violence and discrimination against Muslims and Dalits, with 
the indifference and tacit cooperation of state institutions (see Section 3.1).  
As familiar democracies increasingly embrace ‘strong men’, and, as fascism is increasingly packaged 
as ‘justice’ and ‘national progress’, politics has become a minefield of dissonance. What increasingly 
seems to take its place is a fatigue with democracy (Appadurai, 2017) that while scapegoating and 
vilifying minorities, mouths a defence of its hate speech as ‘free speech’.  As words dissolve into empty 
rhetoric, political discourse has been consumed by ontological, phenomenological and 
epistemological crises. We can no longer trust the meanings of words, the intentions of political 
actions nor even our own ‘knowledge’ of these processes.  
Perhaps the clearest example of this has been the Modi government’s enactment and defence of the 
Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 (henceforth CAA). As a law that links Indian citizenship to religion 
– an unprecedented legal development – the CAA is animated by the silent enabling presence of the 
memory and ressentiment of the Partition. However, the rhetoric and events surrounding the law 
present something of a case study in authoritarianism and Post-Truth. In the following section I detail 
some of these contestations around the CAA and then move on to draw broad conclusions regarding 
the crisis of meaning, the global rise of authoritarianism and the task of anthropology amidst these 
cataclysmic processes.  
 
 
The CAA and the Ghost of the Partition 
The CAA is a problematic law in that it links Indian citizenship with religion to fast-track citizenship 
appeals for ‘illegal migrants’ from six religious communities – Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, Parsis 
and Christians – from the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan (Regan et 
al, 2019). The law accepts citizenship claims on the broad assumption that all of these groups face 
religious persecution in their originating countries (ibid.). In doing so, the Act exempts these 
individuals from being prosecuted for ‘illegal’ migration. Meanwhile all Muslims – including those 
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belonging to persecuted communities in the neighbourhood such as the Ahmadiyas and Rohingyas – 
are excluded from the protections offered under this Act (ibid.).  
As a legislation that explicitly links Indian citizenship to religion, the CAA serves as the foundation 
stone of the Hindu Rashtra (nation-state) envisioned by the Hindu Right. Consequently, Appadurai 
(2019) has dubbed the CAA, ‘the loudest dog whistle by a ruling party since Indian independence, 
intended to declare Muslims as open game for any form of degradation and destruction.’ The brutal 
lynching of over 50 Muslims and the burning of hundreds of Muslim homes and businesses during the 
4-day anti-Muslim pogrom in north-east Delhi in February 2020 (Ellis-Petersen, 2020; Kamdar, 2020; 
The Indian Express, 2020b) has proved the prescience of Appadurai’s words. 
The CAA is a curious piece of legislation in that it explicitly mentions only the three Muslim-majority 
states in India’s neighbourhood: Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The focus on these three 
states is interesting considering that India also shares a land border with China and Myanmar and a 
sea-border with Sri Lanka. Since independence, India has also received refugees from these three 
countries. Between 1982 and 1987, India received 134,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees; comprising 
India’s largest refugee population on record (Nath, 2016). Tibetan refugees (officially designated as 
‘foreigners’) number roughly 80,000 people (Purohit, 2019). India’s most recent refugee community, 
the Rohingyas, are estimated at about 40,000 people with at least 16,500 recognised by the UN 
refugee agency (Ganguly, 2019).  
Contrary to the reality of the flow of undocumented migration in South Asia, the CAA somewhat 
revealingly focuses only on the three Muslim-majority states in this region. It is relevant here to briefly 
focus on the issue of religious persecution. While the BJP has argued that the CAA is meant to give 
persecuted minorities citizenship, the Act neither mentions persecution (religious or otherwise) nor 
provides a legal definition for the purposes of jurisprudence (Bhat, 2019). The Act merely defines a set 
of people whom it exempts from the category of ‘illegal migrant’, provided they entered the country 
before December 31, 2014 (ibid.). Kundu and Mohanan (2020) argue that by creating different 
channels whereby citizenship can be sought on the basis of one’s religion and country of origin, the 
CAA is inherently discriminatory. Moreover, without offering a reasonable justification for this 
discrimination (ibid.), the Act instead offers only a crude generalisation that is neither grounded in 
reality nor consistent with its stated purpose (Bhat, 2019).  
However it is through the latter that we are provided an invaluable glimpse into the Hindu nationalist 
worldview. Although the CAA does not offer an explicit definition, it nevertheless articulates its 
makers’ implicit understanding of religious persecution. By singling out six non-Muslim minorities in 
the only three Muslim-majority states in India’s immediate neighbourhood, the CAA implicitly 
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understands religious persecution as the ‘normative function’ of a Muslim-majority population. The 
CAA imagines religious persecution as something that affects only non-Muslim minorities in only 
Muslim-majority states.    
In doing so, the law envisions a Hindu India besieged by a fanatical Muslim horde. Standing alone in a 
deeply hostile neighbourhood, Hindu India is seen as an island of freedom and democracy in a sea of 
darkness. The BJP Chief Minister of Gujarat Vijay Rupani said as much when in support of the CAA, he 
said that, ‘Muslims can go to any of 150 countries, but there is only one country for the Hindus, and 
that is India’ (NDTV, 2019b). Such discourses present India as the last refuge for Hindus; the lone 
bulwark of human rights and democracy for Hindus in South Asia. 
Creating the perception that the Hindu (and by extension Hindu India) is in danger normalises a violent 
Hindu nationalism as the antidote to this problem. These discourses also feed off the Hindutva version 
of Indian history as a series of foreign invasions and occupations (see Section 1.3). As stated in the 
previous chapter, this narrative of victimhood is crucial to presenting the violence of Hindutva as a 
form of reasonable self-defence; the ‘action’ to a ‘reaction’ (see Chapter 3). In the process, we see a 
larger politics of victimhood actively depoliticizing the field; making a discriminatory and 
unconstitutional citizenship law seem a legitimate and necessary piece of legislation motivated by a 
higher moral concern for human rights in India’s immediate neighbourhood.   
In Parliament, the BJP has sought to defend this law by reference to the Partition and the Nehru-
Liaquat Pact of 1950 (Habib, 2020). Both Amit Shah and Narendra Modi have sought to present the 
CAA as a correction of the failures of the Nehru-Liaquat Pact (ibid.); as an explicit attempt to complete 
the unfinished work of the Partition.   
The Nehru-Liaquat Pact was a bilateral treaty signed between India and Pakistan in 1950 in response 
to persistent reports of religious persecution against Hindus in East Pakistan (Daniyal, 2019). This was 
followed by rioting in Kolkatta (ibid.). This retributive pattern of violence was itself linked to the 
retributive genocidal violence of the Partition (ibid.). The Pact provided a framework for the treatment 
of minorities in both countries (The Indian Express, 2019b). It comprised a bilateral commitment by 
both parties to safeguard the minority communities within their territories, guaranteed them 
complete equality of citizenship such as equality before the law, freedom of movement, freedom of 
speech and worship, equality of opportunity and the right to serve in the armed forces and civil 
services (ibid.). Significantly the Pact formally untethered India and Pakistan from the concerns of 
religious minorities in the other’s territories by stipulating that minorities must henceforth look to 
their own governments for the redressal of their grievances (ibid.). The Pact also allowed refugees to 
return in order to sell the properties they had left behind (Habib, 2020). 
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However, Hindu nationalists have long held that the Nehru-Liaquat Pact was an unnecessary 
concession to Pakistan (Daniyal, 2019). SP Mookerjee and KC Neogy (leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha 
and members of Nehru’s cabinet) had resigned over their opposition to the Pact (ibid.). They believed 
that military intervention and the complete annexation of East Pakistan was the only acceptable 
solution to the problem (ibid.). Mookerjee was also in favour of the complete and forceful deportation 
of Muslims from India (ibid.).  
Exhuming the ghost of the Partition, the BJP has argued that the CAA was necessitated by the fact that 
Pakistan and Bangladesh had not implemented the Nehru-Liaquat Pact. Prime Minister Modi and 
Home Minister Amit Shah were both quoted justifying the CAA as a correction of the Nehru-Liaquat 
Pact (Financial Express, 2019b; Outlook, 2020a). In addition to this, they argued that the CAA could 
not be seen as discriminatory because through the Nehru-Liaquat Pact, ‘secular Nehru’ too had 
considered India as a natural safe haven for persecuted Hindu and Sikh minorities (ibid.). Prof Habib 
(2020) has criticised the BJP’s attempt to link the CAA to the Partition and Nehru-Liaquat Pact as a, 
‘misleading but also a blatant falsification of history.’ 
The BJP has continuously countered the claim that the CAA is a sectarian law by claiming that the law 
is in fact meant to provide Indian citizenship to persecuted refugees. Internationally as well as 
domestically (in an affidavit filed before the Supreme Court), Modi’s regime has defended the CAA as 
a matter of internal policy, and, as, ‘a reinstatement of Indian ideals of secularism, equality and 
fraternity’, respectively (Sagar, 2020). If the government and its leaders are to be believed, the CAA is 
a legislation that hopes to uphold human rights and, to enfranchise refugees and undocumented 
migrants.  
A further layer of nebulousness in all this is that while in the past the BJP has consistently linked the 
CAA to a pan-India National Register of Citizens (NRC), it disavowed these very same connections in 
response to the massive anti-CAA protests. For context, the NRC is a proposed national citizenship re-
verification exercise that would require those arbitrarily deemed as ‘doubtful’ citizens to appear 
before the state to prove their citizenship using identity documents, birth certificates, and even family 
lineage (where applicable). 
Since the 2016 state elections in Assam, the BJP has presented the CAA and NRC combine as the ‘final 
solution’ to the alleged problem of ‘infiltration’ from Bangladesh (Gohain, 2016). During the 2019 
general elections, Amit Shah consistently vowed to eject ‘illegal migrants’ from the country and 
presented the NRC as the appropriate instrument to achieve that goal (BBC, 2019d). Shah also 
consistently linked the NRC to the CAA, making his intentions to target only Muslims clear as day. For 
example, in an April 11 speech, Shah said, ‘We will ensure implementation of NRC in the entire 
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country. We will remove every single infiltrator from the country, except Buddha [sic], Hindus and 
Sikhs’ (Venkataramakrishnan, 2019).  
Shah reiterated this message on April 23, 2019 where in an oft-quoted (and memed) dialogue, he 
exhorted his listeners to understand the chronology of the CAA and NRC (ibid.). Shah said, ‘First the 
CAB [Citizenship (Amendment) Bill] will come. All refugees will get citizenship. Then NRC will come. 
This is why refugees should not worry, but infiltrators should. Understand the chronology’ (ibid.). Shah 
repeated the message through his Twitter handle on May 1, 2019 as he tweeted, ‘First we will pass 
the Citizenship Amendment bill and ensure that all the refugees from the neighbouring nations get 
the Indian citizenship. After that NRC will be made and we will detect and deport every infiltrator from 
our motherland’ (ibid.). 
Hitherto Shah and the BJP’s messaging was consistently clear. While the NRC would identify ‘anti-
national’ ‘intruders’ (those without appropriate documents), the CAA would provide Hindus, Sikhs, 
Buddhists, Parsis, Jains and Christians with an additional chance at citizenship through naturalization; 
a failsafe (Anand, 2019). The sole exclusion, Muslims, would be deported or incarcerated long-term in 
detention centres; consequently disenfranchising Muslims en masse across India.    
However, following the massive anti-CAA protests – which were led by all sections of society and also 
replicated globally (Acharjee, 2020; Deol, 2020) – Modi and the BJP changed tack. In an attempt to 
confuse and pacify, Modi claimed that there had been no discussion of a pan-India NRC. Addressing a 
rally in Delhi on December 22, 2019, Modi said:   
‘After the formation of my government, from 2014 till this day, I want to tell the 130 crore 
citizens of the country, there has been no discussion on the word NRC. There hasn’t even been 
any talk [about it]. Only, after the Supreme Court said so, it [the NRC] had to be done for 
Assam. What are you talking about? Lies are being spread.’ 
(Prime Minister Narendra Modi quoted in Anand, 2019; Mathew and Rajput, 2019). 
Ironically, it was Modi’s own statement that was a blatant lie. Although the ongoing NRC in Assam 
(one that is specific to that state) has emerged out of the Assam Accord of 1985 and been resumed by 
the Supreme Court of India (Roy, 2019), the BJP, under Modi and Amit Shah, was quick to turn the 
NRC into a regional and national electoral issue (Kundu and Mohanan, 2020). This is due to the 
effectiveness of the discourse.  
The spectre of undocumented migration from Bangladesh serves as an effective dog whistle for larger 
Hindu nationalist demographic anxieties. Using rumours, disinformation and dubious readings of the 
2011 religious census (Financial Express, 2015), the BJP and right-leaning academics such as Udayon 
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Misra (2016) have assumed a direct correlation between the rise of Muslims in Assam and 
undocumented migration from Bangladesh (Gohain, 2016). BJP leaders have alleged that anywhere 
between 20-80 million ‘illegal’ Bangladeshi migrants currently reside across India (BBC, 2020). This 
despite the fact that the Indian government has gone on record to admit that it has no official figures 
for the number of Bangladeshi migrants in India (ibid.). Moreover, recent data released by India’s 
Border Security Force and National Crime Record Bureau has shown that since 2017, more 
undocumented migrants have been caught leaving for or returning to Bangladesh than entering India 
(Singh, V, 2020b).  
If my detailed exposition on the CAA and NRC leaves my readers feeling confused, disoriented and 
fatigued then that is something of a deliberate performative element of my discussion of the crisis of 
meaning. It is through this game of smoke of mirrors, of deliberate obfuscation through rhetoric, 
rumour, dog whistles, misinformation and double-speak that the BJP has been successful in deflating 
some of the opposition to not just the CAA but its larger Hindu fascist project. Where in other times 
this Nuremberg-like legislation that writes Hindu supremacy into law might have been met with an 
immediate loss of confidence in the prevailing regime, the CAA has been met with opposition, yes, but 
also confusion, disinterest and even celebration.  
This was visible especially in the aftermath of the Delhi pogrom of February 2020; an anti-Muslim 
pogrom that was a violent reactionary Hindu nationalist response to the anti-CAA protests (Ahmad, 
2020). The violence in north-east Delhi was instigated by BJP leader Kapil Mishra and visibly carried 
out by organised mobs of Hindutva ‘activists’ with the complicity of the police (Bedi, 2020; Dwivedi, 
2020; Hindustan Times, 2020). However, under the direction of the BJP-controlled Home Ministry, the 
Delhi Police has worked tirelessly to present the anti-CAA protestors as the ‘real’ conspirators of the 
pogrom (Lalwani, 2020; Pasha, 2020). The result is that the very pogrom that disrupted and killed the 
anti-CAA movement is now being paradoxically blamed on the leaders and organisers of this 
movement (ibid.). 
A similar campaign of misinformation and defamation seems to be afoot with the ongoing farmer 
protests in India. Farmers in India have been camped on the borders of Delhi since November 27, 
2020, when their plan to march on Delhi was halted by brutal police repression (Pandey, 2020). 
Farmers across the country are currently protesting the passage of three recently enacted 
controversial farm laws which threaten to significantly shrink the incomes of farmers and usher in a 
corporate take-over of Indian agriculture (ibid.). This months-long siege of Delhi is a carnivalesque 
second-coming of the anti-CAA movement.  
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However, rather than take notice of the concerns of farmers, the Modi government, backed by a pliant 
electronic media, has gone on an information blitz aimed at presenting the new laws as long-pending 
‘reforms’ that will significantly improve the lives of Indian farmers (Bal, 2020). The government has 
also sought to waylay the discourse of the protest by portraying the large presence of Punjabi farmers 
as evidence of the movement’s Khalistani affiliation and also, by arguing that the farmers have been 
misled by the opposition parties into protesting a law that they do not fully understand (ibid.). 
Once again, as with the CAA protests, the dissenters have found themselves in a quagmire of 
misinformation and rhetoric where nothing seems to be what it is. But what do these quotidian 
political developments have to do with the anthropologist? Everything.  
 
 
A Crisis of Meaning! Post-Truth! But What’s New?  
So how does one make sense of all this? How does one read through the layers of nebulousness; these 
claims and counter-claims to victimhood? But also, is it not natural for politicians to lie? What makes 
this crisis different? And, is this crisis of meaning – this era of Post-truth – unique to our times?  
In the enduring resonance of the affective registers of ‘belief’ and ‘faith’ in the Post-truth era, a 
Weberian might read further posthumous validation of Weber’s (1965, 2013) life’s work. After all, 
Weber’s (ibid) core thesis combined political-economic sociology with the sociology of religion to 
observe patterns of religious thought within the ‘modern’ processes of nationalism and capitalism. 
According to Weber (ibid.) the genesis of capitalism drew heavily on Protestant ethics.  
Within the Post-truth era’s crisis of meaning we can observe the resonance (or resurgence?) of claims 
to ‘faith’ and ‘belief’ that distinctly smack of the theological. The resemblance is heightened by the 
religious nature of the nationalisms of our times, be it Modi’s Hindu nationalism or Trump and 
Bolsonaro’s evangelical white nationalism. Authoritarian regimes and movements in other global 
contexts such as Poland, the deep-states of the Middle-East (including Israel), Turkey, Sri Lanka and 
Myanmar, to name a few, can be similarly characterised by a visibly religious strain of ultra-
nationalism. In other contexts, such as the UK, where religious nationalism does not explicitly 
characterise conservative discourse, a particular strain of ‘secular’ cultural Christianity is nevertheless 
implicit.    
Indeed, just as the ‘traditional’ appears to be salient within the ‘modern’, so too, the crisis of meaning 
appears to be salient within the rise of authoritarianism. German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1970) 
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appears to have been among the earliest to have raised the spectre of the crisis of meaning through 
his book, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to 
Phenomenological Philosophy (Učník, 2016). Writing in 1936, Husserl was concerned about the rise 
and consolidation of fascism in Europe, particularly in Germany (ibid.). Husserl saw the rise of fascism 
as the victory of ‘irrationalism’ in the heart of Europe: a ‘modern’ society with a tradition of ‘rational 
inquiry’ (ibid.: 1). By announcing a perceived crisis of meaning, Husserl sought to draw attention to 
the problem of how the principles of ‘objectivity’ and ‘rationality’ that appeared to drive scientific 
progress, seemed to gain so little purchase in other areas of society (ibid.). As L’Ubica Učník (ibid.: 2) 
frames it, the key problem occupying this crisis of meaning and Husserl’s thought was, ‘the question 
of what constitutes knowledge and how objective knowledge relates to the meaning of the world and 
human subjective existence.’ 
In anthropology this line of reflexive questioning has manifested in a persistent epistemological crisis 
that we now know as the crisis of representation (see Section 1.1). As stated previously, the crisis of 
representation has sought to problematize the epistemology of anthropology by asking to what 
degree anthropological truths may be considered ‘real’ truths (Maynard and Cahnmann-Taylor, 2010). 
The crisis of representation emerged in the 1980s through the writings of anthropologists such as 
James Clifford (1986), Johannes Fabian (2002) and George Marcus and Michael Fischer (1986). Clifford 
(1986), in particular, has drawn attention to ethnography’s lack of representativeness due to its 
tendency to produce abstractions and partial truths far detached from the lived experiences of its 
subjects (see also Stanley, 1996). Similarly, Fabian (2002) argued that anthropology’s ‘schizochronic’ 
use of time was to blame for its ‘othering’ and unrepresentative representations. The anthropologist’s 
figurative detachment, Fabian (ibid.) argued, hierarchically distances the anthropologist from their 
subject in place and time. It places the anthropologists and their readers in a detached, privileged 
time-frame, whilst confining the ‘other’ to the past; a ‘stage of lesser development’ wherefrom the 
‘other’ can be studied in its ‘natural’ and ‘primitive’ state (Bunzl, 2002: xi). Fabian (2002) directly 
connected this tendency to anthropology’s colonial past, and consequently, the history of unequal 
power-relations between researchers and their informants. 
How might we then understand these crises? Or better yet, how might we subvert and overcome 
them? How do we as anthropologists show up for work amidst the epistemological, ontological and 
phenomenological crises that characterise the discourse of our times? There are two levels on which 
I propose to address these questions.  
The first of these is by deconstructing a certain sense of surprise that comes across in the academic 
‘discovery’ of these crises. For example, at the heart of Husserl’s (1970) announcement of the crisis of 
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meaning lies a certain surprise at his discovery of ‘irrationality’ within ‘rational’, ‘modern’ Europe. It is 
Husserl’s inability to reconcile fascism with European modernity that leads him to proclaim this crisis. 
However, as I have shown repeatedly in this dissertation, fascism (and religious nationalism) is a 
product of modernity that adopts, co-opts and appropriates the sciences and technologies of 
modernity as much as it draws on a nostalgic imagination of history and tradition.  
Therefore, if Husserl is unable to reconcile the rise of fascism with European modernity then that has 
much to do with a certain colonial, Euro-American imagination of Europe and its place in the world. It 
is this conception of European modernity that Aimé Césaire (1972) eloquently admonished in his 
seminal essay, Discourse on Colonialism. Césaire saw Nazism as the logical end-point of European 
modernity and the colonial encounter. For Césaire, fascism was merely colonialism done at home, in 
Europe99. Thus, seen in another light, the crisis of meaning at least partly appears to be a product of 
the shattering of self-aggrandising, narcissistic notions of one’s own perceived modernity. Here, we 
would do well to heed Bruno Latour’s (1993) reminder that, We Have Never Been Modern. 
To clarify, I am not arguing that the crisis of meaning is not real, but rather that a substantial strain of 
academic discourse on it goes no further than a myopic exclamation of surprise at the dissonant 
shattering of a particular Euro-American conception of Western modernity: a shock at the realisation 
of the incompleteness of the West’s ‘modernity’. As the rise of authoritarianism with its regime of 
Post-truth and democracy fatigue takes hold in allegedly ‘healthy’ Western democracies (Appadurai, 
2017), they are forced to confront the ‘irrationality’ that self-conceptions of modernity disguise. As a 
racist demagogue wins the US presidential election whilst boasting of having ‘grabbed pussies’; as he 
enjoys the unconditional support of his base whilst propounding a political culture of nepotism, 
unaccountability, bigotry and scapegoating; the ‘modern’ West is forced to confront its own 
‘tribalism’. This is one level at which the crisis of meaning feels jarring.  
My identification of Eurocentrism in the academic response to the crisis of meaning is also tangentially 
evocative of Abu-Lughod’s (1991) aforementioned critique of the crisis of representation (see Section 
1.1). Abu-Lughod (ibid.) critiques the crisis of representation for the lack of attention Marcus and 
Fischer (1986) give to the issue of positionality. Abu-Lughod (1991) argues that anthropological truths 
are not only partial truths but also positioned truths. The crisis of representation neglects to consider 
the different dialogical complexities that confront ‘halfie’, native and feminist anthropologists in the 
field. Assuming a complete separation between the self that studies and the ‘other’ that is studied, 
                                                            
99 In a lighter vein, we may regard the authoritarianisms of our time as colonialists whom the Covid-19 
pandemic has forced to work from home.  
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much of the crisis of representation discourse is based on a Euro-American conception of 
anthropology and its practitioners.  
Much like with the crisis of meaning, here too, Eurocentrism inhibits analysis, producing the partial 
diagnosis of a real problem. Yet, at the core of this pervasive Eurocentrism lies an essentialist view of 
the world. I am specifically drawing attention to essentialism in this context, to link my discussion here 
back to Marilyn Strathern’s (1992) critique of the impoverishment of the Euro-American imagination 
of ‘society’. As stated previously in Section 3.3, Strathern (ibid.) has shown that the Euro-American 
idea of society is built on the imagination of homogeneity such that national societies are analogised 
to a single individual body. Homogenous, undifferentiated and held to be static over time, these big 
imagined collectivities rely on the logic of essentialism (ibid.). This is as true of nation-states who 
marshal history and archaeology to present themselves as eternal facts (Balibar, 1992; Herzfeld, 1992) 
as it is of religious communities (van der Veer, 1994; Thapar, 1996, 2015) or even Europe itself (Said, 
1978; Wolf, 1982). 
Therefore, for the anthropologist working amidst the world’s authoritarianisms, its crisis of meaning, 
and the crises within their own discipline, an increased attention to the specificities of one’s context 
appears the only way out of the muddle; a stormy crossing through the heart of the epistemological 
muddle as de Certeau (1984) would have it (Highmore, 2007). The task of the anthropologist then is 
to unsettle the essentialisms of our time, rigorously challenging the masks that hide the particularities 
of our reality. This is as much a call to do better anthropology as it is born out of the imperative to 
make sense of violence.  
This is what I have done in this dissertation. By wading directly into starkly polarised debates on 
nationalism and belonging, I have used the memories of the Partition as a springboard for the 
examination of these urgent political and epistemological contestations in the South Asian context. 
Chief among these has been my problematisation of the Hindu-fold. Through a detailed examination 
of my informants’ memories of violence along with relevant historical and ethnographic literature on 
South Asia, I have drawn attention to the shifting boundaries of the Hindu-fold (see Section 3.3). 
Drawing on the work of Das (2007), Feldman (1997), Misri (2014) and Pandey (2001), I have shown 
how the Hindu-fold is performed, sustained and maintained through the generous use of violence; 
violence that serves simultaneously as a call to arms and a warning to enemies and non-participants 
(Banaji, 2018; Sarkar, 2002).  
The anti-essentialist direction of my research is also influenced by Arjun Appadurai’s (1998) insights 
on the connections between ‘vivisectionist violence’ and globalisation (see Introduction). Appadurai 
(ibid.) posits ‘vivisectionist violence’ as a response to the ‘uncertainty’ of globalisation. The modern 
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state with its technologies of population management and large-scale identities abstracts and 
disappears the individual within these broad labels (ibid.). Against this uncertainty – to essentialise 
that which seems fluid, fragile, unstable and thereby ‘pollutable’ (Douglas, 1984) – this kind of gory, 
proximate, bodily violence seeks to establish a gruesome form of certainty: ‘dead certainty’ 
(Appadurai, 1998: 919). It seeks to locate and stabilise in the body of the other that which globalisation 
unsettles in society (ibid.; also see Ghassem-Fachandi, 2010). 
Additionally, in the case of Hindu nationalism, it is the essentialism of a timeless, victimised Hindu 
nation that gives sense to its ressentiment. It is only when one imagines the Hindu nation as a timeless 
monolith victimised by its racial and ethnic ‘other’, the Muslim nation, that the contemporary violence 
of Hindu nationalism makes sense. It is only when an essentialised conception of the Muslim 
collectivity is held as the ‘other’ to and oppressor of a similarly essentialised Hindu collectivity that 
revenge against Muslims anywhere in the present for the ‘sins’ committed by Muslims anywhere in 
the past makes sense (Sarkar, 2002). For the Hindu nationalist, revenge emerges as a ‘mobile concept’ 
that dissolves temporality (ibid.). As Tanikar Sarkar writes: 
‘[T]he Muslim of today embodies all past offences and future threats that have been allegedly 
committed and could be committed. Therefore, revenge may be taken on any Muslim 
anywhere for anything that any Muslim could do or [has] done. […] Even Muslims of the past 
must pay for what Muslims of the present are doing, just as Muslims of the present are paying 
for the past’ 
(ibid.: 2874) 
Thus, as Sarkar’s (ibid.) stark summation of the logic of the ‘retributive’ violence of Hindu nationalism 
shows, it is the imagination of an eternal, essentialised Hindu collectivity – alongside a similarly 
essentialised Muslim collectivity – that gives sense to this discourse. However, as Peter van der Veer 
(1994) has shown, Hinduism and Islam – as religions, collectivities and communities – are mere 
illusions that mask diverse and often contradictory religious discourses, traditions, sects and castes. 
Van der Veer’s (ibid.) work demonstrates Hinduism and Islam (and similarly other religions) for the 
illusions that they are; abstracted large-scale labels that loosely hold together a remarkably diverse 
constellation of racial and ethnic groups, as well as spiritual traditions and cosmologies. Attack this 
essentialism and you destroy the very foundation that foregrounds the imagination of these nations: 
these abstractions. Here, I would also include the nomos – whose failings require rationalisation 
through theodicy – as another one of these abstractions that needs challenging. 
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Framed against this context, the anthropologist’s problematisation of the common sense 
essentialisms of our times becomes a powerful tool for the mobilisation of an effective anti-fascist 
politics. An explicitly anti-essentialist ethnography in this context not only speaks truth to power but 
also provides an account of violence – as I have done – that pays attention to the specificities of 
violence; including those violent acts considered ‘not violence’.  
The second and final level on which I wish to engage with the crisis of meaning is by sketching its 
relation to the limits of ethnonationalism. In her book Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation, Tanika Sarkar (2010) 
draws our attention to the limits of ‘communalism’ (ethnonationalism). Sarkar (ibid.) writes that it is 
important to remember that ethnonationalism – or the politics of hate in general – cannot articulate 
its authentic and specific agenda. The agenda is to redraw the boundaries of religious identity and 
national community in exclusively antagonistic and vindictive terms. Sarkar argues that due to the 
explicitly violent nature of this project, hate can never identify itself as such. She concludes that, 
‘deprived of the exact words of its enterprise, it can only live as a parasite’ (ibid.: 272).  
Because it can only exist as a parasite on the margins of discourse, this kind of politics needs the 
conditions of Post-Truth in order to flourish. Unable to articulate that to which it truly aspires, its 
leaders instead create, settle for and depend on disinformation, dog whistles and euphemisms to 
spread their message of hate and violence. They are forced to disguise their calls to mass 
incarceration, violence and genocide as reactions to economic concerns or as ‘reasonable concerns’ 
surrounding immigration and ‘overpopulation’. This is why the language of economic nationalism has 
become the far-right’s most trusted tactic; one that has consequently yielded rich electoral dividends. 
This crisis of meaning, this period of Post-Truth then is deliberately created and nurtured by a politics 
of hate that despite thriving under democracy fatigue, nevertheless finds itself unable to truly express 
that which is truly in its heart.  
Disinformation, confusion and equivocation then are as much deliberate strategy as they are an 
inability to fully air the true nature of one’s political project; lest it trigger a definitive backlash. This is 
because the minute hate and violence identifies itself for what it is, it loses its ability to survive in this 
nebulous popular ‘democratic’ form. Seeing their blood-stained hands for what they are, people are 
likely to recoil from it in disgust; enough of them anyway to disrupt the careful electoral arithmetic 
that manufactures the far-right’s slim electoral majorities.  
While the reader might interpret this as a form of theodicy – one that expresses an undying faith in 
the innate goodness of humanity – disgust at the violence of one’s collectivity is not without historical 
precedent. The resounding cries of ‘Never Again’ that followed the revelation of the full extent of the 
Holocaust and American disgust at the revelation of the violence of their own troops during the 
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Vietnam War are some examples of how the public revelation of violence – revelations that force 
reflection on one’s own complicity in the suffering of others – can overturn public support for regimes 
and wars.  
In the Indian context, the aftermath of the 1948 assassination of Mahatma Gandhi shows us that India 
too is capable of being disgusted by Hindu nationalism. Gandhi’s assassination by the Hindu nationalist 
terrorist Nathuram Godse provoked a state-led period of disgust at the violent nationalism of the RSS 
(Menon and Bhasin, 1998; Guha, 2018). The entrenchment of the narrative that Hindu nationalism (or 
communalism) was not nationalism can be seen as one of the most enduring consequences of this 
event. In Delhi, where the assassination occurred, the event brought an abrupt end to the violence of 
the Partition (ibid.). As large crowds gathered to mourn and witness Gandhi’s funeral procession, India 
and Pakistan were briefly forced to confront the human cost of extreme nationalism (Guha, 2018). An 
unfortunate and unintended consequence of this was the suppression of the memory of the Partition. 
Too shameful to be shared, too painful to be confronted, the violence and the suffering of the Partition 
was temporarily consigned to silence; overshadowed by a greater – and narratively simpler – ‘national 
trauma’ (Debs, 2013).  
With the CAA and NRC, the BJP appears to be fast approaching the limits of its ethnonationalist 
discourse. So close to achieving the Hindu fascist state it has always dreamed of and yet unable to 
clearly articulate its dream, the BJP is forced to play the long game of a gradual creeping fascism. While 
the CAA and NRC combination clearly articulated the ruling party’s fascist designs, the massive 
nationwide anti-CAA movement showed that it was too much too soon. As stated previously, the 
unexpected strength of the movement forced Modi to deny the link between the two policies (Anand, 
2019). Under pressure to back down and yet unable to do so, the BJP found itself caught between 
satisfying the bloodlust of its hard-core supporters whilst also somehow convincing its moderate 
followers as well as an increasingly united opposition of the goodness of the law’s intentions. The 
result was a Post-truth Prime Minister caught in a web of his own lies whilst denying the 
inconsistencies of his party’s politics. For a very brief period between December 2019 and February 
2020, Modi seemed to have been cornered.  
Writing in The Washington Post in December 2019, Rana Ayyub (2019b) was among those journalists 
and observers who wondered if India’s anti-CAA movement could be a ‘tipping point’ against 
authoritarianism in India. Author and journalist Kapil Komireddi stuck out his neck to argue that since, 
‘In 2014 India was the first democratic country to succumb to this wave of populism […] now India will 
be the first country that will show the way to reclaim democracy from the clutches of these thugs’ 
(Komireddi quoted in Ellis-Petersen, 2019). 
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Although India is far from finding its way out of authoritarianism, Komireddi’s prophecy appears to 
have been indirectly realised in the US. On May 25, 2020, George Floyd, a 46 year old African-American 
resident of Minneapolis was publicly lynched by officers of the Minneapolis Police Department (The 
New York Times, 2021). Floyd’s murder unleashed a veritable revolution with massive Black Lives 
Matter protests and marches sweeping the US; reviving a long-running debate on police brutality and 
racial injustice (Johnson, 2020). Braving Covid-19 lockdowns and brutal police repression, a critical 
mass of American people (especially black women) stood their ground asking for police reforms and 
an end to police brutality and racial injustice. Trump’s racist and insensitive response to the protests 
(as well as his mishandling of the Covid-19 pandemic) served only to fuel public anger against his 
administration. 
This wave of Black Lives Matter protests that swept the US in the summer of 2020 closely resembled 
the anti-CAA protests but with one crucial difference: unlike in India, Black Lives Matter protests were 
six months before rather than after the national election. The literal and symbolic feeling of 
asphyxiation experienced by large sections of society in Trump’s America – which these historic 
protests articulated – transformed the 2020 American Presidential election into an existential issue. 
This (rightful) anger at and existential fear of the possibility of another four years of a poorly disguised 
white supremacist administration was expressed at the ballot box through a historic mandate for Joe 
Biden (Albright, 2020). The Biden-Harris ticket received the highest votes ever garnered by a ticket in 
American history and received as much as 87% of the black vote (ibid.).  
Although Trump has been voted out of office, ‘Trumpism’ persists. All that his electoral defeat appears 
to have achieved is the USA’s return to, ‘some semblance of imperial “normalcy”’ (Roy, 2021). With 
over 70 million votes cast in his favour (ibid.), Trump was far from the unpopular demagogue many of 
us wished he were. Emboldened by the size of his mandate despite his comprehensive loss, Trump’s 
lame-duck period has been something of a case study in the limits of ethnonationalism. Unable to 
announce the coup he wished he could, the Trump campaign’s desperate bid to cling to power has 
been restricted to filing numerous unfruitful legal challenges based on a blatantly false narrative of a 
‘stolen’ election (Rutenberg et al, 2020). After all, for a politics whose idols constitute a veritable 
pantheon of the ‘losers’ of history – the Confederacy and Nazi Germany – one loss could never have 
sufficed!  
Trump’s most audacious attempt at a coup – publicly inciting a crowd of his supporters to storm the 
US Capitol Building – triggered a massive backlash from even within a section of his own party and 
support base (Parker et al, 2021; BBC, 2021). Cornered, defeated, globally discredited as a would-be-
dictator and having been impeached a historic second time (BBC, 2021), Trump was forced to disavow 
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any links to the storming of the Capitol (Parker et al, 2021). Treating the would-be-insurrectionists 
with kid gloves, the furthest Trump could go was to say that he empathised with them and that they 
must stand down (ibid.). Deprived of the words to articulate his deepest ambitions, unable to take 
credit for or openly praise his supporters for championing his cause, the attempted Trump insurrection 
has remained restricted to a dubious victimhood narrative of a ‘stolen’ election. This does not make 
their attempts any less of a coup but it is somewhat revealing that for all of his purported popularity, 
Trump cannot actually call his coup a coup; nor claim direct credit for the storming of the Capitol.  
In the Trump universe and the conspiracy theories that orbit it, digitally manipulated content has 
sought to attribute the violence in the Capitol to ‘anti-social elements’ and ‘antifa’ (Reuters, 2021). 
‘Why is this necessary?’, one might ask. Why does the ‘historically popular’, ‘unconditionally 
supported’ Trump feel the need to disavow the violence and hoped-for coup of his own supporters? 
The answer lies in Sarkar’s (2010) idea of the limits of ethnonationalism. Although Trump’s complicity 
in the violence was clear as day, the limits of the discourse prohibit him from actually taking credit for 
it. Caught between wanting to satisfy the blood-lust of their most radical esoteric supporters while 
also pacifying the shocked and alarmed moderates within their own ranks, Trump and the Republican 
Party could neither deny the logic of their violence nor claim credit for it.  
However, Sarkar’s (2010) idea of the limits of ethnonationalism must not be seen to portend the 
inevitable failure of this politics. This is not what this idea or my discussion of it is meant to do. I am 
not discussing the limits of fascism to provide hope or comfort. Rather, understanding that even the 
most popular among these ‘democratic’ authoritarianisms has limits helps better understand the 
dialogical complexities within which they operate. It is hoped that such academic analyses might feed 
into better anti-fascist thinking (Arendt, 2017). 
If there is any encouraging sign to be read in all this, it is this: the fact that the BJP – despite its 
popularity and Parliamentary majority – is forced to manufacture consent through disinformation, 
confusion and obfuscation shows that it is still far from acquiring a complete hegemony. And every 
major national protest movement be it the anti-CAA movement or the ongoing farmer’s movement, 
forces it to make the hard choice between sustaining its rule by force or to persist with manufacturing 
consent through disinformation. That is, every major act of resistance forces Modi to show his hand. 
As a cornered Modi regime is forced to abandon the veneer of democratic consent altogether, it will 
have also destroyed the very same nebulousness that allows it to thrive amid a fragmented, distracted 
and confused electorate. Ultimately, this is perhaps the only way out of Post-Truth; a classic insurgent 
strategy that forces fascism to reveal itself. Force the fascists to show their hand and hope that our 
better instincts prevail. 
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India: A Global Innovator 
In conclusion I want to return to Kapil Komireddi’s observation about India having been among the 
first to succumb to this ongoing wave of authoritarianism (Ellis-Petersen, 2019). Komireddi’s words 
echo those of Appadurai (2019) who has similarly argued that India – courtesy Modi’s Hindu 
nationalism – ‘is not only following a global swing to the authoritarian right, it is an innovator’. That 
is, India has emerged as not only a conscientious student, but also, a global innovator of 
authoritarianism. Moving beyond Eurocentric analyses that see Modi as a student of Trump, Putin or 
Marine Le Pen, Hindu fascism must be seen as the global innovator that it is. In these analyses of global 
authoritarianism it is important to challenge these orientalist perspectives that see the Orient as 
following in the footsteps of the Occident. The Orient is the master of its own will; in this case, fascism. 
These connections are open for all to see. In Hindu nationalism’s conception of India as the lone 
democracy in a hostile neighbourhood – implicit in the CAA – one can see echoes of the Zionist 
visualisation of Israel as an ‘oasis in the desert’. We see an acknowledgement of the similarities 
between these discourses in a joint-statement that Narendra Modi and Israeli PM Benjamin 
Netanyahu published in the Times of India in 2017, upon the conclusion of Modi’s Israel visit. The joint 
statement refers to Indian-Israeli ties as a ‘natural partnership’, implies geopolitical similarities and 
identifies ‘terrorism’ as one of the common challenges facing both these countries (Modi and 
Netanyahu, 2017). Islamophobia does not just divide, it also unites. Moreover, in recent times, India 
has adopted the Israeli doctrine of ‘collective punishment’ when dealing with its minorities and 
dissenters. This was visible in India’s nearly six months long internet shut-down – the longest in a 
‘democracy’ – in the former state of Jammu and Kashmir (Schultz and Yasir, 2020), as well as in the 
BJP-led UP government’s repression of anti-CAA protests which included the use of rampant police 
brutality, arbitrary detentions, hefty fines for the alleged destruction of public property and the 
‘sealing’ of the properties of organisers and their communities in an effort to ‘recover damages’ (The 
Times of India, 2019b; Livemint, 2020; Outlook, 2020b). 
Similarly, I have previously stated the similarity of Hindu nationalism to Trump’s evangelical white 
nationalism (see Introduction). Ann Kingsolver and Annapurna Pandey (2019) have drawn attention 
to the similarities between Modi and Trump’s economic nationalism. This similarity that begins in the 
slogans itself – Modi’s ‘India First’ alongside Trump’s ‘America First’ – as pointed out by Indian-
American comedian Hassan Minhaj on his show Patriot Act (2019) also extends to the level of policy 
(Kingsolver and Pandey, 2019). Both Modi and Trump seek to boost domestic manufacturing of 
nationalistically branded goods whilst offering up their country’s marginalised workers to global 
markets (ibid.). The main difference between them is that while the Indian strategy is aimed at 
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attracting multinational corporations to shift their manufacturing to India by promising them a skilled 
workforce, the US has put emphasis on domestic consumption but lowered tax incentives for 
businesses (ibid.). 
The similarities between Hindu nationalists and American white nationalists are not merely 
coincidental. The Modi-Trump ‘bromance’ is something of a global phenomenon. This includes praise 
for Modi from former Trump aide Bannon, according to whom Modi is the leader of a ‘global revolt’ 
based on ‘Reaganesque principles’ (George, 2016). On September 22, 2019, at the ‘Howdy Modi’ 
mega-rally in Houston, Texas, Trump and Modi ominously shared a stage (Al Jazeera, 2019b). 
Addressing hysterical crowds of Indian-Americans, Modi broke with diplomatic convention to endorse 
Trump for re-election by thundering a clumsy paraphrasing of his own 2014 election slogan, ‘Ab ki 
baar Trump sarkar’ [This time, a Trump administration] (Lakshman, 2020).  
The Modi government has also made overtures to far-right politicians in Europe and Brazil. Brazilian 
President Jair Bolsonaro was India’s official chief guest at the 2020 Republic Day (26 January) 
celebrations (The Indian Express, 2020a). In October 2019, India also hosted a controversial delegation 
of far-right MEPs (Al Jazeera, 2019a). Their visit included a photo-op with PM Modi as well as a trip to 
Kashmir (ibid.). This was two months after India had stripped Jammu and Kashmir off its autonomy, 
downgraded it to a union territory and bifurcated the former state (ibid.). Kashmir was also reeling 
from an unprecedented telecom shutdown, a total internet shutdown, massive troop deployment and 
a near complete paralysis of the local economy (ibid.). In this climate it was vital for the government 
to push the narrative of ‘normalcy’ in Kashmir. Hosting these far-right MEPs in friendly interactions 
where they parroted the BJP’s narrative of normalcy was meant to reassure domestic audiences about 
the situation in Kashmir and reinforce India’s supposedly robust global standing.  
The bonhomie between the far-right MEPs and Modi’s government seemed to underscore their 
ideological similarities (and compatibility). Aadita Chaudhury (2018) has observed that while an 
alliance between European and American white nationalists and the Hindu Right seems impossible on 
the surface, there are significant historical and cultural connections between the two. German Nazis 
in the 1930s endorsed the idea that ancient India’s sophisticated Sanskrit-speaking civilisation had 
been created by a common Indo-European ancestor: the Aryan race (ibid.). This idea was in itself a 
product of orientalism (Thapar, 1996), meant to resolve the anomaly of an advanced ancient oriental 
society by attributing its ‘progress’ to the ‘racially superior’ occident (Chaudhury, 2018).  
While the Hindu-Aryan myth has been a part of the Indian (Hindu) nationalist consciousness since the 
nineteenth-century (Thapar, 1996), it was Savitri Devi (born Maximiani Portas) – a Frenchwoman, 
mysticist and card-carrying Nazi – who used Aryan race theory to establish political and philosophical 
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linkages between the Nazis and Hindu nationalists (Goodrick-Clarke, 2000). For Savitri Devi, Hinduism 
was not just a religion but the only living example of ‘Aryan heritage’ (ibid.: 43). She saw Hinduism as 
an ally in her goal to oppose the ‘casteless’, ‘decadent’ ‘egalitarian’ philosophies of the Abrahamic 
religions (ibid.).  It was in this context that Devi’s ideas found traction in the strongly upper-caste Hindu 
nationalist circles of the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS (ibid.). For example, RSS Chief M.S. Golwalkar’s 
(1939) autobiography expressed admiration for Hitler and Nazi racial policies (also see Introduction).  
However, in the present, it is India’s advancing Hindu fascism that offers American and European far-
right leaders important lessons on political strategy. Aadita Chaudhury (2018) has argued that, ‘Modi 
demonstrates to European white nationalists the possibilities and means of implementing 
authoritarian values and policies within the scope of secular, liberal and multicultural democracies.’ 
Like Modi’s Hindu nationalism, far-right leaders in Europe and the US lament multiculturalism as the 
loss of a ‘pristine’, ‘authentic’ culture whilst harnessing nostalgia for a glorious past marked by racial 
homogeneity and/or supremacy (ibid.).   
However, in identifying these connections and similarities – historical and contemporary – I am not 
implying some kind of elaborate global fascist plot to take over the world. As Arjun Appaduria (2017) 
has observed, while many of these leaders and their politics connect and resemble each other, the 
connections are largely the result of accidental and partially overlapping ambitions, visions and 
strategies. Ultimately the contemporary wave of authoritarianism is located in the modern nation-
state’s lack of sovereignty over its national economy.  
The relentless march of globalisation with its diffuse supply chains makes it impossible for the modern 
nation-state to exercise complete control over its economy (ibid.). In such a world, where economic 
sovereignty as the foundation of national sovereignty has become tenuous, states and leaders have 
turned towards cultural sovereignty (ibid.). Thus, one finds economic anxieties are expressed as 
cultural and demographic anxieties; as fears around immigration, ‘overpopulation’ or ‘demographic 
replacement’ (ibid.). This is as much the use of a dog whistle necessitated by the limits of 
ethnonationalist discourse (Sarkar, 2010), as it is a politics responding to the transformations of 
globalisation (Appadurai, 1996, 1998, 2017).  
Ultimately in this dissertation I have used the memories of the Partition as the broad cultural canvas 
upon which I have tracked transformations of politics and power. Conducting fieldwork in the shadow 
of Modi’s India and the normalisation of his Hindu nationalism, I have used these memories of 
violence, displacement and suffering to understand the discourses of Hindutva. In the process, the 
ethnographic evidence I have presented – that explores how people use Hindu nationalism as a form 
of theodicy – has wider application across a myriad global contexts similarly reeling under the assault 
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of this ongoing wave of global authoritarianism. The theory and conclusions of my dissertation offer 
important conceptual tools for a deeper understanding of such patriarchal fascist regimes who 
worship the demagogues of our times; these daddy-like ‘sons of the soil’ whose individual fortitude 
symbolises the strength of the nation itself.  
As they reach the final page of this mammoth dissertation, readers may be drawn to wonder what the 
future holds for us. Does it offer hope for salvation? Or, does it promise nothing but more misery, 
oppression and suffering? Having studied India’s embrace of Hindu nationalism closely, I am inclined 
to offer no hope or words of comfort. Rather than coin theodicies that promise the downtrodden 
political left that they may someday inherit the Earth – theodicies that may also soothe us into blissful 
passivity – I would like to conclude by quoting the words of two poets: Dylan Thomas and Aamir Aziz. 
 
‘Do not go gentle into that good night.  
Rage, rage against the dying of the light.’ 
Dylan Thomas (2003: 116) 
 
‘And you may kill us but we will become ghosts and write, 
We will write all the evidence of your crimes, 
And if you write jokes from the courts, 
We will write justice on the streets and walls, 
The deaf will hear us, we will speak so loudly, 
The blind will read, we will write so clearly, 
You may write the black lotus, we will write the red rose, 
You may write oppression on the land, 
Revolution will be written on the sky. 
Everything will be remembered. 
Everything will be remembered.’ 
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